Platoon FSCX as Enabler Integration Training within IWTS — A Technique
By COL Trevor Voelkel, LTC Eric Evans, MAJ Craig Hymel, MAJ Christopher
Cummings
Article published on:
June 20, 2024 in the Summer 2024 Edition of Infantry
Read Time:
< 23 mins
Soldiers with 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment conduct AT4
live-fire training in Adazi, Latvia, on 17 September 2023. (Photo by SGT
Cesar Salazar Jr.)
The Army Integrated Weapons Training Strategy (IWTS) provides a specified
framework for conducting collective training and validating units as part
of a progression of ever-larger echelons. While IWTS provides objective
criteria for validating individual and squad-level proficiency prior to
platoon collective training, it does not fully account for certain key
systems, nor does it provide a readily available solution for tying these
disparate training events together in support of platoon-level training.
This article provides a recommendation for structuring individual and
squad-level training to bridge the gap between squad and platoon live-fire
exercise (LFX) events with a platoon-level fire support coordination
exercise (FSCX) and enabler integration training.
Background
After completing Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) Rotation 22-10,
the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st
Airborne Division (Air Assault), identified digital fires capabilities as
a gap in our training progression and fires enterprise. Our battalion’s
training glidepath after JRTC already included a machine-gun (MG) academy
concept to validate tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); standard
operating procedures (SOPs); and crew drills across the formation and
build proficiency within weapon squads. We chose to incorporate weapons
squads into the digital FSCX to maximize training at echelon and focus on
transitions from indirect to direct fire. Including these squads also
provided platoon leaders a maneuver element to incorporate into their
planning without shifting their focus from fires to maneuvering a full
platoon.
Our second iteration of the enabler integration training FSCX glidepath
included an anti-tank (AT) weapon academy, a small unmanned aerial systems
(sUAS) university, Mortar Training and Evaluation Program (MORTEP), and a
series of leader professional development (LPD) events covering sUAS,
fires enterprise, and fires effects as prerequisites. Between these
events, we set conditions to effectively employ all key weapon systems at
the platoon and company levels during the FSCX.
Exercise Intent
The primary consideration for our FSCX methodology was to depart from the
“walk and shoot” scenario where platoon leaders echelon indirect assets in
support of their own movement. Instead, we wanted leaders to integrate key
weapon systems at echelon across the breadth of the formation to maximize
effective employment of all suppression assets, with support from unmanned
aerial systems (UAS), to support adjacent units and achieve the company
commander’s mission and intent. To support the FSCX, we trained and
certified sUAS, AT, and mortar teams prior to the exercise to provide the
platoon leaders with well-trained and coordinated enablers.
The key tasks in this training progression include validating the digital
fires kill chain, integrating UAS into fire support and mortar training,
incorporating lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, training
appropriate and contextually appropriate fires planning, and reinforcing
mission command principles (intent vs. specified task). At end state,
leaders from squad to battalion echelons understand the integration of key
direct and indirect fires assets, the importance of commander’s intent vs.
specified tasks, and how to incorporate lessons learned to drive future
training progressions as a learning organization. It also sets the
conditions for follow-on echelon training, which includes platoon
situational training exercises (STXs)/ LFXs, company STXs/LFXs, and
battalion and higher STXs. This training methodology builds upon lethal
squads from the squad LFX to train platoon and company leaders to employ
enablers at echelon to ensure companies do not fight like large platoons
(and battalions do not fight like large companies).
Train-Up Concept
Figure 1 illustrates the seven-week training progression along five lines
of effort (LOEs). Of note, the Leaders LOE lists LPDs for each week; these
are executed in conjunction with leaders observing the concurrent training
applicable to that week’s LPD. For instance, in T-4, while Soldiers are
conducting certification flights, leaders will be observing the UAS
flights and receiving briefs from trainers on the employment of these
systems. The train-up can be divided into three phases.
Phase I — Academics. Phase I of enabler integration
training begins with completion of squad live fires on or before T-8 and
lasts four weeks. A robust vehicle identification block of instruction
serves as the foundation for the fire support, weapons, and UAS training
due to how critical this is for target acquisition and proper effects
delivery. Fire support team (FIST), sUAS, and AT system
certifications/qualifications adhere to applicable training circulars
(TCs). The AT system training is augmented with an initial AT academy
which serves two purposes:
-
To move beyond the technical operation of the weapon systems and
discuss tactical employment, and
-
To provide weapon squad leaders TTPs for training their AT teams
during and after the FSCX training glidepath.
Likewise, the MG academy block of instruction focuses on the technical and
tactical considerations, as well as instruction techniques, prior to
conducting qualification. Finally, MORTEP completes Table I (gunnery
skills) and Table II (fire direction center certification) in a garrison
environment while the digital fires communications exercise (COMMEX)
validates the digital fires architecture between the battalion fire
support element (FSE) and the mortar platoon.
Phase II — LFX. Phase II occurs during T-3 through T-1.
The MG academy transitions from classroom to live-fire events. Starting
with an AT live-fire qualification, weapons squads conduct their
qualification tables and then move into a robust LFX that builds upon the
individual qualification up to a weapons squad LFX. In conjunction with
practical exercises, the MG academy teaches and reinforces battalion SOPs
for weapons squads. In this phase, sUAS operators go through the Call For
Fire Trainer (CFFT) in preparation for the following week’s event, which
pairs them with platoon forward observers (FOs) who will utilize sUAS to
observe and adjust fires in support of MORTEP Tables IV-VI.
Phase III — FSCX. training LOEs merge into the platoon
FSCX, which serves as the culminating exercise for the training glidepath
and integrates all previously trained capabilities. The FSCX challenges
platoon leaders to establish a support-by-fire (SBF) position with only
their weapons squad as a maneuver element, utilizing sUAS and indirect
fires assets to set conditions for SBF establishment and suppression on a
company objective. The enemy disposition is deliberately vague to compel
platoon leaders to reconnoiter the objective, adjust targets accordingly,
and think about the order in which they employ their direct and indirect
systems to achieve suppression and allow the notional adjacent platoons to
breach and clear the objective.
Figure 1 — Enabler Integration Training Model
Enabler Training Concepts
Vehicle Identification (Phase I). Deliberate and thorough
vehicle identification training has reemerged as a critical task in a
large-scale combat operations (LSCO) environment, especially in the
European theater where units would fight alongside multinational
formations. During this training, students receive classroom instruction
on vehicle identification techniques and the capabilities of both friendly
and threat vehicles; they are then tested in accordance with Gunnery
Skills Test criteria.
1
Weapons Squad Academy (Phase I-II). Of the five LOEs,
weapons squads receive the most tailored training. The academic portions
cover operator drills for AT systems and machine guns (Tables I and II)
but also place significant focus on the tactical employment of these
systems and their role within a weapons squad. These portions also teach
and codify battalion SOPs for individual-through-squad employment and
provide weapons squad leaders TTPs for training and qualifying their
crews. Our battalion’s Heavy Weapons Leader Course-certified instructor
conducts Javelin Basic Skills Trainer (BST) during the academic portion,
satisfying Table III for the Javelin. In a similar vein, the live-fire
portion of the MG academy begins with Tables IV-VI of the M240
qualification but then transitions to crew drills, gun
emplacement/displacement, and squad actions. The LFX ends with a company
SBF position utilizing six machine-gun teams.
Figure 2 — Detailed Overview of Weapons Squad Training Progression
Fire Support Certification (Phase I). FIST certification
is conducted in accordance with TC 3-09.8,
Fire Support and Field Artillery Certification and Qualification,
and is validated by the brigade fire support officer.
2
Following certification, the battalion FSE conducts technical training on
all digital fires devices, with a digital communications architecture
validation as part of the training. The FSE then conducts CFFT to set
conditions for observing and adjusting fires with UAS during MORTEP live
tables.
UAS Certification (Phase I-II). UAS certification
consists of two weeks of classroom and simulator instruction followed by
one week of live flight training. Operators complete the Basic Operator
Qualification online training prior to starting the classroom portion.
After initial/refresher flights, operators conduct CFFT under the
supervision of the battalion FSE to ensure familiarization with the
terminology and technical procedures of fire support. This assists the
operator in relaying accurate information to leaders and battalion staff
while the FO concentrates on processing fire missions.
Figure 3 — UAS Certification Overview
MORTEP (Phase I-II). Mortar platoons and company mortar
sections conduct MORTEP according to IWTS, with the inclusion of UAS
operators and FOs paired together to observe and adjust fires during
Tables IV through VI.
3
In this way, we practice and validate the employment of UAS in support of
indirect fires prior to the FSCX.
Leader Training. LPDs run concurrently with the train up
and are augmented by hands-on observation of training occurring that week;
briefs and demonstrations are given by trained instructors. The LPD
progression mirrors the steps taken during the FSCX: enemy analysis,
information collection (IC) plan, indirect fires echelonment, and then
direct fires employment. The LPD series culminates in a tactical vignette
and receipt of the FSCX’s scenario. Platoon leaders then backbrief their
plans and conduct a tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) with their
weapons squad leaders and mortar section leaders of the actual exercise
terrain.
Fire Support Coordination Exercise (Phase III). FSCX
scenarios have platoons echeloning fires in support of their own movement,
which turns into a basic exercise in geometry and timing — a “walk and
shoot.” Our scenario instead places the emphasis on controlling fires in
support of an adjacent platoon that is conducting a breach in support of
an overall company deliberate attack. Platoons are given a
covered-and-concealed route up to an assault position, allowing them to
wait until the last possible moment to begin echeloning fires, first in
support of their own SBF establishment and then in support of the adjacent
platoon’s movement up to the breach point. Platoon leaders also receive
criteria for triggering the initiation of the adjacent unit’s departure of
its assault position. The company-level scenario with associated triggers
emphasizes cross-communication between platoons, both for the assault
initiation as well as controlling fires as the adjacent platoon approaches
the objective. To this end, platoon leaders control their organic weapons
squad with all weapons and have direct support from company sUAS,
battalion mortars, and field artillery.
Training Crosswalk. The weapons squad academy and FSCX
have sizable additional ammunition requirements. Ammunition bearers are
often not included in ammunition calculation, but we highly recommend
their inclusion if the ammunition is available. Weapons squad ammunition
bearers should be qualified on both the M240 and Javelin systems.
Figure 4 — LPD Agenda and Progression
Figure 5 — Simplified FSCX Scenario Course of Action Sketch (3/A is the
execution platoon, while the two other platoons are notional with a
company response cell providing key calls from these platoons.)
Additional sub-caliber ammunition allows all AT4 and M3 crews to conduct
Table V and VI from all five firing positions or to conduct Table VI and
additional training on moving targets. While not allocated by STRAC, we
recommend requesting as much live AT4 and M3 ammunition as possible for
the AT academy; we do not recommend the use of high explosive
(HE)/high-explosive dual purpose (HEDP) rounds during FSCX because of
potential delays from misfires.
In addition to ammunition, this training plan requires Javelin BST
systems, four dummy Javelin rounds, dummy M3 rounds, AT4 systems (two
trainers and two inert), and a link of inert 7.62 rounds per participating
machine-gun team. These are typically available from installation Training
Support Centers.
To maximize training value, we recommend including moving targetry in the
weapons squad academy. For FSCX, the scenario works best with a range that
provides a covered/concealed route to a SBF position that maximizes the
range of M240s while also allowing the platoon leader to adjust fires
against targets on the objective and see the effects of fires. Vehicle
hulks are the obvious targetry for this exercise. If a plethora of hulks
are available, we recommend painting hulks to provide target
differentiation. This also allows you to plan for scenario injects (for
instance, white hulks for the original templated enemy, yellow for
reinforcements, etc.). Depending on terrain, you may need to construct
target reference points (TRPs) on the objective as well. Doctrine provides
a variety of constructed TRP suggestions, such as diesel fuel and sand in
ammunition cans. This gives the training audience ideas to incorporate
into their own engagement area development during future exercises.
Observations and Lessons Learned
We noticed in early iterations that platoon leaders tended to conduct
fires echelonment by rote execution, using UAS to simply confirm the
presence of enemy on the objective prior to executing their target list
worksheet. We coached later iterations to use their fires deliberately
using a three-step process:
1) Understand the target and why we’re shooting it. Use
UAS (or other collection assets) to not merely confirm the presence of
enemy on the objective but identify the exact disposition of the enemy in
the form of a SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment)
report. Then, given the disposition, determine if the pre-planned targets
and effects are still appropriate and meet the commander’s intent to
achieve his purpose.
2) Understand the targeting solution and why we’re shooting that
way.
Given the disposition, determine the necessary adjustments to attack
guidance. At a minimum, pre-planned target coordinates should be adjusted
to maximize first-round effects. Platoon leaders may also need to consider
changing shell/fuse combinations or reallocating systems altogether; if
you’ve allocated a 60mm target against what turns out to be a BMP-3, it
makes sense to switch it with the 105mm target you have templated against
a dismounted trench system.
3) Ensure we achieved the desired effects. Confirming
battle damage whenever possible, either by direct observation or with
sUAS, ensures platoon leaders achieve the desired effects. Platoon leaders
must then report these effects to their fellow leaders to ensure shared
understanding and allow adjacent units to execute their own
conditions-based actions. While unobserved fires are necessary in LSCO,
platoon leaders should be held accountable for providing observation of
fires when observation methods are available.
The three-step process is a coaching method for leaders at echelon to be
deliberate in their use of fires, achieve commander’s intent, and
understand their mission within the larger operational concept. The battle
damage assessment reporting requirement is crucial (when observation is
possible) because it reinforces the purpose of the platoon’s mission —
suppression of Objective Blue Linx in support of their sister platoon.
Platoon leaders also initially struggled with thinking of their mission in
the context of the higher commander’s mission; they used assets to support
their own movement and SBF emplacement instead of in support of the
company. Coaching platoon leaders prior to FSCX to think of the larger
mission in context is critical for FSCX success. Leaders must understand
how and why they are suppressing and ensure they are properly employing
the higher echelon assets entrusted to them.
Finally, we noticed that weapons squads continue to think of their
ammunition bearers exclusively as a third member of the gun team and fail
to account for their role in transporting AT munitions. This is an issue
units will likely struggle with as we continue to transition to a LSCO
training focus. Proper resourcing of training aids and strict enforcement
of AT drills during dry iterations are critical to reinforcing the
importance of ammunition bearers for keeping AT assets in the fight.
Mortarmen in 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment “Red Currahee,” 1st
Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault),
fire an 81mm mortar system during a fire support coordination exercise
at Camp Adazi, Latvia, on 26 August 2023. (Photo by SSG Oscar Gollaz)
Identified Gaps and Recommendations
Doctrine. IWTS provides a thorough training glidepath and
qualification criteria for small arms, gunnery, and crew-served systems,
but it only provides a generic “Special Purpose Weapons” qualification
outline, which also includes shotguns and M320 grenade launchers.
4
The TC for Javelin training provides a training timeline for the BST and
Field Skills Trainer but does not provide specific testing or
qualification criteria in the way that vehicle gunnery does.
5
Likewise, the M3 TC does not have specific training gates or a training
timeline associated with qualification.
6
For instance, there are no vehicle or ammunition identification testing
requirements. We recommend publishing a new TC specifically addressing AT
weapons with prescriptive qualification tables and specified testing
criteria for Tables I and II.
Material. Training aids for the Javelin (replicant rounds
and BST) are available through the Training Support Center but may be
limited in number. We recommend issuing units a BST and replicant rounds
to both enable training as well as reinforce the practical realities of
carrying two Javelin rounds per command launch unit. As a field expedient
alternative, units can approximate the size and weight of rounds and
construct dummy rounds using PVC pipe and filler material.
Regarding sUAS, the aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
gap at the battalion level becomes especially apparent during this
training glidepath; other officers have already identified and discussed
this lack of battalion-level sUAS assets.
7
While the battalion scout platoon conducts reconnaissance and answers
priority intelligence requirements, the scout platoon and its
reconnaissance teams lack the mobility of an aerial asset to quickly
maneuver around the battlefield.
The future division force structures include sUAS munition delivery in the
multifunction reconnaissance troops, but we argue that battalions should
also receive sUAS assets capable of delivering munitions. The ability to
rapidly identify and engage key weapon systems can have an outsized effect
on tactical operations (for instance, identifying and targeting enemy
breaching assets or re-seeding breach lanes with a small scale,
UAS-delivered point minefield). Armed UAS would also mitigate the risk of
employing the battalion assault platoon, a key asset against a mechanized
force. Armed sUAS can screen a company’s advance as well as defeat point
AT systems along the company’s axis of advance.
Organization. We also recommend creating a UAS section
with dedicated operators at the battalion level, which could be overseen
by the battalion S2. Current sUAS are bulky, and the light infantry
battalion modified table of organization and equipment does not have a
dedicated position for sUAS operators. This is especially hard for company
commanders to buy into as the LSCO fight demands our Soldiers carry a
greater variety of systems into a fight, such as additional AT, breaching,
and counter-mobility systems (e.g., Anti-Personnel Obstacle Breaching
System) and air defense/counter-UAS systems. Furthermore, smaller systems
with lower training requirements, such as Soldier Borne Sensors (SBS), are
now available to company commanders. For light infantry company
commanders, legacy systems inevitably are lower in priority than
commercial UAS solutions and lethal enablers, and thus are underutilized.
Conclusion
While the FSCX methodology we developed focuses on platoon-level
leadership, it is both scalable and tailorable to the needs of the unit
and the expertise of the training audience. It allows battalions or
brigades to train sensor-to-shooter linkage at echelon and incorporate
staffs and enabling units who train to achieve their own collective task
proficiency. For example, brigade staffs can build a robust enemy scenario
to practice executing the deep fight and presenting the desired
correlation of forces and means to platoon leaders. Incorporating
assault/AT platoons, howitzer batteries, and attack aviation allows these
formations to meet training objectives while giving platoon leaders
real-world effects feedback and building further complexity to challenge
experienced platoon leaders. The key to all of this, as shown in our own
enabler integration training strategy, is a methodical and concurrent
training glidepath for all enablers with deliberate integration training
prior to FSCX execution.
Notes
1. Training Circular
(TC) 3-20.31-1, Gunnery Skills Test, November 2015, Chapter 2,
Section II. Note: This exceeds the vehicle identification testing
requirements for fire support team certification as listed in Chapter 6
of TC 3-09.8
Fire Support and Field Artillery Certification and Qualification,
March 2020.
2. TC 3-09.8, Chapter
6.
3. TC 3-20.33,
Training and Qualification of Mortars, August 2017.
4. TC 3-20.40,
Training and Qualification – Individual Weapons, July 2019,
Chapter 1.
5. TC 3-22.37,
Javelin – Close Combat Missile System, August 2013, Chapter 3.
6. TC 3-22.84,
M3 Multi-Role, Anti Armor Anti-Personnel Weapon System, July
2019.
7. LTC Michael Hamilton
and CPT Christopher J. Egan, “Improving the Tactical Employment of sUAS
for Light Infantry Battalions in Decisive Action,”
Infantry 112/2 (Summer 2023),
https://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2023/Summer/pdf/5_Hamilton_Egan.pdf.
Authors
COL Trevor Voelkel is currently serving as commander of
1st Brigade (Bastogne), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) at Fort
Campbell, KY. He has served in various positions within the 25th
Infantry Division, 1st Infantry Division, 10th Mountain Division, and
101st Airborne Division. He is a graduate of the Mubarak al-Abdullah
Joint Command and General Staff College (Kuwait) and holds a Master of
Arts in advanced military studies and strategic studies from the U.S.
Army War College.
LTC Eric Evans is currently serving as commander of 1st
Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st
Airborne Division (Air Assault). He has served in various positions
within the 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, and the 101st
Airborne Division. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff
College and the Advanced Military Science Program at Fort Leavenworth,
KS. He holds a Master of Business Administration from Webster
University.
MAJ Craig Hymel is currently serving as the operations
officer in 1-506 IN. He has served in various positions within the 1st
Infantry Division, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, 3rd U.S. Infantry Regiment (Old
Guard), and the Airborne and Ranger Training Brigade. He is a graduate
of the German Joint General/Admiral Staff Course and holds a master’s
degree in military leadership and international security from
Helmut-Schmidt-Universität in Hamburg, Germany.
MAJ Christopher Cummings is currently serving as the
executive officer for 1-506 IN. He has served in various positions
within the 25th Infantry Division, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Ranger
Battalion, and 75th Ranger Regiment Special Troops Battalion. He has
four deployments to Afghanistan and one deployment to Syria. He is a
graduate of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth
and holds a master’s degree in organizational leadership from the
University of Kansas.