Survive to Fight
Operationalize the Drone Fight in Modern Field Artillery Operations
By Capt. Richard Hiler
| Field Artillery, 2026 E-Edition
Read Time: < 9 mins
HIMARS thermal trail. (Photo by Capt. Richard Hiler)
The United States military is navigating the most technologically advanced operational shift in its recent
history. The oversaturation of unmanned systems into large-scale combat operations (LSCO) shifts warfare from
primarily combating conventional forces to an unyielding aerial threat. This shift demands renewed tactical
ingenuity and a re-evaluation of established doctrine.
With the proliferation of inexpensive unmanned aerial systems (UAS), or drones, the modern battlefield grows
more transparent. Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) drones—once used by hobbyists—are now weaponized, capable of
delivering lethal effects and persistent surveillance. For the Field Artillery (FA), this presents a serious
challenge. “Shoot, move, communicate” is no longer sufficient. A fourth priority must take precedence: survive.
In a battlespace defined by constant observation, being detected and surviving cannot coexist.
This article explores the critical challenge posed by drone technology to High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
(HIMARS) batteries, drawing on lessons learned during a recent deployment and several multinational exercises in
the European Theater. By examining the capabilities and vulnerabilities of modern drones, this analysis will
detail the tactical innovations developed to mitigate the threat of detection. Ultimately, this article will
argue that the evolution of the drone threat requires a fundamental shift in doctrine, training and materiel
strategy, with proactive concealment and signature management as the cornerstones of survivability and
lethality.
A New Battlefield, A New Threat: The European Experience
During a recent deployment to the European Theater, Bravo Battery, 1st Battalion, 14th Field Artillery Regiment
(B/1-14 FAR) operated across Germany, Estonia and Lithuania. The battery engaged in extensive interoperability
training with Estonian and Lithuanian HIMARS batteries, as well as the French and British Armies. At every
forward operating station (FOS), the conversation was dominated by the abundant drone threat. While reactionary
methods such as shotguns and specialized “drone busters” were discussed, these solutions address the symptom,
not the system. The more pressing tactical question was, “How do we combat initial detection and implement
proactive measures to ensure our survival?”
In an attempt to answer this question, B/1-14FAR and the French Army conducted a dedicated field training
exercise (FTX) to test the drone’s abilities and the HIMARS and fire direction centers (FDC) crews in a
high-stakes game of “hide and seek.” This interoperability proved invaluable, yielding key takeaways that
significantly increased the survivability of the battery and provided a deeper understanding of the drone’s
limitations. Further exercises with the Lithuanian Army, where Bravo Battery/1-14 FAR utilized drones to hunt
its own, exposed critical shortfalls in both friendly tactics and enemy technology. These experiences form the
basis of the following analysis.
HIMARS covered in foliage. (Photo by Capt. Richard Hiler)
Capabilities of the Drone: An Ever-Present Eye in the Sky
Current HIMARS survivability tactics, specifically the traditional “shoot and scoot” methodology, are highly
vulnerable to detection by modern drones equipped with advanced optical and thermal sensors, particularly in
cold-weather environments. Understanding these capabilities is the first step toward surviving on the modern
battlefield.
The French NX70 drone enabled near-continuous surveillance through rapid battery swaps. Operating at 120 meters,
it detected movement up to five kilometers away, especially along predictable routes (paved roads and unimproved
roads). Lithuanian systems, the EOS-C VTOL and the Penguin C VTOL, prioritized endurance (3 to 25 hours) and
advanced optics, increasing detection rates. The launcher loading module (LLM) of the HIMARS was especially
vulnerable due to its distinct shape. Crews adapted with camouflage nets and foliage to disrupt the physical
shape and thermal signatures. However, thermal detection remained the most significant threat.
In moderate climates, heat signatures from engines and personnel were easily detected; however, the use of
foliage and canopy coverage mitigated this. At night, thermal contrast increased. Vehicles left a distinct
thermal trail (about 200m) lasting up to two minutes. Running engines created strong signatures, challenging the
traditional “shoot and scoot” model. This challenge provided the need for a more calculated approach—hide,
shoot, hide. This calculated approach offered the crew an opportunity to exploit the drone’s limitations.
Exploiting the Seams
Despite effectiveness, drones showed limitations. Heavy rain degraded performance and operator visibility.
Terrain reduced signal range due to line-of-sight requirements. Dense forests cut effective range significantly,
creating opportunities for concealment. By understanding the relationship between terrain, line of sight and
drone range, crews could select firing points and hide areas that exploited these vulnerabilities, forcing the
drone operator to constantly reposition and exposing them to potential detection and targeting.
While the smaller drones were more vulnerable to terrain, the larger drones were limited by icing in cold
conditions due to their flight altitude. This created predictable windows for HIMARS crews to conduct movements
and fire missions with a minimal risk of aerial detection.
Thermal UAS High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and people. (Photo by Capt.
Richard Hiler)
How to Combat the Drone: A New Generation of Tactics
To counter modern detection capabilities, HIMARS crews have shifted their tactical focus toward dense
vegetation, weather windows and rigorous signature management. By utilizing a “leapfrog” movement, they executed
high-angle fire missions from within dense vegetation clearings; crews effectively masked both their physical
presence and possibly prevented the undeniable flash of a rocket launch. The reliance on the natural canopy is
reinforced by a chief’s 360-degree assessment of every hide site; if a vehicle can be seen from any side or has
an exposed view of the sky, it is not viable for survival. As night fell, a new problem emerged.
Operational survival depends on disciplined signature management. Crews reduce their thermal footprint by
shutting down non-essential vehicle systems and applying cool foliage to engine compartments. Critical measures
like covering windshields and lights with camo netting or foliage prevent the glint of the sun or moon from
reflecting off glass surfaces. Additionally, dispersing assets within an operational area (OPAREA) prevents
drones from identifying an entire platoon; this broke up the collective thermal and visual signature.
Perhaps the most significant shift in TTPs is the integration of meteorological analysis into movement planning.
Rather than viewing harsh weather as an obstacle, the battery treated it as a priority movement window; the
rainier, windier and colder the conditions, the more effective the window. Since these conditions significantly
degrade a drone’s surveillance capabilities, they provided the necessary cover for cross-forward line of troops
(FLOT) raids. As a branch, we need to begin discussions of the transition from time-based (move every 30
minutes, every hour, etc.) to conditions-based movement criteria (rain windows, lack of vegetation,
temperature), allowing these high-demand assets to remain survivable and effective in high-threat environments.
Effectively planning movement windows is simply a piece of the puzzle; however, a materiel solution is a needed
framework.
Identifying the Necessities: A Layered Materiel and Doctrinal Defense
Survival against cheap, highly capable drones requires a layered defense where avoiding detection is paramount.
While using local foliage provides a temporary fix, its lack of durability underscores the need for a robust
materiel strategy. To effectively counter modern aerial surveillance, the military must adopt a comprehensive
approach that seamlessly integrates advanced technology with established tactics and training.
An immediate operational requirement is the procurement of multispectral camouflage systems at the firing
battery. HIMARS’s heat signature is its greatest liability. These advanced systems function as thermal blankets
and can mask the vehicle across visible, near-infrared, thermal and radar spectrums. This provides an active
defense to the thermal “spotlight effect” in cold weather. Furthermore, these systems should be augmented by
passive solutions, such as signature-suppressing paints. By reducing thermal output and absorbing radar energy,
these coatings degrade a drone operator’s ability to positively identify a high-value asset, enhancing crew
survivability.
Failing to invest in these materiel solutions shifts the burden of survival onto individual crews and junior
leaders. Without advanced concealment, commanders must accept greater risk, potentially limit their operational
tempo to harsh weather windows and select firing positions based purely on natural thermal cover rather than
tactical advantage. As the Army transitions, integrating live drone threats into training is no longer optional.
This integration is essential for developing a highly calculated “shoot and scoot” methodology, ensuring our
highest-demand assets can shoot, move, communicate and survive on the modern battlefield.
Train How We Fight: The Imperative of Realistic Battery-Level Training
The demand for innovation and deliberate, aggressive training plans has never been more critical. As a battery
commander, it is your fundamental duty to plan, prepare and resource training opportunities that challenge your
formation. We must push our sections and platoons to develop unique tactics, techniques and policies (TTPs) that
enhance survivability and lethality.
The simplest and most effective way to achieve this is through the integration of drones into our training plans
and certifications. The recent addition of drones to the battery’s Artillery Table progression proved to be an
essential tool during the deployment in EUCOM. This was not about administratively checking the box; it was
about fundamentally shifting the mindset.
By integrating UAS, we achieved several critical training objectives:
- Induce realistic stress: The presence of a persistent “eye in the sky” forced sections and platoons to
operate under realistic threat conditions, removing the “admin-tables” mentality.
- Identify vulnerabilities: Drones provide immediate feedback. They showed each HIMARS and FDC when and where
they were most vulnerable to enemy observation and attack.
- Force dynamic reactions: The battery used the drone’s perspective to issue immediate move orders or insert
vignettes, forcing platoons to react to a changing battlefield and execute casualty evacuation (CASEVAC)
procedures under pressure. The U.S. Army is already proving the effectiveness of this approach with
initiatives like “Project Shrike,” where AI-enabled drones reduce the task of calling for fire from minutes
to seconds.
The End Goal: Innovative and Adaptable Warfighters
The tenacious drone threat shows that concealment is the baseline for survival. While utilizing foliage and
weather windows demonstrate crew ingenuity, they are temporary solutions. To ensure the survivability of these
high-value assets, the Army must arm its batteries with the necessary equipment to survive, but this technology
is not a cure all. It must be validated through rigorous, realistic training that permanently integrates live
drone threats at every echelon. Only by understanding the materiel needs and integrating threat-based training
can the force survive and dominate the modern battlefield.
Reference
Lagueux, P., M. Gagnon, M. Kastek, T. Piątkowski, R. Dulski, and P. Trzaskawka. 2012. “Multispectral and
Hyperspectral Measurements of Smoke Candles and Soldier’s Camouflage Equipment.” In Electro Optical
Remote Sensing, Photonic Technologies, and Applications VI, vol. 8542, article 85420F. SPIE. https://doi.org/10.1117/12.977386 .