An Oft-Missed Opportunity

Providing Command and Control with Geronimo at JRTC

By LTC Travis J. Stellfox

Article published on: March 20, 2026 in the Spring 2026 Edition of Infantry

Read Time: < 7 mins

When tasked to provide opposing force (OPFOR) augmentation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 4th Infantry Division, elected to deploy our battalion tactical command post (TAC) to augment command and control (C2) capabilities. In partnership with the 1st Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) and the Commander, Operations Group (COG), 2-12 IN was able to integrate into staff processes and receive live repetitions at providing command and control (C2) against a thinking peer force. This training provided significant benefits to the 2-12 IN battalion staff, Geronimo’s ability to replicate a realistic enemy, and the rotational force. Given the relatively low cost of this additional effort compared to the gains the battalion staff alone received, we recommend all battalions tasked with providing OPFOR augmentation to JRTC elect to include their battalion TAC for future rotations.

2-12 IN provided augmentation for the 1st SBCT, 4th Infantry Division’s JRTC Rotation 25-02. This augmentation consisted of two infantry companies as OPFOR attached to 1-509 PIR “Geronimo,” one infantry company as foreign security forces attached to the Special Operations Training Detachment (SOTD), and our Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), which primarily provided various administrative support. OPFOR augmentation also included Alpha Troop, 2nd Battalion, 77th Field Artillery Regiment, and a platoon from the 4th Engineer Battalion. 2/4 SBCT was additionally tasked with providing observer-controller/trainer (OC/T) augmentation to the various OC/T task forces across JRTC. The following article seeks to describe the benefits of having augmenting forces provide a battalion TAC and makes recommendations for maximizing the success of future iterations through lessons learned.

During each JRTC rotation, 1-509 PIR provides battalion-level C2 for five organic companies plus three augmentee companies while replicating a brigade-sized element with a battalion (+) sized staff. Normally, much of the responsibility for C2 of augmentee units falls to a “partner” Geronimo company because 1-509 PIR staff is consumed by replicating a brigade staff and meeting the rotational training unit’s (RTU) training objectives.

Standard JRTC rotations are 14 days “in the box” with continuous tactical operations after initial entry. The rotational unit must defend against a counterattack and then transition to the offense to seize a major objective. While OPFOR presence is low on initial entry thanks to divisional-shaping operations, those remnant forces are quickly reinforced by a fresh brigade detachment (BDET) which mass to rapidly conduct the counterattack before transitioning to the defense centered on one of JRTC’s major objectives. This creates two primary “fight nights” for the OPFOR: the counterattack and the defense.

An Offer We Could Not Refuse

In discussions with the COG and the 1-509 battalion commander, the opportunity to deploy a TAC and provide C2 to a portion of the OPFOR became apparent. For JRTC 25-02, this opportunity came to fruition through the coordination of our two battalions and the dedication of extremely talented captains and majors on both staffs.

How We Did It

Day-to-day operations are run by the Geronimo tactical operations center (TOC) and generally involve one platoon per company forward in “the Box” maintaining contact with the RTU. During these days, 2-12 IN established our TAC inside of the 1-509 PIR’s “G-Base” adjacent to their TOC. 2-12 IN tied its battle staff into the Geronimo staff and executed shadow-tracking of the battle, thus allowing 2-12 IN to refine products and execute TAC rehearsals including the battle handover drill.

During the two “fight nights” (counterattack and defense), Geronimo 6 normally deploys his TAC forward with 100 percent of all assigned and augmenting companies. This places a strain on the span of control specifically during the counterattack, where companies in the north are unable to communicate with companies in the south.

Working with Geronimo 6 and his staff, plans were simply divided into two battalion areas of operation (AOs), which allowed 2-12 IN to capitalize on this opportunity to deploy its TAC and conduct C2. Each fight allowed the 2-12 IN TAC to control one Geronimo company and one organic company.

In doing so, 2-12 IN corrected the span of control challenge and allowed the Geronimo TOC to replicate a brigade with the battalion executive officer (XO) serving as “brigade commander,” thereby presenting a more realistic replication of a BDET to the RTU.

The Counterattack — For the first “fight night,” the 2-12 IN TAC integrated with Geronimo Main to coordinate the northern axis of advance. 2-12 IN was given two companies — one organic Stryker company fighting as dismounted infantry and one mechanized company — with attached mortar, engineer, and air defense assets. The main effort in the south was led by Geronimo 6 in his TAC and consisted of our other organic Stryker company, also fighting as dismounted infantry, and the remainder of Geronimo’s organic forces. The two-TAC approach proved useful when the main effort was disrupted by a combination of weather and 1/4 SBCT in the south. 2-12 IN rapidly adjusted to a branch plan, allowing its TAC to control the exploitation force after achieving an initial penetration in the north.

The Defense — The second “fight night” saw similar advantages in having both TACs forward controlling two battalion fights. For the defense, 2-12 IN was task-organized in the south, again fighting as dismounted infantry but augmented by a platoon of armor. Geronimo Main held an armor reserve, and a mechanized company was tasked to support whichever AO saw the RTU’s main effort — this ended up being our defense in the south. The greater ability to C2 separate fights allowed Geronimo 6 in the north to better assess the situation and deploy a mobile counterattack force into the RTU rear while our TAC in the south blocked the main advance.

Given the relatively low cost of this additional effort compared to the gains the battalion staff alone received, we recommend all battalions tasked with providing OPFOR augmentation to JRTC elect to include their battalion TAC for future rotations.

Benefits to Augmenting Units

Taking advantage of the opportunity to train the command post (CP), 2-12 IN received exposure to the experimentation that Geronimo does and the lessons it learns from conducting 10 repetitions a year on these missions and observing RTU actions.

The most significant benefit was the opportunity for the 2-12 IN headquarters and TAC personnel had to execute two realistic repetitions at live C2 in multidomain operations (MDO) against a thinking enemy with all the support that a rotational unit has — minus OC/Ts. This is an unmatched opportunity to test and learn. The hard reset in-between “fight nights” allows time for an after actions review, with the resources and opportunity to fix the problems identified as opposed to having to fight through it in the box for 14 days straight.

Additionally, the staff-to-staff professional development that takes place as battalion TAC personnel observe the planning and targeting process conducted by Geronimo was incredibly beneficial. Not only did the 2-12 IN staff observe and participate in planning, but its TAC personnel conducted daily repetitions to “shadow track” the fight from just outside the Geronimo TOC. Both opportunities were a huge jump start and will be critical for our developing staff given current experience levels and our progression through staff tables. Finally, having the 2-12 IN battalion headquarters on the ground increases opportunities to conduct additional training on the front and back end of the augmentation timeline.

Benefits to 1-509 PIR and the RTU

Possibly the most significant advantage this combined operation allows is for the OPFOR to be much closer to what it should replicate — a challenging near-peer enemy. Geronimo replicates a BDET, and augmentation with a battalion HQ allows the Geronimo TOC to act as the brigade while fielding two O-5 commanders forward controlling battalion-sized elements and better aligning with the replicated OPFOR force package. This more closely matches what the National Training Center (NTC) provides as OPFOR with Blackhorse fielding two battalions.

The second CP also enables Geronimo company commanders to focus on their company fight. Managing augmentee companies administratively and tactically traditionally falls to a counterpart Geronimo company commander. 2-12 IN’s headquarters relieved much of that strain, but the most significant impact was during the two “fight nights.” Normally, the Geronimo TAC controls both the northern and southern maneuver corridors, requiring a company commander in each to act as ground force commander (GFC) in their AO controlling a partnered augmentation company. The 2-12 IN TAC assumed that role and enabled Geronimo’s TAC to do the same, thereby allowing the companies to focus on their fight.

Finally, the staff-to-staff professional development goes both ways as the 2-12 IN staff provided an inquisitive outside look at Geronimo’s planning and targeting process. This increases the capabilities of both staff elements, effectively improving the outcome for each rotation.

Recommendations

I would highly encourage battalions tasked to provide two or more companies as augmentation to OPFOR at JRTC to deploy and fight their TAC. While staff-to-staff learning is a great opportunity, I recommend against deploying the full battalion staff and attempting to conduct MDMP; Geronimo planning integrates not only the enemy picture but also friendly intent. This critically shapes the accomplishment of training objectives for the RTU. For simplicity’s sake, I recommend against bringing additional home-station equipment and instead relying on the highly available prepositioned (PREPO) fleet. Light units should consider bringing their actual TAC vehicles/equipment; however, a Stryker formation’s organic C2 equipment would have been disruptive and confused the RTU. 2-12 IN brought the equipment and established the TAC between a Light Medium Tactical Vehicle (LMTV) and Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV); heavy units should take the opportunity to fight light. Ideally this is the start of a relationship that feeds through to a future JRTC rotation and allows training objectives to be more mature.