Outthinking the Adversary

A New Training Blueprint for the Electromagnetic Warfare Specialist

By MSG David A. Fisk

| Gray Space, 2026 E-Edition

Read Time: < 9 mins

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This article was edited with the assistance of artificial intelligence (AI) tools. Final review and editing were conducted by authorized DoW personnel to ensure accuracy, clarity, and compliance with DoW policies and guidance.

The U.S. Army’s approach to electromagnetic warfare is at a major turning point. As we prepare for Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO), the electromagnetic spectrum is no longer just a background detail; it is the front line. Against advanced peer adversaries, whoever controls the spectrum controls the pace of the battle. Yet, as we face this new reality, a hard truth remains: Our training pipeline for the 17E Electromagnetic Warfare (EW) Specialist is still stuck in the Global War on Terror era (U.S. Army, 2026a).

To win on the modern battlefield, the Army must completely rebuild the 17E career path. We can no longer afford to train technicians who only know how to operate isolated systems in safe environments. Instead, we must create network-smart problem solvers who can manage complex data in adverse conditions. By moving critical information technology (IT) certifications to the very beginning of a soldier’s career, requiring strict analog backup training, and changing the job description at every rank, we can build a force ready to outthink and outmaneuver any enemy (Department of the Army, 2023).

The “Closed-Box” Legacy

When the Electronic Warfare Specialist Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) was first established, it was built specifically for the counterinsurgency fight. In that environment, soldiers were largely trained as “closed box” operators (Department of the Army, 2020). They were taught to press specific buttons on specific pieces of equipment to achieve a specific effect, usually against a less technologically advanced threat. The systems were isolated, the bases were static, and the networks were mostly reliable.

Current training models, based on older selection boards, still reflect this era (Department of the Army, 2023). We are teaching soldiers to be passive end-users of technology. However, a peer fight will look nothing like the conflicts of the past 20 years. Our adversaries have advanced jamming capabilities, deep network integration, and the ability to target our electronic signatures almost instantly (U.S. Army, 2026e). This reality creates significant command friction that the Army’s entire division-centric warfighting approach must overcome (Infantry Warfighters’ Forum, 2026).

In a LSCO environment, 17Es cannot solely be equipment operators. They must become network integrators. They need to understand how their specific pieces of gear communicate with the broader Army network, how data flows across the battlefield, and how to conceal our digital footprint. A push-button operator will fail when the network goes down; a network integrator will find a way to reconnect the force.

Thriving When the Screens Go Black

The most critical gap in our current training is how we prepare soldiers for Denied, Degraded, Intermittent, and Limited (DDIL) environments (Department of the Army, 2025e). We know our communications will be jammed and our networks will be attacked. When the screens go dark, our 17Es need the skills to troubleshoot the problem and get their commanders back in the fight.

During a recent joint training exercise in an austere overseas environment, our EW teams proved exactly why this networking knowledge is vital (Janovic, 2026). In the exercise, our soldiers successfully networked a variety of tactical radio and sensor systems over a complex web of mesh networks and satellite backhauls (1st Special Forces Command, 2026). They consolidated this sensor data, ingested it into tactical servers at the edge, and automatically nominated targets to a fires work bench (Eaton, 2026).

A soldier without a deep, foundational understanding of IT fundamentals cannot build, manage, or troubleshoot that kind of architecture. Yet currently, we introduce programming and advanced software skills usually around the staff sergeant level, which is far too late in a 17E’s career (Department of the Army, 2023). Worse, the pipeline completely lacks basic, entry-level training in IT fundamentals (Department of the Army, 2025g). This must change. We must require foundational IT certifications, like CompTIA Network+ and Security+, during Initial Entry Training (IET). A new 17E arriving at their first unit should already know how to check an IP address, verify data flow, and perform basic network fixes.

Furthermore, true resilience means being able to operate without the network entirely. Alongside these digital skills, the schoolhouse must bring back rigorous training in analog skills, such as map-and-compass navigation and manual planning. If a system loses GPS due to enemy jamming, the 17E must be able to seamlessly shift to analog methods without missing a beat (Department of the Army, 2025f).

A New Blueprint for Skill Progression

To build this modern force, we must redefine what is expected of a 17E at every rank (Department of the Army, 2025d). While they must remain the Army’s unrivaled technical experts in Electronic Support (ES), Electronic Attack (EA), and Electronic Protection (EP), this new blueprint marries that doctrinal expertise with network mastery (Department of the Army, 2025b). This career evolution begins at Skill Level 1, where junior enlisted soldiers transition from passive system operators to Foundational Integrators. Armed with baseline IT certifications, they initialize ES sensors to detect adversary signals. This carries the fundamental requirement that they fully understand the spectrum they are looking at to accurately characterize threats rather than just passively watching a screen (U.S. Army, 2026f). They configure EA effectors for precise engagement and provide critical EP insight by advising their units on how to protect signatures and detailing the operational risks if systems remain unhardened (U.S. Army PAE-Fires, n.d.).

As they promote to sergeant, they mature into tactical troubleshooters. When the electromagnetic environment becomes heavily contested, these Skill Level 2 NCOs lead the response. They troubleshoot broken data links between remote ES collection nodes and command posts, ensuring that friendly EA operations can continue and EP advisements are communicated even under intense enemy jamming (Department of the Army, 2025a).

Reaching staff sergeant, the 17E steps back from individual pieces of gear to become a Network Architect. Operating at Skill Level 3, they design and manage the local battlefield network (U.S. Army, 2026a). They are responsible for fusing complex ES data streams, such as lines of bearing from distributed sensors, into the commander’s Mission Command architecture to enable rapid EA targeting (Shaffer, 2026). Simultaneously, they provide advanced EP oversight, advising on frequency deconfliction to prevent friendly fratricide and mitigate enemy collection.

This deep technical mastery translates into operational influence at Skill Level 4, where sergeants first class serve as Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) Integrators. In this role, they translate EA, ES, and EP realities into actionable advice during the MDMP, directly shaping how the commander maneuvers and fights within the spectrum (Department of the Army, 2025c). Finally, at Skill Level 5, master sergeants take on the mantle of Senior Advisor and Enterprise Manager (Department of the Army, 2025e). Operating at the strategic level, they advise senior commanders on the complete electromagnetic order of battle (U.S. Army, 2026c) while actively managing the critical technical feedback loop with the acquisition community to drive future capabilities.

Fixing the Broken Feedback Loop

That final point regarding the feedback loop is another critical area where the current system falls short. Right now, soldiers are not formally trained on how to provide detailed, technical feedback about their equipment to the people who buy and design it (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2026).

Consider the lessons learned from the recent field exercise. In the field, our teams identified and navigated unforeseen technical anomalies and hardware integration challenges with newly fielded sensor equipment (Janovic, 2026). Because our 17Es possessed the technical mindset to diagnose the root cause instead of simply reporting that a system was broken, they were able to pass exact, actionable data straight to the program office (Eaton, 2026). By formalizing this technical feedback loop in our training, we create a force capable of giving precise information that accelerates how fast the Army can update its software and field new equipment, keeping us one step ahead of the enemy’s own upgrades (Program Executive Office Intelligence, Electronic Warfare & Sensors, 2026b; U.S. Army, 2026b).

Conclusion

Forging the modern 17E is not just about updating a training manual; it is a strategic necessity. If we want to achieve decision dominance in the next major conflict, we must invest heavily in the minds of our soldiers today (U.S. Army, 2026g).

By demanding basic IT mastery from day one, preparing our force for the realities of degraded networks, and expecting more from our leaders at every level, we can transform the 17E branch. We will move past the legacy of the closed-box operator and build a community of modern network integrators. The future of warfare will be complex, fast, and heavily contested. With this new blueprint, our Electromagnetic Warfare Specialists will be ready to meet it head-on.

References

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Author

MSG David A. Fisk is the Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) NCOIC for an Infantry Division in Hawaii. Throughout his extensive career, MSG Fisk has held the Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) of Chemical Operations Specialist (54B/74D), Electronic Warfare Specialist (29E), and currently Cyber Electromagnetic Activities NCO (17E). His operational deployments include combat tours to Iraq and Afghanistan. He has served in numerous roles including as a Battalion CBRN NCOIC, an Electronic Warfare Sergeant, and a Senior EW NCO OC/T with the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) Operations Group. MSG Fisk is a graduate of all levels of the NCO professional development system and holds numerous technical certifications including CompTIA Network+, Security+, and Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH).