Improving Corps Deep Fires
NATO’s Innovations for U.S. Forces
By LTC Scott Clark
| Field Artillery,
2026 E-Edition
Read Time:
< 10 mins
Spc. Sean Reyes, a vehicle operator assigned to 2nd Battalion, 20th
Field Artillery Regiment, 75th Field Artillery Brigade, Fort Sill, OK,
fires an M240B machine gun from the rear of a convoy during a convoy
live-fire qualification course on August 25, 2019, at Fort Sill. In
addition to the convoy live-fire qualification course, the Soldiers of
the ‘Deep Strike’ Battalion spent nearly two weeks in the field being
evaluated on their ability to complete their required taskings while
competing in the best-by competition. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Dustin D.
Biven / 75th Field Artillery Brigade)
The defense of NATO’s Eastern Flank will be decided in the deep fight,
where air and land fires must synchronize, converge, and defeat enemy
forces in depth. The war in Ukraine demonstrates that both sides can
effectively mass thousands of fires daily, driving NATO to experiment with
new ways to shorten the kill chain and seize the initiative. U.S. forces
have an opportunity to learn from these NATO-led efforts, drawing on
operational experience to adopt Alliance innovations that increase
lethality, responsiveness, and interoperability in corps deep fires.
Whereas brigades and divisions once served as the principal operational
units during the peace support and counterinsurgency era, tailored
operational habits formed that still linger today. That strategic
environment was defined by a low tolerance for risk, deliberate decision
cycles, and a relatively slow operational tempo. As a result, missions
were often designed to be nearly risk-free—at the cost of speed,
adaptability, and overall effectiveness.1
As we pivot toward Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO), however, that
legacy mindset presents real challenges. Preparing for LSCO requires more
than updated tactics—it demands a fundamental rethinking of how we plan,
synchronize, and execute operations. The modern battlespace introduces
exponentially more airspace users, extended system ranges, and compressed
decision timelines. These dynamics call for an evolved approach to command
and control—one that prioritizes agility and operational effectiveness,
even amid uncertainty and risk.
To achieve this shift, three NATO concepts stand out: corps-level Joint
Air-Ground Integration Centers (JAGICs), the Air Support Operations Center
(ASOC) Battle Management Area (ABMA), and the Rear Artillery Tube Line
(RATL). The JAGIC is a current operations staff cell combining fires,
targeting, intelligence, and airspace experts to enable rapid, integrated
targeting decisions. The ABMA is a notional sector of airspace managed by
the ASOC to simplify vertical and horizontal deconfliction while
integrating air support. The RATL is a procedural line marking the
rearward extent of tube artillery fires to help aircraft manage risk.
Developed and refined through NATO experimentation, these concepts
illustrate how the Alliance is modernizing air-land integration. Together,
they shorten the kill chain, reduce risk, and maximize the combat power of
Allied fires. More importantly, they represent a shift from incremental
adjustments to a comprehensive approach—one that should prompt U.S. forces
to rethink how corps deep fires are coordinated, controlled, and
integrated at scale.
Spc. Sean Reyes, a vehicle operator assigned to 2nd Battalion, 20th
Field Artillery Regiment, 75th Field Artillery Brigade, Fort Sill, OK,
looks down the sights of an M240B machine gun and fires from the rear of
a convoy during a convoy live-fire qualification course on August 25,
2019, at Fort Sill. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Dustin D. Biven / 75th
Field Artillery Brigade)
The Challenge of Air-Land Integration
In LSCO, airspace deconfliction and targeting coordination are constant
challenges. A major European theater conflict could generate thousands of
daily fires deconflictions and hundreds of air support requests.
Traditional airspace coordination measures (ACMs) and fire support
coordination measures (FSCMs) refined during recent decades of
low-intensity conflict are insufficient at this scale.
Current U.S. tools—such as coordinating altitude (CA), coordination level
(CL), and special ACMs like restricted operating zones (ROZs), goalposts,
and hotwalls—can work in limited contexts but are poorly suited to LSCO’s
density and tempo. ROZs and goalposts require deliberate planning and
often delay responsive or mobile fires, while hotwalls are highly
restrictive and can shut down large volumes of airspace. UAS proliferation
further complicates the picture, adding persistent demands on airspace
management and targeting.
Figure 1. Corps-level JAGIC Conceptual Placement. (Photo provided by
Author)
U.S. forces typically employ JAGICs at the division level, but NATO
experimentation shows that shifting these functions to the corps
echelon—supported by ABMAs and RATLs—creates a permissive fires
environment with the flexibility and authority needed to keep pace with an
adversary’s overwhelming firepower.2
Corps-Level JAGICs
Though U.S. doctrine places the JAGIC at the division level to consolidate
fires, airspace, and targeting personnel in one integrated node, NATO
found greater efficiency by elevating the JAGIC to the corps. The 1
German-Netherlands Corps (1GNC) and the U.K.’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
(ARRC) tested corps JAGICs, demonstrating their ability to manage deep
fires, prosecute suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) missions more
effectively with fixed-wing aircraft, and integrate corps-level artillery,
intelligence, electronic warfare, naval gunfire, and aviation into the
deep fight.3
Figure 2. Corps-level JAGIC Positions & Layout (Photo provided by
author)
In NATO exercises, division JAGICs struggled to maintain a shortened kill
chain because most target engagement authorities (TEAs), fires rules of
engagement (ROE), and collateral damage estimate (CDE) requirements reside
at corps or higher. Positioning the JAGIC at corps allows commanders to
rapidly approve dynamic targeting decisions without waiting for divisions
to elevate requests. Corps are also more consistently equipped with the
appropriate digital fires and targeting systems to meet target selection
standards and support faster decisions. NATO found that corps JAGICs can
cut joint fires deconfliction timelines to under six minutes.4
Challenges remain. Divisions may hesitate to relinquish joint fires
integration capability or ACM control, given its traditional home at
division level. Manning is also an issue—especially for the ASOC, which
requires highly trained personnel scarce across the Alliance.
Additionally, supporting every division with a JAGIC is nearly impossible.
Recent Allied exercises and NATO’s Air-Land Integration Symposium
highlighted both the benefits and challenges: Field Artillery Professional
Bulletin: E-Edition ground components welcomed faster approvals and more
coherent multidomain integration, while some air components raised
concerns about standardizing multinational airspace procedures across
diverse corps. These concerns emphasize that important doctrinal details
must be refined, but both corps and divisions are increasingly receptive.
Notably, III Armored Corps’ recent Warfighter successfully experimented
with the corps JAGIC, concluding that the corps echelon is the proper
level for managing airspace as a weapon system.5
The ASOC Battle Management Area (ABMA)
The ABMA is a new Allied Air Command (AIRCOM) concept under
experimentation. Because the ASOC is a mandatory component of the JAGIC,
the ABMA aims to simplify and accelerate tactical airspace control.
Traditional deconfliction—using CA, CL, and the fire support coordination
line (FSCL)—has proven cumbersome at scale. The ABMA addresses this by
delegating airspace to the corps to subdivide into three or four sectors
from the close area to the FSCL. This enables flexibility, direct control,
and responsiveness for combat engagements and dynamic targeting.
ABMAs also support broader AIRCOM constructs. Air Power Contribution to
Counter-Land Operations (APCLO) depends on clear airspace structures,
while Composite Air Operations (COMAO) require predictable coordination.
The ABMA provides a framework for integrating land fires rapidly into
APCLO and COMAO.
Though promising, ABMAs are not yet codified in NATO doctrine. Recent 1GNC
and ARRC exercises using ABMA constructs reduced deconfliction from hours
to minutes, demonstrating both potential and challenges—particularly
aligning procedures across nations and ensuring common digital airspace
visualization tools.6
The ABMA’s upper limit often aligns with the CA—typically mid-20,000 feet
above mean sea level (around FL250) to account for mortar and cannon
ordnance.7
This is insufficient for rocket artillery, whose maximum ordnance heights
overlap with manned and unmanned flight corridors. GMLRS, for example, can
reach 71,000 feet, forcing reconsideration of traditional CA settings.
Figure 3. ABMA Structure
Therefore, ABMA planning must align its upper limit with rocket
artillery’s maximum ordinate. Mortars and cannon fires are unaffected, but
missile fires such as ATACMS and PrSM (exceeding 180,000 feet) can remain
excluded due to their rarity and requirement for deliberate
deconfliction.8
Aligning ABMAs with rocket artillery enables greater freedom of action for
land-based fires while allowing a corps JAGIC to coordinate with the air
component for fires exceeding the ABMA limit.9
The growing use of UAS further reinforces the need for this framework.
The Rear Artillery Tube Line (RATL)
The RATL is another AIRCOM concept providing a procedural control measure
identifying the most rearward position from which tube artillery fires are
expected. It informs friendly aircraft where tube artillery is firing,
helping manage risk with minimal restriction on land-based fires.
During the 2025 Joint Project Optic Windmill (JPOW), 1GNC validated the
RATL as part of integrated air and missile defense. AIRCOM proposed
refinements at its annual Weapons and Tactics (WEPTAC) seminar. The RATL
allowed corps along NATO’s Eastern Flank to maintain responsive
counterfire without pausing for aircraft clearance. Aircraft could cross
the RATL by assuming calculated risk coordinated through a corps JAGIC.
NATO analysis found the statistical risk of artillery fratricide against
aircraft to be negligible (fewer than one in one million flight hours when
firing 1,000 rounds per hour). With Allied artillery already outnumbered
by Russia five-to-one, commanders should accept this risk rather than
restrict land fires.10
Figure 4. RATL Application
Challenges remain; air components require improved digital visualization
and standardized procedures for crossing the RATL. JPOW reinforced the
need for multinational exercises to reconcile procedural differences and
build confidence.
RATLs also help air components understand ground battlespace measures by
aggregating Artillery Manoeuvre Areas (AMAs) across multiple corps. While
AMAs designate artillery employment areas, the RATL provides a simpler
procedural reference for where fires originate across a broad battlespace.
The original RATL excluded rockets and SRBMs. Given the expected volume of
rocket fire in LSCO, this paper proposes adapting the RATL to include
rockets but continue excluding SRBMs (PrSM, ATACMS, KTSSM, Predator Hawk).
Rocket maximum ordinates create natural intersections with aircraft flight
paths, so the RATL offers a clear procedural reference to manage this
risk.
Notes
1.
Rienk Sijbrandi. "The Brigade Deep Battle." Field Artillery Bulletin
(2022). Available at:
https://www.fieldartillery.org/news/the-brigade-deep-battle.
2.
RAND Corporation. Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltics Through
Resilience and Resistance. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2022. Available at:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2779.html.
3.
Sarah Fortin and Pasquale Masone. "Air-Land Integration: Bridging the
Gaps in Joint Force Education and Training." The Journal of the JAPCC,
Ed. 33 (2022). Available at:
https://www.japcc.org/articles/air-land-integration-bridging-the-gaps-in-joint-with-force-education-and-training/.
4.
NATO exercise reporting on JAGIC deconfliction timelines.
5.
John Bradley, David Chapman, and Stoney Grimes. "Army Optimization of
Airspace as a Weapon System: The Argument for Corps JAGICs." Field
Artillery Journal. Issue 1 (2025).
6.
NATO. Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.3.5 Air-Land Integration Planning
Guidance. Brussels: NATO Standardization Office; NATO Allied Air
Command. Manual 80-6.1, ch. 3 (COMAO).
7.
NATO Standardization Office. AJP-3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and
Space Operations. Brussels: NSO, latest ed.
8.
U.S. Army. Technical Manual TM 9-1425-646-10: Operator's Manual for
Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS); data on GMLRS and ATACMS maximum
ordinates.
9.
Erhan Güleç and Shawn Kelley. "Integrating the Blue and Green Domains."
The Journal of the JAPCC, Ed. 40 (2025). Available at:
https://www.japcc.org/articles/integrating-the-blue-and-green-domains/.
10.
David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson. Reinforcing Deterrence on
NATO's Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics. Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016. Available at:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html.