Dying on the Vine

How Historic Roots Produce Enduring Evolutionary Problems for Army Aviation

By Maj. Mark M. Stanfield

Article published on: March 1, 2025 in the January-March 2025 Edition of the Aviation Digest

Read Time: < 10 mins

Around the time of the Army Air Service’s infancy (that is, in 1917), General John J. Pershing and others sought to keep the new air arm small (Maurer, 1979) in size, scope, and assignment–something for which operational problems continue in all components of the U.S. Army. The desire at the time was to keep the Air Service a part of the Army and inadvertently (or by design) limited in scope of strategic thinking, interdepartmental collaboration, and tactical acumen. Ever since, the perspective toward and understanding of aviation by all other Army warfare specialties has inherited an equally narrow field of view and spectrum of employment. Whether by accident or ambition, the early decisions to prune and rein in aviation closely to Army command has resulted in issues like underutilization of combat power; continual capabilities briefs to nonaviation units; and more dramatically, a lack of innovative, inventive (or even involved) use in exercises and combat operations.

Having chosen my words carefully, the idea is not that Army Aviation is dead on the vine but rather, dying (or at least dated) in its current state. It needs new life. The bold, big picture offered in this commentary is to reverse and modernize that 100-year-old thinking. In truth and humility, the point of this article is not to discuss solutions at length, especially given the limitations of a single author; instead, it is to illuminate many concerns, and as such, suggest that they are appropriate for consideration by joint and political levels well above Army Aviation.

So, why am I, as a U.S. Air Force Maj., even writing this article for Aviation Digest, and what gives me the authority? I am a former Army Aviator and wanted this article to be thought-provoking and timely toward modernizing the force. I also have a multiservice perspective, since I now serve in my third branch. In each setting, I have always tried to make things better where possible. In truth, this article is perhaps a bit controversial; however, I wanted to express my constructive, respectful criticism to the Army Aviation Enterprise.

Is it an outrageous argument to reference policy and opinion from so long ago? Aviation—at least powered, fixed-wing flight—itself is about as old. Not only was that crucial decision to limit the Army Air Service not so distant in time, but its impact has been fairly permanent in its mark on Army Aviation. Through Pershing’s words and founding policy, there is a ghost of the past within Army Field Manual (FM) 304, “Army Aviation” and elsewhere, which keeps aviation grounded within the larger Army service. Indeed, the initial (and enduring) belief that Army Aviation is a force solely supporting the ground commander was the strong opinion of General Pershing himself (Department of the Army, 2020, p. 11)—so much so that it seems the Army cannot or will not shake itself from that tenet.

Army Aviation still largely supports its own ground forces, and that cultural relationship is important to be sure. There is an inherent trust involved between the ground force and Army Aviation assets: The Soldier on the ground has always believed an Army aircraft is nearby (or can be) to resupply, rescue, or bring supporting fire overhead. While logical, to almost exclusively define aviation’s existence around that is also restrictive. That sole support of the ground forces’ mindset might also partly be explained by language in the Aviation Branch’s guiding FM 3-04, which suggests Army Aviation should be leaders in tactical employment of the maneuver force; yet, and as a contradiction, also embody a supportive role (Department of the Army, 2020, pp. 1-1 to 1-2). In 1999, then Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN Eric K. Shinseki, gave his “Address to the Eisenhower Luncheon” speech during the 45th Annual Meeting of the Association of the United States Army. The speech, which addressed the future of the U.S. Army, rather apparently left out Army Aviation in that vision (Shinseki, 1999). To suggest that aviation is sometimes an afterthought in the minds of non-aviation Army leaders is not unfounded.

The U.S. Air Force, in its birth, was able to break somewhat from tradition and embrace transformation in its infancy and has continued to do so nearly throughout its history (Gladwell, 2021). It is important to clarify that the nearly simultaneous departure of the Army Air Force and the generation of the U.S. Air Force in the 1940s, while necessary for air warfare and overall expansion of U.S. foreign policy and national defense capability, represented an immediate talent and resource drain. I believe that the drain is one that—in its continued inattention to and exclusion of—an otherwise premier, first-to-fight capability the Army Aviation Enterprise has suffered ever since as a fighting force within the U.S. Army.

World War II was instrumental in transforming air warfare. Striking Japan from American outposts in Eastern India and the Marianas (truly the choice between a rock and a hard place) drove the development of longer range aircraft (Gladwell, 2021). As a result, U.S. military aviation units have since operated rather independently (or collaboratively) and more to the point, distally to their parent organizations, whereas Army Aviation units by doctrine and choice are still employed proximally. U.S. forces now have global reach with many Air Force aircraft, U.S. Navy carrier and expeditionary strike groups, and Marine Expeditionary Units. In fact, the Marine Corps has not only blazed the trail of vertical envelopment, but it has continually expanded on it in terms of doctrine and advancements in technology, to include rotary-wing, fixed-wing, and tiltrotor aircraft. By comparison, Army Aviation units, and in some instances technologies themselves, have largely remained the same (e.g., air assault, attack, and lift categories) since the 1980s and are not only directly attached to the main element but almost entirely reliant on other services to deliver their assets overseas. In fact, Army Aviation only became its own subgroup in 1983, which might highlight the nature of its somewhat unchanged state.

It is also worth mentioning that although technically “brand new,” most Army aircraft are a retread of designs from decades ago, the newest being the early 1980s (B. Moenck, personal communication, March 11, 2023).

Fleet modernization programs have also not produced many new capabilities; rather, they have just changed how Army Aviators operate in the cockpit (B. Moenck, personal communication, March 11, 2023).

The Army, however, does not need long-range aircraft to deliver its own assets abroad so much as it should strive to emulate other aviation services in the joint environment. In my experience, and interestingly enough, the Bell V-280 Valor tiltrotor aircraft is a much longer-range platform than any current Army aircraft, with the exception of the C-12 Huron. If the issue of Army Aviation limitations does not seem very pressing or around the corner, the Future Vertical Lift concept in fact highlights it. The V-280 will require an Army Aviation partner that understands joint environments because it will soon have an aircraft that performs outside and above the confines of Army airspace and other typical planning boundaries. In other words, when considering an aircraft that will very quickly and extensively reach beyond traditional Army airspace confines, the Army will soon have to rethink its service counterpart relationships. This is because the Valor will find itself in the joint service environment, regardless of intent. For a service seeking relevance in joint multidomain operations, the Army’s new tiltrotor aircraft, much like the larger landscape described in this article, will hasten the need for an organizational shift toward goals that align and array with other joint services. Most certainly, one should not prepare for a marathon after the starting gun fires.

The Bell V-280 Valor tiltrotor technology demonstrator aircraft in flight over a flat landscape during a test flight at Redstone Arsenal Alabama in August 2024. U.S. Army photo by David Hylton, PEO Aviation

A constant process of inward reflection, redefinition, and realization of Army Aviation goals is necessary. In truth, one of the most significant ironies is that in the same period of the early 1900s and for 2 solid decades beyond that, U.S. Army Aviators were some of the most influential pioneers of America's earliest record-setting and industry-changing flights (Thomas & Thomas, 2004). This was in the face of very strong, high-ranking voices that kept the Air Service limited in its development and delivery of Army aerial combat power. Is this lack of reflection a problem of the service or the Aviation Branch? Maybe both. Perhaps those early pioneers were creating growth where they saw possibility. As has been wisely noted in the past, the organization cannot seem to exist as “both fully Army and fully Aviation” (Burke, 2018).

It can also never be rid of its ghosts until they are acknowledged and replaced by bold adventurism and ambitious goals. Introspection by Army Aviation will create a direction that is for and of the future.

My viewpoint is that the Army has a tremendous number of problems just in aviation alone: pilot retention, quality of life, airframe age, maintenance complexity, inspection schedules, combat training center rotations, and extensive (or sometimes career-permanent) non-aviation duty assignments, to name a few. Big picture and broad thinking (in general) could provide a way to fix those problems in particular. Stated differently, the Army has numerous, specific, and in some cases, stymied problems that might better be served by a return to not only very rigorous and academic thinking, but also open and critical thinking as this nation experienced several decades ago at the highest levels of government.

A Chinook helicopter from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment approaches a beach from off shore during training near Hurlburt Field, Florida. U.S. Army photo by MAJ Jeff Slinker.

Army Aviation frequently involves discussion of outdated concepts, such as coordinating altitudes, which quite literally puts the Army outside joint airspace as a distant (or even non-) participant. Thus, it puts itself in a very quiet Army-centric corner, whereby thinking and collaboration only occur using a ground-based lens and consequently, working little with other branches and partners. What’s more, of the things that Army Aviation thinks it “owns,” it is in reality a brigade combat team or division that actually creates and dictates that particular airspace plan, and therefore, aircraft utilization. This is the case even though Army flying units work through, influence, and can force multiply every single one of the other Army warfighting functions.

Being careful to not mischaracterize the whole Army Aviation Enterprise and despite these realities for its majority, somewhere out there, some groups of Army Aviators are still operating in these bold, autonomous ways. Of course, there is a Special Operations Aviation Regiment, and there are specialized National Guard and Army Reserve units working with, for example, Air Force close air support platforms and personnel recovery/combat search and rescue squadrons. Recent history has shown dramatic rescues and wildland firefighting efforts by some of the same units. Perhaps the reason these aviators are still operating in this way is that they do not have geographically proximal higher headquarters or long-standing, unbroken, orthodox policies that keep them limited in their scope. Most likely, these units thrive from a somewhat untethered existence or job description, which is one potential solution. That there are units performing these audacious, daring employments of aircraft and mission is promising—and far better than the limited experience of this article’s one voice. The best solutions will likely come from reactions and impressions of its reading.

Institutional matters aside, the growing potential for conflict with large national forces, such as the Russian Federation or the People’s Republic of China, mean that Army Aviation would assume a far larger role than just a subordinate, supportive one as in present doctrinal theory and practice. Additionally, the Army desires to be a significant joint force collaborator, and it should be, to assure national and allied success in future exercises and combat operations. To perform both in the 21st century well, and for Army Aviation to remain at the forefront of combat capability during the next 100 years, it needs both action and openness to change that matches the joint language written in its publications—and the trailblazing that, though few carry the banner forward, would continue the behavior and legacy of Army Aviation’s earliest pilots. Constant evolution in Army Aviation, without considering regeneration, could mean the potential for a lack of growth in a service known not just for transformational vision, but for actually seeing it through.

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