The 3P’s

Observations for BN S-3’s from the NTC

By MAJ Jeong Hong

July 15, 2026 | Field Artillery, 2026 E-Edition

Read Time: < 15 mins

A U.S. Soldier assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Mobile Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, observes a Boeing CH-47 Chinook approach for landing during sling load training as part of the Joint Pacific Readiness Center Exportable Exercise at Fort Magsaysay, Nueva Ecija, Philippines, May 10, 2026. JPMRC-X, as part of Exercise Salaknib, integrates U.S., Philippine, and partner forces in realistic scenarios to enhance interoperability, refine multi-domain tactics, and strengthen regional readiness in the Indo-Pacific. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Christopher Moorehead)

In a sense, being a Field Artillery Battalion (BN) S-3 is remarkably easy. ATP 3-09.23 Field Artillery Battalion Operations lists on page 13 everything for which the S-3 is responsible. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary’s definition for “responsible” further makes it clear that all the S-3 must do is be “liable to be called on to answer.” Task and purpose couldn’t be more obvious.

Notably, the doctrinal list for what a BN S-3 must be accountable for is quite comprehensive and expansive. BN staffs tend to be junior, experience levels vary and the tactical mission of the close fight seems to be more dynamic when battery-level leaders clash with the enemy near the Forward Line of Own Troops—complicating the implementation of classroom-type instruction of staff processes.

This article is addressed toward BN S-3s and is written to hypothesize that if the BN S-3, as only one of two Field Grade staff officers in the battalion, can find a way for people, products, and processes to be more than the sum of the parts, he or she may be able to meet all of that person’s doctrinal requirements to contribute to a BN’s success. Accordingly, perhaps BN S-3s may then feasibly be held liable for them all without the cognitive culmination constantly in their peripherals as they fight the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at the National Training Center.

Of note is that nothing contained will be fundamentally new. However, readers should view this article as an affirmation of the contents as observed by the author at the National Training Center after aggregating the challenges, opportunities and friction of multiple Rotational Training Units, as the BN S-3 of each experienced the crucible of simulated ground combat.

Framework

As referred to in a previous paragraph, ATP 3-09.23 outlines what is expected. The crosswalk that follows reorganizes these responsibilities into one of three “buckets” of “People,” “Product,” or “Process” that the author labels a component of the system. Italicized portions highlight relevance. Further discussion by topic elaborates key points and augments with illustrations on how that component enables the BN S-3.

Note: This article is written to be modular, and the reader may reach each component independent of the others without significant loss of context. However, readers will find that the cross-pollination of the three dynamics enhances the relevancy of each.

A simple observation of the BN S-3’s doctrinally listed responsibilities is that people-focused responsibilities are not as densely populated as process-based requirements. However, the process of “Direct the operations …” populates both in this section as well as in “Process” (below) because operations fundamentally is a people-focused process. Secondly, the S-3 becomes the primary point of entry that coordinates with the battalion’s sustainment enterprise (BN Executive Officer, S-1, S-4 and Forward Support Company Commander—at least as explicitly defined) to integrate and operationalize sustainment. In other words, sustainment succeeds when its functions are arrayed and incorporated with ongoing missions. People drive operations, and recent experiences provide the following.

1. Staffs must be well-trained and experts in their domains.

Varying levels of experience will produce similar variety in talent diversity. This dynamic inevitably will endure as officers, NCOs and Soldiers continue to professionally develop. However, this does not exonerate the S-3 from continuing to drive the engine of learning and prioritize the staff ’s growth. This is accomplished through capitalizing on multi-echeloned training events at home stations and exercising individual skills to build “reps and sets.” Training events must realistically reflect how we fight according to unit standard operating procedures (SOP), and the staff must recognize the trigger-time as more than hardships to endure. Expertise must be expected and the acceptance of mediocrity viewed with prejudice. When it comes to an effective staff, Officer, NCO and Soldiers alike must have a shared accountability to one another on their duties. A rigid adherence to a rank structure that ignores talent risks creating an environment where subordinates do not feel that any contributions aside from their dictated duties will be valued. This dynamic mostly manifests in the officers’ participation in MDMP and planning processes where NCO participation is either discounted or neglected, and the opportunity cost of losing out on decades of experience in exchange for perhaps another priority is high.

2. The Main Command Post must be manned in-depth with redundancy built into individual sections.

The BN Main Command Post (MCP) is the preeminent center for mission command and operations. Acknowledging that manning levels of various staff functions may be a challenge due to personnel availability, the S-3 must ensure that each section builds redundancy despite manning challenges. When firing batteries depend on a battalion staff to coordinate, anticipate or verify that conditions are set for their success, imbalances in knowledge distribution between staff shifts cannot be an excuse for inaction. Further, expertise in a specific warfighting domain (such as FDC and S-2) is a given, but some cross-trained familiarity lends itself to efficiencies. A rudimentary understanding of the functions across the aisle enables a shared appreciation of requirements with the potential for assistance if provided enough repetitive exposure and cross-training.

As a quick aside, the MCP’s layout in and of itself contributes to whether the BN S-3 and staff can function effectively. Regardless of configuration, MCPs must permit easy access to the common operating picture, analog tracking boards and other tools that enable the staff to synchronize. Staff members must have similar access to one another to defeat stove-piped information, and the free but disciplined exchange of information must not be hampered by physical orientation or obstacles in their way. The BN S-3 must be physically positioned in a way to fight the battalion and affect all of the above. Often, the BN S-3s are found to be anchored to a Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P) or Mobile Mission Command Service (MMCS) workstation, radio mics in-hand and overwhelmed by a deluge of information. BN S-3s must depend on, and hold staff members accountable for, receiving the information and producing knowledge to assist in creating shared understanding across the entire organization.

3. Staff members perform their functions consistently.

Staffs who are well-trained, reciprocally competent within sections and manned in-depth must then perform their individual functions the same way, every time and at high standards. The consistent performance of duties supports expectations. Higher headquarters can rely on the battalion to meet their requirements without repetitive contact for compliance that wastes valuable time. Subordinate units can count on the battalion to provide predictability at the lowest levels. The fog of war and the challenges of a free-thinking, innovative enemy provide enough friction for a warfighter. The consistent and excellent performance of duties can mitigate human error, which often further introduces friction and slows momentum. Where time is the resource that is never in abundance, expectation maintenance can enable tempo.

4. Senior staff leaders are distributed equitably.

Senior leadership for a battalion staff is often comprised of the BN S-3, the BN Operations Sergeant Major and, potentially, the BN Fire Direction Officer and Master Gunner, subject to their experiences. Acknowledging that training, manning, redundancy and consistent performance outlined above may not optimally align, senior-leader expertise may provide a mitigating influence to ensure the staff operates coherently. However, senior-leader distribution must be balanced. Unless all members of the senior staff leadership are equally invested and knowledgeable of ongoing operations, the momentum generated by one can quickly be lost by the other(s) who lack the expertise and continuity to maintain tempo. This continuity is established by an honest self-assessment and follow-on decisions for leader presence requirements by shift, weighing experience and the understanding of ongoing operations heavily to prevent uneven talent distribution.

ATP 3-09.23 lists products required for field-artillery operations. Not surprisingly, they are ubiquitous and with their own doctrinal references that lay out their contents in much greater detail. Products are frequently referred to by staff officers for various facetious reasons, but in the context of combat operations, they are no different from the classes of supply. That is to say, the friction caused by an inadequate Fragmentary Order (FRAGORD), vague operational priorities or a poorly selected Position Area for Artillery (PAA) is just as lethal to battalion momentum as a dry fuel tank. Accordingly, recent experiences provide the following commentary on best practices. Once again, these are not meant to insult intelligence but to underscore the observed necessity and trends.

1. Formats exist—and they are clear, concise, and adequate.

The 9-Line MEDEVAC is frequently a “smart card”-type document that is printed, laminated and affixed to various surfaces for quick reference. It clearly and succinctly provides the format for the nine radio transmissions that can bring a helicopter to evacuate a casualty, an astonishing feat for something so simple.

The BN S-3 should follow a similar principle when developing products for the battalion. This includes rehearsals, reports and anything else that enables the common operating picture. More than clichés of a staff trainer, the author’s choice of the words “clear,” “concise” and “adequate” are used deliberately to make three points.

First, “clarity” of communication implies that the format of a product does not require additional explanation once released. In the mind of a fatigued warfighter looking at it under the dim glow of a red light, products should automate action of their own standing. “Concise” in practical terms implies a path of least resistance in both creation and execution. Product formats are developed to be as compact as possible to avoid wasted efforts and potential mistakes. Finally, “adequate” follows that format sufficiently accomplishes the purpose for which they are designed. This is accomplished through careful staff work and provides that multiple versions of a product are not required.

2. The information can be sent and received regardless of transport.

Using the 9-Line MEDEVAC analogy once again, those nine transmissions can be sent via radio, tactical internet, phone call or any other means that get the information into the hands of a pilot.

Similarly, products must be able to be sent and received through multiple means. For example, meteorological (MET) messages should theoretically be sent Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) to AFATDS. However, the given format can also be sent over a phone, if required. Things such as reports and commander’s update briefs should also be concise and “flattened” enough that a particular transport capability is not required to send the information within. The black color of the bubble on a PowerPoint slide is less relevant than a battery that has only 10% of fuel remaining.

3. Redundancy across digital and analog displays ensures continuity.

Undeniably, technology has evolved to enable data centricity and permit more digital application in MCPs. Common operating pictures are often displayed via projectors and updated live. Tracking mechanisms are retained on computers and subject to fewer computational errors. However, these means are only valid so long as power generation and communications capabilities remain intact and unaffected by things such as lack of fuel, line of sight, enemy attack and equipment shortfalls.

BN S-3s are often proficient at integrating digital products into command-post operations but are similarly observed to maintain analog displays as redundancy. This is a good practice that is intuitive to staff officers, and most battalion command posts replicate this.

However, frequently these two means do not match. Analog products lose fidelity as staff members lack duty-redundant skills or inconsistently perform these duties. If digital outpaces analog, then efforts must be made to implement processes to prevent this. Clarity, conciseness and adequacy lend themselves to this efficiency.

Using the common operating picture as an example, the elements contained should be clear enough that decision making is not challenged with the added task of interpretation, concise enough that a Soldier with a marker can make an update just as quickly as with a keyboard on a screen and adequate enough that additional context isn’t required to understand. The insurance that analog products provide enables BN S-3s the ability to read the room across multiple means without the imperative need for a digital connection.

With operations being inherently procedural, it is no surprise that the bulk of a BN S-3’s responsibilities are process-based. Much of these are focused on existing military processes (Military Decision-Making Process, artillery planning considerations and sustainment calculations) that, like products, have their own doctrinal baselines. The list below highlights two artifacts of processes that serve to underwrite the elements in the chart above: Tactical SOPs (TACSOP) that serve to codify the processes and battle rhythms that actuate the execution of the same.

1. The TACSOP is understood by the staff because they wrote and then revised it.

At each rotation’s final AAR, units are challenged to either codify best practices, modify any existing practices, or both. Inevitably, the vessel for these revisions is the unit TACSOP. Although BN S-3s are frequently the designated custodian of the TACSOP, it must be collectively and deeply understood by the staff. Staff participation in TACSOP development must not be limited to a few marginal touchpoints and gestures of contribution. Individual staff sections must explicitly own specific segments, continually revise them as the unit evolves and derivatively own the processes that are codified within them in a distributed manner. Furthermore, SOPs benefit from an inherent agility that is baked into the processes. That is to say, TACSOPs that have redundancies already built into individual processes enable flexibility as opposed to disjointed, ad hoc solutions to what become single points of failure. For example, if a TACSOP describes a full Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency (PACE) plan for MET distribution or depicts multiple configurations of an MCP based on the availability (or lack thereof) of certain vehicles or equipment, the BN can fight with more flexibility instead of losing momentum to address emergent issues. Although the processes above become perfected as they are tailored to the unit and its fighting posture, they are made truly lethal as the architects of those processes continually sharpen them with each training repetition.

2. The battle rhythm demands compliance.

In the context of the BN S-3’s responsibilities, the battle rhythm becomes the implementation plan for the procedural requirements. Battle rhythms that are either collectively “owned” or are simply placed behind the Battle Captain/NCO’s desk appear to fall victim to irrelevancy. A single enforcer of the “clock” who initiates actions on-time, every-time ensures that the hard work put into determining how the battalion will fight is not done in vain, as (critically) routine things are done routinely. Staff members can rely on routine events where they can synchronize and update the entire team; the BN S-3s can subsequently and potentially reduce their involvement as intra-staff interactions trigger automated actions.

Furthermore, BN S-3s who can gauge the operational tempo and modify the battle rhythm ensure that the organization can fight the rhythm of the battle as opposed to arbitrarily and rigidly adhere to a sequence developed short of the line of departure. An inability to modify and adapt to changing circumstances guarantees that the battle rhythm becomes an obsolete sheet of paper preserved behind a document protector for posterity without consequence.

Lastly, an adherence to the self-governed tempo of an organization as dictated by a battle rhythm lays the foundation for the successful execution of the Rapid Decision-Making and Synchronization Process, or RDSP. Where an effective battle rhythm governs a unit’s actions, the enemy’s influence on friendly actions is mitigated to a stimulus that initiates an RDSP cycle as opposed to a cataclysmic, emotional event. The inputs and outputs of battle rhythm events will have provided enough shared understanding and context (running estimates) that the BN S-3 and the collective staff will be able to quickly orient on to determine what decision criteria have been met, refine acceptable courses of action and implement accordingly.

Conclusion

This article has likely not been revolutionary in changing anyone’s understanding. These tenets are often repeated in other discussions with greater intellectual rigor. The content above serves simply to underline that the fundamentals remain fundamental. Furthermore, this is not an indictment of those very talented BN S-3s who, having fought hard and trained their respective staffs to excellence, have found victory in the High Desert. It is rather a confirmation of the BN S-3’s doctrinal responsibilities as outlined in the framework above as a reflection of their hard work and a tribute to the fruits of their labor.

References