Irregular Warfare Is More Than Just SOF

The Need for Statutory Authority for Conventional Forces to Support IW Operations

By MAJ Joshua R. Hall

Article published on: May 29, 2026 in the 2026 Issue #1 of Army Lawyer

Read Time: < 44 mins

A U.S. Army Green Beret assigned to 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) demonstrates an air assault task to Royal Thai Army soldiers in Lopburi, Thailand. (Credit: SPC Paul Blythe)

On 2 October 2020, the Department of War1(DoW) published the Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the 2018National Defense Strategy2(IW Annex). The IW Annex emphasizes the need to leverage conventional force capabilities to be successful in the irregular warfare (IW) fight. “Conventional forces have, and always will have, a role in IW across a variety of missions and a range of military activities.”3In the age of great power competition, this role will likely be training and equipping foreign and irregular forces engaged in IW operations. However, as with any military activity, the unit must have both the operational and fiscal authority to lawfully execute such activity.4For U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), the recently codified 10 U.S.C. § 127d (formerly section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 20185) provides SOF with such fiscal authority to train and equip foreign and irregular forces engaged in IW.6As it currently stands, this statute is a SOF-specific fiscal authority. In fact, there is presently no overt statutory authority that authorizes U.S. conventional forces to support foreign or irregular forces engaged in IW.

While conventional forces have executed and supported IW campaigns in the past, many of the more recent operations consisted of foreign internal defense (FID) or stability operations as opposed to training and equipping foreign forces.7Moreover, after the Vietnam War, Congress began to slowly but severely limit the DoW’s discretionary funding for foreign assistance.8Fast forward to the present, and IW remains a capability that exists not only within special operations but also conventional forces.9However, in the age of great power competition, U.S. conventional forces lack the necessary fiscal authority to provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals engaged in IW operations.

This article will address this gap and advocate for a legislative proposal to provide conventional forces with the necessary fiscal authority to successfully complement SOF and contribute to the IW fight. First, it provides a brief history of IW and conventional forces’ execution of IW in previous campaigns. Next, it outlines the existing and most commonly utilized operational and fiscal authorities for training, equipping, and supporting foreign forces. Finally, it advocates for a legislative proposal to fill the existing statutory gap in fiscal authority for conventional forces conducting IW.

History of Irregular Warfare and the Use of Conventional Forces

U.S. military doctrine generally recognizes two forms of warfare: “conventional[/traditional,] and irregular.”10Until recently, there was no agreed-upon definition of IW.11Currently, IW is defined as “[a] form of warfare where states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities.”12Generally, the specific IW categories can be classified into five mission sets: unconventional warfare, stabilization, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency.13Despite the recency of an approved DoW definition, the concept of IW is far from new.14In fact, IW can be traced as far back as the 1800s with the U.S. Navy’s engagements against the Barbary Pirates.15From there, the U.S. military’s history of conducting IW is seen in almost every major military campaign, from Vietnam and the Cold War to the campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria.16More importantly, these IW campaigns were not limited to SOF and involved conventional forces either leading the mission or enabling SOF units on the ground.17

One may ask, if conventional forces conducted IW in the past, why is there a need for such authority now? The answer is two-fold. The first involves a significant increase in congressional oversight of the President’s and, thereby, DoW’s discretionary spending for foreign assistance post-Vietnam War.18In 1961, Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA).19With it, the President was able to use the FAA’s contingency fund so long as the use was “in the national interest.”20One can only imagine the potential for abuse with such a sweeping provision. “As was said during a 1906 debate in Congress, creating such an untethered fund ‘is like giving a child more money than he wants for a trip uptown and back; he will surely spend the balance of it before he gets home.’”21Thus, the President heavily relied on these contingency funds within the FAA to provide military aid to foreign forces both during Vietnam and the Cold War.22In an effort to curtail such unfettered discretion, Congress, over a period of roughly twenty years, would exercise its power of the purse through a series of restrictive appropriations and defense authorizations.23Therefore, the seemingly unlimited funds to train and equip foreign forces are a thing of the past for the DoW.

Second, not all IW missions involve training and equipping foreign forces. As mentioned earlier, IW can be categorized into five mission sets.24One such mission set is stability operations.25Many of the more recent IW campaigns executed by conventional forces involved stability operations as opposed to training and equipping foreign forces typically seen in unconventional warfare.26Thus, there was no need for conventional forces to have a train and equip authority at the time. Nevertheless, as we continue to navigate through the age of great power competition, our conventional forces will undoubtedly require the authority to train and equip our foreign partners in order to deter our global competitors. Before addressing the authority gap head-on, it is important to understand a brief history of conventional forces conducting IW through-out prior military operations.

Vietnam

One of the first notable IW campaigns was carried out by both conventional forces and SOF during the Vietnam War.27General Paul Harkins, commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), was tasked to advise and assist the South Vietnamese Army.28While the term had yet to be coined, his unit was engaging in what we now refer to as “Foreign Internal Defense” (FID).29FID is defined as “participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organization in any of the programs and activities taken by a host nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, violent extremism, terrorism, and other threats to its security.”30This FID mission was essentially a “whole-of-government approach” to strengthen the South Vietnamese Army to defend against the insurgent Viet Cong guerrillas.31In keeping with the whole-of-government approach, civilian villagers were recruited to expand this defense network.32These entities would later be named “Civilian Irregular Defense Groups.”33

In terms of support, U.S. forces, including both conventional and special operations, helped train, equip, and operate with hundreds of thousands of these irregular forces.34For example, the U.S.- and South Vietnamese-backed Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program aimed to support local forces to root out the Viet Cong from the villages.35The U.S. military advisors attached to the CORDS program mentored and assisted their South Vietnamese counterparts in creating a self-sufficient security force in the villages.36Eventually, this IW campaign would shift toward a conventional large-scale combat operation (LSCO) in which U.S. forces fought against the North Vietnamese Army.37

The lessons learned from Vietnam underscore some of the main points addressed in the IW Annex.38Specifically, “[s]uccessful military contributions to [IW] require a deliberate and sustained integration of conventional and special operations capabilities.”39The Vietnam War presented a hybrid warfare theater in which U.S. forces had to fight the guerrilla forces of the Viet Cong in a counterinsurgency campaign as well as the conventional forces of the North Vietnamese Army.40Moreover, there was no clear transition between irregular and conventional warfare; rather, the shift was dictated by the operational environment.41While the success of counterinsurgency in Vietnam is certainly debatable, the lesson gleaned is that IW neither is nor should be the sole responsibility of SOF.42Following the Vietnam War, much of the focus shifted away from IW;43however, conventional forces still played a role in IW efforts during the Cold War.

Lieutenant Andrew Sterrett leaves schooner Enterprise to board the Tripoli, 1 August 1801 during the First Barbary War, which was one of the United States’ first engagements in IW. Oil on canvas by Rodolfo Claudu, 1951. (Source: U.S. Naval Academy Museum Collection)

Cold War

Looking back at an example of strategic competition, IW played a prominent role during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.44Rather than engage in direct conflict between the two nations, the United States and Soviet Union trained and equipped irregular foreign forces, many of which were located in Central America.45Battles were fought through these proxy forces, and the two nations avoided escalation to a nuclear war.46

Nicaragua

In 1981, President Ronald Reagan ceased any further economic support to Nicaragua and pointed to the country’s support of communist insurgencies in El Salvador.47Specifically, the Sandinista government of Nicaragua, with support from the Soviet Union and others, secretly provided aid to these insurgents in El Salvador.48In response, President Reagan turned his efforts to training and equipping a clandestine group of fighters (irregular/ guerilla forces) called the “Contras” or “counterrevolutionaries.”49

The Reagan administration moved swiftly and openly operated training camp sites in Florida, California, and parts of the Southwest to train these anti-Sandinista paramilitary groups.50Additionally, President Reagan authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to create a paramilitary force in Honduras.51What began as a so-called “covert” operation quickly escalated as the CIA-led recruitment and training of the contras grew from 500 to 15,000 by 1984.52Simultaneously, the U.S. military was engaged in “joint military maneuvers in Honduras and in naval ‘exercises’ off both Nicaraguan Coasts.”53President Reagan was successful in funding these operations largely without an overt appropriation from Congress.54Instead, President Reagan was able to use a CIA contingency fund as well as DoW funds to support the Contras.55

Soldiers from 40th Engineer Battallion, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Task Force Eagle, prepare an explosive charge to destroy a confiscated Serbian Army BOV-VP Wheeled Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) on 19 October 1996 during Operation Joint Endeavor. (Source: National Archives)

El Salvador

The civil war in El Salvador dates back decades, but tensions escalated in 1980 when radical groups within El Salvador aligned with the Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN).56The combined group consisted of guerrilla forces of roughly 12,000 fighters.57President Reagan feared that the Soviet Union would see the potential overthrow of the government in El Salvador as an opportunity to spread communism throughout Central America.58

Thus, as the events were unfolding in Nicaragua during the early 1980s, the United States deployed a mix of Army Special Forces and conventional forces as military advisors to train and equip El Salvadoran forces.59This IW mission set was twofold: counter-insurgency and foreign internal defense.60Mainly, the advisors were tasked to train the El Salvadoran forces in order to combat the insurgents within their country and ultimately prevent the country’s collapse.61What became known as the Military Advisory Group consisted of both SOF and conventional forces, which were broken down into functional areas.62For example, the small unit training teams provided garrison support for the Salvadoran quick-reaction force, while the mobile training teams provided administrative and logistical support to the group.63Overall, the Military Advisory Group helped reshape the Salvadoran forces into a professional force, which was able to combat the insurgent forces of the FMLN and prevent the overthrow of its government.64

While the U.S. military was able to train, advise, and assist foreign forces in Central America, President Reagan’s seemingly discretionary use of CIA and DoW contingency funds would have consequential effects on the DoW in the aftermath of the Cold War. The criticism of the foreign assistance efforts in South America was only heightened in both the national and international media, resulting in the infamous Iran-Contra scandal.65The ensuing congressional testimony revealed “the scope of the Administration’s [apparent] deceit in circumventing the congressional ban on military aid to the contras.”66

Additionally, the scandal highlighted “how dangerous it can be when the Government seeks to avoid constitutional constraints by allowing a group of freewheeling private operatives to conduct a secret foreign policy with American weapons and funds.”67In response, Congress would begin to severely limit the President’s ability to use the DoW to fund foreign forces.68This began with appropriation restrictions known as the Boland Amendments, which initially prohibited the use of DoW funds to “support any group or individual for the purpose of overthrowing the Sandinistas.”69This was just the beginning of further congressional oversight and heightened scrutiny on DoW funding. The next several years would bring about more appropriation restrictions from Congress.70Thus, as alluded to earlier, the executive’s previous ability to spend DoW funds with minimal oversight is a thing of the past. Now, in 2025, it would not be prudent to repeat past mistakes and act without positive authority from Congress. Doing so would only result in further congressional oversight and restrictions. After the sweeping restrictions from the Iran-Contra scandal were implemented, IW campaigns in the 1990s shifted from training and equipping foreign forces to conducting stability operations in Bosnia and Somalia.

Source: R. Cody Phillips, U.S. Army Ctr. Mil. Hist., Bosnia-Herzegovina: The U.S. Army’s Role in Peace Enforcement Operations 1995–2004, at 20 (2005).

Bosnia

Shifting from counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense, the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia in the 1990s serves as a prime example of U.S. conventional forces conducting stability operations, another key IW mission set.71Stabilization in this context is defined as “an inherently political endeavor that requires aligning U.S. Government efforts—diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense—to create conditions in which locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent violence.”72

After the collapse of the Soviet empire, many republics opted to secede from the non-aligned Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.73Among these seceding republics was Bosnia-Herzegovina.74While these secessions were often met with violence, the greatest destruction occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina during a civil war that lasted more than three years (1992–1995).75In response, a peace agreement was signed in December 1995 that allowed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to enforce peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.76As part of this mission, the United States deployed around 20,000 military personnel to conduct stability operations in the region.77The bulk of the U.S. forces consisted of the 1st and 2d Brigades of 1st Armored Division (see above chart).78Designated as Task Force Eagle, the forces would deploy in support of Operation Joint Endeavor, the first of three stability and peacekeeping operations.79

The initial task of Task Force Eagle was to “separate the former warring factions into their respective areas and establish a zone of separation.”80Once the zones were established, the task force set about on its peacekeeping mission by setting up checkpoints and patrolling through the designated zones.81These peace enforcement operations were “atypical military campaigns.”82As opposed to traditional armed conflict, “political and diplomatic issues significantly influenced the Army’s actions and created an inverted role in which the absence of fighting was the measurement of success.”83Overall, the stability operations were a success and largely led by the U.S. Army’s conventional forces throughout the entire campaign.

Source: Colonel Glenn M. Harned (Retired), Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Inst., Stability Operations in Somalia 1992–1993: A Case Study 33 (July 2016).

Somalia

During Operation Restore Hope, U.S. conventional forces were once again called to conduct stability operations in Somalia from 1992 to 1993.84As the organization chart depicts, Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia consisted largely of conventional forces across the Services, including the U.S. Marine Corps’ I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), the U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), the U.S. Air Force’s 437th Wing, and the U.S. Navy’s Ranger Carrier Battle Group.85The Unified Task Force (UNI-TAF) operation was conducted under a United Nations (U.N.) mandate, which was unprecedented.86The U.N. Security Council opted to intervene in another country’s affairs without receiving any request from the country itself.87

The call to action in Somalia can be attributed to the ongoing civil war between different factions and clans within the country, as well as a severe famine and drought.88All of this resulted in a war-torn country filled with violence and starvation.89In other words, a major humanitarian crisis that caught the attention of the U.N. and the United States.

Thus, on 5 December 1991, JTF Somalia received its operation order from U.S. Central Command.90The JTF was tasked with securing the major relief distribution sites in Somalia and providing security throughout the area of operations.91This was to enable unimpeded relief operations by U.N. forces conducting humanitarian aid. Once secure relief efforts could be readily established, the U.S.-led task force would slowly transition the security effort to U.N. forces.92By January 1993, the JTF commander declared that the task force had accomplished its mission.93Thus, on 4 May 1993, the United States transferred responsibility to the U.N.94

Iraq

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) provides a recent example of conventional forces conducting IW.95During OIF, U.S. forces earned a decisive victory over the Iraqi Army in what can properly be classified as a large-scale combat operation (LSCO).96After swiftly removing Saddam Hussein from power, these same conventional forces shifted their efforts to stability operations.97This transition is rooted in the U.S. Army doctrine of “transferring responsibility for security and governance to legitimate authorities.”98However, after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, an insurgency quickly grew and once again shifted the nature of the fight.99Now, U.S. conventional forces were having to conduct counterinsurgency.100Counterinsurgency operations were something U.S. conventional forces had not engaged in since Vietnam. The former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Jack Keane, highlighted this concern, noting,

I think we codified the major tenets of the counterinsurgency we learned and it was in our memory up until 1975. When the [Vietnam] war ended we purged it from our lexicon and put the doctrine we had developed on the shelf and embraced war against the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union.101

Moreover, conventional forces had to grapple with more than just counterinsurgency in Iraq. U.S. conventional forces were responsible for training and equipping the newly reformed Iraqi Army in what became known as “Security Force Assistance” (SFA).102As discussed earlier, SFA is not a new concept for conventional forces, as seen in Vietnam and Central America. However, since that time, SOF have taken the lead on training and equipping foreign forces.103As noted by then-Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates in an address to Army leaders, “The standing up and mentoring of indigenous arm[ies] and police—once the province of Special Forces—is now a key mission for the military as a whole.”104However, this task was not feasible for SOF to take on alone due to the size of the efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan.105Thus, as noted in a report by John Nagl and Marshall Cooperman, “In Iraq and Afghanistan, the train, advise, and assist mission fell to the Regular Army for the first time in decades.”106As for funding, a key finding from Nagl and Cooperman’s report showed that “[m]uch of the SFA effort was conducted in an ad hoc manner, without sufficient funding or strategic prioritization.”107Thus, over the next several years, Congress would provide the DoW with various “ad hoc” fiscal authorities passed through “various annual authorizations.”108

Train, Equip, and Support Foreign Forces: The Operational and Fiscal Authorities

“In order to fund any task, mission, or operation, the [DoW] (and the executing unit) must have the following: (1) operational authority, (2) funding authority, and (3) proper funds.”109Operational authority generally “flows” from the Combatant Commander’s (COCOM’s) authority in their area of responsibility.110Specifically, 10 U.S.C. § 164 states that COCOMs are “directly responsible to the Secretary [of War] for the preparedness of the command to carry out missions assigned to the command.”111In common practice, the President, through the Secretary of War (SecWar), authorizes the mission, which is later conveyed through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in an execute order (EXORD) to the relevant COCOM.112However, as noted above, operational authority is just one requirement prior to executing the mission. The mission must still be paid for, which means Congress must appropriate the funds for that particular purpose.113

The appropriations are what give Congress the necessary checks and balances on the executive and are traced back to the U.S. Constitution.114Article 1 authorizes Congress to “provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”115Furthermore, “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”116Thus, before the President can direct troops to execute a given operation, the executive branch (e.g., President, DoW, etc.) must first point to a positive statutory authority (i.e., appropriation) before expending any funds. This is especially applicable to the often-muddled area of foreign assistance.

The general rule is that foreign assistance falls within the purview of the Department of State (DoS).117The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 grants the DoS the primary responsibility and authority to conduct foreign assistance on behalf of the United States.118However, there are two exceptions to this general rule: (1) interoperability, safety, and/or familiarization training (commonly referred to as “little t training”) or (2) pursuant to a specific statutory appropriation or authorization by Congress.119

“Little t” Training

“Little t” training is derived from prior Government Accountability Office (GAO) opinions.120From those opinions, the DoW is now allowed to use its Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds to train foreign forces if the primary purpose of the training is “Interoperability, Familiarization, and Safety [interoperability training] of the foreign troops” operating with U.S. forces in advance of a combined exercise.121

The big shift began in 1984 when Representative William Alexander asked the Comptroller General of the GAO for its opinion after a major DoW exercise in Honduras.122From 1983 to 1984, approximately 12,000 U.S. military personnel participated in this exercise in Honduras.123The primary concern of Rep. Alexander was that the DoW misused its O&M funds to pay for large-scale construction projects, humanitarian assistance, and extensive training with its Honduran counterparts.124

U.S. Army Advisors with Force Package 25-1, 54th Security Force Assistance Brigade, train alongside Albanian Armed Forces, Kosovo Security Force soldiers, and New Jersey National Guard Soldiers during Exercise Immediate Response 25 in Albania. (Credit: CPT Aaron Blevins)

In 1984, the Comptroller General issued an opinion stating that the DoW “clearly does not have unlimited discretion in determining which activities may be financed with O&M funds.”125The big takeaway from the opinion is that the DoW cannot simply train and equip foreign forces using its O&M funds unless it has specific statutory authorization from Congress or the training is informal (e.g., interoperability training).126For example, U.S. forces training a foreign country’s airborne qualified soldiers on a specific type of parachute ahead of a combined exercise would likely be classified as interoperability/familiarization or “little t” training.127On the other hand, U.S. forces setting up a three-week airborne school to qualify foreign forces as paratroopers would likely be seen as foreign assistance or “big T” training.128

Statutory Appropriation or Authorization

Four general categories of appropriations and/or authorizations for DoW-funded foreign assistance exist: “(1) Support to Security Cooperation and Foreign Partners; (2) Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) and Authorities that Enable Operations; (3) Humanitarian Assistance; and (4) Special Payment Authorities.”129As it pertains to IW, the most relevant appropriations and authorizations involve (1) and (2) respectively: Support to Security Cooperation and Foreign Partners and OCO/Authorities that Enable Operations.

Security Cooperation: Traditional Combatant Commander Activities One of the most common Traditional

Combatant Commander Activities (TCAs) involves U.S. military interaction with foreign military forces on behalf of the geographic combatant commander (GCC) in furtherance of their campaign plan.130These interactions are commonly referred to as military-to-military (M2M) contacts.131This responsibility is nested within the responsibilities given to COCOMs in 10 U.S.C. § 164 and funded as traditional combatant command activities via Service component command O&M funds.132

U.S. Army Green Berets assigned to 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) discuss future Joint Combined Exchange Training opportunities with Tunisian Army special operations soldiers at Camp Mackall, North Carolina. (Credit: PFC Edgar Martinez)

Security Cooperation: Training with Friendly Forces

One of the most commonly utilized fiscal authorities for both conventional forces and SOF is the authority for U.S. forces to conduct training in a friendly foreign country with that country’s foreign forces. In 1991, Congress authorized SOF the ability to train with foreign partners in a program called the Joint/Combined Exchange Training (JCET) Program.133Congress provided conventional U.S. forces with the same fiscal authority to train with the military forces of a friendly foreign country as part of section 1203 of the 2014 NDAA.134In an effort to consolidate and systematize these DoW foreign assistance authorities, Congress codified the “Training with Friendly Foreign Forces” authority as 10 U.S.C. § 321 for conventional forces and 10 U.S.C. § 322 for SOF and its JCETs.135

The key word in the language of both statutes is training “with” friendly foreign forces. The intent behind the statutes is U.S. military readiness and, thus, the purpose of both authorities is to train and benefit U.S. forces.136Therefore, these training plans are centered on the U.S. forces’ mission-essential tasks.137This does not preclude foreign forces from receiving an incidental benefit as part of the training, but the primary beneficiary must be U.S. forces in order to satisfy the purpose requirement.138The statutes permit the COCOM to pay for training the U.S. forces assigned to the command in conjunction with training, and training with, armed forces and other security forces of a friendly foreign country; expenses of deploying the U.S. forces for that training; and incremental expenses incurred by the friendly developing foreign country incurred because of the training.139

Security Cooperation: Building Partner Capacity

The authority to build the partner capacity (BPC) of a foreign security force is a train and equip authority codified in 10 U.S.C. § 333 (commonly referred to as “Triple Three”).140Triple Three grants the DoW (both conventional forces and SOF) “the ability to ‘build the capacity’ of foreign military forces in support of Security Cooperation and Overseas Contingency Operations.”141As a legislative constraint, Congress specifically enumerated nine purposes for which the DoW is permitted to build the capacity of a partner force.142

Similarly, Leahy Vetting is required before DoW can support a partner force under the Triple Three Program.143Triple Threes are funded with O&M funds appropriated by Congress in the annual DoW appropriations law.144The approval authority for Triple Threes is SecWar, with Secretary of State concurrence and congressional notification at least fifteen days before implementation.145

Triple Three funds are certainly a great step in allowing conventional forces to train and equip foreign forces, however, it has its limitations in an IW context. The major restriction is that 10 U.S.C. § 333 limits funding to the country’s “national security forces.”146This limitation precludes conventional forces from training and equipping irregular forces, groups, and individuals, which are often the primary training audience in IW.147Furthermore, the training and equipping of these forces must meet one of the nine enumerated mission sets of the statute (e.g., counterterrorism, counter-weapons of mass destruction).148Thus, while Triple Three is applicable to conventional forces, the statute’s limitations severely restrict conventional forces’ ability to effectively contribute to IW. The authorities in the next two sections address authorizations and appropriations for OCO funds/authorities to enable operations. Of note, both of the authorities discussed next are limited to SOF.

SOF-Specific Authorities that Enable Operations: 10 U.S.C. § 127e

As part of section 1208 of the 2005 NDAA, Congress authorized SecWar to expend up to $25,000,000 to “provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing military operations by United States [SOF] to combat terrorism.”149This authorization came in response to the years-long frustration that SOF experienced at the early stages of the war in Afghanistan.150

Shortly after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, members of the U.S. Army Special Forces, commonly referred to as Green Berets, paired with members of the CIA in Afghanistan.151While the Green Berets were tasked with an unconventional warfare campaign, their efforts were greatly frustrated due to a lack of fiscal authority to train and equip the Afghans.152After years of legislating, the passage of this authority allowed SOF to train and equip the irregular/ proxy forces in Afghanistan.153Due to the success of the program, in 2017, Congress codified section 1208 of the NDAA as 10 U.S.C. § 127e.154This removed the need for continual reauthorization and increased SecWar’s funding limit to $100,000,000 annually.155Since its passage, 10 U.S.C. § 127e has been used to combat terrorism by supporting irregular forces in Niger, Libya, and Syria, among many other countries across the globe.156

SOF-Specific Authorities that Enable Operations: 10 U.S.C. § 127d

Similar to 10 U.S.C. § 127e, the recently codified 10 U.S.C. § 127d (formerly section 1202 of the FY 2018 NDAA) allows SOF to train and equip foreign irregular forces.157Unlike 127e, 127d is not connected to counterterrorism, but rather to provide “support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing and authorized [IW] operations by [SOF]”158The statute goes on to provide its own definition of IW: DoW activities “not involving armed conflict that support predetermined United States policy and military objectives conducted by, with, and through regular forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals.”159

Just as SOF identified its lack of fiscal authority in the early days of Afghanistan, U.S. military leaders determined that a similar authority was needed in the era of great power competition. In 2016, Major General (MG) Mark Schwartz was the commander of Special Operations Command – Europe (SOCEUR), which oversaw all special operations in the European theater.160During this time, Russia was in conflict in eastern Ukraine.161In an effort to assist irregular or proxy forces in the area, MG Schwartz and his staff identified a gap in fiscal authorities.162Specifically, there was no statute that permitted SOF to train and equip these irregular forces in Ukraine.163The operation was not tied to counterterrorism; therefore, 10 U.S.C. § 127e was off the table. This led the SOCEUR staff to draft a legislative proposal, similar to 10 U.S.C. § 127e, but not tied to counterterrorism.164

This proposal would eventually come to fruition, albeit with some modifications, as the authorization was approved in section 1202 of the FY 2018 NDAA.165The Senate Armed Services Committee report noted that “adversarial nations are becoming more aggressive in challenging U.S. interests and partnerships and destabilizing regional order through the use of asymmetric means that often fall below the threshold of traditional armed conflict, often referred to as the ‘grey zone.’”166Thus, Congress recognized the growing need to fund these partnerships through asymmetric means in great power competition. Section 1202 would be codified as 10 U.S.C. § 127d in December of 2023 with the passage of the FY24 NDAA.167

Because 10 U.S.C. § 127d was modeled after 10 U.S.C. § 127e, it is not surprising that much of both statutes’ language is similar. However, a big difference, aside from the IW-versus-counterterrorism language, is the type of conflict (or lack thereof) in which the funds can be used.168By the definition of IW in 10 U.S.C. § 127d, this authority only applies to “[DoW] activities not involving armed conflict.”169Thus, if and when competition escalates to armed conflict, the United States will likely need additional authorization to continue to train and equip foreign forces.170That is a separate discussion and not the focus of this article. Regardless of the type of conflict, 10 U.S.C. § 127d still leaves conventional forces at the window looking in towards the IW fight.

Expansion of IW Fiscal Authority to Conventional Forces

As emphasized in the IW Annex, the DoW must “[s]ustain IW as a core competency for the entire Joint Force, not just [SOF].”171However, in order to truly sustain IW as a core competency, Congress must provide conventional forces with similar authority to train and equip foreign and irregular forces as their SOF counterparts. Failing to do so will likely result in the overuse of SOF and, more importantly, “reinforce or create additional seams in U.S. capabilities to respond to the current and future operating environments.”172

In the age of great power competition, presence is essential.173However, the United States cannot sustain a prolonged presence in all areas of the world.174Such a measure requires cooperation and engagement with not only our partners and allies, but also the other irregular forces that will certainly be called upon to resist a near-peer threat.175These engagements can take many forms, with one being the training and provision of weapons and weapons systems to these foreign forces before conflict ensues.176However, these engagements cannot be a “SOF-centered endeavor.”177As the former commander of Special Operations Command (SOCOM), General Richard Clarke, recently testified, “[T]he threats posed by violent extremism remain the primary focus of [SOF] (60 percent of deployed forces) as opposed to [Great Power Competition (GPC)] (40 percent).”178General Clarke further asserts that “[e]ven if [SOF] were 100 percent committed to GPC, their size and need for dwell time, for example, would not allow them to optimize U.S. engagement across these activities.”179Thus, conventional forces must also conduct IW to further these engagements.

Make no mistake, SOF will always play a key role in IW.180“Their training, experience, and capabilities will make them the forces of choice for sensitive activities, particularly when a light footprint and low-visibility approach are required.”181However, in competition, not all of these engagements are low-visibility, nor should they be in many cases.182

For example, China is the pacing threat to the United States.183As noted in the 2026 National Defense Strategy, “China is already the second most powerful country in the world—behind only the United States—and the most powerful state relative to us since the nineteenth century.”184Unlike many of the disparate terrorist organizations the United States fought in the Middle East, China’s influence encompasses much of the Indo-Pacific region.185Of the seven GCCs, the Indo-Pacific Command is by far the largest, comprising thirty-eight nations.186

China’s historic military buildup maintains far-reaching capabilities that extend beyond the Western Pacific.187Thus, going back to General Clarke’s point, SOF alone cannot fully optimize the United States’ engagement and presence across this vast area of responsibility. Conventional forces will also need to conduct IW by training and equipping both regular and irregular forces of our allies in order to deter near-peer threats such as Russia and China. For example, this support could be in the form of sending a light infantry company to train with troops in Taiwan or the Philippines.188

Regardless of the unit or operational mechanism employed, conventional forces require the necessary fiscal authority to conduct these IW operations now, in competition, to set the conditions for success in the event of conflict. This section thus provides several proposals for Congress to level the playing field and permit conventional forces to support their foreign partners in ongoing IW operations.

Amend the Existing 10 U.S.C. § 127d

One option is for Congress to simply amend 10 U.S.C. § 127d by removing the phrase “Special Operations” in subsection (a) and inserting “U.S. Forces.”189This would be the simplest fix, and a persuasive argument can be made for such a change. In fact, nowhere in the definition of IW, as defined within the statute itself, does it specifically mention special operations. Instead, IW is simply defined as “[DoW] activities not involving armed conflict that support predetermined United States policy and military objectives conducted by, with, and through regular forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals.”190

One concern with this approach is the potential conflict that such a broad authorization could create between conventional forces and SOF. Any experience in the military will quickly reveal the territorial nature that commanders, units, and organizations maintain within their area of operations.191Terms such as “battlespace owner” and “subject-matter expert” give a glimpse into the potential friction that could develop when both forces are permitted to conduct IW in this context. One may argue that this is the precise reason we have specializations within the military.

Additionally, simply amending the statute as-is would leave it to the respective units (conventional and SOF) to de-conflict between themselves.192One can foresee the logistical, administrative, and even operational headaches this would create if both units were able to operate in a vacuum. More importantly, this type of friction would run counter to the the IW Annex’ s intent of seamlessly integrating conventional forces and SOF in IW.193

Enact New Legislation for Conventional Forces to Support Foreign Forces in IW

Congress could pass a new statute permitting only conventional forces to conduct IW. In other words, Congress could enact a similar statute to 10 U.S.C. § 127d, but make it only applicable to conventional forces. Additionally, Congress would have the ability to place some limitations on conventional forces with a new statute. For example, Congress could limit the use of conventional forces to specific IW missions, such as stability operations, as opposed to counterinsurgency. On the other hand, Congress could limit the particular foreign force that conventional units support (e.g., support to regular forces, but not irregular forces).

After all, Congress may have been very deliberate in tailoring 10 U.S.C. § 127d to apply only to SOF.194Therefore, amending the existing statute would go against Congress’s intent when it passed section 1202.195Again, by, with, and through activities are traditionally executed by SOF units.196Thus, Congress could enact new legislation in the IW realm that is specifically geared toward conventional forces and their capabilities.

However, this option also presents issues. Congress may be hesitant to pass new legislation for conventional forces to conduct IW on its own—a mission set historically considered to be within SOF’s purview and expertise.197There is some historical evidence to support this thinking in the legislative history of 10 U.S.C. § 127d.198In its report accompanying section 1202, the Senate Armed Services Committee noted that “the ability of U.S. SOF to conduct low-visibility, IW operations in politically sensitive environments make them uniquely suited to counter the malign activities of our adversaries in this domain.”199

Additionally, in 10 U.S.C. § 321, the “Training with Friendly Foreign Forces” statute, Congress specifically limited U.S. conventional forces to train “only with the military forces of a friendly foreign country.”200Congress placed no such limitation on SOF, which is permitted to train with either “the military forces or other security forces of a friendly foreign country.”201Thus, Congress may be unconvinced that conventional forces, on their own, can properly and effectively train and equip foreign forces in IW.

Draft a New Statute that Enables Conventional Forces to Train and Equip Foreign Forces, but Only when Accompanying or in Coordination with SOF

A third option would be to enact new legislation granting conventional forces the authority to support foreign forces, but with checks and balances by SOF units on the ground. Specifically, conventional forces would only be able to train and equip foreign and irregular forces when accompanying SOF. Further parameters can be added to or substituted for the word “accompany,” such as “attached to” or “supporting.” By inserting the requirement that conventional forces must be accompanying, attached to, or otherwise supporting SOF, conventional forces would be limited from arbitrarily supporting any and all foreign forces or irregular forces during an IW operation.

A U.S. Soldier (left), assigned to Logistics Company Advising Team 6640 of 6th Battalion, 54th Security Force Assistance Brigade, adjusts a day/night laser sight for a Djiboutian soldier (right), assigned to Bataillon d’Intervention Rapide Bataillon d’Intervention Rapide at Goubet Range, Djibouti. (Credit: SFC Shane Klestinski)

From a logistical standpoint, conventional forces may not always be physically colocated with their SOF counterparts. Thus, the new legislation could add a notification and concurrence requirement to the pertinent SOF commander before conventional forces are allowed to execute. This notification is generally presented through a concept of operations (CONOP), which is staffed through the various echelons for review, concurrence, and ultimate approval.202This specific notification could go as high as the SOCOM Commander. On the other hand, the notification could go to a lower command level, such as the respective SOF component command (e.g., U.S. Army Special Operations Command) or the relevant Theater Special Operations Command (e.g., Special Operations Command Pacific).

Regardless of the level of commander, the notification and concurrence requirement ensures that SOF is kept in the loop and has eyes on any such IW operation conducted by conventional forces. Furthermore, a notification and concurrence requirement is certainly not a novel concept. Many CONOPs require notification or concurrence from different levels of command or different stakeholders. For example, all proposed 10 U.S.C. § 333 (Triple Three) operations require the Secretary of State’s concurrence before execution.203More-over, SecWar must also coordinate with the Secretary of State on any proposed Triple Three program.204Therefore, similar to the Triple Three program’s structure, Congress can impose safeguards with notification, concurrence, and coordination requirements between conventional forces and SOF prior to execution.

In review, the third option seems to strike the right balance of enabling conventional forces to support IW operations while providing oversight from the traditional, and often more experienced, IW actors in SOF. First, from a realistic viewpoint, it is unlikely that Congress would pass any new legislation or amend existing legislation giving conventional forces unlimited discretion to conduct IW. It is clear from the legislative history of 10 U.S.C. § 127d that Congress identified SOF as the right fit for training and equipping irregular forces due to its unique capabilities.205While Congress might be amenable to giving conventional forces limited authority, it is doubtful they would grant this authority outright. Therefore, Congress is not likely to pass the first two options discussed.

Second, granting conventional forces this authority without any SOF oversight would likely be a rush to failure. This is not to say that conventional forces are not capable of training and equipping foreign forces engaged in IW. History has shown that conventional forces have been successful in this endeavor.206However, the issue is that those previous campaigns occurred decades ago (e.g., Vietnam, the Cold War).207Conventional forces were not prepared to conduct SFA in Afghanistan and Iraq as this skill set had atrophied since the end of the Vietnam War.208This responsibility was thrust onto the conventional units out of necessity, but they lacked the training and resources. 209 Therefore, the third option would ensure that conventional forces are eased into this responsibility as they would work alongside and coordinate with SOF. There may be a point in time when conventional forces can execute this unilaterally. However, at least initially, it is best to take a phased approach, or in Army methodology, a “crawl, walk, run” method. 210

Conclusion

As history has shown, IW is not a novel concept. More importantly, IW is not solely the function of SOF. While SOF has often traditionally taken the lead in counterterrorism and unconventional warfare, these operations are not its “exclusive domain.” 211 Conventional forces have regularly executed IW in past campaigns, whether unilaterally or in a support role to SOF. 212 In the age of great power competition, which could escalate to conflict with near-peer adversaries, conventional forces will undoubtedly be called upon to execute IW. This will involve training and equipping our foreign partners to deter both internal and external threats. However, Congress must act swiftly to address the current gap in IW fiscal authority for our conventional forces. Failing to do so will place our conventional forces in the same position as our Green Berets during the early days of the war in Afghanistan.

Furthermore, this does not mean that conventional forces should be operating in a silo. As stated in the IW Annex , “Successful military contributions to [IW] require a deliberate and sustained integration of conventional and special operations capabilities.” 213 Thus, Congress should require close coordination between both forces to ensure that their respective capabilities are integrated and their efforts synchronized. Expanding the current authority will reinforce conventional forces’ longstanding role in supporting and enabling SOF. After all, the fifth SOF Truth is that “most special operations require non-SOF support.”214Overall, Congress should enact new legislation that authorizes U.S. conventional forces to provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing and authorized IW operations. TAL

Notes