Centralized vs. Decentralized Fires in the Brigade Combat Team
By John-Connor Redmond CPT, FA
Article published on: May 5, 2025 in the Field Artillery 2025 E-edition
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< 7 mins
Introduction
This paper aims to
provide doctrinal references and lessons learned for the Fires enterprise at the Brigade Combat Team level
conducting Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). The units of focus for this paper are the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Fires Support enterprise down
to the individual Forward Observers (FOs), the Direct Support (DS) FA Battalion (BN), and the Firing Battery
Fire Direction Centers (FDCs). The primary audience for this paper is Brigade (BDE) and BN Fire Support Officers
and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), Field Artillery Battalion Staff Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers,
Firing Battery Commanders, and First Sergeants. This paper is a collaboration of key developmental billet
complete Observer Coach Trainers (OC/Ts) with an aggregate of 70 rotations of experience at the National
Training Center (NTC) Fort Irwin, CA.
The three areas of focus
consist of defining centralized/decentralized fires and dispelling common fallacies, discussing when either
should be implemented along with associated prerequisites necessary for higher degrees of decentralized control
and providing examples of successful implementation of decentralized control. Common themes observed have been a
need for more understanding and trust in the fires enterprise to execute a decentralized control of fires due to
lack of detailed planning, insufficient training, or understanding of the degrees of control that can be
implemented before arriving at NTC. This paper seeks to provide doctrinal references and common successful
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) to be utilized by the BCT Fires enterprise to enable the maneuver win
the BDE’s first fight.
Defining Centralized vs.
Decentralized Control
In order to adequately define centralized and
decentralized control of fires, it is essential to discuss them regarding the acronym AWIFM-N, which describes
the principles of Fire Support execution (FM 3-09 pg. 1-15 para. 1-40). Specifically, this paper will focus on
“weighting the main effort” and “maximizing feasible centralized control”. Doctrine defines centralized or
decentralized as those that need to meet certain criteria to be considered one or the other. FM 3-09 discusses
centralized and decentralized control as a spectrum in which the tactical situation will dictate the optimum
degree of control necessary for a given operation.
Additionally, it is important
to acknowledge that doctrine interprets centralized and decentralized differently depending on which echelon is
being discussed. At the BCT echelon ATP 3-09.42 discusses options for sensor to shooter linkages with varying
degrees of control (ATP 3-09.42 pg. 5-30 to pg. 5-33); this is the common understanding of the methods of
control. However, at the FA BN level, ATP 3-09.23 refers to centralized and decentralized control as two forms
of tactical fire direction. Centralized control is Battery operations, and all fire requests are routed through
the BCT Fires Cell (FC) and the FA BN. Decentralized refers to platoon-based operations and the use of data
linkages and quickfire channels that bypass some or all of the normal intervening operations facilities (ATP
3-09.23 pg. 5-3 para. 5-15). No matter the echelon, the two methods of control are purposely referred to as a
spectrum to allow the fires enterprise the flexibility of combining varying degrees of control at different
echelons to create timely, accurate fires and enable the maneuver to defeat the enemy where the commander
chooses.
The two major fallacies
attributed to centralized and decentralized control are that of Direct Support (DS) and positioning guidance.
While the DS relationship is a degree of decentralization, it is at the far end of the control spectrum. It is a
common misconception that inside a BCT, decentralized control means a maneuver battalion will get a DS
Battery or platoon during an operation. Other measures, such as quickfire nets and appropriate priority of
fires, can be utilized to provide timely fires while mitigating the risk associated with a DS Battery. The
second fallacy concerns the FA BN and the positioning guidance of its firing units. Decentralization of control
within the FA BN does not mean the batteries determine the platoon positioning guidance. Put simply, it involves
the FA BN in producing a more detailed plan to determine the positioning of platoons, not just the batteries.
Decentralization of control is not just pushing responsibilities to lower headquarters (HQs) but also producing
detailed, permissive plans that enable the elimination of nodes in the kill chain to expedite fires.
Examples of Successful Decentralized Control Options
Centralization vs
Decentralization in the Offense and Defense
When determining the degree of centralized or
decentralized control, FM 3-09 provides guidelines for whether it is a defensive or offensive operation. Higher
degrees of centralized control are normally more appropriate in the defense since the enemy has the initiative.
Therefore, the commander cannot afford to dissipate fires capabilities on secondary priorities before
determining the enemy’s main effort. In the offense, the degree of control can lean more decentralized because
friendly forces have the initiative and will have a greater need for responsive fires (FM 3-09 pg. 3-37 para.
3-96). These guidelines nest directly with the aforementioned tenets of AWIFM-N; “weighting the main effort” and
“maximizing feasible centralized control”.
Prerequisites for
Decentralized Control
BCT after BCT, the Wolf Team observed a tendency
to higher degrees of centralized control of fires in both the offense and defense. The lack of successful
decentralized control of fires is due to two factors: a lack of training appropriate sensor-to-shooter linkages
and a lack of detailed, permissive planning.
Decentralized control of fires is
observed to be avoided because the trust has not been built with a
proper training progression. Additionally, if the BCT does attempt decentralization of control for the first
time at NTC, it is likely to be unsuccessful, which further degrades trust with maneuver commanders and within
the fires enterprise. Critical to the ability to deliver decentralized fires is the fires enterprise’s ability
to build and maintain the necessary data linkages or lines of communication and train them prior to executing at
NTC. A regular, robust Digital Sustainment Training (DST) plan, preferably signed by the BCT commander, is
essential in giving the Fire Supporters and the FA BN FDCs the necessary repetitions to be successful. This DST
plan must be used to identify Command and Control (C2) requirements and shortfalls of participating units to
give the BDE FSO, FSCOORD, and BCT commander a realistic picture of what decentralized degree of control the BCT
can implement. Additionally, although these sensor-to-shooter linkages are decentralized, they could have to be
resourced by echelons not in the linkage to ensure communications. A prime example would be utilizing a BDE
retransmission team to ensure a quickfire net is viable at the extended distances projected during the conflict.
After validation of decentralization capability through DST, the BCT Fires enterprise should use the
pre-existing Artillery Table progression or company/BN CALFEXs to demonstrate competency and build trust.
Once mutual trust in a BCT fires enterprise’s capability to decentralize fires is
built, emphasis must be placed on creating a permissive battlefield to employ them. First, the supported units
must have Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCMs) and Air Coordination Measures (ACMs) that ensure air space
remains clear for the firing unit or allows for expedient clearing of air space. The sensor and shooter must
understand the coordinating altitude (CA) and the range at which the decentralized firing unit breaks the CA.
Additionally, supported units must efficiently provide ground clearance through accurate, common operating
picture and permissive FSCMs. The second variable in achieving effective decentralized fires is disseminating
and understanding the High Pay-off Target List, Attack Guidance Matrix, and Target Selection Standards
(HPTL-AGM-TSS or HAT). Too often, OC/Ts observe the trend of BCTs attempting to implement a quickfire net
straight from sensor to shooter without setting those subordinate units up for success. Centralized planning at
the BDE must be utilized to make the battlefield permissive.
Conclusion
Centralized and Decentralized control is a
spectrum of varying degrees of control that the mission determines. Centralized control lends it to be used in
defensive operations because of the flexibility to mass fires that the commander retains. The responsiveness of
more decentralized fires allows commanders to seize opportunities created by taking the initiative in offensive
operations. The observed trend is centralized fires in the BCT. Trust built through robust training of alternate
kill chains and detailed, permissive planning has proven to enable maneuver to defeat the enemy where the BDE
chooses.
Bibliography
Headquarters, Department of Army. March 2016. ATP 3-09.42, Fire Support for the Brigade Combat Team. Washington, D.C.: Army Techniques Publication.
Headquarters, Department of Army. September 2015. ATP 3-09.23, The Field Artillery Cannon Battalion. Washington, D.C.: Army Techniques Publication.
Headquarters, Department of Army. August 2024. FM 3-09, Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations. Washington, D.C.: Army Techniques Publication.
Author
CPT John C. Redmond has served in both the PACOM and EUCOM theaters in both fire direction and fire support roles. Key
experiences include serving as BN FDO during a Korean Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) rotation with 1/3ID, Battle Group
Poland FSO ISO Enhanced Forward Presence and Archer Battery commander training partner and allied nations both gunnery
and fire support with the M777. These experiences, combined with two years spent at the National Training Center on Wolf
Team observing multiple brigade combat teams, helped to identify the trends and recommendations outlined in this
article.