Supreme Command The "Unequal Dialogue" of Civil-Military Relations

By Major Bradan T. Thomas

| Army Lawyer, 2026 Issue #1

Read Time: < 19 mins

Supreme Command Book Cover

War, therefore, is an act of policy. Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them. It is clear, consequently, that war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means.1

The American institution has long been cognizant and conscious of both the import and impact of civil-military relations in our democracy. From the Declaration of Independence2 and the Constitution3 to modern legislation,4 jurisprudence,5 and policy,6 our national framework provides consistency in its insistency on civilian control of the military. Though such civilian supremacy is well accepted and affirmed,7 views diverge sharply on exactly how involved elected civilians should be in military matters.8 Departing from Samuel Huntington’s “normal” theory of civil-military relations, Eliot Cohen’s Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime9 contributes to contemporary discourse by offering a timeless, and timely,10 exploration of the tenets and tensions of wartime civil-military relations.

Artfully presented through the extraordinary triumphs of four war states-men—American President Abraham Lincoln, French Premier Georges Clemenceau, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion—and their impactful modes of directive, communicative, and probing leadership, Cohen argues that Huntington’s “normal” theory (that is, a professionalized military thrives when insulated from politics and “subjective civilian control”)11 is as flawed as it is frustrated. Indeed, the preponderance of Supreme Command’s chapters showcases the efficacy of involved, invested, and ingrained civilian control of military matters—a practice that challenges the normative view that Cohen argues is perhaps overly deferential to military decision-making.12

In breaking from Huntington’s long-held theory, Cohen posits that the continuous discussions between civilian and military leaders during war are necessarily “unequal dialogues.”13 This simple phrase encapsulates a powerful two-part concept that upends tradition: ongoing discourse between the soldier14 and the statesman is paramount in responsible wartime decision-making, and the authority to make such wartime decisions unambiguously and unquestioningly lies with the statesman (informed, of course, by the advice and counsel of the soldier).15 Through its multinational quartet of political paragons, Supreme Command deftly expounds on our Nation’s bedrock principle of civilian control of the military,16 offering critical food for thought for all who live in and cherish a democracy.

Though steeped in historical examples, the substance of Supreme Command is as relevant now as ever to both civilian policymakers and military practitioners. Its coverage is especially applicable for today’s judge advocates (JAs), who often find themselves operating at the tripartite intersection of law, policy, and practice.17 Just as mastery of the law is non-negotiable for members of our Corps, so too is a foundational understanding of the legal landscape in which they practice, including how it informs their ability to provide principled counsel.18 Cohen’s invaluable contextualization of the arena in which JAs practice makes Supreme Command a must-read for all.

Huntington Sets the Stage

The “normal” view of modern civil-military relations that Cohen challenges emanates primarily from Huntington’s seminal book entitled The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.19 Published in 1957, Huntington’s widely accepted position espouses a deep preference—indeed, a convictional reverence—for “objective civilian control” of the military, at the heart of which “is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism.”20 Such professionalism, Huntington argues, is characterized by expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.21 Because the officer corps satisfies these criteria while specializing in the “management of violence,”22 Huntington asserts that the military should be left alone (that is, insulated from political matters and civilian meddling) to serve as a utilitarian tool of the state.

A practical analogue to Huntington’s view of proper civil-military relations is the relationship between a Soldier facing court-martial and their detailed defense counsel. In this context, the Soldier personally makes several major decisions regarding fundamental components of their trial,23 and the defense counsel is responsible for the tactical and strategic decisions to achieve the Soldier’s objectives. Guided by Army Regulation 27-26’s Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(a), the defense counsel “shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and . . . shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”24 Though the “wide latitude” for strategic and tactical decision-making afforded to the defense counsel25 falls short of Huntington’s ideal of “autonomous military professionalism,” the attorney-client dynamic parallels a Huntingtonian view of the military serving as an independent means to effectuate civilian policy.

While the symbiotic relationship between an accused and their defense counsel approaches the “normal” theory of civil-military relations, one cannot ignore the import of the context in which that joint enterprise exists. The defense attorney might very well pay no mind to the possibilities that an acquittal will further disrupt social circles in the Soldier’s unit, that an assaultive cross-examination of an alleged victim will cause them lasting distress, or that they will zealously attack the arguments of their colleagues across the aisle. This luxury is afforded to the defense counsel because they work to serve and preserve the interests of only the particular individual they represent in that particular case.26 Such simplicity does not exist for a nation’s military or civilian leaders, who work to serve a complex, complete society that exists in a globally connected world. The comprehensive, multidisciplinary ramifications of wartime decision-making inject a level of complexity that Cohen appreciates and explains in describing what makes a successful statesman and a workable civil-military dynamic.27

Cohen Steals the Show

In diverging from the established view of civil-military relations, Cohen’s Supreme Command posits that civilian political leadership must engage in an enduringly interactive, almost intrusive role in military matters.28 Policymakers’ active involvement in the myriad facets, stages, and details of military planning and action, Cohen asserts, does not so much trample the might of a military as it does faithfully serve both the democracy that military supports and the true ends of policy. This necessary entwinement of civilian policy and, by extension, military execution—which is not a novel concept, but one gleaned from centuries of warfare and theory29—requires

  • that political leaders immerse themselves in the conduct of their wars no less than in their great projects of domestic legislation; that they must master their military briefs as thoroughly as they do their civilian ones; that they must demand and expect from their military subordinates a candor as bruising as it is necessary; that both groups must expect a running conversation in which, although civilian opinion will not usually dictate, it must dominate; and that that conversation will cover not only ends and policies, but ways and means.29

Four exemplary case studies exemplify these principles, proving in various wartime contexts, political climates, and geographical regions that the active statesman succeeds through “querying, prodding, suggesting, arbitrating, and on rare occasions ordering their professional subordinates.”31 While each of Cohen’s subjects faced unique challenges in ensuring and imposing civilian control of military matters, all were united in their consummate competence in penetrating the veil of military autonomy to achieve success for their respective nations.

Supreme Command assesses wartime leadership over the course of nearly a century, during which the world evolved dramatically (going, for instance, from President Lincoln’s 1860s plight to abolish slavery to President Harry Truman’s 1948 order32 to desegregate the military). Lincoln desperately sought military leaders who understood and shared his virtue, vision, and values during the American Civil War.33 Clemenceau, on the other hand, had to moderate and mediate for two successful and diametrically opposed generals near the end of World War I.34 The ever-probing Churchill constantly questioned and spurred action in others to optimize results throughout World War II.35 And Ben-Gurion completed the Sisyphean task of shepherding his nascent nation’sunderprepared military force to be one postured to protect the fledgling state during the Arab-Israeli War of 1948.36 These leaders devoted themselves entirely to their causes and treated their militaries as a facet of the national security strategies that they closely controlled, in opposition of Huntington’s preference for an autonomous military.

Although their challenges differed, each statesman treated his role similarly and solemnly: “master the details of war,”37 probe and challenge always,38 and remain engaged (and dominant) in the “unequal dialogue.”39 While no statesman studied was a perfect military tactician or strategist,40 all demonstrated their aptitude for excellence in marshalling vast amounts and varied types of information, eliciting necessary additional facts and data, and facilitating optimal results.

As a shining American example, Cohen details Lincoln’s immersion in three subjects that enabled him to shape the Union’s successful war effort: the development of magazine-fed rifles (which he personally tested and helped procure), the bolstering of the transcontinental railroad (which he used to facilitate logistics for his army), and the advent of the telegraph (which granted him near omnipresence throughout the country).41 Cohen makes clear that Lincoln’s drive to “master the details of war” paired with his personal investment in developing and employing new technologies to form a complete sight picture of the Union’s position, capabilities, and potential far exceeded what any career military officer might have had.42 Cohen’s remaining exemplars demonstrated similar focuses on their respective areas of improvement that are no less impactful than Lincoln’s. Indeed, each of the four statesmen exemplifies Cohen’s metaphor that he was more than just the captain of a ship; rather, he was the captain at the helm of a complex sailing vessel with innumerable intricately counterbalanced systems while navigating uncharted, uncertain, and unforgiving seas on a moonless night.43

Unflinching determination and unyielding purpose are among the leadership traits common to Cohen’s protagonists. Each leader used his military (through its uniformed leaders) to assist in accomplishing his policy goals, ensuring great oversight to guarantee that all military action fit into the political landscape of the day. With great conviction, each leader devoted every part of himself to his purpose, going so far as employing “ruthlessness” to achieve the task at hand.44All four statesmen’s ultimate dedication to purpose and willingness to engage in, and dominate, the “unequal dialogue” set them apart from unremarkable and unsuccessful leaders.45The actions and tactics of these four men form the core of Cohen’s theory that an informed, invested politician who unyieldingly seeks an optimal end state is best suited to make wartime military decisions.

Conclusion

Transcending time, culture, and conflict, generations of civilian philosophers46 and military theorists47 have pondered the ideal allocation of authority between civilian leaders and military executors. As illuminating as it is informative, Supreme Command contributes to the conversation by explaining the presupposition of “normal” civil-military relations, offering a cogent counter, and thoughtfully supporting its position with objectively successful historical demonstrations by renowned world leaders. JAs stand to benefit from analyzing Cohen’s work, as discussion continues today on the unsettled subject of civil-military relations48

To concretize the influence of civil-military relations on the modern practice of military law (and thus the prudence of its study), one need look no further than the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 202249 and 2023,50 which jointly implemented sweeping, reformative changes to the military justice system. Through the establishment of the Office of Special Trial Counsel,51 civilian-borne changes have tempered commanders’ authority to administer military justice in the most serious of cases—an issue of first impression and significant concern for many of today’s commanders.52 Despite this fundamental change to the long-established practice of commander-driven disciplinary authority, the Armed Forces have fully committed to its implementation as good stewards of the principle of civilian control of the military.

While commanders expect their command counsel to explain the letter of the law, they will undoubtedly appreciate the coexistent ability to provide the underlying basis, background, and context for such changes. Because this necessarily requires an understanding of civil-military relations and the “unequal dialogue” that governs, JAs should start (or continue) their study with Supreme Command’s meaningful message. Understanding and internalizing its arguments will enable practitioners to “embrace the challenge of change”53 individually and “be the JAG Corps the Army needs”54 collectively.

Notes

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. & trans., 1976) (1832). Current U.S. Army doctrine enshrines Clausewitz's view, providing that "[a]ll U.S. military operations share a common fundamental purpose—to achieve specific objectives that support attainment of the overall political purpose of the operation . . . set by national authorities." U.S. Dep't of Army, Doctrine Pub. 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces para. 1-6 (31 July 2019).

2. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (submitting as a grievance that King George III had "affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power"). For a discussion of civil-military relations and the Declaration of Independence, see Major Adam T. Schultz, George Washington and the Establishment of Civil-Military Relations in Relation to the Declaration of Independence (June 12, 2015) (M.M.A.S. thesis), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA623955.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP7G-KLC5].

3. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (vesting in Congress the powers to raise, support, and regulate armed forces); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (empowering the President as Commander in Chief of the forces Congress raises, supports, and regulates).

4. In its 1947 restructuring of the U.S. military, creation of the Air Force, and establishment of the civilian position of Secretary of Defense (now referred to as the Secretary of War), "it [was] the intent of Congress . . . to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified civilian control . . . ." National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, § 2, 61 Stat. 495, 496. Such unified civilian control continues today, with the President appointing each military secretary "from civilian life." 10 U.S.C. § 113 (civilian Secretary of War); id. § 7013 (civilian Secretary of the Army); id. § 8013 (civilian Secretary of the Navy); id. § 9013 (civilian Secretary of the Air Force). To further protect the requirement of civilian control, secretarial appointees must be at least seven years removed from any military service. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, e.g., Act of Jan. 22, 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-1, 135 Stat. 3 (excepting then-Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin from this temporal requirement), and arguments against such exceptions, e.g., 167 Cong. Rec. S86–87 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 2021) (statements of Sens. Collins and Van Hollen).

5. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 645–46 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The purpose of lodging dual titles in one man was to insure that the civilian would control the military, not to enable the military to subordinate the presidential office.").

6. E.g., President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., National Security Strategy 21 (2021) ("We will maintain our foundational principle of civilian control of the military, recognizing that healthy civil-military relations rooted in mutual respect are essential to military effectiveness.").

7. For an unprecedented example of such subordination articulated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see Memorandum from Joint Chiefs of Staff to Joint Force, subject: Message to the Joint Force (12 Jan. 2021) ("As we have done throughout our history, the U.S. military will obey lawful orders from civilian leadership . . . and remain fully committed to protecting and defending the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.").

8. See, e.g., Lieutenant Colonel Kevin F. Krupski, Who's the Boss? Defining the Civil-Military Relationship in the Twenty-First Century, Mil. Rev., Jan.–Feb. 2023, at 26.

9. Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (2002).

10. Cohen completed his manuscript on the heels of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Id. at 225. This serendipitously coincided with the United States' recursion into the Middle East, beginning what some have labeled "World War IV." Norman Podhoretz, World War IV: The Long Struggle Against Islamofascism 9–15 (2007).

11. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 80–83 (1957). For Cohen's analysis of civil-military relations, see Cohen, supra note 9, app.

12. It is noteworthy that, in focusing on results of decisions past, Cohen forsakes analysis of the military's robust decision-making processes. Failure to consider the potential of today's military decision-making processes is error. For comprehensive coverage of the breadth and depth of military planning in a joint environment, see Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 5-0, Joint Planning (1 Dec. 2020) (C1, 1 July 2024).

13. Cohen, supra note 9, at 12, 209.

14. The author adopts Cohen's use of "soldier" to indicate military leaders generally, noting that Cohen's analysis applies chiefly to strategic-level senior officers of all branches of the Armed Forces. Accordingly, the term is not capitalized.

15. Id. at 209. The concept of such advice and counsel is deeply embedded in our system of governance. For example, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President and Secretary of War. 10 U.S.C. § 151(b)(1). As a steward of the profession of arms, the Chairman "reinforces effective civilian control when [he] seeks clarification, raises questions about second- and third-order effects, and proposes alternatives that may not have been considered." Ashton Baldwin Carter et al., To Support and Defend: Principles of Civilian Control and Best Practices of Civil-Military Relations, War on the Rocks (Sep. 6, 2022), https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/to-support-and-defend-principles-of-civilian-control-and-best-practices-of-civil-military-relations [https://perma.cc/7JRB-T57K].

16. E.g., The Federalist No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton) ("Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject, it is a full answer to those who require a more peremptory provision against military establishments in time of peace, to say that the whole power of the proposed government is to be in the hands of the representatives of the people.").

17. See, e.g., Dan Maurer, The Department of Defense's in Extremis Legal Challenges During Modern Warfare, Arts. of War (Apr. 24, 2024), https://lieber.westpoint.edu/dod-extremis-legal-challenges-during-modern-warfare [https://perma.cc/WFN7-KTM9].

18. See U.S. Dep't of Army, Field Manual 3-84, Legal Support to Operations para. 1-4, 1-2 fig.1-1 (1 Sep. 2023) (defining the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Corps constants as principled counsel, mastery of the law, servant leadership, and stewardship); Lieutenant General Stuart W. Risch & Lieutenant Colonel John E. Swords, Lawyers as Leaders: Servant Leadership and Our Dual Profession, Army Law., no. 2, 2024, at 9, 12 (identifying principled counsel as our Corps's "true north").

19. Huntington, supra note 11, at 80–94. Interestingly, Cohen spent his formative years studying under and learning from Huntington, who served as Cohen's senior honors thesis adviser, doctoral adviser, and lifelong mentor. Eliot A. Cohen, My Formative Years, Robert Jervis Int'l Sec. Stud. F. (Dec. 7, 2021), https://issforum.org/essays/PDF/E395.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DHD-TSWD].

20. Huntington, supra note 11, at 83. Much has been written and said about the military as a profession. E.g., U.S. Dep't of Army, Doctrine Pub. 6-22, Army Leadership and the Profession ch. 1 (31 July 2019) (C2, 6 Feb. 2025) [hereinafter ADP 6-22]; Army University Press, On Leadership: The Profession (YouTube, May 20, 2022), https://youtu.be/0tKvW1rHMc8 [https://perma.cc/Z823-C3ZS].

21. Huntington, supra note 11, at 8–12. This position contrasts starkly with Clemenceau's view that "[t]here is no honor of the army . . . any more than there is an honor of farmers or cigar sellers. . . . The army is composed of civilians, clothed in a certain fashion and subordinated to a special regime for a certain purpose." David S. Newhall, Clemenceau: A Life at War 195 (1991), quoted in Cohen, supra note 9, at 58.

22. Huntington, supra note 11, at 11–12. Huntington minces no words in asserting that the management of violence is reserved to officers specifically while the application of violence is left to the enlisted who, in his opinion, "have neither the intellectual skills nor the professional responsibility of the officer." Id. at 17–18. While Army doctrine recognizes the unique demands and expectations of its officers, e.g., ADP 6-22, supra note 20, para. 1-110 ("Serving as an officer differs from other forms of Army leadership by the measure of responsibility attached, and in the magnitude of the consequences of inaction or ineffectiveness."), the latter portion of Huntington's view is misinformed, e.g., The Judge Advoc. Gen. & Regimental Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army, TJAG & RCSM Sends, vol. 41-17, In Recognition of National Paralegal Day (23 Oct. 2023) ("The training and steadfast devotion to continuous self-development exhibited by our [enlisted] military paralegals and paraprofessionals directly contribute to mission success. [Enlisted m]ilitary paralegals are highly trained professionals who are dual-hatted as technical experts and tactical Soldiers. This unique status requires them to be leaders and people of action.").

23. These "major decisions" are case objectives, choice of counsel, forum, pleas, whether to testify, and settlements. U.S. Dep't of Army, Regul. 27-26, Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers r. 1.2(a) (26 Mar. 2025) [hereinafter AR 27-26].

24. Id. (emphasis added). This rule's second comment further clarifies that "a client also has a right to consult with the lawyer about the means to be used in pursuing those objectives," but that the lawyer is not required to pursue objectives or employ means simply because a client may wish that the lawyer do so. . . . In questions of means, the lawyer should assume responsibility for technical, legal, and tactical matters, such as which witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, which court members to challenge, and what motions to make. Id. cmt. 2. This parallels Huntington's theory that military leaders should be left to dictate operations.

25. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (explaining that no set of rules can satisfactorily govern a defense counsel's decision-making, as such a scheme would "restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions"); United States v. Gooch, 69 M.J. 353, 361 (C.A.A.F. 2011) ("This Court 'will not second-guess the strategic or tactical decisions made at trial by defense counsel.'") (quoting United States v. Mazza, 67 M.J. 470, 475 (C.A.A.F. 2009)).

26. Compare AR 27-26, supra note 23, para. 6 (describing an attorney's responsibilities to a client), with id. r. 1.6(b) (permitting an attorney to reveal confidential client information for various reasons, including when defending against a client's allegations against the attorney). While zealous advocacy is important, so too is stewardship of the profession.

27. Cohen, supra note 9, at 212–15.

28. Id. at 208–11.

29. E.g., Clausewitz, supra note 1, at 605 ("Is not war merely another kind of writing and language for thought? It has, to be sure, its own grammar, but not its own logic.").

30. Cohen, supra note 9, at 206.

31. Id. at 173.

32. Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 28, 1948).

33. Cohen, supra note 9, at 19–21.

34. Id. at 68–72, 76–79.

35. E.g., id. at 118–20.

36. Id. at 148–51.

37. Cohen, supra note 9, at 49. –51.

38. Id. at 12.

39. Id. at 208–09. Though these tenets might seem as ubiquitous as they are foundational in modern military decision-making, Cohen dissects what their absence can produce through his analysis of the Vietnam and Gulf Wars. See id. at 173–207.

40. Acknowledging at the outset that he is subject to accusations of "hero-worship," Cohen "makes no apology for not providing a comprehensive account of each leader's efforts," opting instead to focus on each statesman's warcraft in the context of civil-military relations. Id. at xii–xiv.

41. Id. at 25–29.

42. Id. at 49–51. Today's military commanders operate in much of the same way Lincoln did, skillfully leading and deciding while informed by a myriad of factors, information, and considerations. "Commanders use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand an operational environment (OE); visualize and describe the operation's end state and operational approach; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess operations." U.S. Dep't of Army, Field Manual 5-0, Planning and Orders Production para. 1-7 (4 Nov. 2024).

43. Cohen, supra note 9, at 212.

44. See id. at 222–23 (sampling each statesman's "deep, dark streak of willingness to do terrible things").

45. Cohen explores those civilian leaders he considers unsuccessful in a chapter entitled "Leadership Without Genius." Id. ch. 6.

46. Cf. Plato, Republic 375b–c (C.D.C. Reeve trans.), in Plato: Complete Works 1014 (John M. Cooper & D.S. Hutchinson eds., 1997) (exploring the dual nature required of "guardians" to be aggressive toward enemies yet gentle toward civilians and the careful balance they must have in tempered force) ("Yet surely they must be gentle to their own people and harsh to the enemy. If they aren't, they won't wait around for others to destroy the city but will do it themselves first.").

47. E.g., Clausewitz, supra note 1.

48. Compare, e.g., Carter et al., supra note 15 (reviewing, in an open letter penned by eight former Secretaries of Defense and five former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "the core principles and best practices by which civilian and military professionals have conducted healthy American civil-military relations in the past—and can continue to do so, if vigilant and mindful"), with Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Return to Sender?: Analyzing the Senior Leader "Open Letter" on Civilian Control of the Military, 15 Harv. Nat'l Sec. J. 77 (2023) (scrutinizing the open letter's efficacy).

49. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-81, §§ 531–39C, 135 Stat. 1541, 1692–99 (2021).

50. James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-263, § 541, 136 Stat. 2395, 2579–81 (2022).

51. § 531, 135 Stat. at 1692 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 824a).

52. See generally David A. Schlueter & Lisa Schenck, This Is Not Your Grandparents' Military Justice System, Army Law., no. 2, 2023, at 74 (surveying Congress's recent military justice reform); David A. Schlueter & Lisa Schenck, Transforming Military Justice: The 2022 and 2023 National Defense Authorization Acts, 231 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (2023) (examining the same in greater detail).

53. The Judge Advoc. Gen., U.S. Army, TJAG Sends, vol. 42-01, A Message from the 42nd Judge Advocate General (15 July 2024).

54. The Judge Advoc. Gen., U.S. Army, TJAG Sends, vol. 43-08, Army Legal Services Transformation Efforts (24 Feb. 2026).

Author

MAJ Thomas is a student in the Command and General Staff Officer Course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.