Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?1
Appointment of Guardians for Incompetent Soldiers
By Mr. Daniel C. Brown
May 1, 2026 | Army Lawyer, 2026 Edition, Issue 1
Read Time:
< 14 mins
Roman soldiers aid one another in building walled fortifications, as
depicted on Trajan’s Column in Rome, a monument completed in AD 113.
(Source: University of Chicago)
With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the
right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the
work we are in; to bind up the nation’s wounds; to care for him who shall
have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan . . . .2
Members of the Army are typically understood to be strong, fit, healthy, and
able to care for themselves, and the Army’s medical accession and retention
standards are designed to ensure that this is the case.3
For a variety of reasons, however, this can cease to be the case for some
Soldiers. Whether as a result of combat injuries, stroke, traumatic brain
injury, mental disorder, or some other cause, Soldiers may become so
severely disabled that they are unable to direct their own health care.
Ordinarily, in such circumstances, either the Soldier or their family member
has made the necessary arrangements to allow medical decisions to be made
(most often by way of a durable power of attorney for health care, other
equivalent document, or an order of guardianship from a state court).
In some cases, however, no prior arrangements exist, no guardian is
appointed, and no family member is willing or able to undertake this
responsibility. In such cases, the Service department bears the
responsibility of ensuring that one or more suitable persons are appointed
as guardians, if necessary, to properly direct the medical care of its
members. This article will demonstrate that this unique responsibility rests
on commanders; it will address the means and methods of seeking such
arrangements; and, finally, it will discuss direct litigation of
guardianship in the event it becomes necessary.
Establishing Guardianship as a Command Responsibility and Its Challenges
The Baseline: Commanders Bear a Moral, Statutory, and Regulatory
Obligation for Their Soldiers’ Healthcare
As this article’s introductory quote demonstrates, President Lincoln’s
second inaugural address recognizes the obligation of the Nation to care for
its Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines.4
Whether they have been wounded in battle, in training, or by other means,
members of the Armed Forces have offered their lives to defend this Nation,
and the Nation, in return, owes them a duty to care for them. For as long as
a Soldier falls within our ranks, commanders and leaders at every level in
the Army bear a responsibility to their subordinates that was described by
one court as “quite unique”5
“to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the personnel assigned to”
them.6
This responsibility is recognized by statute:
All commanding officers and others in authority in the Army are required . .
. to take all necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations,
and customs of the Army, to promote and safeguard the morale,
the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers
and enlisted persons under their command or charge.7
This relatively recent statute8
merely reflects and codifies an understanding of the Nation’s responsibility
that dates at least to 1865.
This responsibility is further clarified in Army Regulation 600-20,
Army Command Policy.9
That regulation establishes the responsibility of “commanders at all levels”
to care “for the health of their command,” including preventative medicine,
medical readiness, provision of necessary medical care, and evaluation of
Soldiers’ mental health.10
Moreover, this obligation is repeatedly and explicitly stated in Army
doctrine on leadership.11
Representative statements include that Army professionals “safeguard the
health and welfare of their Soldiers;”12
“[c]ommand also includes responsibility for health, welfare,
morale, and discipline of assigned personnel;”13
and that “[h]aving genuine concern for subordinate health and welfare . . .
is the right thing to do.”14
The Challenge: Lack of Authority to Direct Care
Notwithstanding commanders’ broad responsibility for their subordinates’
health and welfare described above, explicit authority to make medical
decisions on behalf of those subordinates is limited. AR 600-20 authorizes
commanders to direct, with or without a Soldier’s consent, emergency medical
care, immunizations, isolation and quarantine, detention for medical care,
limited care for behavioral disorders, diagnostic and other examinations,
and for obtaining evidence.15
Conspicuously absent is general authority for a commander to direct a
Soldier’s medical care.
A Soldier’s Incapacitation Does Not Grant This Authority
Taking this challenge a step further, no law, policy, or legal precedent yet
exists directly addressing the question of commanders’ authority to direct
the medical care of an incompetent member of their command. The closest
analogy in existing law is in the context of inmates who have been found
mentally incompetent to stand trial, specifically in the context of a state
seeking to administer antipsychotic drugs to render such an inmate competent
to stand trial or for other reasons. The most recent Supreme Court decision
on this question is Sell v. United States.16
Sell opens its analysis by addressing prior precedent. It notes,
“In [Washington v.] Harper, this Court recognized that an
individual has a ‘significant’ constitutionally protected ‘liberty interest’
in ‘avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs.’”17
The Harper Court in turn held that “the Due Process Clause permits
the state to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with
antipsychotic drugs against his will,
if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment
is in the inmate’s medical interest.”18
Sell next addressed Riggins v. Nevada, in which “the Court
repeated that an individual has a constitutionally protected liberty
‘interest in avoiding involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs’—an
interest that only an ‘essential’ or ‘overriding’ state interest might
overcome.”19
The Riggins Court similarly held that such treatment would have
been appropriate if it “was medically appropriate and, considering less
intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of Riggins’
own safety or the safety of others.20
Sell’s analysis recognizes that individuals have a liberty interest
in avoiding involuntary administration of medical treatment—an interest so
great that only an “essential” or “overriding” government interest may
overcome it. While treating an inmate for his own safety or that of others
would likely reach that level, it “may be rare” that the interest of
rendering a defendant competent to stand trial will rise to that level.21
While Soldiers accept limitations on their constitutional rights, it cannot
be the case that they possess “the right to be let alone—the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men”22
to a lesser degree than an inmate in a state mental hospital. Therefore, it
seems improbable that the Army would have greater latitude in administering
or directing medical care without their consent than a state mental hospital
would. Moreover, should the Army assert military necessity as a basis for
providing medical treatment without a Soldier’s consent (perhaps pursuant to
AR 600-20, para. 5-4g(5)23), and thus that its judgment is entitled to deference, this position is
likely to be met with skepticism by the courts. Courts have historically
accorded substantial deference to the executive agencies’ positions, and
particularly the military departments.24
However, “Although courts accord substantial deference to an agency’s final
action and presume it valid, the rational basis standard ‘does not reduce
judicial review to a rubber stamp of agency action.’”25
What to Do? The Path to Identifying or Establishing a Guardian
It is anticipated that Soldiers so severely disabled as to be unable to make
medical decisions on their own behalf will soon undergo disability
separation. As a result, the commander’s responsibility in this regard will
be relatively short-lived. However, “relatively” is an essential
qualification in the preceding sentence; the Department of War target is to
complete the disability evaluation process within 180 days from referral
into that process,26
and all of the Services routinely exceed that target.27
Moreover, referral into the disability process is not immediate, and the
lack of an individual with the ability or authority to direct the Soldier’s
medical care may delay it. As a result, a commander may well be responsible
for such a Soldier for a year or more. The Soldier’s condition may warrant
transfer to a Soldier Recovery Unit, but such a transfer merely moves the
problem from one commander to another.28
Appointment of a legal guardian is not necessary for a Soldier to proceed
through disability processing; Army regulations authorize the next of kin to
make decisions on the Soldier’s behalf throughout that process, even if not
formally appointed or qualified as a guardian under applicable state
law.29
But while such a family member may make administrative decisions on the
Soldier’s behalf throughout the disability process, their family status does
not, in itself, authorize them to direct the Soldier’s medical care, and any
Soldier in this situation is almost certain to require extensive ongoing
medical care during and after the separation process. While the Soldier’s
post-separation medical care is not the commander’s concern, the commander
remains responsible for the Soldier’s medical care while in service.
Determine Whether an Authorized Person Already Exists
The commander’s first step would naturally be to ascertain whether the
Soldier has already executed a durable power of attorney for health care, an
advance directive, or an equivalent document, giving some other person the
power to make medical decisions on that Soldier’s behalf in the event of
that Soldier’s incapacitation. If the commander is able to identify an
authorized person and validate that that person has been named in an
appropriate document, the commander’s responsibility is satisfied in this
regard. The suggestions below may assist the commander in locating an
authorized person.
Ask the Soldier
At the risk of stating the obvious, if possible, the commander should ask
the Soldier whether the Soldier has designated another person to make
medical decisions; if so, by what means; and the location of any relevant
documents. This, of course, depends on the Soldier being willing and able to
communicate, and having sufficient presence of mind to answer these
questions accurately; either or both of these may well be in question given
the Soldier’s condition. However, it is often the case that a Soldier may
have periods of lucidity in which these questions may be answered.
Consult with Next of Kin, If Any
If the Soldier cannot answer these questions, the commander’s next step
would be to consult with the Soldier’s next of kin, determined by means of
the Department of Defense Form 9330 if otherwise unknown. The commander may
also ask any known friends or associates of the Soldier if they know whether
the Soldier named an individual to manage such affairs.
Consult with the Installation Legal Assistance Office
Installation legal assistance offices routinely prepare healthcare powers of
attorney, advance directives, and other such documents on behalf of Soldiers
and dependents.31
If the commander has been unable to determine from the Soldier or the
Soldier’s family or friends whether such a document exists, contacting the
installation legal assistance office (and, perhaps, the legal assistance
offices of prior installations at which that Soldier served) could be the
next step. Legal assistance offices are required to record these services in
Client Information System. As a result, the office should be able to easily
determine whether it has prepared such a document for the Soldier. If so,
the office may have an electronic copy from which the commander could learn
whom to contact.
Determine Whether the Soldier Can Validly Name Someone
The requisite mental capacity to execute a durable power of attorney may not
be the same as that to be deemed mentally competent to make medical
decisions. This distinction is explicit in the Uniform Health-Care Decisions
Act of 1993,32
as enacted by New Mexico: “A determination of lack of capacity under the
Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act shall not be evidence of incapacity under
the provisions of Article 5 of the Uniform Probate Code.”33
Under this uniform act, capacity “means an individual’s ability to
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of proposed
healthcare, including its significant benefits, risks and alternatives to
proposed healthcare and to make and communicate an informed healthcare
decision.”34
Under its 2023 revision, mental capacity to appoint an agent under a
healthcare power of attorney requires only that the Soldier “recognize[] the
identity of the individual being appointed or identified and understand[]
the general nature of the relationship.”35
These standards are markedly different, and it may be the case that a
Soldier lacks the former capacity while still possessing the latter.
The above are illustrative examples; as the relevant subjects are questions
of state law, the standards for mental capacity in each context will vary
from state to state. If the Soldier meets the latter standard but not the
former, a healthcare power of attorney, advance directive, or other suitable
document can be prepared on that Soldier’s behalf. Determining whether this
possibility is viable will require careful consideration of the Soldier’s
condition and a thorough analysis of the relevant state statutes. It should
be undertaken by experienced legal assistance personnel. The attorney
representing the Soldier in question should carefully document the
circumstances leading the attorney to believe the Soldier possesses the
necessary mental capacity, and should consider requesting the presence of a
witness, such as a paralegal, during client meetings. Should the validity of
the instrument, or the Soldier’s capacity to execute it, be questioned in
the future, that witness may provide evidence supporting the Soldier’s
capacity.
Seek to Assist a Willing Family Member
Suppose no appointing document is found, and the Soldier is unable or
unwilling to appoint an agent. In that case, the commander should consult
with the Soldier’s next of kin, if possible, to determine whether that
individual or some other family member or friend is willing to seek an
appointment as a guardian. In this case, while the commander cannot directly
act to appoint the individual in question, that individual can be directed
to various resources to assist in that process.
Team members prepare life-saving equipment at Belvoir Hospital, which
contains a Warrior Pavilion for wounded and ill Service members. (Credit:
Reese Brown)
A family member or other person willing to act in this capacity may consult
with the installation legal assistance office, the Department of Social Work
(DSW) at the relevant Military Treatment Facility (MTF), and/or the
appropriate state agency for assistance if needed. The individual will often
be eligible for legal assistance under Army Regulation 27-3, para.
2-4(a)(6)36
as a dependent, and should first be directed to the installation legal
assistance office. That office can then engage other resources (including
DSW and/or the appropriate state agency) as required. Legal assistance may
also be able to refer the individual to local counsel on a pro-bono or
reduced-fee basis, as it is likely that services beyond the appointment of a
guardian will be needed.
Subject to resource constraints and local policy, installation legal
assistance offices may be authorized to represent eligible family members
under the Expanded Legal Assistance Program, potentially including
representation in court.37
This would, if available, eliminate or mitigate the need for outside local
counsel.
Engage an Appropriate State Agency
“Every State provides avenues through which, for example, a doctor or
institution can seek appointment of a guardian with the power to make a
decision authorizing medication—when in the best interests of a patient who
lacks the mental competence to make such a decision.”38
Many of those states have established agencies to assist with such matters
(e.g., the Georgia Department of Human Services39); the commander, in consultation with the servicing judge advocate (JA)
(and, in most cases, the DSW at the relevant MTF), should attempt to engage
their services when possible or relevant.
Most states serve as “public guardians,” or guardians of last resort.40
“Public guardians are last resort guardians to incapacitated persons subject
to what is already a last resort legal mechanism (guardianship) when no
suitable alternative options are available to address the person’s
needs.”41
“The latest comprehensive study [conducted in 2005] shows that every state
except Nebraska and Wyoming, and the District of Columbia, has some form of
public guardianship.”42
That study defined public guardianship as “the appointment and
responsibility of a public official or publicly funded organization to serve
as legal guardian in the absence of willing and responsible family members
or friends to serve as, or in the absence of resources to employ, a private
guardian.”43
“[T]he overwhelming majority of state statutes provide services to
incapacitated individuals who are determined to be in need of a guardian
under the adult guardianship law but have no person or private entity
qualified and willing to serve.”44
Patient pods at an emergency alternate care facility near Joint Base
Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska. (Credit: Rachel Napolitan)
A combination of the above mechanisms should resolve any case. Ordinarily,
the appointment of an individual known to (and, if possible, chosen by) the
Soldier would be preferred; if this is not possible, the state can and
should operate as the guardian of last resort. Should all of these fail,
however, the guidance below will be relevant.
Commence Guardianship Proceedings
If all of the above fail, the commander, through the servicing JA, may need
to commence guardianship proceedings. This is believed to be a novel
suggestion; no cases or secondary materials have been found addressing this
possibility. However, should the state fail to act in accordance with its
obligation as a public guardian, or should the Soldier’s case not fall
within the parameters of that program, this provides the commander with an
avenue of last resort to see to the Soldier’s care.
Jurisdiction and Applicable Law
While guardianship is ordinarily the province of state law and thus state
courts, the U.S. Government is constitutionally unable to subject itself to
the jurisdiction of a state court: “It seems plain, therefore, that the
government could not, in the absence of congressional authorization,
intervene as a party to the action in the state court;
no officer of the government being clothed with authority to subject it
to the jurisdiction of a state tribunal.”45
Therefore, rather than commencing the action in state court, the Army would
be required to institute proceedings in a U.S. District Court. Such courts
“have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings
commenced by the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof,” unless
otherwise provided by statute, and thus would have jurisdiction over the
proposed action.46
Under the Erie doctrine,47
as no Federal common law or statute governs guardianship,48
the substantive law of the relevant state will apply to this guardianship
action. This will ordinarily be the law of the state where the Soldier is
located.
Standing
As with any question of state law, significant variation exists among
jurisdictions. However, typical state statutes provide that “any interested
party,”49
“any interested person,”50
or “a person interested in the individual’s welfare”51
may petition a court for the appointment of a guardian. While no litigation
on the question has been found, the commander’s responsibility for the
Soldier’s healthcare would appear to constitute such an interest.
Procedure
When any Army activity is considering commencing a civil action, including
an action for guardianship, the servicing JA should immediately contact and
coordinate with Litigation Division. The chief of Litigation Division is
responsible for supervising litigation in which the Army is interested,
acting for The Judge Advocate General on litigation issues, and serving as
the primary contact with the Department of Justice on litigation.52
The servicing JA in such cases should prepare a litigation report and
forward it to Litigation Division.53
Litigation Division will then engage with the local U.S. Attorney’s office
to commence the action in the appropriate district court.
Conclusion
Commanders bear a statutory, regulatory, and moral obligation to ensure
their Soldiers’ medical care, all the more so when those Soldiers are so
severely disabled as to be unable to make decisions on their own behalf.
Awareness of this potential issue will ensure that JAs can advise their
commanders appropriately to fulfill this responsibility as long as their
Soldiers remain in the service. TAL
Notes
1. A phrase from the
Roman poet Juvenal, literally translated to: “Who will guard the guards
themselves?” David Isenberg, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?, CATO
Inst. (May 31, 2010),
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/quis-custodiet-ipsos-custodes
[https://perma.cc/SJD7-WM6B].
2. President Abraham
Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865) [hereinafter Second
Inaugural Address], reprinted by Lib. of Cong.,
https://www.loc.gov/resource/mal.4361300/?st=text&r=-0.027,-0.323,1.111,1.336,0
[https://perma.cc/Y2S9-BY3X] (emphasis added).
3. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Army, Regul. 40-501, Standards of
Medical Fitness chs. 2–3 (27 June 2019) [hereinafter AR 40-501]
(regulating “Physical Standards for Enlistment, Appointment, and
Induction,” and “Medical Fitness Standards for Retention and Separation,
Including Retirement”).
4. See Lincoln,
supra note 2. Airmen and Guardians, of course, were not a factor
in 1865.
5. United States v.
Thomas, 50 C.M.R. 114, 116 (N.C.M.R. 1975).
6. Id.
7. 10 U.S.C. § 7233(4)
(emphasis added). Virtually identical requirements apply within the
Departments of the Air Force and Navy. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 8167, 9233.
8. It was enacted by the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-85, § 507(a)(1), 111 Stat. 1629 (1997).
9. U.S. Dep’t of Army,
Regul. 600-20, Army Command Policy (6 Feb. 2025) [hereinafter AR 600-20].
10. Id. para.
5-4.
11. See U.S.
Dep’t of Army, Doctrine Pub. 6-22, Army Leadership and the Profession (21
July 2019) [hereinafter ADP 6-22].
12. Id. para.
1-68.
13. Id. para.
1-95 (emphasis added).
14. Id. para.
5-38.
15. AR 600-20,
supra note 9, para. 5-4(g).
16. Sell v. United
States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
17. Id. at 178
(quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990)).
18. Harper,
494 U.S. at 227 (emphasis added); accord Sell, 539 U.S. at 177.
19. Sell, 539
U.S. at 178-79 (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134-35 (1992)).
20. Riggins,
504 U.S. at 135; accord Sell, 539 U.S. at 178.
21. Sell, 539
U.S. at 180.
22. Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
23. AR 600-20,
supra note 9, para. 5-4(g)(5).
24. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984), overruled by Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S.
369 (2024). The full extent of the effects of Loper Bright is as
yet unknown, but it will undoubtedly reduce deference to military
departments.
25. Wilkins v. Austin,
745 F. Supp. 3d 375, 388 (E.D. Va. 2024) (quoting Ergon-West Va. v. United
States EPA, 896 F.3d 600, 609 (4th Cir. 2018)).
26. See U.S.
Dep’t of Def., 1332.18, Disability Evaluation System Manual: Process para
1.2(d) (24 Feb. 2023).
27. See, e.g.,
U.S. Dep’t of Def., IDES Performance Report (Dec. 2025) (on file with
author) (noting that only 55 percent of cases met this goal across
Services, with the Army slightly better at 57 percent).
28. The discussion
infra refers repeatedly to the Soldier’s commander. Ordinarily
the commander will have appointed one or more individuals within the
command to take any necessary action; “commander” thus includes any
personnel acting on the commander’s behalf.
29. See U.S.
Dep’t of Army, Regul. 635-40, Disability Evaluation for Retention,
Retirement, or Separation para. 4-12 (19 Jan. 2017) [hereinafter AR
635-40].
30. U.S. Dep’t of Def.,
DD Form 93, Record of Emergency Data (12 Feb. 2026).
31. This assistance is
authorized by U.S. Dep’t of Army, Regul. 27-3, The Army Legal Assistance
Program para. 3-4(e) (1 May 2024) [hereinafter AR 27-3].
32. The Uniform Act
itself could not be located; it has been replaced by a revised edition in
2023, and the Uniform Law Commission’s website does not appear to have an
archive of previous versions of its uniform laws. It was adopted (as
discussed infra) by relatively few states. Citations are therefore to the
Act as enacted by one of those few states.
33. N.M. Stat. Ann. §
24-7A-11 (2024). The description of this act as “uniform” is a misnomer;
while prepared and promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission and
recommended for adoption by all states, only seven states have adopted the
1993 act, and one (Delaware) has adopted its 2023 revision.
See Enactment History: 2023 | Health-Care Decisions Act, Unif. L.
Comm’n,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=3df274d6-776b-4780-8e4e-018a850ef44e
[https://perma.cc/2YGG-WAMP] (last visited Mar. 4, 2026).
34. N.M. Stat. Ann. §
24-7A-1(C) (2024).
35. Unif. Health-Care
Decisions Act § 3 (Unif. L. Comm’n 2023).
36. AR 27-3,
supra note 31, para. 2-4(a)(6).
37. See id. para. 4-2(a).
38. Sell v. United
States, 539 U.S. 166, 182 (2003) (citing Ala. Code §§ 26-2A-102(a),
26-2A-105, 26-2A-108 (Michie 1992); Alaska Stat. §§ 13.26.105(a),
13.26.116(b) (2002); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-5303, 14-5312 (West
1995); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 28-65-205, 28-65-301 (1987)).
39. See Ga.
Code Ann. 29-4-3(b.1) (2024).
40. See Hailey
M. Hanners,
Comment: Who Wants the Ward? The State’s Role in Adult Guardianship
Proceedings, 11 Tex. Tech. Est. Plan. Com. Prop. L.J. 359, 365 (2019).
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing Pamela B. Teaster et al.,
Wards of the State: A National Study of Public Guardianship, 37
Stetson L. Rev. 193, 205 (2007)).
43. Teaster et al.,
supra note 42, at 205.
44. Id. at
207.
45. United States v.
Inaba, 291 F. 416, 418 (E.D. Wash. 1923) (emphasis added).
46. See 28
U.S.C. § 1345.
47. See Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
48. See In re Rackley, 502 B.R. 615, 628 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013).
49. E.g., Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2111.02 (2024).
50. E.g., Ga.
Code Ann. § 29-4-10 (2024).
51. E.g.,
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 524.5-303 (2024).
52. See U.S.
Dep’t of Army, Regul. 27-40, Litigation para. 1-4(d) (19 Sep. 1994).
53. See id. paras. 5-4(a), 3-9.
Author
Mr. Brown is a Soldiers’ Disability Evaluation System
Counsel with the Office of Soldiers’ Counsel, U.S. Army Legal Services
Agency at Fort Stewart, Georgia.