The Crows and I

The Existing Crisis of Purpose and Electronic Warfare’s Inability to Provide Support to Maneuver Commanders

By MAJ Herbert “Trey” Norton III and CPT Gabriel Barreto Diaz

July 1, 2026 | Gray Space, 2026 E-Edition

Read Time: < 10 mins

A mentor once told me, “New things are just old things happening to new people.”1 Eight years after electromagnetic warfare (EW) moved to the Cyber Branch, EW still lacks a coherent and consistent strategy across the formation. More concerningly, it lacks general understanding of both cyber warfare and electromagnetic warfare, sometimes even warfare itself. No branch of the Army has suffered from a greater crisis of purpose than EW. Our given description as per DA PAM 600-3 is: “military action using electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or combat the enemy.”2 EW has, because of this vague guidance, lacked a cohesive culture and trajectory while pursuing niche capabilities and failing to enable maneuver commanders. EW’s impending crisis mirrors the 2008 decline of Field Artillery’s (FA) branch.3 Like the authors of “The King and I: The Impending Crisis in Field Artillery’s Ability to Provide Fire Support to Maneuver Commanders” (a white paper revealing the decay within the FA branch), our first endorsement for EW, the then MG John B. Morrison Jr., knew that without a combat-oriented mentality, similar Fires, Cyber, and especially EW professionals “would go to the land of misfit toys.”4

The Island of Misfit Toys:

A Branch Lacking Cohesive Culture, Purpose, and Trajectory

The current practice of electromagnetic warfare within the force resembles the island of misfit toys. EW was converted from functional area to a combat branch under CY Corps in 2017. In the following eight years, the fundamental problem—how to achieve spectrum dominance—has been tackled in a multitude of different ways depending on unit formation and parochial priorities. Individual formations pursue valid technical and tactical approaches tailored to their immediate mission sets, but those stove-pipes do not aggregate into sustained, coherent spectrum dominance and often diverge into different trajectories for solving this fundamental problem and pursuing the basic principle of EW—to attack the transceiver. Examples of divergent approaches include ad hoc counter-sUAS packages, campaigns that prioritize “hiding in the spectrum,” tactics for operating inside denied environments, emissions control (EMCON) practices that effectively force units into communications blackout, and complete dependence on now-aging JOINT platform-specific capabilities such as GROWLER and EC-130. At the same time, processes like endless Joint Tactical Air Request (JTAR) and Electronic Attack Request Form (EARF) submissions and expansion into non-traditional mission areas such as information operations, psyops, tactical deception (TAC-D), and even space operations fragment effort and attention. This fragmentation is rooted in a systemic lack of shared understanding and purpose. Commanders lack a common situational picture of EW’s role and how it fits inside cyberspace and electromagnetic activities (CEMA). Persisting misconceptions that EW doctrine is a moving organizational preference rather than an application of unchanging electromagnetic physics lead to inconsistent expectations, competing loyalties with Signal and Military Intelligence, and uneven demand signals for EW capabilities. Meanwhile, the EW professionals lack experience and long-term vision, leaving them unprepared to enable commanders’ situational understanding and tactical/operational success. The operational consequence is predictable: Resources (funding, manpower, and engineering hours) are spread thin across myriad projects with limited depth and little measurable effect. Personnel retention suffers as officers, warrants, and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) grow frustrated by the absence of a clear mission and identity, strengthening the perception that their innovations will be better rewarded in the civilian sector. Innovation itself stalls because teams hop from idea to idea without follow-through, diluting effects and preventing rigorous assessment of which proposed solutions solve the problem and achieve the basic principle of EW. The result is an organization lacking regimental identity and unified purpose, reducing what ought to be a concentrated instrument of decisive spectrum control to a set of fragmented solutions.

Recommendations:

• Establish Cohesion and Culture

  • Repair and uphold standards and discipline to create predictable, repeatable outcomes across formations.

  • Adopt a combat arms mentality that places supporting maneuver commanders at the center of EW purpose. EW professionals knowing what maneuver commanders do and how they do it is vital to supporting the commanders’ situational understanding and operational success.

  • Actively listen to commander intent and align EW priorities to solve operational problems rather than chasing technology.

Chirping Canaries Instead of Whispering Ravens:

Giving Warning Signs without Analysis or Strategy

The Joint Force is more interconnected and electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) dependent than ever, yet our EW practice remains anchored to the century-old physics of modern radio theory. For the last 20 years, our adversaries studied and prepared to operate within the EMS at scale. Rather than rising to meet adversaries at their operational level, Army EW professionals often behave as if every adversary possesses near-omniscient sensing and thus counters with narrow, fear-driven solutions. That posture pushes EW toward boutique special operations forces (SOF)-like capabilities while neglecting the large, persistent spectrum users we ought to shape and contest.

Instead of serving as a disciplined partner with Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Information Operations (IO), we have focused on becoming sensors-only and creating tactical emitters to deceive the enemy, resulting in only deceiving ourselves and our commanders. Instead of focusing on the three core functions of EW—electronic sensing (ES), electronic attack (EA), and electronic protection (EP)—the branch has been distracted by a plethora of EW projects and side quests. This project saturation has delayed the progress of EW across the conventional Army and has delayed EW professionals’ ability to support maneuver commanders in the way that they need and want to be supported.

Cultural and administrative incentive problems amplify these technical gaps. Operators and technologists commonly propose new platforms or software suites (sometimes aligned with future civilian employment) to solve capability shortfalls. Those proposals are rarely malicious, but they flood commanders with a chorus of competing options: bright, tempting “chirping canaries” that distract from choosing and executing a consolidated vision. EW professionals have proliferated an idea of electronic deception in the form of decoys that are not sophisticated enough to fool our adversaries layered, 3-dimensional, EW/SIGINT capabilities. What EW needs instead is disciplined, persistent analysis and an electronic warfare employment concept that functions like Odin’s whispering ravens: coherent, prioritized, and actionable insight feeding a single, common operational picture.

Recommendations:

• Restructure SIGINT and Spectrum Management Roles

  • Clarify roles so SIGINT drives EW, enabling us to execute electronic attack and confirm SIGINT detects to speed up targeting and/or maneuver decisions.

  • EW professionals are the commander’s stewards in the EMS; every emission and every silence in the EMS is our charge, and SIGINT and Spectrum Management must align with us to ensure mission success.

• Innovate with Purpose

  • Prioritize innovation that solves commander problems and produces operational effects rather than attractive technical demonstrations.

  • Avoid proliferating low-value gadgets that cannot enable spectrum dominance at scale; focus on scalable, interoperable systems and effects.

  • Establish live targetry with threat-load frequencies to provide realistic emissions and behaviors for collective training.

  • Expose and correct internal replication of commercial solutions presented as innovation.

From Mind to Will:

Becoming the Warfighter’s Hammer

New members of the EW community lack experience and understanding because EW training does not prepare personnel for large-scale combat operations (LSCO) in the EMS. Soldiers at combat training centers (CTCs) are incapable of using their weapons platform at greater than direct-fire range in under an hour. The warrant officer is usually the best trainer. The NCO is usually the best technician, and the officer is the best equipment engineer and programmer. None demonstrates the ability to plan, manage, lead, or control via the operations process from training management to course of action development (COA DEV).

Current EW professionals are not taught to appreciate how the EW fight differs by echelon and have applied a one-size-fits-all technical approach to the domain. Training and force design fall short of adversary scale and sophistication; we underuse existing technology and default to point solutions that resemble using smartphones as if they were walkie-talkies. Existing and novel EW tools are not employed for warfare properly, if at all.

Innovation in EW is not progressing toward more effective weapon systems; instead, we keep producing gadgets (cellphones on drones, homemade deception radios, and other improvised “innovations”) that lack the capability to enable spectrum dominance at a scale similar to our competitors globally. We cannot “sense the enemy to death,” and electronic attack as it currently exists lacks the power to produce mass effects on the battlefield. We have trained down to the fielded and homemade capabilities of the radio and not up to the capabilities of our competition. As stated above, a Raspberry Pi with a software-defined radio in a box or some such permutation cannot be the solution; we must adopt a warfighting and enemy-focused mindset. Admiring the Ukrainians for their grit and innovation is different from building a force or capability to dominate like our competitors.

The mindset of risk evasion in the pursuit of comfort must shift. MG Morrison believed that support to maneuver commanders and operations officers was “the most important thing for EW professionals to remember”5. EW must have the will to live up to the “1” in our military occupational specialty (MOS) that designates us as a combat branch. Supporting maneuver commanders is our highest purpose, and we must represent the warfighter’s hammer in the electromagnetic domain or remain on our island of misfit toys.

Recommendations

• Fix Training and Readiness

  • Force accountability during training cycles with measurable outcomes and instructor/unit responsibility.

  • Institutionalize threat training and analysis at the schoolhouse and via the Foundry so maneuver-supporting CEMA cells can build scenarios from real-world enemy capabilities and activities.

  • Assign a training readiness authority within the division and require CTCs to provide objective grades that confirm readiness.

  • Teach and implement the eight-step training model, TLPs, and battle staff at Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) so enlisted EW professionals understand the physics and echelon-specific employment of their trade and can be a strong backbone of our profession.

  • Understand the EW fight at echelon and collaborate to pursue tactical and technical approaches that make up a cohesive trajectory toward decisive spectrum control.

The Foundry and the Fire: Solutions to Forge a Cohesive Culture, Purpose, and Trajectory

Current EW practice is diffused and reactive, intermingled with a variety of EMS-dependent functional areas and human-dimension teammates. Training is misaligned, often blending counterinsurgency (COIN) with LSCO. The relationship between SIGINT and EW is unclear; the Army cannot dominate a spectrum it does not own. Industry exploits gaps in our EW professional understanding of the threat holistically, and training rarely delivers realistic, threat-informed scenarios. The result is a capability set that cannot reliably produce mass battlefield effects or sustain dominance across contested electromagnetic environments. To serve its primary purpose and fulfill its principle, EW needs change.

Recommendations

• Challenge Industry and Raise Practitioner Literacy

  • Teach EW professionals skeptical, threat-informed acquisition habits. Evaluate industry offerings against rigorous operational requirements.

  • Direct foundries to develop scenarios to train battalion, brigade, and division cyberspace and electromagnetic activities (BN, BDE, DIV CEMA) cells to get better, more relevant repetitions in our profession's planning, management, and understanding of fighting in support of maneuver.

  • Require demonstrable operational advantage from commercial partners and hold vendors accountable to threat-aligned standards.

Notes