From Vacancy to Victory

Addressing Command Vacancies in the Army Reserve

By CPT Alisha Wartluft

Article published on: July 18, 2025 in the Summer 2025 edition of Army Sustainment

Read Time: < 5 mins

U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) commanders play a crucial role in leading and managing Reserve units. Their leadership is essential for ensuring that units are deployment ready and prepared for combat operations. However, the heavy reliance on the Reserve component (COMPO 3), coupled with civilian job demands and family commitments, has led to ongoing vacancies of mid-career officers in the USAR. To meet Total Army force requirements, the USAR must address commander vacancies at company, battalion, and brigade levels by implementing strategic resources such as increased financial compensation for commanders, opening the Regular Army COMPO 1 centralized selection list (CSL) to USAR positions, and establishing a Total Army training school without quotas.

Compensating Commanders

USAR officers are more likely to volunteer for command positions if they receive financial compensation that covers the extra time commitments, effects on their civilian careers, and time spent away from their families. Currently, USAR officers have no financial incentive to take command positions; if anything, they are disincentivized from doing so, which is evident in the amount of command vacancies.

Unlike active duty (AD), the USAR lacks the competitive edge for assignment completions to influence promotions. Consequently , completing key developmental assignments like command does not lead to higher pay for USAR officers. Regardless of completing a command assignment, USAR officers face no greater opportunity for promotion than those who do not. In fact, officers who take on more challenging positions struggle to complete school and stay competitive in their civilian careers. Conversely, officers who only meet the minimum requirements or become quiet quitters receive promotions at the same rate, if not higher.

The USAR has long recruited on a 39-day requirement model. However, current officers within leadership positions are compensated for 74 days annually, with an additional estimation of 17.3 unpaid hours per month. From my 16 years with the USAR and experience as a company commander, I believe a fully engaged commander works an extra 5 to 10 hours per week. Company commanders are essentially on call 24/7 but receive zero pay for this non-duty time. This additional necessity for commanders to meet readiness and leadership requirements financially impacts them via their civilian employment through loss of income, use of vacation time, and missed promotion opportunities.

Although the motivations of those who serve in the military are commendable, no one joins with the expectation of working without proper compensation, and no one works for free. Acknowledging the need for fair compensation, the 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation proposed policies to utilize the USAR while considering the current labor market, aiming to create competitive personnel systems in terms of pay and benefits.

To supplement these financial losses from the civilian sector and ensure compensation for non-duty requirements, USAR officers must be compensated when they assume command with either a $30,000 dollar bonus or 2% of AD rate officer base pay. This additional compensation will attract the most competent and talented officers within the USAR to volunteer to fill command vacancies. This solution rewards talented Soldiers, promotes those willing to take on more responsibility, and encourages them to stay in the USAR as their civilian careers and families grow.

Broadening the CSL

Another solution to filling USAR command vacancies is to open the CSL to all Active Component (AC) officers, including Active Guard Reserve officers. This approach enables AC officers to complete their required key developmental time for promotions while providing valuable growth and mentorship opportunities to USAR officers from experienced senior officers.

The USAR has persistently been unable to fill command positions that the board changed from opt-in to opt-out. As a result, more lieutenant colonels and majors are opting out of senior roles, and those chosen for command positions may be ones who did not review their board files or who are simply available.

Opening the slating list benefits both COMPOs 1 and 3. AD senior leaders gain more command opportunities and development through exposure to other COMPOs, while Reserve officers benefit from the training and development by full-time officers for less experienced subordinates. This solution is financially beneficial for the USAR budget because it incurs no additional costs. In fact, department officials have already initiated a pilot program that places AD officers in USAR commands, aiming to address leadership gaps and enhance operational readiness.

Total Army Force Training

The Army can fill command vacancies by cultivating more leaders through a Total Army force program. This initiative removes COMPO-specific seats and prioritization for COMPO 1 officers, expanding opportunities for Reserve Soldiers at no extra cost.

The scarcity of seats available to USAR officers in the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) has led to a lack of lieutenants. With only 3,200 annual BOLC seats and 4,000 ROTC graduates, there are not enough seats for USAR officers, since most quotas belong to COMPO 1.

Equalizing the BOLC quotas would address the significant impacts seen in the retention of Reserve officers beyond the two-year mark. Currently, over one-third of USAR lieutenants fail to complete BOLC and are removed from the USAR. Increasing quotas would reduce this failure rate. Despite the USAR having over 200% of its lieutenant strength, the low BOLC completion rate causes shortages up to the O-5 level, with an 87% shortage of captains, a 71% shortage of majors, and a 67% shortage of lieutenant colonels.

The USAR must create its own leaders from within, starting at the junior officer level. The Army can achieve this by providing more professional development courses from BOLC to intermediate-level education for USAR officers, enhancing their training and education to prepare them for command positions.

Conclusion

In summary, USAR officers are hesitant to take on command roles due to a lack of financial incentives and career advancement opportunities. The shortage of mid-senior-level officers in the USAR has led to persistent vacancies in command positions. Uneven quotas among components have further impeded the development of senior officers in the USAR. To address this, the USAR must offer financial compensation for commanders, allow AD officers to fill USAR command positions, and create a Total Army program to train officers.