Transformation in Contact

The Impact on Human Resource Operations

By 1LT (P) Nathania Nuño

Article published on: April 1, 2025 in the Army Sustainment Spring 2025 Edition

Read Time: < 8 mins

Featured Photo: PFC Aaden Maynard, a signal support specialist assigned to the 225th Brigade Support Battalion, 2nd Light Brigade Combat Team (Provisional), 25th Infantry Division sets up camouflage coverage during the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center exercise at Dillingham Airfield, Oahu, Hawaii, Oct. 2, 2024. (Photo by SPC Abreanna Goodrich)

This article describes the impacts and challenges of the transformation in contact (TiC) initiative for the 225th Brigade Support Battalion to the 225th Light Support Battalion (LSB). Outlined in Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) Execute Order (EXORD) 138-34, the reconfiguration of our brigade’s support entities and its prototype status created systemic constraints in human resource (HR) operations. Without solidified and official modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOEs), our systems of accountability and ability to provide optimal customer service were negatively affected. Though we found temporary solutions, we continue to face the crippling effects of our inability to provide accurate services and to perform in our warfighting function.

MTOE

Since the transformation was labeled as a prototype, the S-1 team was not provided with an official MTOE that outlined the new positions and companies that we received. This very quickly became a challenging task to accomplish, because we were expected to build our own MTOE from scratch and to maintain accountability of Soldiers in positions that did not yet exist.

With the guidance outlined in HDQA EXORD 138-34, we were able to build an MTOE that temporarily assisted with the organization of our Soldiers and those we gained. Our battalion composition went from an authorized number of 340 personnel (without forward support companies) to 755 Soldiers. With this new brigade concept, we organically possessed all forward support companies, the signal company, and the headquarters and headquarters company brigade (BDE) with its three new platoons (the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear reconnaissance platoon; the unmanned aircraft system platoon; and the electronic warfare platoon). As a part of the 225th LSB, we are responsible for the accountability and administrative needs of almost 800 Soldiers, making us the largest battalion in our brigade.

Essentially, we were expected to perform our operations at the same bandwidth despite our battalion nearly tripling in size and our staff section remaining unchanged. Although the team managed HR tasks and services without the extra assistance, the prototype status of our unit and brigade later became a larger issue with our system of record, the Integrated Personnel and Pay System-Army (IPPS-A).

The initial concept has evolved since its transformation on April 2, 2024. In addition to receiving our forward support companies back to our organic personnel, we had several new positions added and received other support companies to our organic structure. As we continue testing the light support concept, we expect several more changes to occur, including our battalion transitioning under an entirely new brigade.

IPPS-A

The most difficult challenge that we faced and are still facing is the accuracy of our accountability and HR processing system, IPPS-A. When we initially received our new Soldiers, we had no available positions to slot anyone under their new companies. Bravo Company more than doubled in size. We established the Army’s first general support company (GSC). Incoming Bravo Company and GSC Soldiers were spread across three unit identification codes (UICs) with no accurate way of knowing which Soldier belonged to which company. In addition, the signal company and brigade headquarters had to be realigned under our battalion hierarchy in IPPS-A. Though we maintained analog methods of accountability and administrative processes, this very quickly became problematic. Soldiers were unable to route any administrative actions to us, and company leadership was unable to view any of their new Soldiers’ information. No other Army system, such as the Digital Training Management System, was able to accurately reflect our battalion’s data because IPPS-A, our main system of record, was inaccurate.

Our initial push to move personnel into the correct UIC was not successful. We did not have enough positions available under each respective company. We received push back from higher echelons when it came to building new positions into the system. The argument was that there was no updated MTOE in place that outlined the transformation. Thus, it was expected that we maintain the same systems and processes while we physically were in a different formation. This was a major setback. We were forced to maintain all analog products with no way of using our system of record for accountability or administrative actions.

Despite the push back, we were able to use the few empty standard excess positions we had available and move them to the UICs that needed the additional slots. This meant that all new personnel fell under standard excess rather than their actual duty title and position. In the future, this may become an issue with each of these Soldier’s talent profile and promotion boards. However, at the time, the goal was to obtain an accurate system of accountability in which every Soldier physically present in the formation was under their correct company. Despite our efforts to use all the available templates, even with the existing positions used, we were still short billets in each company.

Eventually, the U.S. Army Pacific Command G-1 team agreed to create new standard excess positions for our entire brigade to assist with the TiC. The brigade received 469 additional templates, 260 of those belonging to 225th LSB and 74 belonging to the brigade headquarters.

Our battalion received more than half of the new brigade positions in IPPS-A. After repeatedly trying to move service members in batches under their respective companies, IPPS-A did not support this transfer method. Thus, the team had to individually move all 334 personnel into each position. The team was able to move all personnel within a span of five days. However, despite our efforts to create and maintain an accurate system of processing, we still face issues with IPPS-A.

Because of our prototype status, the Army continues to view us under our old battalion composition. This means that we still receive personnel under our inactive UICs and must continuously move Soldiers into their correct company. We are now at a point where we run the risk of running out of standard excess billets under each company and are requesting additional positions to be built.

Our current solution to this issue is to do a detailed scrub of each company and remove personnel who may be filling critical positions. This task is very time consuming. It requires that each Soldier under each inactive UIC be moved individually. With each personnel move in the system, there are several steps that require approvals of the assignment being built, thus adding to the length of the task. On average, we receive 10 to 12 incoming personnel each week. Though we include this task as part of our weekly battle rhythm, it is difficult to maintain accuracy within the system because we continuously receive new personnel who require new assignments to be built.

JPMRC

Accountability — Our light support concept was validated for the first time during our JPMRC 25-01. This was also our first attempt at our light logistics cluster (LLC) composition. This concept differed from the brigade support area (BSA) way of supplying equipment, food, and fuel to the fight. The cluster concept involved splitting our battalion into three groups (red, white, and blue), in which each cluster had the same capabilities to support any forward element. From the HR perspective, this meant that we not only had to take accountability of the battalion but also understand in which cluster each Soldier was located. This was challenging. It became even more difficult when each cluster began to displace to different areas of the island. To ensure that accountability remained as accurate as possible, we divided up the S-1 team into each LLC. Our main course of action was to maintain analog products for two main reasons: One, to ensure that we could continue our operations if we had no connectivity or communication with each cluster. Two, IPPS-A was not reliable. We did not want to run the risk of searching for a Soldier and having their company location be inaccurate. If we were to use this concept in a deployment setting, an official MTOE would have to be released to ensure that our systems were 100% accurate.

In addition, we had outside support units attached to us during the exercise. This increased our numbers to almost 500 boots on the ground. Another limiting factor with IPPS-A involved the ability to view any of the attached Soldiers’ information. IPPS-A viewing privileges are dictated by the level of access one has in the system.This can become problematic when building an attached Soldier’s casualty packet or in any emergency. With IPPS-A still an evolving system, it is imperative to consider how this would affect future training settings or deployments.

Replacement Operations — Our cluster composition created complexity in replacement operations. With the original BSA concept, the location of the mortuary affairs collection point (MACP) and Role 2 (BDE support medical company and patient hold) was constant. Both facilities were co-located with the BSA, even with any movements. On the other hand, with the cluster concept, the MACP was assigned to White Cluster, and Role 2 was split into the Role 1+ and Role 1-, each facility with its own independent movements. Not only did this make the replacement process more difficult, but accountability of wounded Soldiers across the brigade became very challenging. This was our first time running replacement operations as a light brigade combat team and LSB. Several problems in the administrative and patient-moving process for casualties emerged that must be addressed.

First, it is imperative that the brigade S-1 team maintains a close relationship with both Role 1s. As a battalion S-1, it became difficult to keep track of the location and number of casualties within our unit. It is important that we not only know who is wounded but also our military occupational specialty strength to request critical shortages. Though a tracker was established in the latter half of the exercise, this must be a system that is emplaced before any exercise. Administratively, we leaned heavily on the use of the Nonclassified Internet Protocol Network (NIPR) for the routing of all casualty packers and personnel replacement requests. NIPR was reliable, but we should have used other methods of communication to train for situations where we suffer a network breach or a loss of NIPR connectivity.

Final Observations

Though TiC is a very promising concept that we made work, the lack of support and structure to TiC has made it increasingly more difficult for the staff sections and Soldiers to fully immerse in the process. The additional work detracts from the ability to accurately test and validate the light support concept. As we continue to assess and improve the lethality of our fighting force, it is imperative that the unit going through the transformation receive the necessary support to fully evaluate the proposed strategy. Nevertheless, with the difficulties of TiC, this prototype enables us as a force to learn the concept of adaptation and appreciation for the ever-changing Army in which we serve. Despite the outcome, there are several lessons to be learned and a promising way ahead for the future of our fighting forces and HR operations.