Over-the-Snow

Resupply for the Arctic Airborne Cavalry Squadron

By Capt. Clare Shea

Article published on: September 1, 2024 in the Fall 2024 edition of Army Sustainment

Read Time: < 10 mins

1st Lt. Brady Taylor and Sgt. Enrique Hurtado of the Distribution Platoon check fuel can loads during a LOGPAC on the Jarvis Creek at Donnely Training Area, Fort Greely, Alaska, during JPMRC 24-02, Feb. 11, 2024. (Photo by 1st Sgt. Brandon Fry)

In 2021, the Department of the Army renewed its focus on Arctic dominance and strategy, publishing the latest cold weather operations strategy, Regaining Arctic Dominance. The strategy emphasizes the ability to project power in high-altitude, extreme cold weather environments and compete with peer adversary threats in Arctic regions. There is likely no warfighting function that is more critical and complex in this harsh environment than sustainment. The Arctic strategy emphasizes that the Army will “be able to project power from, within, and into the Arctic to conduct and sustain extended operations in competition, crisis, and conflict from a position of advantage.”

Sgt. Scott Henderson of the Distribution Platoon prepares MREs in a snow mobile sled at the Forward Support Company CP for an upcoming LOGPAC at Donnely Training Area, Fort Greely, Alaska, during JPMRC 24-02, Feb. 13, 2024. (Photo by Capt. Clare Shea)

Recently 1st Squadron, 40th Cavalry Regiment (Airborne), 2nd Brigade, 11th Airborne Division (Arctic), participated in Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center ( JPMRC) 24-02 at Donnelly Training Area, Alaska. This exercise gave the cavalry forward support troop (FST) the opportunity to test and exercise over-the-snow sustainment using snow mobiles and sleds. The following lessons learned from that exercise provide planning considerations for successful execution of over-the-snow sustainment in extreme cold weather environments. They also provide recommendations for future changes to Arctic sustainment doctrine and the common table of allowances (CTA) for forward support companies in Arctic environments.

Before JPMRC 24-02, the 11th Airborne Division (Arctic) used over-the-snow sustainment on an extremely limited basis. Mobility, especially for sustainment vehicles, is considerably limited in Arctic environments due to snowfall and road conditions. In the past, over-the-snow resupply was only conducted from line company trains to the individual Soldier. However, the extreme distance of lines of communication (LOCs) that the 40th Cavalry Regiment faced during JPMRC 24-02 and the addition of new snow mobiles to the CTA, allowed the FST to validate running over-the-snow logistics packages (LOGPACs) from the FST all the way to the individual paratrooper.

During JPMRC 24-02, the FST supported two reconnaissance troops and the headquarters and headquarters troop (HHT). During the force-on-force fight, both reconnaissance troops fought mainly dismounted. Each reconnaissance troop operated with two to three Humvees and four snow mobiles. Each troop required significant JP-8 fuel to heat their Ahkio 10-man tents. HHT deployed with a significant package of vehicles to support the squadron tactical operations center (TOC), including two 15K generators, four Humvees, four snow mobiles, and three medium tactical vehicles. The majority of these vehicles were run at idle during the battle to sustain communications platforms and to keep batteries on vehicles charged.

Field Trains Command Post and the Brigade Support Area

The brigade support area (BSA) was located in a large area near the wood line approximately 25 km (15.5 miles) south of the reconnaissance troops. The terrain, restricted road networks, and snow conditions prevented bulk resupply forward of the BSA. The FST operated a node that served as the field trains command post (FTCP) at the BSA with primarily bulk assets and the maintenance control team. The FTCP did not have any over-the-snow capabilities. The FTCP was led by the troop executive officer and the maintenance control sergeant and included two M107 Tank Rack Modules, two load-handling systems, and a maintenance expandable van. The executive officer coordinated daily with the BSB for resupply of bulk fuel, motor gasoline (MOGAS) (used to fuel snow mobiles), Class I and Class IX repair parts, and various Class II supplies. The executive officer would then coordinate for supply forward to the combat trains command post (CTCP).

CTCP

The FST established its command post (CP) approximately 7 km (4.3 miles) forward of the BSA. The CP only brought forward smaller assets, including only fuel/water cans, three days of supply (DOS) of meals ready to eat (MREs), four snow machines, two contact trucks, and one command Humvee.

The removal of snow and coordination with the engineers is critical to the establishment of any CP in Arctic environments and must be a top priority. The FST placed the CP in a concealed area adjacent to the main supply route (MSR) to enable quick resupply. Additionally, the CP was located approximately 1 km from a frozen, snow-covered creek that served as a critical over-the-snow MSR leading to the logistics release point (LRP).

The headquarters section prioritized setting up the CP tent for communications. In addition to providing command and control (C2), the CP tent served as a critical asset to keep water cans liquid (i.e., keep them from freezing) for resupply forward to the reconnaissance troops.

Distribution

Trail creation and selection are critical to the success of over-the-snow resupply. The distribution platoon was able to use a frozen river as a high-speed avenue of approach and used existing logging trails to create an over-the-snow trail network for use by snow mobiles. Much of this trail system existed in another battalion’s battlespace and required constant communication and coordination to prevent fratricide. In addition, the FST cached three DOS of MREs near the troop CPs to reduce LOGPAC requirements, alleviating distribution requirements.

The distribution platoon established the LRP at the edge of the wood line near an open area approximately 3 km (1.9 miles) south of the reconnaissance troop observation posts (OPs). The reconnaissance troop’s executive officer or first sergeant met the distribution platoon at the LRP or picked up supplies at a later time, transporting the supplies to their troop OPs via snow mobile.

Fuel and water can resupply is critical for successful Arctic sustainment. The FST relied entirely on fuel can and water can resupply forward of the CTCP. Bulk vehicles are too large and targetable to move through any MSR in the area of operations. Snow mobile movement enabled the FST to move supplies undetected through a uniquely improvised trail network and reduced the number of large vehicles moving on the road. Mobility on the tight roads, hindered by snow drifts and under constant enemy surveillance, required alternate, non-wheeled resupply methods. During the operation, the FST determined that one snow machine sled has the following resupply capacities: One sled can carry 20 x fuel cans (both JP-8 and MOGAS) or 20 x water cans or 22 x cases of MREs or 1 x 75 gal MOGAS Drop Tank. This configuration is not optimal for movement on any uneven terrain because the load is more unstable than cans. This configuration would be optimal for a groomed snow trail.

Fuel Consumption

The four-stroke snow mobiles (Skidoo Skandic and Expedition models) consumed very low amounts of fuel compared to other military vehicles. The FST used approximately five gallons of MOGAS per day per snow machine (traveling approximately 40 km per day). The FST had the highest rates of fuel consumption in the squadron. The snow mobile fuel consumption for the line troops was significantly less because they moved shorter distances during the exercise. The FST delivered approximately one can of MOGAS per troop daily for their snow mobile operations. On average, the FST delivered 18 to 20 cans of JP-8 daily for the two recon troops that were fighting in dismounted operations, with some mounted battle positions.

Maintenance

Almost all vehicle maintenance was conducted in the rear at the BSA. Various small repairs were conducted forward. However, the terrain and weather forced all major repairs to occur in the rear where greater parts and assets were available. Instead of using large maintenance tents, the mechanics conducted maintenance using a tarp over the localized area of the vehicle and a bullet heater to keep warm.

The maintenance platoon assisted with vehicle and snow mobile recoveries. Maintenance towed downed snow mobiles with another snow mobile in the forward position. The recovery team used approved tow straps and removed the drive belt to tow the snow mobiles. While towing, a Soldier rode on the towed machine as a safety measure to control the brakes. The recovery team also used sleds to rear-tow a downed snow mobile. In future operations it would be beneficial to have an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) with tracks and winch to increase stability, especially if recovery from an established trail is required.

Medical Evacuation

Although not used during JPMRC 24-02, snow mobiles and sleds are a useful method for casualty evacuation from the forward line of troops back to the Role 1 medical facility.

Command and Control

Splitting the FST into two nodes over a long distance made C2 challenging. The CTCP maintained successful communications platforms with the squadron TOC for the duration of the exercise. However, the CTCP had challenges communicating with the FTCP. The only method of communication was the Integrated Tactical Network and the Alaska Land Mobile Radio. Communication was spotty and not reliable over the considerable distance. The FST is not equipped with the proper communications equipment to provide continuous communication between the FTCP and CTCP. One member of the command team would typically move over to the FTCP for battlefield circulation and provide important updates and orders to the FTCP.

Additionally, the maintenance control team struggled to access the Global Combat Support System-Army network. The maintenance team was unable to get very small aperture terminal (VSAT) connection through the duration of the exercise, likely due to tree cover and high latitudes that make satellite connection difficult. The FST was unwilling to compromise security for VSAT connection by placing the maintenance team in a wide-open area.

Other Considerations

The weather during JPMRC 24-02 was favorable for sustainment, with temperatures hovering in the high 20s. This warmer weather contributed to the overwhelming success of the cavalry FST’s over-the-snow sustainment. Only a few weeks earlier, the weather at Donnelly Training Area was -40 degrees Fahrenheit for two straight weeks. If this weather had held, the sustainment requirements for fuel would have significantly increased and put a severe strain on the distribution platoon. Additionally, the distribution platoon would have been put at a greater risk for cold weather injuries, causing significant complexities to LOGPAC operations.

Recommendations for Future Over-the-Snow Distribution Operations

During JPMRC 24-02, the FST selected only one LRP due to the length of the LOC. In future operations, it would be prudent to select multiple LRP locations to increase survivability and shorten the distances for line troops to travel to get supplies. Additionally, LOGPACs in the future can be used to deliver analog orders and 5988-E forms to improve the orders and maintenance processes.

CTA Recommendation

Since Arctic sustainment is still in the developing stages, much of the equipment used does not fall under the Arctic airborne modified table of equipment and instead is ordered as CTA equipment to support mission requirements. The use of small mobility platforms will increase sustainment reach in Arctic climates. The following equipment would significantly increase over-the-snow sustainment success for the forward support companies:

Distribution platoon: Four snow mobiles (three trail snow mobiles and one mountain snow mobile for cutting trails) with four sleds.

Maintenance platoon: One ATV with tracks for maintenance contact support and for recovery. This type of asset would enable the FST to drive on windblown surfaces with limited snow and not damage a snow mobile in terrain that does not allow Humvee movement. One small unmanned aircraft system to assist with route reconnaissance and route building.

Line troops: Line troops require a minimum of four snow mobile sleds to enable sled swaps for commodities. Each line troop requires a minimum of 40 JP-8 cans to enable fuel can swaps and a minimum of 10 cans of MOGAS. Additionally, the MOGAS cans must be clearly different from JP-8 cans to reduce mixing incidents. Also, line troops need at least 50 water cans.

Over-the-Snow Security

In the future, it would be beneficial to incorporate M249 machine gun platforms onto snow mobiles. Currently the only security available on LOGPACs is the operator’s M4 rifle. Additionally, the snow mobiles cannot switch to blackout lights or turn off the lights. The distribution platoon used duct tape to block out the lights. In the future, it will be critical to incorporate blackout lights into the snow mobile.

Conclusion

The future success of Arctic dominance will depend on the reliability of sustainment in cold weather and high-altitude environments. Ultimately, any conflict in an Arctic region will require a transition from over-the-road to over-the-snow logistics. Continuing to realistically train these tasks and to equip sustainment units for this reality will enable the Army to project power in Arctic regions.