Testing the Newest Army Long-Range Weapon Systems

Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon and Mid-Range Capability

By MAJ Edward Richardson, CPT Bol Jock, SSG Maggie Vega and Mr. Mark Colley

August 1, 2024 | Field Artillery, 2024 Issue #2

Read Time: < 11 mins

The Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) system. (Photo: Lockheed Martin)

Abstract

This article asked the question: how does the Fire Support Test Directorate (FSTD) assess new weapon systems like Long-Range Hypersonic Weapons (LRHW) and Mid-Range Capability (MRC)? In answering such a question, the Army’s Test and Evaluation Policy suggests a framework of continuous evaluation (CE) to provide assessment of a system during development (AR 73-1). Accordingly, FSTD uses principles of CE to execute an observation strategy parallel to LRHW and MRC exercises, experiments, demonstrations and training. The key task is to catalogue observations and cross reference those observations with Army capability requirements to reduce the costs of manpower, time and equipment associated with a larger singular test. This article provides details of FSTD’s observation strategy and recommends CE principles of new and existing artillery systems. The implication of this strategy is an optimized process for assessing the effectiveness, suitability and survivability (ESS) of new weapon systems and a way to assess the continued performance of fielded equipment.

Background and context

The starting point of understanding our current hypersonic weapons capability gap and developing solutions to close such gap is looking into the past for lessons. Particularly, there are several instances where the United States military was surprised by the technological advances of other countries, leading to playing a catch-up game. However, the U.S. often discovered ways to rapidly catch up and surpass its competition. For example, at the start of World War II, the U.S. Field Artillery guns were behind the Germans. In fact, “American artillery was armed with obsolete French guns that were transported via horses and unreliable trucks.” We can argue that there was no need for advanced artillery systems before WWII, leading to the U.S. complacency in improving its artillery systems. However, when the need arose for a more capable artillery system during WWII, the U.S. developed, fielded and effectively deployed an advanced artillery system within two years. Instead of replicating German artillery guns by increasing guns’ ranges, the U.S. focused on building better artillery systems, which included improving weapon accuracy and employing advanced observation platforms. This approach to closing the capability gaps allowed the U.S. to utilize planes as observers, which led to a significant advantage for the U.S. artillery systems. Today’s power competitions could be compared to the artillery capability gaps in WWII.

Framing the Problem

Like the situation in which the U.S. found itself in WWII, the U.S. is in competition with several near-peer adversaries regarding hypersonic weapon capabilities. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), even though the development of hypersonic technology has been an ongoing effort for the U.S. government since the 1950s, less emphasis was put on its use as an offensive or defensive weapon system until recently. Currently, the Army is fielding and prototyping two variations of hypersonic weapons. By utilizing the middle tier of acquisition (MTA) pathway, the Army intends to win the hypersonic capabilities competition.

This article seeks to answer the question: How does the FSTD assess new weapon systems like LRHW and Mid-Range Capability MRC? Due to bureaucratic, complex and risk-averse cultures within Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition programs, “the technological superiority of the United States is now being challenged by potential adversaries in ways not seen since the Cold War.” As a result, the U.S. is required to adapt to the rapidly changing global power competition. However, to adapt to such changes, there is a need for revisions to the acquisition process and operational tests. MTA aims to streamline this process to tackle the lengthy timeline associated with major capability acquisition (MCA).

Figure 1: Adaptive Acquisition Framework

Recommendations

The MTA Pathway is intended to fill a gap in the defense acquisition system for those capabilities with a level of maturity that allows them to be rapidly prototyped or fielded systems within five years of the MTA program’s start. The programs using the pathway aim to accelerate capability maturation before transitioning to another acquisition pathway or to minimally develop a capability before rapidly fielding. The MTA methodology has two pathways: rapid fielding and rapid prototyping. A key point that can be derived from these two strategies is that there will need continuous coordination and involvement among all the stakeholders. These strategies also introduce challenges to the testing community, such as the complexities of program integration, the different categories of monies required and the multifaceted decision-making web needed to provide relevant test data as seen in Figure 1 effectively.

Rapid Prototyping. Rapid prototyping (e.g., MRC) test strategies set evaluation criteria and milestones for technology maturity and prototype performance, culminating in an operational demonstration of the fieldable prototype in an operational environment. Progressive operational and live fire assessments of capabilities and limitations, based on data from incremental integrated test events during the prototype development program, should be included in the test strategy.

Rapid Fielding. Rapid fielding (e.g., MRC and LRHW) test strategies will answer evaluation criteria and inform milestones decisions to demonstrate the performance of the proposed products or technologies for current operational purposes. Rapid fielding decisions should be based on integrated developmental and operational testing that demonstrates how the capability fulfills the warfighter’s mission or the concept of operations (CONOPS). As rapid fielding programs will begin production within six months of the program’s start, they typically will rely heavily on previous testing to support this accelerated timeline. The test strategy will identify all prior testing and specify the additional testing necessary to address differences between the tested prototype and the planned production configuration.

Limitation to MTA: With MTA (e.g., rapid prototyping and rapid fielding), the focus is on providing systems to warfighters in a timely manner, leading to several limitations in using this acquisition strategy. Firstly, MTA uses an abbreviated capability development document (A-CDD), presenting limited evaluated criteria for assessing the systems. Therefore, while FSTD may collect data on the MTA systems, an operational test may still be required to validate all the requirements. Second, MTA systems do not meet full system requirements, as Soldiers may develop shortcuts to the required procedures during the assessment. As a result, data collected during rapid fielding and prototyping exercises may not represent the full capability of the systems. However, to mitigate those shortcomings, operational test agencies (OTA) such as FSTD must be involved in the exercise planning process to effectively assess critical operational issues criteria (COICs) during the unit’s training exercises. Embedding in the unit’s planning and execution allows data collectors to capture reliable information that can be evaluated against the COICs. Recognizing the limitations of MTA pathways, continuous evaluation and assessment aimed to mitigate those shortcomings.

The delivery of the first prototype hypersonic hardware to Soldiers of the 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, 17th Field Artillery Brigade is completed on Oct. 7, 2021, with a ceremony at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. (U.S. Army photo by SPC Karleshia Gater, I Corps Public Affairs)

Continuous Evaluation and Assessment: Recognizing the need for a simpler and faster acquisition pathway, the Congress directed DoD to use mid-tier acquisition (MTA) to rapidly prototype and field new weapon systems. As outlined in AR 73-1, the continuous evaluation and assessment process is a key method at which this article is centered and the strategy for FSTD to assess MTA programs, namely LRHW and MRC. Accordingly, T&E, in support of rapid capabilities such as the LRHW and MRC, must be agile in support of more urgent fielding schedules. The FSTD will embed itself early into the program’s lifecycle to document progress through continuous evaluation and observations of key events. The FSTD anticipates reduced test time and costs through comparative analysis, data sharing and the use of all credible data sources. This CE process, informed by the results of developmental and operational testing, supports senior leader decisions for full deployment.

The Army’s Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office’s Mid-Range Capability Project Office, in conjunction with Soldiers from 1st Multi-Domain Task Force, and the U.S. Navy Program Executive Office Unmanned Aviation and Strike Weapons, successfully demonstrated the launch of a Tomahawk missile from the Army’s prototype Mid-Range Capability system on June 27, 2023. (U.S. Army photo by Darrell Ames, Public Affairs Officer, Program Executive Office Missiles and Space)

Observation Plan. Observations are conducted during unit training events and can be broken down into two types: observations prior to the acquisition decision memorandum (ADM) when the system is a prototype and observations post ADM when the system is a program of record. Observations should be documented by the OTA in a Memorandum of Observation (MoO) and shared across the enterprise. Observations of prototype and field systems can be used for a variety of purposes, including informing unit tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs); capabilities and limitations reports/safety releases; informing requirements for the program of record; and helping to integrate the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) of the system. Given that these observations are conducted on prototypes, they should not be included in the OTA’s operational demonstration of the system.

The Fire Support Test Directorate supported two operational exercises for the LRHW fielding system and published a MoO for both. These observations were provided to the unit, the material developer, the system evaluator and the capability developer for their use as appropriate. Observations conducted post ADM of program of record systems can be valuable if carefully planned and approved at the appropriate level. These observations can be used to buy down program risk for the project manager and descope the operational demonstration required in the acquisition process. As LRHW and MRC are issued and employed, the program manager has an opportunity to get credit for meeting the requirements of the system outside of the operational demonstrations. These opportunities, for example, include operational exercises with joint and coalition partners.

Conclusion

Rapidly closing the capability gap is the main aim and the advantage of using MTA. With rapid fielding (i.e., LRHW) and prototyping (i.e., MRC), a needed capability can hit warfighters’ hands within two to five years, making this acquisition pathway ideal for developing timely capabilities for warfighters. In alignment with MTA’s aim for rapid prototyping and fielding, FSTD implements incremental and continuous evaluation for the Army’s newest weapon systems (LRHW and MRC).

Continuous evaluation involves incremental observations of the systems as the units employ them. Unit training plans provide the structure for the execution of continuous testing for FSTD. As FSTD observers embed themselves with LRHW and MRC batteries during their training exercises, the FSTD data collectors can gather data that can be credited to units during operational demonstrations. This approach decreases time and resources informing milestone or production decisions, as much of the data would have already been collected during incremental observations. Such incremental observations are provided to program managers and software developers to improve weapon systems or annotated as credits for operational tests. This positive feedback loop reduces acquisition time, which aligns with the overall aim of the MTA: rapid prototyping and rapid fielding.

References