Aviation

Forward Arming and Refueling Operations in Large-Scale Combat Operations

By CPT Summer S. Lancette

Article published on: March 1, in the January-March 2025 Issue of the Aviation Digest

Read Time: < 8 mins

Night refuel at Fort Hood, Texas. U.S. Army photo by CPT Travis Mueller.

The Russia-Ukraine War has provided many lessons about Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). Two‌‌ ‌specific lessons, however, are exceptionally applicable to the challenges U.S. Army Aviation will experience during LSCO. The first lesson is that there is a significant increase in munition expenditure compared to U.S. operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Second, the combat in Ukraine has demonstrated that dispersion is the key to survivability (Robinson, 2023). Regarding the second lesson, although Army Aviation often conducts dispersed operations at the company and troop level during training exercises, it often fails to properly train and identify existing gaps when sustaining such operations. A failure to properly understand the implications‌‌ ‌of dispersed operations on sustaining aviation formations may leave Army Aviation insufficiently prepared to fight. With the preparation for LSCO now being the preeminent training focus for the Army as a whole, the aviation community must address the aviation sustainment problem created by operating within a contested environment.‌

Specifically, how will Army Aviation employ forward arming and refueling point (FARP) packages to provide the requisite fuel and ammunition for company-sized missions while maintaining a small enough ground footprint and signature to avoid detection and targeting? A solution to such a complex problem will require Army Aviation leaders to push boundaries; accept risk; and train unconventional tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) with respect to FARP operations during LSCO.

Two decades of counterinsurgency operations (COIN) have minimized the flexibility of Army Aviation. Aviation units are accustomed to operating in and out of fixed military bases and airfields, where they replenish their fuel and ammunition.‌

Furthermore, deployed aviators primarily fy in team fights, part of an aircrew weapons team. Breaking the precedent COIN has established, Army Aviation must adapt to the demands of LSCO‌ as team fights from fixed sites will no longer be the norm.

Rather, company command posts (CPs) will jump every 24–48 hours to remain undetected and increase survivability. What this means is that aircraft will likely take of and land at different CP locations, thus highlighting the importance of utilizing jump FARPs across the area of operations more frequently. Additionally, Army Aviation is beginning to emphasize collective training in larger elements and utilizing jump‌‌‌ FARPs and silent FARPs¹ forward of the battalion tactical assembly area (TAA) and company CPs. Observations and experiences from the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) at Hohenfels Training Area in Germany, and‌ the National Training Center (NTC) rotations at Fort Irwin, California, underscore that Army Aviation continues training for LSCO by prioritizing company-level missions. Such missions exercise phased and continuous attacks on objectives while employing anywhere from eight to 16 aircraft at a time. An additional observation as to how Army Aviation is now training to better prepare for LSCO is the large-scale long-range air assaults currently being‌‌ developed by the 101st Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB). This new concept for air assaults plans for the use of up to an entire CAB to execute a joint forced entry. These observations are just two examples in Army Aviation demonstrating how the sheer nature and size of LSCO will inherently require more fuel (CL III) and ammunition (CL V) for mission success, as compared to CAB operations historically seen in COIN.‌‌‌‌

Transitioning to a focus on FARPs and their footprints, previous and current aviation training see FARP site selections being predicated on easy-access open fields capable of fitting four to eight aircraft at a time in a traditional horizontal FARP layout. The fueling at such a site is conducted by two to four heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks (HEMMT), and if ammunition is required, an additional four to five palletized loading system (PLS) trucks. This type of FARP site and layout is ideal for an active FARP at a traditional TAA but will be ill-suited for the challenges presented by LSCO. Instead, jump FARPs will be crucial to enable aviation missions to reach the division deep area and ensure the safety and survivability of FARP packages. Forward arming and refueling point site selections should not be limited to large, open fields that make for easy detection. Instead, they should be FARPs activated at specified times and at inconspicuous locations. These adjustments will consequently decrease predictability and increase survivability.

Referencing Army Techniques Publication 3-0.17, “Techniques for Forward Arming and Refueling Points,” FARP site selection is mission, enemy, terrain, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations, or METT-TC, dependent and a function of the battalion S-3. The only requirements of the FARP are to:

• “meet unit missions requirements.
• Provide support throughout the battlefield under all conditions.
• Avoid threat observation and engagement” (Department of the Army, 2018, p. 2-2).

With this doctrinal guidance, the possibilities of how to execute FARPs are endless. The determining factor for selecting FARP sites will be in our leadership’s innovation and willingness to accept risk.

Forward arming and refueling point capacity during training missions is oftentimes “hand-waved.” Commanders are briefed and assured the FARP will contain enough fuel and ammunition to support the mission one to twofold. Within the confines of Field Manual 4-0, “Sustainment Operations,” and safety regulations, only PLS trucks and trailers may transport aviation ammunition (Department of the Army, 2019). Each PLS truck is able to carry 10 pallets of ammunition, bearing in mind that not all types of ammunition can be transported on the same truck at the same time. What this means is that the FARP package would be greater than five oversized trucks in order to transport an AH-64 company’s full combat load (CBL) with enough fuel and ammunition. The complexities introduced by LSCO make it unacceptable for such “hand-waving” to continue because a commander may no longer be able to easily forward-deploy such a large FARP package without the legitimate risk of losing those assets and Soldiers.

Tigershark FARP Operations at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. U.S. Army photo by SGT Ashunteia Smith.

Forward arming and refueling point packages will be a high-value and high-payoff target for an enemy during LSCO. Consequently, large jump FARP convoys in this contested environment will be at risk of interdiction and targeting by indirect fires, first-person viewer drones, enemy reconnaissance elements, and potentially, enemy aircraft (Wilson, 2024).

This leads to the first problem of how the size of a FARP package can be decreased while still maintaining a large enough CL III and V capacity to effectively support a company-sized mission. This unique problem will force Army Aviation to rethink the current doctrine and TTPs pertaining to the movement and storage of CL III and V. Some rhetorical examples of this include: How compactly can a PLS load 8x AH-64s standard CBL without mixing ammunition restrictions? Could a CH-47F transport CL V and if so, how much? How many light medium tactical vehicles would it take to transport only the Hellfires of a company’s CBL? These are just a few questions to consider as Army Aviation starts to develop the TTPs to ensure sufficient assets and prioritize survivability.

Another possible solution allows for aviation units to remove the movement of CL V from the FARP package equation entirely by using CH-47s to discreetly pre-position ammunition holding areas (AHAs) across the division operational environment. This could allow for the reduction of the size of a jump FARP convoy to potentially three vehicles (2x HEMMT; 1x high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle) as this silent convoy needs only to move to the forward-positioned ammunition.

U.S. Soldiers refuel a CH-47 Chinook helicopter at a FARP in the 28th Expeditionary Combat Aviation Brigade’s area of operations in the Middle East. U.S. Army photo by SPC Rob Donovic.

An additional approach to decreasing the size of the FARP package is to leverage the assets we already possess, such as the advanced aviation forward area refueling system (AAFARS) and Fat Cow operations.² The AAFARS is a four-point refuel system providing a total of 2,000 gallons of fuel. This solution to fuel can be transported with empty blivits by a ground vehicle in a container or sling loaded full by a UH-60 helicopter.

Though Fat Cow operations may have the largest signature with the CH-47 being the primary source of fuel, in my experience and taking into account convoy and transit times, Fat Cows are the quickest to set up, making them a viable option for last minute FARPs after a mission is initiated.

The second challenge Army Aviation faces with respect to preparing for LSCO is how to properly train and prepare for these aforementioned unconventional FARPs. The training must start with leadership. Risk is both accepted and mitigated by the unit commander. The forward support company, in coordination with the battalion S-3, have to be willing to think creatively when it comes to selecting FARP sites and executing FARP operations. Such new ideas may alter conventional thinking with respect to FARP selection. Rather than prioritizing open fields for FARPs, units may turn to abandoned roads and parking lots. Moreover, training at the battalion and company level will have to emphasize driver training and nighttime driving. Units must understand and stress the importance of conducting jump FARP movements during periods of darkness and to obscure locations, minimizing the risk of detection. In addition to administratively conducting regular night driver training, units must prioritize the actual employment of a full jump FARP and all of its steps at night during a JMRC or NTC rotation. Early on in the rotation, units should exercise lift assets to establish notional AHAs, frequently maneuver FARP packages to these sites to set up refuel pads on a road, and have the aircraft actually utilize the FARP for fuel. All of this experimenting and training will be the true test of the unit’s readiness and ability to employ a small, survivable package capable of supporting an aviation LSCO mission.

Logistics win and lose wars. Finding a solution that can solve how to increase or maintain the capacity of FARPs while decreasing its footprint during LSCO will not come easily or quickly. Through proper planning, preparation, and execution during training, we can identify the gaps in our processes and devise TTPs to ensure the most efficient, survivable way to accomplish aviation sustainment operations in a contested environment. Innovation and an increased willingness to accept risk at the tactical level will lead to the development of different FARP courses of action. The result will be an Army Aviation community able to proactively identify potential friction points, find solutions, and be ready for the challenges LSCO will present.

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