Getting Small to Win Big

Equipping the LSB to Fight and Win in LSCO

By MAJ Sean McLachlan

Article published on: September 1, 2025 in the Fall 2025 edition of Army Sustainment

Read Time: < 14 mins

Soldiers conduct company trains resupply in Oahu, Hawaii, August 2024. (Photo by MAJ Sean McLachlan)

Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center (JPMRC) rotation 25-01 offered a sobering glimpse into the logistical realities of future conflict in the Indo-Pacific. For the 225th Light Support Battalion (LSB) of the 2nd Light Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, the exercise reinforced a hard truth: our current distribution platforms are poorly suited for the terrain, threat environment, and distribution requirements of a contested island campaign. Despite advances in mission command systems and refined support relationships under the prototype LSB, our trucks are too large and too heavy to sustain a fight that is dispersed, degraded, and atypically non-linear.

If the Army is to succeed in a multidomain fight across the Indo-Pacific, it must embrace a tiered distribution model that retains large-capacity platforms at higher echelons while empowering support battalion and company-level sustainers with smaller, more agile vehicles. These smaller platforms must be light enough to maneuver through restrictive jungle terrain and compact enough to sling-load. These platforms are not merely convenient. They are essential to waging large-scale combat operations (LSCO) in the Pacific theater.

The Terrain Is the Enemy

The Indo-Pacific is fundamentally a maritime theater. It is characterized by chains of small islands separated by vast ocean, covered in thick vegetation, and defined by minimal infrastructure. Many of the operational areas under consideration, such as the Philippine islands of Batanes, Palawan, or Fuga, lack developed roads, formal ports, or even operable airstrips. In such terrain, the Army’s traditional workhorses, such as the Palletized Load Systems (PLSs), Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTTs), M978 fuelers, and M984 wreckers, struggle to remain relevant. These platforms require wide, hard-packed roads and large turning radiuses. They are difficult to recover without similarsized vehicles, and they present large thermal, visual, and acoustic signatures. Simply put, they are designed for high-throughput movement on well-maintained infrastructure, not for navigating jungle trails or other restricted terrain typical of the Pacific theater.

What JPMRC Taught Us

At JPMRC 25-01, the 225th LSB supported a dispersed, multi-island exercise across the Hawaiian island chain (200 miles distant) that mirrored likely conditions in a Pacific fight. Key observations included the following:

Access Denied by Terrain: On multiple occasions during JPMRC 25-01, large sustainment platforms were physically unable to reach forward elements due to narrow trails, dense jungle terrain, and weight-restricted infrastructure. Units operating just 5 to 10 kilometers beyond the brigade support area (BSA) were effectively cut off from ground-based logistics support by these terrain limitations. Doctrinally, the field trains command post (FTCP) and logistics release point (LRP) must be separated by several kilometers, enabling sequential and echeloned distribution from FTCPs to combat trains command posts (CTCPs), CTCPs to LRPs, and LRPs to the forward line of own troops (FLOT). In practice, however, the terrain collapsed these doctrinal layers: the BSA and LRP became one and the same. No viable ground routes existed beyond that point for anything larger than a Humvee, and in some cases, only Infantry Squad Vehicles (ISVs) could traverse the terrain. For instance, a key bridge on the main supply route could not support vehicles heavier than a Humvee, while all the alternate routes were too narrow even for that.

This effectively eliminated the sustainment structure between the BSA and forward maneuver companies. The result was a breakdown in echeloned logistics. There were no functioning field or combat trains capable of bridging the gap between the BSA and the LRP. The inability to project sustainment beyond the BSA meant that infantry companies had to assume the responsibility for distributing supplies across 5 to 10 kilometers of contested terrain. In other words, the company trains extended from the BSA to the FLOT. Critical bulk water distribution systems like the 400-gallon Water Buffalo, 800-gallon Camel II, and 2,000-gallon Hippo were unusable due to size and weight constraints. With no way to push these systems forward by ground, the LSB was forced to resort to high-risk sling-load operations using full Water Buffalos, an approach that is increasingly vulnerable in a drone-saturated environment. Other resupply methods included aerial delivery via Container Delivery System (CDS), low-cost, low-altitude bundles, and ISVs to transport durable water bags and legacy water jugs. However, this last option came at a cost. Designed for rapid tactical movement, infantry task force ISVs were pulled away from tactical operations to compensate for the absence of dedicated small distribution platforms in the support battalion and forward support companies (FSCs). In short, the sustainment architecture collapsed under the weight of terrain restrictions, and infantry forces were left to shoulder the burden of their own resupply, an unsustainable model in prolonged or high-intensity operations.

Lift Constraints: During JPMRC 25-01, strategic and tactical airlift capacity was significantly limited by the operational environment, particularly by the short length of available airfields during the island chain campaign. Despite the availability of C-17 aircraft capable of transporting most sustainment platforms in an LSB under normal conditions, the primary airfield on the objective island had a limited runway length, requiring a 75% reduction in allowable cargo weight. This restriction prevented the delivery of essential logistics vehicles, including the M978 fueler, tank rack modules, 800-gallon Camels, 2,000-gallon Hippos, load handling systems (LHSs), and M984 wreckers. The largest platform deliverable by fixed-wing airlift was a Light Medium Tactical Vehicle (LMTV) paired with a 400-gallon Water Buffalo. As a result, the infantry battalion conducting a long-range air assault across 200 miles of ocean was initially supported by the few LMTVs they could posture forward. Establishing a larger airfield or amphibious entry point to enable full-platform sustainment would have taken several weeks. In the absence of bulk fuel and water, or any dedicated recovery capabilities, the LSB relied heavily on CDS bundles and platform aerial delivery to sustain the island task force across all classes of supply. The lack of scalable, air-transportable logistics platforms at echelon constrained initial-entry forces, degrading early operational reach and reducing the tempo of support during the critical opening phase.

Soldiers from a combat logistics platoon in the General Support Company, 225th Light Support Battalion conduct resupply sling load operations at Dillingham Army Airfield, Oahu, during Nakoa Fleek, August 2024. (Photo by CPT Kevin Davies, GSC Commander)

Signature and Survivability: Large sustainment platforms generated substantial visual, thermal, and acoustic signatures. While such signatures at the BSA are expected and unfortunately still required with the large volume of supplies required to support a brigade combat team, the presence of M978 fuelers, M984 wreckers, LHS/ PLS, and other legacy platforms at the FTCP and CTCP created an outsized footprint that degraded survivability for maneuver elements. In multiple cases, terrain-induced immobility forced FSCs to stage large vehicles away from their infantry battalion command posts and away from security elements, where they became high-value targets with limited organic firepower for defense. Sustainment operations reliant on massed vehicle platforms lacked the flexibility and stealth required for distributed, low-signature maneuver. Without a shift to smaller, more agile sustainment systems at the tactical edge, FSCs will remain disproportionately vulnerable in future LSCO. These challenges are not unique to JPMRC; they are endemic to Pacific sustainment. They cannot be mitigated through better planning alone.

Doctrine Meets the Jungle

Army Doctrine Publication 4-0, Sustainment, defines sustainment as the provision of logistics, personnel services, and health service support necessary to maintain operations until mission accomplishment. Within this definition lie three critical tenets: endurance, operational reach, and freedom of action. However, these concepts collapse when distribution assets cannot physically follow the fight. The LSB construct is modular, tailorable, and optimized for decentralized base cluster operations, but its effectiveness depends on its mobility. When combat and company trains are equipped with vehicles that cannot reach the point of need, the sustainment model fails to deliver. This is not a call to eliminate our heavy platforms. M978 fuelers and M984 wreckers provide vital capabilities. Sustainment in LSCO and expeditionary environments requires a flexible mix of large-capacity platforms with small-footprint, highly mobile platforms. Matching platforms to echelon and environment must become a cornerstone of how we field, employ, and fund the distribution force.

A Tiered Distribution Model

To achieve this, the Army must reevaluate echeloned sustainment from an equipping perspective.

Combat and Company Trains: In the Indo-Pacific, dense jungle, steep gradients, limited infrastructure, and disconnected island topography routinely render traditional distribution platforms ineffective. These conditions make it exceptionally difficult for FSCs (soon to be combat logistics companies) to fulfill their roles without fundamentally rethinking mobility. Current FSC vehicle density is dominated by legacy systems that are too large, too road-dependent, and too difficult to recover or displace forward in jungle or littoral terrain. This leaves FSCs dangerously exposed and unable to meet the needs of maneuver elements in distributed operations. To preserve operational reach and survivability, FSCs must be equipped with a family of small, lightweight, all-terrain vehicles capable of supporting immediate Class I (subsistence), Class III(P) and III(B) (fuel and packaged petroleum, oils, and lubricants), and Class V (ammunition) pushes. These platforms must be optimized for modularity, sling-load compatibility, and rapid deployment via CH-47, C-130, or external lift assets. They must also be capable of navigating narrow trails, degraded infrastructure, and other terrain where M1083s, M978s, or M984s cannot maneuver.

Emerging solutions already exist. The ISV, for example, offers a proven mobility platform that can be adapted for logistics roles. Potential variants include the ISV power variant, the ISV pallet carrier, and the ISV tank variant. These configurations would allow FSCs to build flexible, tailorable logistics packages aligned to mission variables and terrain. By enabling low-signature, rapid displacement sustainment operations at the support-company level, these platforms fill the critical mobility gap between the BSA and the FLOT. Without this shift to smaller, modular sustainment platforms, FSCs will remain a strategic liability in expeditionary operations.

Field Trains and BSA: Traditional heavy platforms such as the LHS, M984 wrecker, and HEMTT family remain indispensable to sustainment in LSCO and must be retained within the BSA. These vehicles provide essential capacity for long-haul distribution, equipment recovery, and refit operations that underpin the broader sustainment architecture. Their high payload, lifting capability, and integration with standardized containers and flatracks make them ideally suited for bulk resupply, transloading, and transportation from seaports or airports of debarkation to and from the BSA.

However, the complexity of the Indo-Pacific terrain and the distributed nature of tactical operations require that even LSBs be equipped with a limited set of smaller, air-transportable logistics platforms. These lighter vehicles enable throughput distribution when forward units are separated by terrain, enemy action, or degraded infrastructure. During periods of emergent need, the LSB must be capable of pushing Classes I, III, V, or maintenance support directly to a forward company or battalion using agile platforms that do not require improved road networks or route clearance.

Integrating ISV variants into the LSB’s internal distribution modified table of organization and equipment provides a critical mobility option. For example, an ISV tank variant loaded with a 200-400-gallon water or fuel pod can be internally transported by a CH-47 and delivered directly to a remote island node. That same aircraft can conduct immediate backhaul by recovering a like-item FSC ISV. Essentially this reinvents the concept of a trailer transfer point but uses small vehicle exchanges instead.

This push-pull model increases operational tempo and responsiveness while minimizing the exposure of large convoys to enemy observation and fires. It also preserves heavy platforms for their intended purpose at the BSA, while extending the reach of sustainment through modular, scalable distribution. The result is a more flexible distribution network that bridges the gap between bulk cargo sustainment and tactical breakbulk delivery in contested, austere environments. Equipping the LSB with at least a platoon-equivalent package of light, configurable vehicles provides the agility needed to maintain momentum across all three levels of brigade combat team trains, especially when roads are compromised, airstrips are short, or units are spread across multiple islands.

Conclusion

The absence of small logistics platforms is not merely a tactical inconvenience. It is a strategic vulnerability, especially in the Indo-Pacific. While large sustainment systems continue to play a vital role at the brigade and division levels, they are insufficient for closing the last tactical mile in a distributed, contested environment. Overcoming this challenge requires a tiered sustainment architecture. Victory in the Pacific will not go to the formation with the most trucks, but to the one that can consistently deliver fuel, water, ammunition, and repair parts to dispersed units regardless of infrastructure, weather, or enemy action. That level of operational reach demands more than adaptation. It demands new platforms and a fundamental reimagining of echeloned sustainment in the context of LSCO.