Cure Notices in Commercial Contract Terminations
By MAJ Kelly R. Snyder
Article published on:
August 1, 2025 in the 2025 Issue 2 of Army Lawyer
Read Time:
< 19 mins
Commercial aquatic drones are staged in preparation for a demonstration
for 2d Infantry Division Soldiers to showcase the capabilities of
cutting-edge underwater vehicles. (Credit: SPC John Farmer)
From the infrastructure and systems that manage and support permanent
changes of station1to our homeland’s defense against the increasing threat of small unmanned
aircraft systems,2commercial contracts play a critical role in supporting Department of
Defense (DoD) missions. When nonconformance, delays, or other issues
arise, the attorneys who advise contracting officers must be confidently
ready to advise on the Government’s options and the steps required to take
certain actions.
If the Government has determined that it is necessary to terminate a
commercial contract, the concepts and procedures for doing so vary from
those for non-commercial contracts in subtle but important ways. The
well-known mechanism for governing non-commercial contract
terminations—Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 49, Termination of
Contracts3—does not primarily govern commercial contract terminations. Instead,
contracting officers must follow the termination procedures found in the
commercial products/services clause and FAR Part 12, Acquisition of
Commercial Products and Commercial Services. They are, however, permitted
to use FAR Part 49 “as guidance to the extent that Part 49 does not
conflict with [Part 12] and the language of the termination paragraphs in
52.212-4.”4These overlapping regulations have generated confusion about whether cure
notices—warnings that the Government considers a contractor’s work
delinquent and a deadline for the contractor to “cure” the condition to
prevent termination5—are required for commercial terminations for cause.6The express language of FAR 52.212-4(m) makes no mention of a cure notice
requirement, while FAR Parts 12 and 49, as well as the non-commercial
default clauses for supplies and services, expressly provide for cure
notices in certain situations.7
This article explores the overlapping frameworks surrounding cure notices
for commercial contracts and explains when a cure notice is required.
Drawing from FAR provisions, commercial contract norms, and key
adjudications, it offers a path for judge advocates (JAs) to navigate this
nuanced and important area of contract law while helping to prevent costly
errors and delays in procurement actions.
Background
Commercial contract provisions “address, to the maximum extent
practicable, commercial market practices.”8They therefore differ from the sometimes lengthy and onerous provisions
and clauses the Government uses for procuring non-commercial products and
services. For example, a contract termination due to the contractor’s
failure to meet contractual requirements is called a “termination for
default” for a non-commercial contract, while for a commercial contract,
it is called a “termination for cause.”9This distinction gets muddied, however, as the FAR’s commercial
termination clause seems to use the terms “cause” and “default”
interchangeably.10FAR 52.212-4(m) provides the following regarding commercial contract
terminations:
Termination for cause. The Government may terminate this
contract, or any part hereof, for cause in the event of any default by the
Contractor, or if the Contractor fails to comply with any contract terms
and conditions, or fails to provide the Government, upon request, with
adequate assurances of future performance. In the event of termination for
cause, the Government shall not be liable to the Contractor for any amount
for supplies or services not accepted, and the Contractor shall be liable
to the Government for any and all rights and remedies provided by law. If
it is determined that the Government improperly terminated this contract
for default, such termination shall be deemed a termination for
convenience.11
FAR 12.403(c) also applies to commercial contracts.12It states that contracting officers “shall send a cure notice prior to
terminating a contract for a reason other than late delivery” and notes
that the “excusable delays” provision (FAR 52.212-4(f)) should eliminate a
need to send a show cause notice prior to termination because it requires
contractors to notify the contracting officers “as soon as possible after
commencement of any excusable delay.”13
To further understand this landscape, it helps to consider commercial
marketplace norms. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) typically governs
private-sector commercial contracts.14While not binding, the Government looks to the UCC for guidance when
regulations or the contract itself do not squarely cover a topic and to
help practitioners understand how the commercial marketplace operates.
Under the UCC, when a tender or delivery is rejected for nonconformance
and the time for performance has not yet passed, sellers may notify the
buyer of their intention to cure the failure and then make a proper
delivery within the contract time period.15Even after the delivery time has elapsed, if a buyer rejects a
nonconformance but the seller “had reasonable grounds to believe [it]
would be acceptable,” the seller may have reasonable time to cure the
defect if they timely notify the buyer.16
Repudiation is another term of art relevant to cure notice requirements.
It is synonymous with rejection, disclaimer, or renunciation, and it
refers to the “refusal to perform a duty or obligation owed to the other
party.”17Repudiation can be evidenced through words or actions.18When done before the delivery or performance due date, repudiation is “an
anticipatory breach of contract but does not constitute a breach unless
the other party elects to treat it as such.”19
Under the UCC, if “reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to
the performance of either party the other may in writing demand adequate
assurance of due performance.”20This anticipatory repudiation is not limited to “cases of express and
unequivocal repudiation.”21Instead, it includes “cases in which reasonable grounds support the
obligee’s belief that the obligor will breach the contract.”22The failure to provide adequate assurance of due performance within a
reasonable time (not exceeding thirty days) constitutes repudiation of the
contract.23Until the next performance due date, or until the aggrieved party has
materially changed their position or elected and indicated they consider
the repudiation final, the offending party may retract their repudiation
“by any method which clearly indicates to the aggrieved party that the
repudiating party intends to perform, but must include any assurance
justifiably demanded.”24
Application: When Cure Notices Are Required
While the FAR’s commercial termination for cause provision does not
explicitly require the Government to provide a cure notice and opportunity
for the contractor to cure,25courts and boards will read this into the clause—at least for those
situations either called for by FAR 12.403(c) or typically requiring such
a notice under FAR Part 49.26This is important because “failure to give a cure notice, when required,
will result in an improper termination” and will convert the termination
into one for convenience, in which the Government incurs more liability
and the contractor incurs much less.27
Some Terminations for Cause Require Cure Notices Despite FAR 52.212-4’s
Silence
In the 2005 General Services Administration Board of Contract Appeals
(GSBCA) decision Geo-Marine, a Government contracting officer
terminated a commercial task order without issuing a cure notice.28Highlighting confusion even within the Federal contracting profession,
the contracting officer notified the contractor that they were being
terminated for “default” under FAR 52.249-8—the termination for default
provision—which the contract did not reference.29The contract did, however, contain the standard commercial items clause
from FAR 52.212-4.30Because “the termination for default clause contained in [standard supply
and service] contracts is similar to the termination for cause clause
included in this commercial item contract,” the GSBCA considered the
“precedent which applies to standard supply and service contracts.”31It noted that terminations for default do not require a cure notice if
the termination is based on failing to deliver or perform in a timely
manner or on repudiating contractual duties before the performance
deadline.32The board explained that “[a]lthough the commercial item contract
termination for cause clause does not mention sending a cure notice, the
regulations which apply to commercial item contracts require the
Government to send a cure notice before terminating for any reason other
than late delivery.”33
Geo-Marine requested a summary judgment and that the termination be
converted into a termination for convenience because a cure notice was not
issued.34However, because they had not presented enough evidence to show that the
termination was not based on non-performance or repudiation—which would
not require a cure notice—the GSBCA denied the request.35
The Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (CBCA) has also read an implicit
cure notice requirement into commercial contracts. In its 2016
Brent Packer decision, the CBCA found that “although the
commercial termination provision, unlike the standard default clause, does
not expressly reference the need for the contracting officer to issue a
cure notice before terminating a contractor for failure to comply with
contract provisions, FAR 12.403 imposes that requirement.”36The board refused to “interpret the FAR in such a way as to render its
requirement for issuance of a cure notice pointless” because a
regulation’s interpretation is “unreasonable if it would render portions
of the regulation meaningless.”37
In Brent Packer, the Social Security Administration (SSA)
terminated for cause two calls of blanket purchase agreements (BPA) with
two different contractors for medical consulting services.38The SSA terminated, without issuing a cure notice, each call and their
underlying BPA because each contractor had accepted employment with a
state agency, which violated the [organizational conflict of interest
(OCI)] requirements of BPAs and call order[s].”39Although the CBCA said it was clear the SSA viewed the OCI provisions as
a material requirement of the call orders, the board stated they “need not
address the materiality issue here because, as the SSA acknowledges, it
never issued a cure notice [to the contractors] before terminating their
call orders for cause.”40
While the SSA argued that issuing a cure notice would have been futile,
and the CBCA agreed that cure notices are not required when they “would be
futile (such as if, for example, a contractor expressly repudiates a
contract),” the SSA had not explained why it would have been futile in
that situation.41Because “it is well established that the . . . cure notice requirement is
intended to allow an errant contractor a time certain within which to
correct identified problems,” and it was clear the contractors at issue
would have corrected the identified problems to comply with the OCI
provision, the termination was invalid.42
A Cure Notice Is Not Required When Terminating for Failed/ Late
Delivery/Performance
As the GSCBA did in Geo-Marine, the CBCA dealt with a challenge
based on termination for cause without a cure notice in the 2007
Bus. Mgmt. Rsch. Assoc., Inc. v. Government Services Agency (GSA)
case.43The CBCA noted that “a termination for cause is the equivalent of a
termination for default, so we apply the same legal standards to both
types of cases.”44However, the contractor failed to provide two required training courses,
and the board found that while “regulations governing commercial item
contracts require the [GSA] to send a cure notice before terminating for
any reason other than late delivery,” when late delivery occurs, “no cure
notice is required” prior to termination.45
The CBCA reinforced this ruling in 2012 when CDA, Inc. argued that the SSA
was required to give it a cure notice before terminating for cause because
the contracting officer stated in a deposition that “non-performance” was
the basis for termination.46However, the board found that late delivery was the basis of the
non-performance, and in accordance with the applicable regulations,
“because CDA failed to deliver its services on time, SSA was not obligated
to provide CDA with a cure notice.”47
The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) has held the same in
similar situations.
In re General Injectables & Vaccines, Inc. involved the
Defense Logistics Agency’s termination for cause of a flu virus vaccine
contract, without a cure notice, for failure to deliver without any
excusable causes.48The notice of termination also explained, “As the contractor notified the
contracting officer of its intent to not perform, the contracting officer
will not send a cure notice or show cause letter to the contractor.”49The ASBCA denied the contractor’s appeal,50and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed that
decision.51
A Cure Notice Is Likely Required When Terminating for Anticipatory
Repudiation
In NCLN20, Inc. v. United States, five days before performance
was supposed to start on a facilities guard contract, the GSA issued a
cure notice requiring the contractor, within twenty-four hours, to provide
copies of permits and assurances that it could perform or be terminated
for default.52The contractor was unable to comply, and two days later—three days prior
to the performance due date—the GSA terminated for default.53The U.S. Court of Federal Claims noted that the doctrine of anticipatory
repudiation has been incorporated into Government contract law, and it
requires “that the contractor give reasonable assurances of performance
but only in response to a validly issued cure notice.”54Because the GSA failed to give a validly issued cure notice and only
twenty-four hours to respond, the court barred the GSA from asserting
anticipatory repudiation as a defense.55
In Cross Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, the contract required
a ten-day cure notice, but the Forest Service did not issue one before
terminating the fuel contract for default; it instead argued that a cure
notice was not required because the contractor anticipatorily repudiated
the contract.56The U.S. Court of Federal Claims once again rejected the Government’s
argument, and it noted that non-government contracts “requir[e] merely a
vague ‘demand’ for adequate assurance, whereas the contract provision
requires a formal cure notice that allows a ten-day period for cure.”57Therefore, it appears that to terminate for anticipatory repudiation in
the commercial contract setting, courts would require the Government to
send a cure notice under FAR 12.403 because anticipatory repudiation is a
“reason other than late delivery” and all such bases for termination
require a cure notice.58
Conclusion
Terminations for default/cause are considered “drastic sanction[s]” that
should be utilized “only for good grounds and on solid evidence.”59As such, JAs should review terminations for cause before the contracting
officer issues them.60Legal counsel should get involved early in the process, as determining
whether a cure notice is required can be a fact-intensive analysis. Even
when a cure notice may not be legally necessary, it may be beneficial,
such as when a contractor can still deliver soon or cure their failure.
JAs should also advise contracting officers to issue cure notices to
mitigate litigation risk—especially when the basis for termination is
ambiguous or when it is unclear whether repudiation has actually occurred
or is just anticipated. Given the high stakes of commercial terminations,
this small procedural step can make a significant difference in ensuring
that the Government’s position will withstand scrutiny if challenged.
TAL
Notes
1.
Statement by Chief Pentagon Spokesman Sean Parnell on Implementation
Memorandum for Permanent Change of Station Joint Task Force, U.S. Dep’t of Def. (June 18, 2025),
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4221479/statement-by-chief-pentagon-spokesman-sean-parnell-on-implementation-memorandum
[https://perma.cc/UED8-UPJA]
(“Today the DoD terminated Home-Safe Alliance LLC (HSA), the DoD HHGs
contractor, for cause due to HSA’s demonstrated inability to fulfill
their obligations and deliver high quality moves to Service members.”).
2.
Anduril Awarded 10-Year $642M Program of Record to Deliver CUAS
Systems for U.S. Marine Corps, Anduril (Mar. 13, 2025),
https://www.anduril.com/article/anduril-awarded-10-year-642m-program-of-record-to-deliver-cuas-systems-for-u-s-marine-corps
[https://perma.cc/D5WX-2MYG].
3. FAR 12.403(a)
(2025).
4. Id.
5. FAR 49.607(a)
(2025).
6.
See 1 Sec. 809 Panel, Report of the Advisory Panel on
Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Regulations 43-45 (2018).
7.
See FAR 12.403(c)(1), 49.402-3(d), 52.212-4(m), 52.249-8
(2025).
8. FAR 12.302 (2025).
9.
See Paul J. Seidman et al.,
Service Contracting in the New Millennium - Part II, Briefing
Papers 12 (West Group 2002).
10.
FAR 52.212-4(m) (2025) (“The Government may terminate this contract, or
any part hereof, for cause in the event of any
default by the Contractor . . . . If it is determined that the
Government improperly terminated this contract for default,
such termination shall be deemed a termination for convenience.”)
(emphasis added); see also FAR 52.212-4(f) (2025) (“The
Contractor shall be liable for default unless nonperformance is
caused by an occurrence beyond the reasonable control of the Contractor
and without its fault or negligence . . . .”) (emphasis added).
11. FAR 52.212-4(m)
(2025).
12. FAR 12.403
(2025).
13. FAR 12.403(c)(1)
(2025); see also FAR 52.212-4(f) (2025) (“[T]he Contractor
shall notify the Contracting Officer in writing as soon as it is
reasonably possible after the commencement of any excusable delay,
setting forth the full particulars in connection therewith, shall remedy
such occurrence with all reasonable dispatch, and shall promptly give
written notice to the Contracting Officer of the cessation of such
occurrence.”).
14.
See Ralph C. Nash, Karen R. O’Brien-De-bakey, & Steven L.
Schooner, The Government Contracts Reference Book 520 (4th ed. 2013).
15. U.C.C. § 2-508(1)
(A.L.I. & Unif. L. Comm’n 2023).
16.
Id. § 2-508(2).
17. Nash et al.,
supra
note 14, at 428.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20. U.C.C. § 2-609(1)
(A.L.I. & Unif. L. Comm’n 2023); see also NCLN20, Inc. v.
United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 734, 756 (2011), aff’d, 495 F. App’x
94 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
21. Danzig v. AEC
Corp., 224 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
22.
Id.
23. U.C.C. § 2-609(4)
(A.L.I. & Unif. L. Comm’n 2023); see also Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 251 (A.L.I. 1981).
24. U.C.C. § 2-611
(A.L.I. & Unif. L. Comm’n 2023).
25.
See FAR 52.212-4(m) (2025).
26.
See Richard D. Lieberman,
Commercial Item Contracts Require Cure Notices Before Termination for
Cause, Pub. Contracting Inst.,
https://publiccontractinginstitute.com/commercial-item-contracts-require-cure-notices-before-termination-for-cause
[https://perma.cc/Z3WF-NQRX]
(last visited July 7, 2025).
27. Appeal of Bell,
ENGBCA 5872, 92-3 BCA ¶ 25,076; Kisco Co. v. United States, 610 F.2d
742, 750-51 (Ct. Cl. 1979); FAR 52.212-4(m) (2025);
see also John Cibinic, Ralph C. Nash & James F. Nagle,
Administration of Government Contracts 964 (5th ed. 2016).
28.
Geo-Marine, Inc. v. Gen. Servs Admin., GSBCA No. 16247, 05-2 BCA ¶
33,048.
29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
35.
Id.
36. Brent Packer and
Myrna Palasi v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,260.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
42.
Id.
43.
Bus. Mgmt. Rsch. Assocs., Inc. v. Gen. Servs. Admin, CBCA 464, 07-1 BCA
¶ 33,486.
44.
Id.
45.
Id.
46. CDA, Inc. v. Soc.
Sec. Admin,, CBC 1558, 12-1 B.C.A. ¶ 34,990.
47.
Id.
48.
In Re Gen. Injectables & Vaccines, Inc., ASBCA No. 54930, 06-2
B.C.A. ¶ 33,401.
49.
Id.
50.
Id.
51.
Gen. Injectables & Vaccines, Inc. v. Gates, 519 F.3d 136 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
52. NCLN20, Inc. v.
United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 734 (2011), aff’d, 495 F. App’x 94
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
53.
Id. at 755.
54.
Id. at 756 (quoting Danzig v. AEC Corp., 224 F.3d 1333, 1338
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted).
55.
Id.
56. Cross Petroleum,
Inc. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 317, 325 (2002).
57.
Id. at 326.
58. FAR 12.403(c)(1)
(2023). See also Appeal of --Bulova Techs. Ordnance Sys. LLC,
ASBCA No. 59089, 18-1 BCA ¶ 37183 (Government sent what was “tantamount
to a cure notice” seeking assurances including supporting documentation,
contractor responded with inadequate conditional assurances, and ASBCA
upheld termination for cause.).
59.
Cross Petroleum, Inc., 54 Fed. Cl. at 326.
60.
See, e.g., DAFFARS 5333.290(b) (Oct. 16, 2024).
Authors
MAJ Snyder is a U.S. Air Force judge advocate and
acquisition attorney within the Air Force Materiel Command Law Office at
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. The views expressed in this
article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or the
U.S. Government.