Practice Makes Perfect

Training Sustainment in the Era of Contested Logistics

By LTC Boyce J. Newton III

Article published on: July 16th 2025, in the Army Sustainment Summer 2025 Edition

Read Time: < 10 mins

The decades long war on terrorism resulted in a near total loss in critical fieldcraft skills Army-wide. With limited training time, units singularly focused on deployment to established theaters with static operations from forward operating bases (FOBs). Now that the war on terrorism is in the proverbial rearview mirror, sustainment units must accelerate their training to meet the demands associated with largescale combat operations (LSCO) in a contested and austere environment. The National Training Center (NTC) continues to serve as the crucible that exposes shortfalls and celebrates strengths in our Army’s armored and mechanized formations as they face off against the vaunted 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment’s opposing force (OPFOR). The only way to achieve victory in this exercise, and ultimately in real combat, is to conduct realistic and quality training regularly.

Contending with Contested Logistics

The modern battlefield is plagued with pervasive surveillance and a multitude of sensors. The result is that operations, particularly logistics operations, are contested throughout their entirety. So how do we contend with contested logistics in the close fight? There are several areas in which units have begun training in their efforts to create a more survivable sustainment enterprise. The success seen in recent conflicts, such as the war in Ukraine, with the myriad of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) as both weaponized and collection assets, should give pause to sustainment leaders. The brigade support area (BSA) and division support area (DSA) footprints are, by far, the largest stationary nodes on the battlefield. They will inevitably be discovered if they remain in a single location too long. These footprints must encourage Soldiers to look to the sky and remain vigilant. When they have countermeasure systems available, they must place them logically throughout the footprint. At the NTC, many units draw counter-UAS and keep them consolidated near their main command post. By the time Soldiers identify an sUAS threat and send the messages to higher authority for action, the sUAS have either dropped their payloads or loitered long enough to provide data to enemy artillery for action. Placing capabilities toward the perimeter increases the likelihood that the sUAS will be neutralized prior to collecting or engaging the Soldiers on the ground. As additional early warning and countermeasure systems become available, it is critical to allocate them to large sustainment nodes and maneuver forces.

The incorporation of sustainment nodes, like the BSA/DSA, onto the defended asset list (DAL) allows for assets to be aligned against the defense and survival of critical sustainment assets. This can include a multitude of assets ranging from UAS platforms to counterfire artillery coverage and everything in between. The investment in the survivability of sustainment nodes serves to ensure extended operational reach. Incorporation onto a DAL is not a silver bullet solution for sustainment node commanders, but it is a powerful deterrent once an enemy force realizes their actions will not occur without repercussions and a potential loss of critical assets.

Another critical method for ensuring the survival of both commodities and sustainment Soldiers is to displace rapidly and frequently. Smaller sustainment nodes like combat trains command posts (CTCPs) must displace every 24 hours, at a minimum, due to their proximity to the forward line of own troops (FLOT). The unit maintenance collection points (UMCPs) must balance displacing with their ability to generate combat power. If they are not encumbered with active maintenance operations, they must displace at the same frequency as the CTCP. Otherwise, the UMCP must utilize the surrounding terrain and camouflage to the best of their ability until they are able to relocate. It is critical for UMCPs to move as soon as they reach a natural pause in maintenance operations. At the NTC, units who force the UMCP to displace with the CTCP suffer significant maintenance shortfalls, and the unit operational readiness rate (ORR) declines. It is simply not tenable for a UMCP to displace every 12 to 24 hours and still conduct maintenance. Units who separate the UMCP from the CTCP and assess their current maintenance workload based on parts on hand have significantly better outcomes with both ORR and evading enemy action.

The larger sustainment nodes require a different plan of action because they are far too cumbersome to manage a daily displacement while still providing support to maneuver forces. The benefit larger nodes have is that they can remain further away from the FLOT, which affords them the ability to remain stationary longer. Regardless, the BSA must relocate every 72 hours at a minimum to prevent being targeted by enemy forces. When arrayed as base clusters, BSAs can execute survivability moves within the immediate area as a mitigation strategy to prolong the brigade support battalion’s (BSB’s) presence in a specific area. This strategy relies on the BSB being highly mobile and somewhat mirrors the way artillery batteries operate within position areas for artillery. The DSA is likely to remain well outside of the enemy’s conventional artillery range. If the enemy’s air force and/or rocket artillery threat is diminished or destroyed, then the DSA will not need to displace frequently.

A final, but certainly not unimportant, area of focus for contending with a contested environment is engagement area (EA) development and site selection. It is a resounding fact that indirect fire and weaponized sUAS are the primary threats to sustainment nodes. As such, units must adopt a dig or die mentality. It is an unfortunate reality that many Soldiers no longer appreciate the importance of digging fighting positions, survivability pits, or using sandbags for protection. The counterinsurgency era and its abundance of concrete bunkers and barriers on well-established FOBs resulted in a massive atrophy in the art of fortifying positions using only shovels and basic building materials. This is further complicated by the often highly restrictive limitations on digging at many Army installations.

The process of digging a machine gun position is labor intensive, but it is the difference between life and death when the king of battle begins raining down steel on your location. It is vital that units return to a culture that stresses the importance of continually improving your fighting position until you displace to the next location. Initial occupation must be closely followed by digging expedient fighting positions. If the unit remains more than 24 hours, then more extensive fortifications are required. Prolonged occupation must prompt requests for engineer assets to assist with improvements and EA development. Sustainment units must do more than lay out concertina wire and sit on a berm if they hope to survive an enemy attack. The BSB must use the terrain and any materials at their disposal to influence where they engage enemy forces. This includes obstacles for denying the enemy avenues of approach, delaying their progress, or turning them. The most effective BSBs in this category have leveraged the expertise of engineers from their brigade combat teams (BCTs).

Training Shortfalls: Bring Back Proficiency

The most common trend that is seen among sustainment units coming to the NTC is a lack of collective training between the BSB and the forward support companies (FSCs), which are attached to supported units. It is rare to oversee a unit that has trained the establishment of the BSA more than once prior to their rotation. It is even more rare to see units that have integrated all the FSCs into their BSA training. The establishment of the BSA is a significant undertaking and requires considerable planning to execute as part of home station training. However, it is a necessary undertaking. Units that have not trained the full echelon of sustainment from the FLOT back to the BSA and beyond are doomed to struggle, if not fail, in LSCO. Most sustainment units do not struggle with proficiency at the individual Soldier level. They struggle with collective proficiencies and integrating skills to accomplish tasks efficiently.

The majority of BSBs have struggled to exercise their systems to maintain situational awareness of the BCT’s current fight. This inevitably leaves the BSB commander in the dark and unable to make decisions in a timely and informed manner. There is a myriad of factors that play into poor battle tracking among BSB staffs. Among the most challenging factors is a lack of proficiency on the limited beyond line-of-sight systems organic to the BSB. The most effective BSBs over the course of the last three years have doubled down on communications training and rehearsed multiple scenarios within the command post throughout their training. Additionally, successful units have maintained robust battle tracking products in both digital and analog formats. This use of redundant tracking mechanisms is critical because digital-based products inevitably experience outages. There are several products that are critical to empowering the BSB commander to exercise mission command and sustain the BCT. The BSB staff must develop and maintain a common operational picture (COP), a logistics COP, a synchronization matrix, a decision support matrix, and a commander’s critical information report matrix. Without the information contained in these products, the BSB commander is unable to make informed decisions regarding adjustments to the concept of support and/or the need for emergency resupply to the warfighter. It is incumbent on the BSB executive officer and the support operations officer to work in tandem to ensure their staffs provide quality information to populate their respective products.

The integration of air assets into sustainment operations is a rare occurrence at the NTC and even when it is utilized it is poorly executed. Upon further exploring the reasons, nearly every BSB over the past three years has reported that they had limited opportunities to train with the aviation elements at their home station. The use of rotary wing assets to move repair parts and personnel replacements has the potential to vastly improve the efficiency and responsiveness of sustainment operations. To be successful, units must practice communicating with aircraft, standardizing marking cargo, and routinely communicating with the aviation element to leverage their aircraft. The use of external cargo transport via slingload also carries the potential to allow larger bulky loads to be transported forward. However, BSBs routinely lack trained personnel and the equipment needed to rig slingloads. The incorporation of these capabilities may not be considered the ultimate game changer for sustainment operations. However, each incremental improvement to the sustainment enterprise allows for gained efficiencies in other areas. These domino effects associated with small improvements carry the potential to form an unstoppable sustainment operation.

The displacement of the BSA is arguably the most complex and challenging undertaking for the BSB. The BSB must contend with the fact that even if they were manned and equipped at 100%, they would still be unable to displace in a single lift. BSBs must train to become nimbler and to work around this reality. In the modern battlefield, a static unit is a dead unit, and there are no exceptions for sustainment formations. At the NTC, every BSB struggles to prioritize loads and to displace their BSA in a reasonable timeframe. Countless BSBs lack prior training for this undertaking. This is apparent through observation because each iteration of displacement takes on a different sequence, load plan, and timeline. As with most topics, repetition is the key to mastering the task. Every BSB must develop a baseline plan for displacement that includes detailed load plans. Additionally, they must assess their loads and eliminate excess items. The combined effects of these efforts will not eliminate the need for BSBs to execute their displacements in multiple lifts or with external support. However, they will expedite the process and gain efficiencies overall.

Ultimately, most units are proficient in their assigned individual tasks. For example, the mechanics repair equipment, and the fuelers know their craft. The two areas where sustainment units struggle are tactical tasks and fieldcraft. The vast majority of sustainment units observed at NTC are not proficient when it comes to emplacing their various weapon systems and/or preparing sectors of fire. Additionally, the use of range cards and sector sketches is lacking. At the individual level, Soldiers know how to operate their weapons, but when it comes to controlling multiple weapon systems to engage an enemy, there is significant room for improvement. Skills like regulating the rate of fire for machine guns or establishing interlocking fields of fire have rarely been practiced. When asked, most Soldiers state that they had adequate time on a range to qualify on the weapon, but they have not trained beyond that. The only way to hone fieldcraft is to practice it, and most sustainment Soldiers have rarely, if ever, prepared fighting positions or employed camouflage systems. Units must seize every opportunity to practice these skills at home station because their lives depend on it in LSCO. Training these proficiencies does not require multi-day field training exercises. Units must take advantage of Soldier/Sergeant’s Time Training to build proficiency over time.

The first time many sustainment units have executed a base defense live fire is at the NTC. Furthermore, training events using blanks and OPFOR at home station are similarly lacking. Sustainment units must train in a similar fashion to their maneuver counterparts. Our maneuver formations are proficient because they progress from individual training and culminate at the company or battalion level with live fire operations prior to the NTC or deployments. The BSBs and other sustainment formations must be afforded the same level of emphasis to hone their Soldier skills.

Conclusion

The adage train as you fight is more relevant now than ever before. The modern battlefield is evolving daily as we observe the tenacity and cunning of both our adversaries and friends currently engaged in conflicts worldwide. It is incumbent on leaders at every level to correct training deficiencies and train beyond individual level skills to collective tasks and integration of capabilities. Lastly, leaders must never forget that modern technologies mean that the logistics enterprise is contested, and vigilance is the key to overcoming constant surveillance. Sustainment leaders at every echelon must bolster their capabilities and ability to defend themselves by seeking innovation within their formations and communicating their lessons learned after every training event. There are a multitude of venues where these lessons are desperately needed to fuel modernization and drive a culture of continuous improvement. Take advantage of the resources available through the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Sustainment Center of Excellence, and the combat training centers. Additionally, share your voice with Army Futures Command entities like the Sustainment Capability Development Integration Directorate and the Contested Logistics Cross-Functional Team who drive continuous transformation efforts to modernize sustainment capabilities for the Army of 2040 and beyond.