Ransomware and Real-World Consequences
Lessons Learned from the Colonial Pipeline Attack
By CPT Euihyung Jung
| Gray Space, 2026 E-Edition
Read Time: < 7 mins
PORTSMOUTH, Va.--Members of the Newport News, Va., Fire Department and the U.S. Coast Guard deploy containment boom on the James River near Surry County on September 19, 2012, as part of the 2012 Colonial Pipeline Preparation Exercise. Representatives from local, state and federal agencies, along with industry partners, worked together to practice and test pollution response procedures during a simulated diesel spill. (U.S. Coast Guard Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class John D. Miller)
In May 2021, Colonial Pipeline’s network was compromised after a password leak. This ransomware incident disrupted fuel distribution across the eastern United States of America. It caused fuel shortages and led people to rush to buy gas. This is a clear example of how a cyber incident can significantly affect critical infrastructure and national security. For Army cyber professionals, it is important to show that leaked or stolen credentials can cause operational and strategic consequences. The big lesson is that cybersecurity is more than an IT issue; leaders are now responsible for making sure that cyber defenses support mission readiness, daily operations, and national resilience.
What Happened and Why It Matters
The Colonial Pipeline supplies nearly half of the East Coast’s fuel, making it the largest refined petroleum pipeline in the U.S. (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE], 2021). In May 2021, hackers connected to the DarkSide ransomware group gained access to the company’s network via an old virtual private network (VPN) account that lacked multifactor authentication (Bellamkonda, 2024). Once they gained access, they used ransomware to force Colonial Pipeline to stop operations (Aljohani, 2022). This attack affected more than just Colonial Pipeline, as multiple states reported fuel shortages and panic-buying, which drove up gas prices (Lubin, 2023). The government put emergency measures in place to keep fuel moving and reduce the effects of the gas shortage (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency [CISA], 2023). It took Colonial Pipeline a significant amount of time to recover because the decryption tools did not work as expected, despite the company paying $4.4 million in ransom (Bellamkonda, 2024). This incident raised public awareness of online attacks and demonstrated the danger they can pose. Attacks on critical infrastructure or organizations can have problems beyond technical issues, including public trust and economic and national security (Aljohani, 2022; Lubin, 2023).
Key Failures Exposed
The Colonial Pipeline breach revealed weaknesses that remain in Army Cyber operations today. The breach started with a basic security flaw: a remote access account lacked multi-factor authentication, allowing attackers to log in using stolen credentials (Bellamkonda, 2024). It wasn’t a sophisticated technical exploit so much as a failure to enforce standard security controls. Another issue was weak separation between systems. Poor segmentation between IT and operational technology networks enabled the intrusion and put physical pipeline operations at risk (Aljohani, 2022). As a result, leadership chose to shut down pipeline operations to contain the threat. Additionally, incident response planning was insufficient. The organization was not ready for a ransomware attack in every aspect. The organization asked for help recovering, which revealed problems with their own backups and response processes. Lastly, the organization’s leadership was forced to make a tense decision with an unsatisfactory outcome. Paying the ransom would help the organization recover faster, but it would increase the risk of future attacks (Lubin, 2023). On the other hand, refusing to pay could have prolonged the disruption and increased economic damage. Cyber incidents like this often force leaders to face strategic dilemmas under critical time constraints (Coombs, 2007).
Implications for Army Cyber Leaders
The Colonial Pipeline attack delivers hard-earned lessons that Army Cyber forces can put into action right now. Cybersecurity must be treated as a command responsibility; leaders cannot delegate cyber risk entirely to technical experts. Commanders are responsible for physical and tactical readiness, so they must also ensure that cyber defenses are integrated into mission planning and execution (Aljohani, 2022). Access control is both one of the most important and weakest points in security. Even problems as simple as weak authentication can cause severe issues when they are missed (Bellamkonda, 2024). Implementing features like two-factor authentication and strong identity management should always be standard requirements. Network architecture is key because it enables separation and establishes boundaries between IT and operational systems, reducing the attack surface and preventing lateral movement (Aljohani, 2022). That means if one segment is compromised, the rest can continue operating and defenders can then isolate and fix the breach more quickly. From a military perspective, this is closely tied to mission assurance and the ability to keep operating in contested cyber environments. Rehearsals are vital for preparing for cyber incidents. Cyber teams regularly conduct military exercises, but training is often limited in scope and does not consistently replicate realistic operational conditions. These shortcomings become apparent during ransomware incidents, where coordination and decision-making are just as critical as technical expertise. Routine, realistic exercises that simulate high-pressure environments enable teams to build experience, improve collaboration, and enhance overall operational effectiveness (Coombs, 2007). Decision-making must be anticipated. Leaders should not face ransomware scenarios for the first time during a real crisis. Establishing decision systems in advance can reduce uncertainty and improve the response time during actual events.
Building a More Resilient Cyber Force
To stay ahead of threats and respond with agility, organizations need a tiered cybersecurity approach. Implementing zero-trust principles ensures that access is continuously verified and limited to critical functions (Aljohani, 2022). This reduces the likelihood that compromised credentials can be used to move laterally within a network and ensures that effects are contained before they disrupt mission-critical operations, even if a single system is compromised. Keeping backups both secure and offline lowers reliance on ransom payments (Lubin, 2023). Organizations with reliable recovery options retain control during incidents and avoid incentivizing adversaries. Integrating cyber risk into leadership decision-making ensures that cybersecurity aligns with business priorities (Aljohani, 2022). This includes incorporating cyber considerations into planning processes, risk assessments, and command discussions. Lastly, collaboration across government and industry improves situational awareness. Information sharing improves the ability to detect threats early and respond collectively to emerging risks (CISA, 2023).
Conclusion
The Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack is an excellent example of how cyber vulnerabilities can emerge quickly and have wide-ranging effects beyond cyberspace. A single compromised system escalated into a nationwide crisis, disrupting fuel supplies, economic security, and public confidence (DOE, 2021; Lubin, 2023). The lesson is clear: Cybersecurity is not only a technical challenge, but also a leadership and capability issue. Organizations that ignore basic security practices, realistic exercises, and integrated planning are at risk of facing comparable crises with equally significant consequences (Aljohani, 2022). What makes the Colonial Pipeline attack worth studying is that the technical intrusion was only part of the story. The larger challenge was managing the operational effect that followed. Future Army Cyber leaders will face similar situations where decisions must be made with incomplete information and under significant time pressure. Building resilient systems and well-rehearsed response methods remains one of the best ways to reduce that risk.
References
Aljohani, T. M. (2022). Cyberattacks on energy infrastructures: Modern war weapons. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/363128927_cyberattacks_on_energy_infrastructures_modern_war_weapons
Bellamkonda, S. (2024). Ransomware attacks on critical infrastructure: A study of the Colonial Pipeline incident. International Journal of Research in Computer Applications and Information Technology, 7(2), 1423–1433. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/386014193_ransomware_attacks_on_critical_infrastructure_a_study_of_the_colonial_pipeline_incident
Coombs, W. T. (2007). Protecting organization reputations during a crisis: The development and application of situational crisis communication theory. Corporate Reputation Review, 10(3), 163–176. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/247478499_Protecting_organization_reputations_during_a_crisis_the_development_and_application_of_situational_crisis_communication_theory
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2023). The attack on Colonial Pipeline: What we’ve learned & what we’ve done over the past two years. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/attack-colonial-pipeline-what-weve-learned-what-weve-done-over-past-two-years
Lubin, A. (2023). Cyber plungers: Colonial Pipeline and the case for an omnibus cybersecurity legislation. Georgia Law Review, 57(4), 1605–1650. https://georgialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/asaf-lubin-cyber-plungers-colonial-pipeline-and-the-case-for-an-omnibus-cybersecurity-legislation-57-georgia-law-review-1605-2023.pdf
U.S. Department of Energy. (2021). Colonial Pipeline cyber incident. https://www.energy.gov/ceser/colonial-pipeline-cyber-incident
Author
CPT Euihyung Jung is a Cyber Officer in the United States Army, currently serving as a Cyber Captain Career Course Instructor. He previously served in the 780th Military Intelligence Brigade as an Assistant S3 and the 101st Combat Mission Team where he served as a Section Leader, Mission Commander, Exploitation Analyst/Trainer (T10 & T50), and Cyber Planner. He holds a Master of Science in Information Systems.