The Dhofar War

British Covert Campaigning in Arabia 1965-1975

By Stephen Quick, and Reviewed by Frank L. Kalesnik

Article published on: June 1, 2025 in the Summer 2025 edition of Army History

Read Time: < 5 mins

University of Exeter Press, 2024 Pp. xvi, 235. $129

The United Kingdom’s relationship with the Sultanate of Oman stretches back to the nineteenth century. Located on the southeastern coast of the Arabian Peninsula, Oman lies along important trade routes connecting the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and Red Sea. It has historic mercantile interests ranging from East Africa to India and Zanzibar. The United Kingdom’s inf luence there grew in the twentieth century, increased during the Second World War, and climaxed in the Cold War. British military assistance enabled Sultan Said bin Taimur, ruler of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, to assert control over the Imamate of Oman located in the mountainous interior during the Jebel Akhdar War (1954–1959), which increased British influence to the point at which the United Kingdom had de facto control of Oman.

The subsequent Dhofar War began in 1964 and lasted until early 1976. The Marxist-led Dhofar Liberation Front hoped to end the sultan’s control of the province, end British influence in the region, and promote the cause of Arab nationalism. The British withdrawal from neighboring Aden in 1967, leading to the establishment of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, increased Marxist control of the insurgents, escalated the supply of Communist bloc weaponry, and increased training opportunities for guerrilla leaders in Yemen and elsewhere. Sultan Said’s regressive and tight-fisted rule led to a disgruntled population and hamstrung military efforts. The situation improved dramatically when, in 1970, his son Qaboos bin Said displaced him in a British-backed coup. (Said spent his remaining years in comfortable exile in London.) The European-educated, Sandhurst-trained Qaboos was a much more effective and progressive leader than his father. He expanded and modernized the military, Arab states and Iran began to support the war effort, and social and economic reforms at the grassroots level won the populace over to the government. Concurrently, the insurgency’s Marxist leadership alienated devout Muslims, who went over to the government in growing numbers. Notably, as Qaboos gained strength as a leader, British influence in Oman decreased while increasing oil revenues made the sultanate less dependent on the United Kingdom.

Stephen Quick’s The Dhofar War: British Covert Campaigning in Arabia 1965–1975 provides many fascinating details that broaden our understanding of this interesting and understudied conflict. British influence was exerted by soldiers who were seconded from the British armed forces for service in the sultanate and by former British commissioned and noncommissioned officers serving on contract as part of the sultan’s armed forces. These soldiers served in conventional air, land, and naval forces, as well as with irregular units trained and mentored by soldiers of the Special Air Service. Until 1970, the war was conducted on a shoestring budget among a disaffected population in rugged mountainous country (the Jebel). After Qaboos took power, the situation improved greatly, particularly when military assistance from Iran and Jordan arrived. The increasing defection of former Muslim insurgents provided a growing number of irregular troops, led by their tribal chieftains, with direct support from special and conventional forces and allied troops from friendly Arab countries and Iran.

In his introduction, Quick claims that “Oman’s Dhofar War was one of the few successful counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns undertaken in the Cold War period” (1). He later concludes, “Dhofar was a markedly small war and COIN campaign as compared to many of those undertaken by Britain in the post–World War II era and further in the later Cold War era in Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, and Afghanistan, for example” (191). What is the difference between the Dhofar War and other larger, less successful Cold War counterinsurgency campaigns? This reviewer believes that in Oman, the British made necessity a virtue. An example is the role of the Special Air Service, which served in British army training teams, advising and assisting irregular Islamic fighters organized in firqats (local militia units). Often recruited from defecting insurgents, the firqats were effective at taking on the enemy because they were fighting on their turf, not the enemy’s. The British army training teams lived and fought with the firqats, understood their culture, and included interpreters who understood their languages. There is nothing new about this. The British had used these methods around the globe in their days of empire, and the Americans have used them with allied indigenous peoples for more than four centuries. Additionally, the British troops were able to replace an unpopular, regressive sultan with one who would make needed changes, take charge of his destiny, and lead Oman into a future less dependent on the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the author explains, “That Oman celebrated its milestone fiftieth National Day well into the twenty-first century with an Al Said still on the throne as a stable, prosperous, intact, and sovereign state is largely due to the enduring historic influence and legacy of the UK’s longstanding involvement in the Sultanate” (195).

In summary, The Dhofar War is not intended for casual readers. It is an academic work of great value to scholars and military professionals interested in the history, theory, and practice of counterinsurgency. Although the topic is currently out of fashion in some military circles, insurgencies have required countering since the dawn of time. The United Kingdom’s efforts in Oman were conducted competently and professionally at a time of great turmoil in a place of continuing importance, both regionally and globally. Time spent reading and pondering the lessons that can be learned from this book will be well-spent indeed.