Moving to Survive

Transforming Artillery Training for Modern Warfare

By CPT Vincent Verdile

Article published on: April 1, 2026 in the 2026 e-Edition of Field Artillery

Read Time: < 13 mins

U.S. Army Soldiers from Alpha Battery, 2nd Battalion 29th Field Artillery Regiment at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, CA, execute calibration on the Paladin Vehicle to prepare for Decisive Action Rotation 14-10, Sept. 11, 2014. At the NTC, decisive action exercises provide a comprehensive approach to training Brigade Combat Teams in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Charles Probst)

Introduction

The Russian targeting cycle can be completed in just three minutes.1 In 180 seconds, a Russian observer can call for fire on a target and artillery rounds can destroy it. The Russo-Ukrainian conflict has provided practical experience for improving targeting with both Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and radar. Ukrainian artillery batteries are targeted by Russian lancet attack drones that saturate the battlefield and force artillery crews to constantly move and hide.2 In future potential conflict, American artillery batteries will have mere minutes to fire and displace before being targeted with counter-battery fire or attack drones.

As a Paladin platoon leader for two years, my battery struggled to displace and move from one Position Area for Artillery (PAA) to another both quickly and tactically throughout certifications and a training rotation at the National Training Center (NTC). During the day, it took at least 10 minutes to displace. At night, it once took over an hour to get the battery in a convoy formation and off a PAA. While batteries in Ukraine are focused on moving to survive, American artillery formations prioritize occupation time standards. My battery’s priority was being ready to fire, forgoing the situational awareness and land navigation skills required to avoid counter-battery fire and drone attacks. The transition to large-scale combat operations (LSCO) requires all self-propelled artillery Soldiers, NCOs, and officers to build and maintain a foundational understanding of the operational environment and the ability to navigate unfamiliar terrain both day and night.

Problem

Navigation

The primary means of navigation in the battery were the Army’s Joint Battle Command–Platform (JBC-P) and various cell phone applications. Maps were on hand, but graphical overlays were created by leadership and not distributed correctly. While JBC-Ps functioned adequately for battery and platoon leadership, the systems were unreliable for Paladin crews and Fire Direction Center (FDC) crews. This created an imbalance in the battery’s ability to delegate navigation throughout the battle space. Platoon leadership maintained the most situational awareness and had working navigation equipment. They led 90% of convoys between PAAs who then grew reliant on them to move from one place to another. While this is part of their role as leaders in a firing battery, this enabled the Section Chiefs, Ammo Team Chiefs, and FDCs to exclusively focus on their gunline tasks to the detriment of their understanding of the operational environment. In the absence of platoon leadership, their ability to navigate was inadequate. Track commanders and drivers were unable to determine their locations on a map. Additionally, more than 50% of howitzer and ammo crews could not read a map or use a protractor.

U.S. Soldiers, assigned to Field Artillery Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, prepare a firing position for their M777 howitzer during a direct fire exercise at the Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, Nov. 17, 2014. (U.S. Army photo by Visual Information Specialist Markus Rauchenberger)

The firing battery primarily fights with one working or “hot” FDC and one on-call or “cold” FDC, with all six Paladins located on the same PAA. The ability to physically operate as a battery will be severely limited in a near-peer conflict. Platoons need to be able to independently master the Field Artillery 2030 Strategy fundamentals of shoot, move, and communicate.3 This requires Soldiers at all levels to navigate without relying on leadership.

Situational Awareness

Howitzer crews struggled to stay aware of where they were on the battlefield, and where the forward line of troops (FLOT) was. This shortfall drastically decreased emergency fire mission proficiency. The time standard for an emergency fire mission outside of a designated PAA is 75 seconds, as outlined in TC 3-09.8.4 This requires a howitzer section to stop in an area that has adequate overhead clearing to fire, receive the fire mission data from the FDC, process the data, and fire the round. These missions occur during convoy operations while moving to a new PAA or logistics release point. While the howitzer requires an azimuth (directional reference point) from the FDC to point the tube in the direction of the intended target, situational awareness expedites the process. This awareness decreases the fire mission time substantially because Section Chiefs can take the initiative to move into position and wait for fire mission data. Relying on the FDC to point them in the right direction wastes time and lengthens the targeting cycle.

Battlefield awareness became significant at our NTC rotation. The battery created rudimentary security for each PAA, not fully aware of the enemy threat. Ammo crews positioned to watch flanks and avenues of approach were not given information about adjacent friendly units or templated enemy reconnaissance. These were often known by leaders with access to JBC-P but not passed down correctly. This relaxed approach to security was amplified by the overall lack of battlefield awareness. Most crews would be unable to answer questions regarding the direction of enemy approach nor the direction of approach for friendly logistics elements. This became even more of an issue at night with limited visibility and non-operational JBC-Ps. Crews lacked the correct information to act with initiative if faced with an approaching vehicle or convoy. This continued singular focus of processing fire missions and shooting rounds hindered the battery’s ability to create an adaptable and mentally agile formation.

Training Constraints

U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class John Williams, a High Mobility Rocket System crewmember assigned to Alpha Battery, 4th Battalion, 133rd Field Artillery Regiment, Texas Army National Guard, supporting 1st Cavalry Division, unloads the rockets from his vehicle prior to Table XII live fire exercise near Tapa, Estonia. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Cecil Elliott II)

Training constraints often limit the battery’s potential. Lack of land for training typically confined the battery to the same handful of PAAs. During a brigade exercise, the battery was forced to remain at the same PAA for two days due to limited space. This familiarity with the training area

and designated routes prevented leaders from improving land navigation skills and convoy operations in unfamiliar terrain. Larger events such as a Combined Arms Live-Fire Exercise (CALFEX) focus on expedited fires and the coordination needed between fire support teams both on the FLOT and the gunline. These training objectives forced commanders to ensure they were meeting time requirements and the targeting schedule to support the maneuver battalions and the brigade commander. While this training is vital, there is little emphasis on the survivability of the gunline. The priority remains on firing timely and accurate rounds. This results in Paladin platoons re-using the same firing points and not conducting survivability moves or displacement to standard.

Due to the inherent risk of firing live rounds in a training environment, the gunline does not move when rounds are fired. This ensures safe conduct and decreases the likelihood of mistakes but does not replicate the movement necessary to survive on a modern battlefield. To win the next fight, artillery batteries must have experience in firing live rounds while moving between PAAs.

Solution

Training Priorities

Self-propelled artillery leaders must prioritize training that focuses on increasing the gunline’s understanding of the operational environment and navigation skills. Platoon leaders should plan land navigation bi-annually for their formation. This will ensure all Soldiers understand and can practice the fundamentals of using a map to find their way in unfamiliar terrain. Land navigation is a diminishing skill that is overlooked in artillery formations but must be trained regularly.

U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to the Field Artillery Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, work together to establish and secure a tactical firing position for their M777 howitzer while conducting a direct fire exercise at the Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany on November 17, 2014. (U.S. Army photo by Visual Information Specialist Markus Rauchenberger)

Leaders should deliberately plan training to educate all Soldiers on how to operate and use a JBC-P. This navigation aid, when operational, is a vital tool that increases battlefield awareness and makes moving between PAAs easier than a traditional map. In conjunction with driver training, all NCOs should receive training and repetitions in leading mounted convoys through unfamiliar terrain both day and night. This will increase their confidence in navigation and help them gain a better understanding of the operational environment. Creating confusing routes and injecting scenarios that force leaders to consider their placement on the battlefield will create a more agile platoon. Implementing platoon operations and forcing communication at greater distances between platoon leaders, battery commanders, and FDCs will allow all leaders to gain more confidence in moving through the battlefield without relying on one another. Furthermore, realistic conditions can replicate survivability moves of an appropriate distance and the exercise of a communications plan.

Crucial to realistic training, while keeping safety in mind, is implementing live fire exercises that force the gunline to move between PAAs during or between fire missions. Platoons should not process hours of live missions and fire dozens of rounds without moving. Howitzer crews must conduct PAA internal survivability moves and practice moving to a new firing point. This will erode complacency and force leaders at all echelons to remain focused and vigilant for safe firing practices.

U.S. troopers, assigned to Bravo Battery, Field Artillery Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, move a M777 Howitzer to firing position for a live-fire exercise at the 7th Army Joint Multinational Training Command’s Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany. (U.S. Army photo by Visual Information Specialist Gertrud Zach/released)

A Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) should be created for map overlays. Every vehicle must have an overlay with a minimum of: all PAAs, main routes, adjacent units, Ambulance Exchange Points (AXP), and templated enemy locations. This overlay should be used to brief Soldiers at all levels to create a common understanding across the battery.

Rehearsals should prioritize communication, Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency (PACE) plans, and reacting to contact. The battery should have an established SOP for which radio frequency is being used for what purpose to reduce confusion and streamline communication. Formations should rehearse their coordination and movements leaving a PAA when receiving indirect or direct fire contact. Rehearsals should emphasize a shared understanding of the order of march, the destination, and the deliberate checks in place to ensure nobody is left behind, especially at night. Rehearsals for reacting to drones will allow crews to act quickly and prevent them from waiting for guidance. Rehearsals for direct fire or visual contact with enemy forces will allow crews conducting PAA security to take initiative and decrease reaction time.

Training Synchronization

While the current Field Artillery Home Station Training Strategy includes training and evaluation outlines (T&EO) to measure situational awareness and land navigation, implementation and testing is not consistent across formations.5 These specific training priorities are intended to emphasize and reinforce fundamentals that are becoming more important in LSCO. These additions should be implemented in conjunction with the natural progression of artillery tables. This will keep training guidance aligned with current doctrine and reduce confusion. Table 1 highlights the best times to include these additions during a normal training cycle.

“The intent of prioritizing situational awareness and land navigation in training is to create independent platoons that can displace and move quickly and effectively.”

Implementation and Measuring Success

Implementation should happen immediately during leader’s time training and free time in the training calendar. Hip pocket training on these topics is possible without any formal training plan. Generally, these additions should occur during the train up or in conjunction with artillery table certifications. Specifically, Level 1 tasks can be trained and assessed prior to or during the Artillery Skills Proficiency Test (ASPT). For Level 2-4 tasks, leaders should implement these additions into the training blocks already designated to prepare each echelon for their artillery table.

Minimal resources are necessary to ensure proper implementation. Level 1 tasks require a land navigation site and access to multiple vehicles with working JBC-Ps. Level 2 mounted land navigation requires access to a training area. If land cannot be reserved, crews can use roads to practice moving from one point to another. Level 2-4 live fire and movement is the most resource intensive. Leaders must carefully plan movement routes that do not violate overhead fire restrictions and have enough subject matter experts to ensure safety procedures are followed when moving with and around live ammunition.

Measuring success is largely subjective and based on each unit’s mission and operational environment. The intent of prioritizing situational awareness and land navigation in training is to create independent platoons that can displace and move quickly and effectively. Focusing on well-planned, rehearsed, and evaluated Level 1 tasks will ensure crews can perform to standard. Leaders should be cautious in expecting Soldiers to execute higher level tasks if they have not first mastered lower ones. Rushing to failure will not meet the intent of these priorities.

Conclusion

Field artillery leaders must rethink and reshape their training priorities to prepare for the next large-scale war. These are practical and straightforward solutions that can be implemented during leader’s time training at the lowest levels. Leaders must do more than focus on occupation time standards. Emphasis on situational awareness and navigation skills at all echelons will increase the survivability of the battery and enhance lethality to support maneuver forces for extended periods of time. Adding these training priorities strengthens artillery table qualifications and creates artillery platoons that can master the fundamentals of shoot, move, and communicate. While many of these concepts are second nature to maneuver formations, field artillery must make a conscious effort to move away from the static counterinsurgency fight and prepare for a fast-moving, multi-domain war.

U.S. Army Sgt. Sean Chaplin, a High Mobility Rocket System crewmember assigned to Alpha Battery, 4th Battalion, 133rd Field Artillery Regiment, Texas Army National Guard, supporting 1st Cavalry Division, looks out through the top hatch of his vehicle before a Table XII live fire exercise near Tapa, Estonia, Sept. 19, 2024. Table XII exercises consist of target identification, communication, and firing on target locations. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Cecil Elliott II)

Endnotes