Built on the Ruins of Empire

British Military Assistance and African Independence

By Blake Whitaker, and Reviewed by Frank L. Kalesnik

Article published on: January 1, 2026 in the Winter 2026 edition of Army History

Read Time: < 4 mins

University Press of Kansas, 2022 Pp. xiv, 265. $39.95

The British Army is often considered the epitome of professionalism, and Britain’s former colonies in Africa maintained its traditions in their defense forces after their independence. The transition to independence did not always go smoothly, however. Seeking to maintain beneficial relationships with its former colonies, the United Kingdom used British training cadres to oversee the transformation of African military units and ensure the process went smoothly. One particular goal was to inculcate these armed forces with an institutional culture that discouraged political involvement. This objective met with varying degrees of success, as Blake Whitaker shows in Built on the Ruins of Empire: British Military Assistance and African Independence.

The author is a historian of the British Empire and a psychological operations officer in the U.S. Army Reserve. Because the American military provides assistance, including training cadres, to African nations, this book is of both current and historical interest to readers. Whitaker uses three former colonies (Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) as case studies. The defense forces of these countries evolved from colonial regiments such as the King’s African Rifles, though the social, cultural, and political distinctions among them make each example unique.

Ideally, British personnel would have mentored leadership cadres, with Sandhurst-trained African officers assuming key leadership positions, and specialist and support personnel training in the administrative and logistical skills necessary to sustain a modern combined-arms force. The benefits to the United Kingdom would include continued inf luence in former colonies, common doctrine to facilitate multinational operations, and contracts to British firms for military hardware. The African nations would benefit from the professionalization of their modern, apolitical armed forces supported by the United Kingdom to meet mutual security objectives.

These efforts met with mixed success, particularly in Zimbabwe, which did not transition directly from British to African rule. Rhodesia’s 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence, with which colonial settlers severed ties with the United Kingdom to maintain White minority rule, led to its military’s involvement in a protracted guerrilla war against African nationalist movements, including Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). Rhodesia became an international pariah, cut off from military assistance from every nation except South Africa. ZANU operated from Mozambique, ZAPU from Zambia, with military assistance provided by the Communist bloc.

Britain, which played a leading role in peace talks, again became influential with the end of hostilities in 1979, followed by elections in 1980, which put Mugabe in power. The challenge was to integrate the former Rhodesian military with fighters from ZANU and ZAPU. Irreconcilable dif ferences bet ween t hese groups, exacerbated by Mugabe’s duplicity and megalomania, made cooperation—and the British Military Advisory Training Team’s (BMATT) job—virtually impossible. The establishment of “one-man, one-party” rule followed, with Mugabe using a North Korean–trained-and-equipped mechanized brigade to stifle opposition. Mugabe’s reign of terror continued until 2017, when the military placed the 93-year-old dictator under house arrest.

Interestingly enough, Whitaker notes that “the relationships developed with Kenya and Zambia, while strained at times, persisted throughout the twentieth century” (194). Furthermore, although both nations also received some degree of support from the Communist bloc, “British influence persisted in the military sphere” (194). The author further claims that “in many ways the training missions in Zambia and Kenya were successful” (194). Britain’s strong relationship with Kenya continues to this day. In fact, “Kenya has also developed into a critical counterterrorism partner in East Africa. Kenyan troops work with both British and American forces trying to counter violent extremist threats in the region” (200).

Built on the Ruins of Empire is a book of great interest to students of Africa, military affairs, and foreign policy. In the cases of Zambia and, particularly, Kenya, maintaining military relationships between former colonies and their former occupiers has proven mutually beneficial. Africa’s resources will guarantee its continued economic and political importance, and the role African armies play in maintaining stability in the region is a crucial factor in ensuring future progress and prosperity. Military assistance programs can promote professionalism, proficiency, and, ultimately, peace. In that sense, the British example is infinitely preferable to the Communist one, as shown in the “worst case” example of Zimbabwe. Blake Whitaker’s thoughtful, well-written, and solidly researched book is highly recommended to readers interested in the subject both personally and professionally.