The Crossroad of Convergence

Future Sustainment of Long-Range Artillery

By LTC Gregory Fassett, CPT Alana Humason, and 1LT Shannon Kennedy

Article published on: May 27, 2026 in the Field Artillery 2026 Edition

Read Time: < 12 mins

Soldiers with the 3rd Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regiment, 18th Field Artillery Brigade, XVIII Airborne Corps, fire a rocket from the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System during a live fire exercise in support of Marne Focus at Fort Stewart, Georgia, March 11, 2025. The HIMARS is a wheeled artillery rocket platform, and is air- or ground-transportable and can fire up to six rockets or one missile at a time, delivering long-range precision fires anywhere in the world. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Bernabe Lopez)

Long-range precision fires are a vital piece of our national defense strategy. However, success on the battlefield cannot solely derive from having superior capabilities but requires the ability to rapidly and reliably sustain them. The ability to consistently deliver long-range artillery fire demands a tailored sustainment system that is equipped to address the needs of a Field Artillery Brigade (FAB). These brigades have logistical requirements unlike any other in the United States Army, but they are burdened with a reliance on higher-echelon sustainment outside of their organic composition. With emphasis on Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) and the continual restructuring and minimizing of the field artillery Brigade Support Battalion (BSB), this article will examine the current sustainment limitations within an FAB, the long-term feasibility of this model and solutions to producing a more agile and responsive approach to field artillery sustainment during LSCO.

Non-Standardized Sustainment of a Field Artillery Brigade

Over the last two decades, field artillery BSBs have experienced a significant decrease in capabilities compared to sister organizations across the Army. A typical Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) or Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) BSB is sufficiently structured with enough personnel and equipment to operate a Supply Support Activity (SSA), modular ammunition transfer point (MATP), perform field-level maintenance, and provide Role 1 and 2 medical care—along with transporting the necessary bulk classes of supply such as water, fuel, and ammunition (U.S. Department of the Army, 2022a). However, opposing Army Force Structure Priorities have gradually reduced the composition of a field artillery BSB since 2005, decreasing to only contain a Headquarters Company and a Network Signal Company. Comparatively, field artillery BSBs now lack the traditional Headquarters, Distribution, Maintenance and Medical companies that sister BSBs have maintained (Wyche, 2012). This reduction has also resulted in field artillery BSBs plummeting from roughly 368 Soldiers to a mere 124, a loss of nearly 67% of their previous force structure (Wyche, 2012). The significant decrease in organic sustainment capabilities has forced FABs to rely on support outside of their Area of Operation (AO), typically elevating them to a Division Sustainment Support Battalion (DSSB).

Figure 1. MTOE Authorization: Equipment. Averaged from active component units on FMSWEB.

These persistent reductions in equipment and allocations have created an imbalance throughout field artillery support channels with field artillery BSBs now significantly under-equipped compared to their firing battalion FSC counterparts. Field artillery BSBs across the five active component brigades are authorized an average of only two Palletized Load Systems (PLS) and three palletized trucks with Load Handle System (LHS) with Enhanced Container Handling Units (ECHUs), while each MLRS battalion FSC possesses approximately sixteen Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTT) and trailers. This disparity also extends to unit fuel capacity; BSBs have a maximum capacity of around 5,000 gallons, compared to approximately 20,000 gallons per firing-battalion FSC. Consequently, throughput distribution—or bypassing intermediate supply echelons—has become the most efficient method for maximizing resupply speed and effectiveness in LSCO (U.S. Department of the Army, 2023).

The reliance on throughput distribution is the most concerning challenge for long-range fire sustainment when analyzing the transportation and distribution requirements for sizeable quantities of rockets. To compensate for the slim design of the field artillery BSBs, a DSSB will instead utilize throughput distribution for rocket transportation directly to Combat Trains Command Posts (CTCPs), omitting the traditional routing through the Brigade Support Area (BSA) entirely (U.S. Department of the Army, 2022a). The current throughput-dependent system, directly correlated to the limitations of field artillery BSBs, poses an increased risk to warfighting efforts in LSCO by detracting resources from a division commander that could be utilized elsewhere. Sustainment delays to long-range fires could also severely hinder progression on the battlefield, prompting a critical evaluation of the feasibility of the current FAB-support structure within a contested environment.

Field Artillery Sustainment: Feasibility in LSCO

The Army’s evolving operational focus at the division level has prompted field artillery sustainment to be re-examined in the Total Army Analysis 25-29. Given that rocket battalions may be assigned as general or direct support to a division during LSCO, the current shortfalls of field artillery BSBs could jeopardize the ability to conduct rapid and reliable resupply operations. Proposed solutions from TAA 25-29 center around the continued restructuring of field artillery BSBs—either to improve support to FSCs or to integrate them into CSSBs for division operations (Headquarters, 2024).

For field artillery BSBs to remain relevant alongside the progression of rocket battalion FSCs, their composition will need to maintain an equivalent measure of growth in key areas of supply and sustainment. Comparative to the current MTOE of a rocket battalion FSC, field artillery BSBs significantly lack key equipment and personnel to execute the required supply support, transportation and field maintenance for FABs during LSCO. The MTOE authorization for field artillery BSBs is designed to support the brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion (HHB), not to provide umbrella support down to the rocket battalion FSCs (U.S. Department of the Army, 2013). As the rocket battalion FSCs projected to grow alongside the field artillery 3x9 conversion, this further expands the sustainment gap between the BSB and the FSCs in both manning and equipment.

While the rocket battalion FSCs will be able to sustain the forward fight for several days from their initial combat load, the BSB cannot provide timely and efficient resupply without increased support from a higher echelon (U.S. Department of the Army, 2020).

Figure 2. Example of echeloned sustainment using field, combat, and company trains.

TAA 25-29 also suggests there are other ways to bolster field artillery BSB support through unit augmentation. The incorporation of tailored-maintenance surge teams at the division-sustainment echelon is one such opportunity to increase support without restructuring. Field artillery BSBs are not MTOE equipped to execute tracked vehicle maintenance or recovery operations, organically lacking key maintainers like MLRS Repairers (94P), Tracked Vehicle Mechanics (91H), Tracked Vehicle Recovery Operators (ASI H9) and M88 Recovery Vehicles to match the capabilities of the FSCs (U.S. Department of the Army, 2013). The augmentation of an MLRS-maintenance surge team to field artillery BSBs would provide accelerated repairs much closer to the point of repair than pass-back maintenance one to two echelons higher.

Division Maintenance Support Companies (MSCs) already contain configured-maintenance surge teams to support M1 Abrams and M2/3 Bradley systems, requiring equivalent 91H, H9, and M88 support for their operations; the implementation of an MLRS platoon or section would only require the addition of 94P maintainers to create a tailored surge team for field artillery units. This opportunity provides viable MLRS maintenance support to be augmented to a field artillery BSB, while also having the least effect on force restructuring for sustainment units.

Given significant equipment and personnel shortfalls within field artillery BSBs and a heavy reliance on Echelon Above Brigade (EAB) support, their continued integration into the division supply channel is questionable. Shifting the battlefield focus to division-level operations suggests that reallocating field artillery BSB resources to CSSBs would enhance support within an AO and improve firing battalion maneuverability and responsiveness to the division commander’s priorities (Wyche, 2012). This realignment would have a minimal impact on overall sustainment, as CSSBs and DSSBs can readily manage throughput to a Logistics Release Point (LRP).

Alternatively, field artillery BSBs could be retained but restructured to support only the brigade HHB, mirroring the support FSCs provide to firing battalions. Much like the HHB staff in an FAB acts as the fires coordination and oversight element for the battalions, the BSB’s staff would shift to provide sustainment coordination and oversight between EAB elements to the battalions. Army force designers could also consider mirroring the Air Defense Artillery (ADA) support structure, which employs enlarged FSCs with SSAs to support air-defense units, given their similar reliance on precision munitions in LSCO. However, ADA’s limited FSC mobility—driven by the static nature of Patriot defenses compared to MLRS or HIMARS—limits how directly that model translates into an FAB.

Sustainment constraints and challenges within field artillery BSBs are presently suggesting that their current organization is unreliable to sustain rocket battalions in LSCO. While restructuring could improve their capabilities, reallocating resources to larger CSSB elements could offer a more comprehensive solution, enhancing EAB support and mitigating sustainment risks. Ultimately, the organic structure of the field artillery BSB as it stands cannot provide the necessary sustainment obligations, posing future risks to long-range fires missions in future conflicts.

Field Artillery Sustainment: The Way Forward

When considering the progression towards division-level operations, it is important to note that all discussions on FAB sustainment require further attention in testing and fielding to confirm their viability. Within that conversation lies key development considerations regarding the future of FAB BSBs: what criteria should be utilized to proceed with the progression of FAB sustainment operations and how we test the necessary adaptations in a realistic environment.

To understand the criteria for redevelopment, an evaluation of current rocket-artillery operations in the Russia-Ukrainian conflict provides insights into the future of rocket sustainment. Currently, the Russian Armed Forces (RuAF) operate under a rigid logistics structure, relying on fixed transportation platforms like railways that limit flexibility in sustainment operations. This has forced RuAF elements to create large sustainment caches that are difficult to rapidly relocate, whereas Ukrainian forces have opted for long-range assets to be more self-sufficient, increasing their mobility and operability within their fleets (Douro, 2023). With the current success that Ukrainian artillery is experiencing with freedom of maneuver on the battlefield, comparatively, field artillery BSBs cannot provide the same feasibility in maneuver or completeness to achieve the necessary sustainment objectives in a contested environment. To address the lack of feasibility of maneuver, the argument returns to a field artillery BSB restructure or augmentation. A field artillery BSB is limited in its capabilities to support the dispersed posture of MLRS battalions, with a continuously growing disparity in allocations between themselves and the rocket battalion FSCs. Without further consideration of the need for adaptable and more maneuverable sustainment elements, there is a risk of sustainment operations becoming more rigid in structure, a dangerous constraint already visible from the failures of the RuAF. A solution must derive from force realignment that bridges these sustainment gaps to form an equitable supply chain from EAB elements or the development of surge teams and composite companies to be embedded into field artillery BSBs to increase sustainment maneuverability during LSCO.

Regarding the future of testing and fielding rocket-artillery sustainment operations, data from the Project Convergence 22 (PC22) Indo-Pacific scenario provides additional insights into the necessity of implementing sustainment-focused trials into large-scale training exercises. In preparation for LSCO, emphasis was placed on measuring key sustainment capacities and capabilities such as speed, range and payload to rapidly resupply across an Indo-Pacific theater (Gully, 2022). Concerns arose about the ability of sustainment support to match the pacing across a multi-domain, extended battlespace in a timely and effective manner, specifically in a maritime-dominant environment. Some solutions introduced to address these challenges have been to implement modern watercraft fleets that will increase maritime operational reach and the development of autonomous resupply capabilities (Gully, 2022). These types of sustainment exercises convey a more realistic picture of sustainment strengths and weaknesses given the current force structure and provide justifiable data for unit redevelopment or expansion—as seen with the watercraft fleets. Applying this type of EAB, scenario- based training to field artillery units would highlight the shortfalls in the BSB’s ability to match the pacing of rocket-battalion sustainment, which data could then be used to justify force restructure as well. However, future rocket-battalion Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations must derive support from an adequate EAB element and not solely be accompanied by Division Artillery (DIVARTY) for sustainment data to be accurately observed. While often accompanying the training unit, DIVARTY can only provide an alternate Command Post for the division and is comprised of a Force Field Artillery Headquarters to serve as the primary advisor to a division commander (U.S. Department of the Army, 2022b).

DIVARTY lacks any EAB-sustainment capabilities, but when conjoined with an EAB sustainment element, they could provide the realistic training environment needed to showcase the necessity for field artillery BSB restructuring to provide extended sustainment support in future conflict.

Conclusion

The sustainment of long-range rocket artillery presents a critical and increasingly challenging logistical problem not just in their brigade elements but for the future of division-level operations. As we move towards the 3x9 conversion of rocket-artillery battalions and their FSCs, the current sustainment model is demonstrably strained and unreliable across a contested environment. A thorough examination of how these brigades currently lack adequate sustainment capabilities, a proactive search for force optimization, and focused training opportunities to retrieve data on sustainment feasibility are no longer simply recommended, but they are essential to ensuring the continued effectiveness of this vital capability in the modern battlefield. The future of field artillery and our ability to dominate the battlefield depends on decisively addressing these sustainment challenges and forging an unbreakable sustainment infrastructure for our artillery forces.

References