America and Vietnam, 1954-1963

The Road to War

By Michael M. Walker, Review by Leroy L. Cisneros

Article published on: December 1, 2025 in the Army History Winter 2025 Issue

Read Time: < 2 mins

McFarland & Company, 2022 Pp. ix, 391. $49.95

One of the impressive aspects of this book, which grabs the reader’s attention from the onset, is Michael M. Walker’s clear identification of the key players and their prominent roles within the Vietnamese hierarchy. This allows the reader to know how these certain individuals from both North and South Vietnam were involved in shaping one of America’s longest wars and helps the reader reflect on who played what part dur-ing the crucial few years between the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in 1964. The breakdown identifies political, military, and influential people who helped set the stage for future events.

As U.S. intelligence estimates began to analyze Vietnamese capabilities at this time, Washington also was observing the internal power struggles that took place in Saigon between governmental factions. Walker describes, with great intricacy, the demo-graphic, religious, and political landscape across Vietnam between 1954 and 1963. These topics set the stage for the U.S. military advisers who were on the ground before the United States’ escalation in 1965. Walker also conducts a deeper study into the capabilities of the South Vietnamese military and its will to fight as the United States drew nearer to total war.

False assumptions, unrealistic expectations, and inaccurate assessments are just some of the major issues that plagued the United States and South Vietnam during this time frame. With no strategic goals identified or end state provided, the United States would pay greatly in the years to come. Another portion of this book articulates enemy capabilities after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, gauging how the North Vietnamese military planned to engage not only the South Vietnamese forces but also American combat units once they arrived in theater.

The North Vietnamese forces were poised to utilize irregular warfare, combined arms maneuver, and the development of a strong insurgency to remain dominant on the battlefield. Their financial support also was substantial during this period, as both North and South Vietnam looked toward superpowers—such as the United States and the Soviet Union—to help fund their collective efforts. With limited key personnel to lead the South Vietnamese forces and political infighting continuing to hamper unified efforts, it is no wonder that this conflict was doomed to fail from the start.

The final portion of the book examines where the United States stood with South Vietnam and which key leaders from both nations would support as John F. Kennedy’s administration took over in 1961. Focus shifted from Dwight D. Eisenhower’s ad-ministration as Washington had to deter-mine, quickly, who its most credible ally was. U.S. intelligence assets increased the scope of their work as they continued to push their influence in both Washington and Saigon. The topic of Laos is also detailed in this book because of its logistical proximity to both North and South Vietnam and because it served as key terrain for the duration of the Second Indochina War, with the Ho Chi Minh Trail providing enormous resupply capabilities to the North Vietnamese forces. Walker expresses that the Vietnam Conflict did not just simply happen overnight or be-cause of one incident. The stage was set long before the approval of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution during Lyndon B. Johnson’s ad-ministration in 1964.

This comprehensive analysis provides a true assessment of what decisions were made and why. It further reviews time constraints and policy inaccuracies, which hampered efforts in South Vietnam. As the rest of the world focused on Europe and the threat of Soviet expansionism in a post–Korean Conflict environment, initial efforts were being placed in Southeast Asia, between 1954 and 1963.

This book flows smoothly while creating a detailed timeline between the years 1954 and 1963. It does not jump across time periods, and it helps the reader comprehend how certain unknown individuals helped develop the Vietnam Conflict. The illustrations, maps, and photographs are placed exactly where they need to be to validate the influential nature of their chosen subjects. Whether the person was a seasoned diplomat assigned to Washington or a North Vietnamese field commander, the author de-fines these individuals so well that the reader appears to have known them all along. No guesswork or uncertainty is present, and this author addresses many of the misconceptions about this war.