Sustainment Forces and Survivability in Large-Scale Combat Operations

By CPT Peter P. Cho and CPT Reed T. Marshall

Article published on: March 10, 2026 in the Winter 2026 edition of the Aviation Digest

Read Time: < 10 mins

Introduction

Army Aviation survivability in large-scale combat operations (LSCO) depends on more than just aircraft maneuver; it requires sus-tainment forces that can survive, move, and react effectively in contested envi-ronments. With the heightened threat of indirect fires and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), our sustainment forces must be more mobile than ever before. As defined in the 2025 Field Manual (FM) 3-04, Army Aviation, the Area for Forward Arming and Refueling (AFAR) establishes a temporary site capable of rapidly arming and re-fueling aircraft. The speed at which an AFAR site can activate, conduct rearm and refuel, and then exfiltrate is critical to survivability for both and ground forces.

During Operation Saber Shield, Echo Forward Support Troop, the 5-17 Air Cavalry Squadron, executed multiple AFAR missions in the Korean theater to extend the operational reach of AH-64 Troops, while reducing sustainment exposure during rearm and refuel operations. This operation provided a critical opportunity to evaluate the survivability of the AFAR concept compared to a traditional Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP). The following analysis highlights key lessons learned in three areas essential to mission success: communication networks, Class (CL) V (ammunition) transportation, and terrain map rehearsals.

Concept of the Operation

Area for Forward Arming and Refueling sites are an aircraft pit stop, similar to those seen during stock car auto racing (Figure 1).

Our AFAR team remained on standby, similar to a quick reaction force, waiting for a mission from higher headquarters. Once a mission was received, the AFAR team displaced to a concealed hide site, established communications with inbound aircraft, and employed the short-range Skydio drone or a larger multi-mission drone for the landing zone’s CHERRY/ICE call (Figure 2).

After the small UAS (SUAS) team completed enemy-focused reconnaissance, the AFAR officer-in-charge (OIC) directed aircraft to the landing zone and simultaneously secured the perimeter with gun trucks. Then, the CL III (petroleum, oils, and lubricants) and CLV vehicles were staged. The aircraft landed, and the staged vehicles conducted their resupply. Upon completion of arming and refueling, the AFAR team would exfiltrate the site and return to the tactical assembly area to prepare for subsequent missions. Our AFAR mission was executed in three distinct phases. Figure 3 outlines the critical actions, sequencing, and timing required to ensure successful operations. Like a pit crew, precision and speed were essential to minimizing risk and increasing survivability.

Figure 1. Macro overview of AFAR sites. Figure provided by the authors.

Figure 2. Micro-imagery of AFAR site 1. Figure provided by the authors.

Figure 3. Area for Forward Arming and Refueling flow chart. Figure provided by the authors.

Communication Networks

Unlike static FARPs, AFAR sites do not benefit from fixed command posts or robust communications networks. Command and control (C2) must be lean, mobile, and redundant. Initially, we relied on Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS); however, terrain, convoy movement, and even minor disruptions often caused disturbances to line-of-sight communication. This made SINCGARS unreliable for the precise timing required in AFAR operations. To extend communication beyond line-of-sight, we shifted to Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P) as an alternate. The JBC-P was also the primary means of communication with higher headquarters. While the JBC-P offered more reliable over-the-horizon connectivity, once aircraft were in range of the SINCGARS, voice communication was preferred by both the AFAR team and pilots. Additionally, our AFAR team utilized the MPU-5 mobile ad-hoc radio, which allowed them to tether to their SINCGARS radios mounted in the vehicles while moving around the AFAR site. Furthermore, the team experimented with an MPU-5 attached to a multi-mission SUAS to extend the range of the mesh network over several terrain features. This provided the AFAR team beyond line-of-sight voice communication, accelerating decision-making and communication dominance.

Clarity in roles and responsibilities were just as important as equipment. We developed a communication flow chart to codify who talks to whom and when. While specific roles will depend on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations, our thought process was that in combat, the forward support troop must anticipate the fuel and ammunition needs of the unit it supports. Troop commanders make sustainment decisions using discipline initiative, running estimates, and time-distance analysis. Preparation of fuel and ammunition packages enable maneuver functions to stay in the fight. Logisticians apply continuous assessment to be ready for resupply requirements when communication is degraded or lost. Understanding the unit’s missions and needs enables the AFAR OIC to be flexible. Flexibility was critical when one AFAR site was compromised by enemy activity. The distribution platoon leader, assessing the ground situation in real time, immediately redirected aircraft to an alternate site. His ability to act decisively prevented delays and reduced risk to both aircraft and sustainers.

Example of the initial method. Photo provided by the authors.

Example of the improved method. Photo provided by the authors.

Example of the best method. Photo provided by the authors.

Example of the best method. Photo provided by the authors.

Example of the best method. Photo provided by the authors.

Class V Transportation

Fueling aircraft is routine for distribution platoons, and after several iterations we were able to use 2 x 50-foot hoses to fuel directly from our Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical fuel trucks. Truck-to-aircraft refueling with rotor blades turning took practice for leaders to assume the risk; however, after a few iterations, it became second nature. The greater challenge we faced was moving Class V, particularly rockets and AGM-114 Hellfire missiles. Loading and survivable transportation of munitions to each aircraft became our primary friction point. We tested several methods to find the optimal method for arming:

• Initial Method: Based on an article we read from another unit, we attempted pre-packaging rockets and missiles on SKEDCO litters. This worked but required significant manpower to load and offload from our Light Medium Tactical Vehicles (LMTVs), increasing personnel packaging.

• Improved Method: We assigned designated LMTVs to each aircraft. This reduced handling steps but increased the number of vehicles in the area, raising detection risk and lowering survivability.

• Best Method: We used a Load Handling System (LHS) with a flat rack, which proved to be the fastest and most efficient method for arming. The LHS driver could rapidly move a flat rack of ammunition to each aircraft, reducing transportation time by half and cutting down the number of vehicles and Troopers required.

Loading ammunition is labor-intensive and requires a well-thought-out personnel package. The LHS offered the best balance of efficiency, survivability, and speed. Although completed on a smaller scale during our training, we estimated up to 45 Hellfires will fit on a flat rack, which is enough to rearm more than one platoon of AH-64Es. Practice was critical to making this process smooth and safe. The LHS operator requires significant experience and repetition to build confidence in maneuvering flat racks under field condition. Operating the system on uneven or restrictive terrain demands precise control to safely drag, position, and offload the flat rack without damaging the munitions or equipment.

It is important to note that not all munitions are suitable for loading at an AFAR site. In LSCO, we expect our Apaches to consume mostly rockets and Hellfires, while using 30mm mostly for self-defense. Loading 30mm can be a sluggish process and increases the amount of time the aircraft are on the ground for rearming. This creates the need for the AFAR team to be on site longer than its intended purpose. We currently assess that 30mm loading should be conducted farther from the forward line of own troops (FLOT) at a more traditional FARP.

Terrain Map Rehearsals

Executing AFAR is not intuitive. Unlike a fixed FARP, there are no established pads, permanent communication networks, or predictable aircraft traffic patterns. Every aspect of the mission, from convoy operations and timing to integration with SUAS and sequencing with aircraft, places heavy demands on sustainers. To mitigate this, we prepared three terrain models for each of the three landing zones within our AFAR zone. Before every mission, each participating element briefed its role to build shared understanding. Walking through the terrain model rehearsals ensured not only that every Trooper knew their specific AFAR tasks, but also how they fit into the bigger picture. This allowed the entire team to execute as if it were running a playbook (Figure 4).

Even with rehearsals, no AFAR mission went perfectly. However, by making rehearsals part of the battle rhythm, our Troopers internalized the importance of urgency and survivability. Through multiple iterations, we refined convoy staging, site establishment, integration with our SUAS and Military Police security elements, and communication with inbound aircraft. Each rehearsal shaved critical minutes off our timeline. By the final execution, our AFAR team could establish, operate, and displace less than 30 minutes from arrival on station to displacement—a fraction of the time it took on our first attempt. Every second we saved could mean the difference between survival and vulnerability. That sense of urgent precision became a shared understanding among our AFAR team.

Figure 4. The Ghost Rider distribution platoon conducts AFAR rehearsal. Figure provided by the authors.

Conclusion

The AFAR concept is still developing, but our experience proved its potential. By emphasizing lean C2 through disciplined communications, solving Class V distri bution challenges with mobile solutions, prioritizing rehearsals, and cross-training sustainers, we transformed AFAR from a theory into a practical, repeatable capability. Every Soldier in the AFAR team should not only master their primary task but also understand the jobs of others. If one person goes down, another must step in. For a distribution platoon, this means knowing both fueling and ammunition tasks. This flexibility not only improves efficiency but also maximizes survivability.

Going forward, the Army must be able to execute AFAR missions at multiple locations simultaneously. We believe it is possible to open two sites at a time to spread the combat power and further reduce risk to force. Further training and iterations are necessary to ensure feasibility for C2 of two separate teams. Ultimately, AFAR operations extend the supported aviation element’s operational reach and freedom of maneuver. In LSCO, we must have alternate methods to refuel and rearm beyond static FARPs. Sustainers are the enablers of all combat operations; without survivable rearm and refuel operations closer to the FLOT, Army Aviation’s reach becomes limited.

If given the opportunity to expand on this, the 5-17th would emphasize the ability to displace an AFAR team from the traditional FARP. To provide realistic training, we would focus on the FARP’s transition to multiple AFAR teams to provide a logistical train closer to the FLOT. For the AFAR to succeed, our sustainers learned aviation terminology, procedures, and missions. Simultaneously, the aviators needed to understand the sustainment perspective regarding the challenges of convoy movement, ammunition handling, and fuel distribution that make continued operations possible. We built confidence among our Troopers through active involvement in the planning process. Having sustainers present during mission planning meetings gave us the opportunity to think through problems from an aviator’s perspective. This experience not only broadened our understanding of their mission but also sharpened our ability to anticipate requirements. As we developed shared understanding, we were able to provide timely support. This allowed us to better support the mission set in the Korean Theater.

References