Engineering Resilient Fire Support in LSCO

Electromagnetic Warfare Considerations

By WO1 Jesse Ojeda

July 17, 2026 | Field Artillery, 2026 E-Edition

Read Time: < 9 mins

A U.S. Soldier assigned to the 2nd Cavalry Regiment collects data to improve situational awareness of the electromagnetic spectrum during Spectrum Blitz 26 at the Hohenfels Training Area, Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Germany, June 23, 2026.As Europe’s premier electronic warfare (EW) competition, this metrics-based event challenges participating units across a realistic operational environment to validate platoon readiness, foster interoperability, and identify the top EW platoon in Europe. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Danil Pak)

Large-scale combat operations (LSCO) will reveal a chaotic environment where the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) is persistently contested and actively targeted. Peer and near-peer adversaries have demonstrated the ability to detect, disrupt and exploit friendly force emissions, placing the fires enterprise at particular risk of electromagnetic warfare (EW). Joint Publication (JP) 3-85, “Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations,” defines EW as “military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy.”1 This environment forces the fires warfighting function to rethink how they communicate, distribute their architecture and employ their sensors under an EW threat. Through disciplined management of emissions, physical and signal dispersion, robust communication plans, radar employment considerations and adaptive command and control (C2) structures, the fires community can engineer a more survivable fires architecture. It is imperative for fires planners to examine the vulnerabilities of degraded communications, understand signal discipline and dispersion and consider radar survivability to implement a positive way forward while operating in LSCO.

Degraded Communications

When preparing for LSCO, it is essential to consider the capabilities of our peer and near-peer threats that could cause catastrophic disruptions in our lines of communication and directly affect our ability to deliver accurate fires. Communication degradation in LSCO is not a matter of if, but when. Field Manual (FM) 3-0 cautions Army leaders on this point, warning that communication with no electromagnetic signature may, at times, be the norm.2 Commanders must rely on solid primary, alternate, contingency and emergency (PACE) communication plans to incorporate adaptability into how they relay their intent and guidance concerning mission objectives. Overreliance on tactical satellite (TACSAT) communications and upper tactical internet to achieve a successful kill chain is no longer an effective procedure.3 Contested multidomain operations (MDO) in future warfare demand the engineering of flexible digital and voice communication pathways and a strong C2 structure.

Sensor → Detect → Report → Process → Decide → Engage → Assess
Sensor-To-Shooter Link

Tested and validated standard operating procedures for a degraded operational environment will help enable a resilient fires network capable of working through technological disadvantages rather than being paralyzed by them. Recognizing these shortfalls in LSCO is not meant to discourage technological innovation, but to emphasize the importance of establishing resilient communication pathways. A resilient fires network represents the difference between shaping the operational environment and striking long-range targets with precision, versus failing to set conditions and delivering inaccurate fires.4 The current Russian-Ukrainian conflict demonstrates that even advanced systems have minimal advantage without communication integrity and adaptable kill-chain architectures.5 As the possibility of a fragmented fires enterprise becomes more prevalent in LSCO, field artillery units must increase interoperability between echelons and develop proficiency in degraded operations—building resilient, survivable and effective fires processes.

Threats in the EMS

• Electronic Attack (Jamming)

• Electronic Deception

• Signal Intercept

• Precision Fires

• Cyber Attack

Radar Survivability Principles

• Minimize Emissions

• Short Emission Windows

• Displace Frequently

• Deceive the Enemy

• Use Terrain & Cover

• Integrate with EW

• Maintain Situational Awareness

Signal Discipline and Dispersion

The inherent risk in operating within a denied, degraded and disrupted space operational environment (D3SOE) makes signal discipline and dispersion central to preserving the integrity of the fires enterprise. Fire supporters who are not cognizant of their electromagnetic signatures risk the safety of their fire support systems, networks and sensor-to-shooter links. Failing in this aspect creates detectable nodes, increasing the likelihood of exploitation by adversarial intelligence and targeting systems. However, complete cessation of all electromagnetic activity is also not the solution; this in itself can be revealing, as sudden silence may indicate movement or imminent action.6 Patterns of emission, whether from constant digital traffic, repetitive transmission schedules or high-volume fire mission activity, can provide adversaries with actionable targeting data, complicating sensor-to-shooter linkages and threatening the survivability of a successful kill chain.

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict showcases the consequences of operating in a contested EMS, demonstrating that electronic warfare and cyber interference can fragment centralized C2 networks.7 In counterfire operations, transmitting targeting data and coordinating fires must be decisive, especially when survivability is measured in seconds. Complex fire mission processing procedures, typically implemented in centralized control, require multiple echelons of digital communication, creating observable concentrations of activity within the EMS. It’s these emissions that make command posts easier to detect and exploit, fundamentally exposing the vulnerability of centralized fire architectures and persistent emissions. This potential for exposure reinforces the necessity of signal discipline and dispersion to preserve responsive, accurate fires.

Radar Survivability

Radar employment and survivability look vastly different when comparing counterinsurgency (COIN) operations to LSCO, particularly when the EMS is expected to be contested. Prolonged COIN campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan occurred within largely permissive electromagnetic environments. This contributed to a decline in U.S. focus on electronic warfare proficiency, while peer and near-peer adversaries honed their ability to exploit the EMS.8 When the EMS proves to be a decisive domain, it fundamentally alters how radars are employed to maintain their survivability. Gone are the days of employing consistent cueing for ample radar coverage and collocating with tactical operations centers. Current technological advancements discourage the use of continuous and on-off cueing schedules because they may be ineffective against peer or near-peer adversaries.9

Within LSCO, radar survivability requires accounting for the lethal and nonlethal effects of war to maintain functional accuracy. This creates a continuous race between detection and displacement, frequent jamming, and deception. Russian forces have demonstrated their effectiveness in executing electronic disinformation, using the Krasukha-4 to generate false targets, thereby prompting Ukraine to respond and reveal its force positions.10 In a contested EMS, every radar emission makes the system vulnerable to electronic attack and compresses the survivability window for both the sensor and the counterfire fight it supports. Radars can no longer be viewed as static sensing assets, but instead as maneuver elements whose survival depends on continuous competition between acquiring targets and avoiding detection. This forces fire support planners to deliberately employ radars and account for appropriate positioning.

Disciplined Emissions + Positional Dispersion + Rapid Execution = SURVIVABLE KILL CHAINS

A Way Forward

If the fires enterprise is to survive and remain responsive in a contested electromagnetic environment, it must institutionalize resilient PACE communication plans, reduce reliance on persistent emissions and deliberately balance when to operate in a centralized versus decentralized command-support relationship. A survivable PACE communication framework is paramount for fire support and directly affects sensor-to-shooter linkage. Success depends on consistent training across all communication platforms, enabling Soldiers to become more attuned to various system capabilities and ensuring adaptability in D3SOEs. Overreliance on a single radio frequency band, such as TACSAT, weakens the fire support network, resulting in a poorly executed PACE communications plan.11 Evolving beyond persistent emissions requires deliberate management of electromagnetic signatures and effective use of dispersion techniques to sow doubt and ambiguity around how an organization plans to execute its scheme of fires. In LSCO, failing to consider both runs the risk of becoming high-value targets to enemy forces.

FM 3-0 explains that when the threat of enemy fires is prevalent, commanders should consider adopting decentralized operations and dispersing their electromagnetic footprints through smaller C2 nodes.12 Within this construct, decentralized execution and the employment of quick-fire channels offer a plausible solution. Quick-fire channels, as defined in FM 3-09, limit user involvement to enable rapid target prosecution while maintaining desired control; this streamlines the fire mission process without sacrificing oversight.13 Such architecture in LSCO must be strongly considered and deliberately employed to limit electromagnetic signatures and facilitate expedited fires and compressed sensor-to-shooter timelines. All of these elements are particularly vital in counterfire operations to preserve combat effectiveness, responsiveness and survivability. Ultimately, the future of the fires enterprise in LSCO, under threat of EW, will not depend solely on technological innovations but also on its ability to manage emissions and adapt its architecture to be advantageous within the EMS.

Conclusion

Contested domains are the reality in LSCO. The EMS poses several challenges that will test the fires community more than any prior conflict. To maintain responsive and accurate indirect fire, the fires enterprise must develop survivable PACE communication plans that promote interoperability across all echelons, balance centralized and decentralized execution and minimize observable emissions. Radars must be treated as maneuverable assets rather than as stationary weapons-locating sensors. Furthermore, training should deliberately ensure personnel are proficient across all communication platforms, especially when operating in a degraded environment. Technological innovation is a piece of the puzzle when discussing success in LSCO under the threat of EW. Still, the fires community must not forget the importance of being disciplined in how it executes fires to support maneuver so it can thrive in a contested EMS operational environment.

References