Talent Management of Critically Short Military Occupational Specialties

Observations of Current Processes and Recommendations for Change

By CW4 Chris Ludwick - Field Artillery Warrant Officer Career Manager

October 1, 2024 | Field Artillery, 2024 E-Edition

Read Time: < 9 mins

Intro

Over the course of the last four years, the Army has made tremendous improvements to its personnel management systems and processes. Beginning with the introduction of the Army Talent Alignment Process (ATAP) in 2019, followed by the release of the Integrated Personnel and Pay System – Army (IPPS-A) in 2023. The total force has witnessed firsthand just how serious the Army has become about truly placing people at the forefront. No longer are officers and units forced to speculate on what’s available to them. Thanks to ATAP, there is a collaborative environment from which to formulate educated decisions based on officer preferences and unit requirements.

Despite the numerous benefits of IPPS-A, it is ATAP that has had the largest impact on talent management and distribution. In its basic form, ATAP is a market-style hiring system that aligns officers and units based on preferences from both sides of the equation. The overwhelming benefit of this style of talent management is that it provides unprecedented levels of visibility to officers participating and searching for new employment and to units on the hunt for fresh talent. There will be more discussion of ATAPs structure later, but first, it’s important to highlight the two components that make it effective: inventory and demand.

Assignment variety, one of ATAP’s hallmark characteristics, only exists when the balance of officers participating matches a high percentage of known vacancies for a given Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) and grade. Put simply, job or assignment location diversity only occurs if there are enough personnel to fill more than just the Army’s highest priorities. For many MOSs, the task of creating diversity through inventory availability is relatively easy for junior grades such as Warrant Officer One (WO1) and Chief Warrant Officer Two (CW2), making the ATAP market the ideal mechanism to distribute personnel. However, at senior grades, it is not.

The remainder of this article will narrow the personnel management aperture to focus specifically on the Field Artillery Technician, a warrant officer MOS deemed critically short based on current and projected available strength and overall demand from the operational Army. It will discuss in detail, this unique cohort and highlight several reasons to change the way we manage and distribute talent within the force, primarily for senior grades.

Background

For a young officer preparing for their first move, talent management pre-ATAP appeared very “fluid” from the outside looking in. One could say it was less structured and lacked the transparency of ATAP. Approximately nine months before reaching their Year/Month Available to Move (YMAV) they would have a simple, yet effective conversation with their career manager to discuss professional development needs and personal desires. This conversation typically ended with the career manager requesting a list of locations to which the officer and if applicable, their family, would be comfortable moving. The general assumption is that one of the locations provided aligned with both the needs of the Army and the officers wishes. If not, each side would go back to the drawing board to determine the best fit. Ultimately, the moving officer would receive orders to a new location and the cycle would begin all over again.

Talent Management in the 21st Century

From the onset, ATAP was highly effective at managing the distribution of Soldiers across the Army. Units were able to interview and select personnel from a pool of talent while warrant officers participating in the market had incredible insight and influence over their own careers. As we exited the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, entering what many believed would be a period of relative peace and stability for the Army, the future of ATAP was bright.

Despite the overwhelming success, there is still something missing in terms of assignment variety, especially for those warrant officers who are part of specialties that are well below optimal strength. Personnel falling into this category tend to have fewer options based on the low inventory of personnel moving in each cycle. Unfortunately, they typically end up relocating from one high-tempo unit to the next with little time to conduct a personal or professional assessment of their career, compete for a broadening assignment and maybe most importantly, reconnect with family. To the Army’s detriment, warrant officers finding themselves in a continuous cycle of fast-paced activity inevitably elect to retire and seek employment elsewhere.

Challenges

The term “burnt out” is commonly used to describe an individual’s mental and physical state as it relates to their daily activities, work environment or personal life. For many mid and senior grade Field Artillery Technicians, this is a common reality. To get a better understanding of why it has such an impact, we must take a closer look at the basic characteristics of the group.

Most of the current Field Artillery CW3s and CW4s matured through the Army’s enlisted ranks navigating the continual rotation of forces combatting terrorism around the world. They successfully completed numerous overseas assignments, extended training exercises and have largely put the needs of the unit above all else. In an effort to find a different perspective of the Army, they submit an application to become a warrant officer, are eventually selected and are placed right back into the fray as a brand new WO1. Outside of schooling and time for a brief move from one location to the next, they have done little to alter the rigorous pace experienced while serving as an Enlisted Soldier.

Warrant officers who’ve lost their drive or willingness to serve are becoming more common each day. It’s not that they’re underperformers or lack technical expertise; it’s simply because they have reprioritized what they see as being most important. While making the decision to willingly depart the Army is a deeply personal choice, there are cascading effects that occur with the loss of each one. In this instance, their departure represents one less Soldier available to move which equates to fewer assignment options for those remaining and one more unit in need of the skills this MOS provides.

The Need for Change in Distribution Strategy

A low inventory of Officers participating in a market leading to a lack of diversity and assignment opportunity is a challenging problem to solve. However, one could suggest the realignment of all technical warrant officers, or at a minimum, those deemed critically short, to one cycle per year. The summer movement cycle is likely the best choice given the fact that many mid-career Officers have school aged children and prefer to move between academic years to lessen the burden on their families. Besides the obvious personal benefits, this approach would also ensure a decent balance of broadening and operational assignments from which to interview for since there would be an approximately 30% increase in the quantity of movers participating in the market. The downfall with this course of action is that it would force those families who prefer to move in the winter to adjust their plans, potentially increasing friction within their homes.

The second option could be described as a balanced merger of talent management processes. The Army could give career managers a bit more flexibility and allow them to blend current systems and practices with those in existence prior to ATAP. The basic premise is to permit career managers of understrength MOSs to receive a preference list of potential assignments from the Officers identified to move who are of the grade CW3 through CW5 and work to place them on assignment to one of those locations. The biggest friction here is that the gaining unit no longer gets a vote in who they receive. However, one of the largest benefits would be that the Army is once again placing a degree of career control in the hands of the officer and potentially giving them more input than they would have participating in a market with limited assignment options.

The third and final course of action is a bit more radical and the most likely to draw criticism. Nonetheless, it is worth consideration. With such high demand for quality warrant officers at senior grades in our most influential positions, the Field Artillery branch should research the possibility of establishing panels to determine which Officers fill each assignment. For example, the Field Artillery Commandant, with concurrence from Human Resources Command, could hold an annual selection panel to align talent to the highest priorities across the Army. Using a fraction of the information available to members of promotion selection boards, a small panel of senior Field Artillery leaders could determine “best fit” based on knowledge, skills and behaviors (KSB). Officers competing for positions under review of the panel would have their voices heard by submitting a preference sheet rank ordering the entirety of available options. The downside to this course of action is that it could appear as a “good-ole boy” system where Officers were being aligned to certain jobs based on their personal relationships instead of past performance or career progression.

Supporting this effort is the fact that over the past few years, the Army has slowly shifted from a brigade combat team (BCT) centric force to a pre-Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) structure where the division is the unit of action and focal point of operations in armed conflict. Inside most specialties, jobs are delineated by importance to the formation in which they operate and the doctrinal mission of the organization. For example, CW4 Field Artillery Technicians serving in the operational force at the two-star level, to include special operations and cyber, as the units senior Targeting Officer are of immense importance. They have a great deal of influence and responsibility to facilitate the targeting process on behalf of the commander and to conduct talent management of the Field Artillery Technicians residing in their subordinate units. Within the same field, corps, theater fires command or element and Multi-Domain Task Force Targeting Officers serve a similar role and require a highly talented senior CW4 or CW5 to ensure maximum efficiency. When looking at the MOS from a broadening or force generating perspective, positions such as the Field Artillery Proponent warrant officer, career manager and warrant officer Instruction Branch Course Manager require an equal degree of talent. The challenge in front of the Field Artillery Branch continues to be on-hand strength versus organizational need.

Conclusion

We know the Army has made tremendous strides in talent management and distribution and have developed systems that are very successful. However, we must continue to ask ourselves if it is enough and if we should have a “one size fits all” process regardless of on-hand strength of the MOS being managed. Regardless of the outcome, the ATAP market is highly effective in aligning talent to the right location at the right time for our healthy populations.

Despite its success, there should be another review of the techniques employed when volume does not exist. Ideally, the system is modified to provide a bit more flexibility while maintaining the strong, policy-based structure of current practices.