Making 3,000 Look Like 30,000

By Colonel Ned Charles Holt

Article published on: October 1, 2024 in the Fall 2024 Edition of Army Sustainment

Read Time: < 9 mins

U.S. Army Soldiers from 10th Support Group and Japanese Ground-Self Defense mem-bers work together to upload various types of equipment onto a Landing Craft Utility at Naha Port, Okinawa, Japan. (U.S. Army

U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) serves as the theater gateway for U.S. forces responding to crises in the Indo-Pacific region. Inside USARJ, the 10th Regional Support Group (10RSG) supports the theater Army in competition and crisis. 10RSG’s primary missions are reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI); base operating support-integrator (BOS-I); contingency sustainment; and managing theater ammunition stocks for U.S. Army Pacific. The 10RSG headquarters (HQ) is on the island of Okinawa, and its two battalions, the 35th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion and the 10th Ammunition Depot, are over 500 miles north on the mainland of Japan.

During the competition and crisis phases, 10RSG has limited assigned forces and operates without follow-on forces for extended periods, which can exceed their capability. USARJ conducts several annual bilateral exercises with the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force ( JGSDF): Orient Shield, Yama Sakura, and North Wind. These exercises provide opportunities for 10RSG to experiment with concepts to support significant forces with limited personnel.

In 2023,the U.S.Army,JGSDF,and the Australian Defense Force (ADF) participated in Yama Sakura 85 (YS 85). Participating efficiency and effectiveness in providing sustainment support. The goal of this paper is not to suggest that a 15:1 ratio is the new norm, but that 10RSG has found many innovative ways to drive down the requirement in future operations. There is a substantial difference between supporting an exercise and a large-scale combat operation. commander more tooth,and increases operational reach. Even with a small support package, 10RSG provided all support categories, including billeting, laundry, transportation, and field feeding, from the arrival of the advance party to the departure of the trail element. A small sustainment package allowed the commander to reprioritize available resources to maximize training with minimal personnel and units from the U.S. included the 11th Airborne Division, 7th Infantry Division, I Corps, and from the ADF, the 1st Australian Division. YS 85 was a command post exercise that included over 1,500 service members from the U.S. Army and ADF and approximately 5,300 members from the JGSDF. Training occurred throughout central and northern Japan, with training sites dispersed 500 miles from Tokyo in the south to Hokkaido in the north. The training focused on increasing interoperability for the three nations to respond to large-scale combat and crisis.

All efforts were synchronized and nested to maximize the use of limited resources to reduce training distractors and ensure the continuity of the operation.

During YS 85, 10RSG demonstrated its exceptional capabilities by supporting over 1,500 service members with fewer than 100 Soldiers, resulting in a tooth-to-tail ratio of 15:1. This remarkable feat, surpassing the U.S. Army’s ratio of 1:4 (1 combat arms Soldier to 4 support Soldiers) during the Iraq War, is a testament to 10RSG’s efficiency and effectiveness in providing sustainment support. The goal of this paper is not to suggest that a 15:1 ratio is the new norm, but that 10RSG has found many innovative ways to drive down the requirement in future operations. There is a substantial difference between supporting an exercise and a large-scale combat operation.

However, it must be noted that even if the support element for YS 85 had been tripled, there would have been substantially more support forces than were used in previous conflicts.

Reducing the tail, the requirement for sustainment Soldiers, provides flexibility, reduces costs, gives the commander more tooth, and increases operational reach. Even with a small support package, 10RSG provided all support categories, including billeting, laundry, transportation, and field feeding, from the arrival of the advance party to the departure of the trail element. A small sustainment package allowed the commander to reprioritize available resources to maximize training with minimal personnel and budget impact, allowing 10RSG to train and rehearse on its assigned wartime missions.

To support the exercise, 10RSG operated four RSOI and BOS-I sites across northern Japan, a tactical command post (TAC) on the mainland of Japan and the main command post (MCP) 1,000 miles south in Okinawa. The TAC was responsible for all support operations for YS 85 and for managing all non-exercise activities that 10RSG was supporting on the mainland of Japan. The TAC was the single source for reporting all personnel, equipment, and supply statuses to reduce redundant reporting and flatten command nodes. The 10RSG TAC had the authority to reposition any personnel, supplies, or equipment without consulting the MCPs to flatten the command-and-control structure and increase its effectiveness.

10RSG engineered each logistics task force (LTF) separately to support the unique mission at the base camps. All RSOI and BOS-I nodes were established a week before the start of YS 85 and operated continuously until the training audience departed Japan. Each LTF had a core group of specialists that included the following, at a minimum:

Lt. Col. Koishi Hiroshi, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force member, briefs U.S. Army Soldiers and JGSDF members about supply routes and resources during a bilateral sustainment brief at Camp Sendai, Japan, Dec. 10, 2023. (Photo by Spc. Nolan Brewer)

• Officer in charge (OIC; branch and rank immaterial).

• Noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC; branch and rank immaterial).

• Transportation specialist.

• Personnel specialist.

• Communication specialist.

• Supply specialist.

With this basic structure, LTFs could be scaled up or down as needed, but each could account for personnel and equipment, provide life support, and run a base camp. With this structure in place, LTFs managed all types of support, such as tactical field feeding, JGSDF acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs), base life support (BLS) agreements, and contracting. A commissioned officer is not required to oversee an LTF. In previous North Wind exercises, an engineer master sergeant and a chief warrant officer served as the LTF OIC/NCOIC for different years.

The 10RSG operated with fewer than half the personnel used in Iraq through a disciplined approach that was process focused and started with the Army’s eight-step training model. It also included the following:

• LTF leader certification program that provided:

• Multiple touchpoints with the 10 RSG command team.

• Deliberate planning coupled with rehearsals and wargaming.

• Flattened command and control that provided leaders at echelon with the necessary authorities, resources, and budget required for mission.

• Host nation support and contracting.

• Vertical integration with USARJ staff (G-1, G-3, G-4,

  and G-6) and horizontal integration with U.S. Army Garrison (USAG) Japan and 403rd Army Field Support Brigade (AFSB) to ensure unity of effort.

• Most important, it included the trust of the supported unit and USARJ.

The genesis of this change was the reliance on the leader certification program for the LTFs. Six months before execution, 10RSG assigned a lead OIC and NCOIC to the exercise. This leadership team was responsible for all aspects of planning, resourcing, and execution, along with an after-action review and a recommendation for changes to the unit tactical standard operating procedure manual and the LTF handbook.

Lt. Col. Koishi Hiroshi, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force member, briefs U.S. Army Soldiers and JGSDF members about supply routes and resources during a bilateral sustainment brief at Camp Sendai, Japan, Dec. 10, 2023. (Photo by Spc. Nolan Brewer)

With the help of the S-3 and support operations, the OIC and NCOIC lead 10RSG through a detailed military decision-making process. When the course of action was approved, the OIC and NCOIC coordinated with the host nation. Training audiences were spread from Alaska, Hawaii, and Japan, and USARJ did an in-depth rehearsal of the concept.

Before the lead-up to the mission, the LTF led conducted site surveys, attended every joint exercise life cycle ( JELC),prepared and presented every significant product for the event, and conducted all rehearsals. The 10RSG command team was involved at every level, from receiving the mission analysis brief, participating in course-of-action development and selection, and ultimately approving the mission. 10RSG dedicated a significant amount of time and energy to wargaming and analyzing every step of the operation to ensure mission success. During the planning and rehearsing phase, the LTF leadership identified potential friction points, resources and authority challenges, and the manning for each LTF node.

The JGSDF provided the bulk of support to YS 85 through ACSAs and BLS agreements. The JGSDF had liaison officers (LNOs) embedded in the 10RSG TAC and local LTFs. These LNOs helped keep the operation together when the operation was adjusted or when weather affected training. This support was more cost-effective than contracting; it maximized local resources, reduced contractor and support fratricide, and increased interoperability between the two nations’ armed forces.

This level of cooperation did not occur in a vacuum. All YS 85 planning efforts were integrated through USARJ staff and were aligned with units participating in and supporting the exercise. During YS 85, USAG Japan and the 403rd AFSB provided over-the-horizon support, and their efforts were crucial to the exercise. All efforts were synchronized and nested to maximize the use of limited resources to reduce training distractors and ensure the continuity of the operation. A standard operating picture, steady information flow, and liaisons from all organizations enabled the TAC and LTFs to synchronize the RSOI and BOS-I support for over 1,500 service members and civilians who came from two countries with 30 points of debarkation. All converged on four locations in Japan. Operations can quickly become desynchronized without flat communications and a combined operations cell. During the reception phase of YS 85, the USARJ G-4 transportation section and the USAG Japan bus cell worked hand in hand to manage this complex mission.

No matter the plan or intentions, effective operations are built on trust between people and units. This concept is understood by 10RSG because it is geographically isolated from units that participate in the exercises (Alaska, Washington state, Hawaii, and Australia) by vast distances and the International Date Line. The unit and USARJ work tirelessly to build and maintain trust between the theater Army and itself. Trust starts with interactions at all JELC events, working groups, rehearsals, and wargames. But the bedrock of trust is delivering the agreed-upon services every time.

U.S. Army Soldiers and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members practice sling load operations during Orient Shield 23. (U.S. Army photo)

No two exercises or operations are the same. Still, several truisms can be transferred to a larger audience to reduce sustainment manning and increase the effectiveness of support operations:

• Choosing the right leader and maintaining command engagement through every step of the operation.

• Conducting mission analysis and wargaming.

• Gaining and maintaining the trust of higher HQs and supported unit.

• Reducing inefficiencies and redundant reporting requirements.

• Mission command that gives leaders at the echelon all the tools and authorities to make decisions without input from higher HQs.

In conclusion, 10RSG provides world-class sustainment support to coalition forces at a tooth-to-tail ratio uncommon in the U.S. Army. 10RSG’s low tooth-to-tail ratio is only possible because of the trust of their HQ, USARJ, the training audience, dedicated and professional officers, warrant officers, and NCOs, along with long-range planning and training that includes all elements of the command. The payoff is better-trained teams and units, trust in the formation and from division-supported units, reduced costs, and a more effective operation.