Liberation in the Littorals

Army Amphibious Assaults Against the European Axis

By John M. Curatola

Article published on: July 1, 2025 in the Summer 2025 Edition of Army History

Read Time: < 77 mins

Landing craft practice ship-to-shore movement while training stateside. History and Heritage Command

Today, the U.S. Marine Corps serves as the nation's expert in amphibious assault. This role emerged from the Corps' pioneering efforts during the interwar years to develop a sea-based forcible-entry capability. Solely interested in such operations, the Corps laid the foundation for U.S. amphibious assaults in all theaters of World War II. During the fight against the Japanese Empire, the Corps' reputation became fully burnished as it seized islands in the Pacific such as Tarawa, Saipan, Peleliu, and Iwo Jima. The Marine Corps' hard-won exploits during its "island hopping" campaign have risen almost to the point of legendary status.

The U.S. Army's amphibious assaults during the same war, by contrast, are less appreciated and often relegated to the historical background. The 1998 blockbuster film Saving Private Ryan exposed thousands of moviegoers to the horrors of the 6 June 1944 Normandy invasion, but people may not have noticed that none of the personnel depicted in the powerful, twenty-minute opening scene were marines. All the characters in the fictional account were soldiers or naval personnel. Most historians overlook the fact that throughout all the theaters of World War II, Army soldiers conducted more than 140 forcible-entry operations, the largest of which was at Normandy.1Against the Axis powers alone, the Army conducted more than ten division-size amphibious assaults. In contrast to the Pacific assaults, which focused largely on capturing small islands or atolls, the landings in the Mediterranean and Europe led to the liberation of whole countries or, in some cases, parts of continents.

Amphibious Fundamentals

Given the Army's World War II amphibious assault record, it is even more impressive that, as late as 1941, the service was not interested in such actions. Amphibious operations were inherently joint endeavors, which compounded the difficulties of developing the capability. Because these operations involved all three domains—air, land, and sea—the U.S. Navy and the Army Air Forces (who also were generally uninterested in amphibious operations) had to work together. This general disinterest in amphibious operations brings several questions to mind: How did the United States develop a forcible-entry capability that liberated North Africa and much of Western Europe? What did U.S. forces do to build the most potent amphibious assault force in the world in just three years? How did such operations evolve over time? Finally, what were the doctrinal, organizational, training, and equipment requirements underpinning these operations?

To answer these questions, a framework is useful. Then, as now, amphibious operations included six important components: command relationships, ship-to-shore movement, naval surface fire support, air support, beachhead establishment, and communications and logistics.2These six building blocks are interrelated and of equal importance to the success of an amphibious assault.

Cargo nets are slung over the sides of the USS Samuel Chase for troop debarkation. Naval History and Heritage Command

Command Relationships

In this multidomain environment, who is in charge? Who has full authority, the ground commander, known as the commander of the landing force (CLF), or the Navy commodore, known as the commander of the amphibious task force (CATF)? Determining this requires an intricate, phased, and nuanced relationship between the two commanders.3

Ship-to-Shore Movement

Naval task forces easily traverse oceans but getting personnel and materiel from seagoing transports to the shoreline can be complicated. Ship-to-shore (StS) movement requires detailed planning and vessels that operate both in the surf and ashore. Quickly building combat power on land relies on deliberate and detailed embarkation and debarkation planning, organization, and execution. StS movement also makes use of shallow-water landing craft to carry troops and equipment ashore.4The Higgins boat, a landing craft famous for its ability to traverse shallow water, addressed this requirement, but most StS movements required bigger vessels that were capable of moving large equipment and bulk supplies ashore.

Naval Surface Fire Support

Having very little organic firepower during the initial phases of the surface assault, the landing force requires naval surface fire support (NSFS). The heavy-caliber guns of the accompanying fleet can shape the battlefield and reduce enemy positions ashore. Battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and other surface vessels provide such support but require careful coordination of timing and targets. To avoid fratricide while trying to engage enemy positions, efficient and effective procedures must be in place between the CATF and CLF.5

Air Support

The use of aircraft for reconnaissance, close air support, and interdiction missions is key to amphibious operations. Naval guns provide important firepower before and during the landing, but they have relatively flat trajectories that cannot reach areas in deflade. Aviation is inherently more flexible, able to reach targets behind beach dunes and other geographic features and provides additional combat power in amphibious operations.6

Large-caliber naval guns provide fire support, helping to reduce prepared enemy defenses ashore, during the assault on Sicily in 1943. Naval History and Heritage Command

Beachhead Establishment

After a landing force comes ashore, it needs to consolidate its gains and quickly establish a secure perimeter to allow for the safe arrival of follow-on waves of troops, equipment, and supplies. The perimeter organizes the shoreline and serves as the conduit for subsequent inland operations. As newly landed formations and supplies come ashore, they can be lost, misappropriated, or erroneously employed in the confusion of combat.7Beachhead organizations such as shore parties and support battalions help prevent such chaos.

U.S. soldiers practice debarkation from a troop transport ship during wartime exercises. Naval History and Heritage Command

Communications and Logistics

Both functions facilitate the coordination, utilization, and growth of combat power ashore. Effective communications networks, especially StS messaging, are necessary to command, control, and coordinate amphibious assignments. Additionally, the efficient movement ashore of fuel, water, ammunition, and other vital supplies and services during the initial assault is key to sustaining the fight.8

Using these six components as a framework, historians can assess the development of U.S. amphibious capabilities throughout World War II. Starting with the Operation Torch landings in November 1942 and ending with Operation Dragoon in August 1944, American competency with amphibious operations in the Mediterranean and European Theaters of Operations grew appreciably. U.S. forces mastered the art and science of amphibious assault and then conducted these operations on a scale never seen before.

Operation TORCH

With the United Kingdom driving Allied strategy in Europe in 1942, securing the Mediterranean and its sea lines of communications was a part of the British "periphery strategy." U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall favored the idea of a cross-channel invasion as early as 1942, but American forces did not yet have the personnel, materiel, or the know-how to conduct such an operation successfully. Fortunately, the Mediterranean Theater of Operations provided a classroom for the Americans to learn the art and science of amphibious operations. During this effort, code-named Operation Torch, the first American landings against the European Axis occurred at three different locations on the North African coast.

The American flotilla arrived off the African coast on 7-8 November 1942. The effort was divided into three task forces, which would conduct nine individual amphibious landings. The Western Task Force, under the command of Maj. Gen. George S. Patton Jr., executed a trio of landings in Morocco, capturing the port city of Casablanca and introducing ground-based aircraft. Approximately 1,000 miles east, of the Algerian coast, the Central Task Force, under Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall, made landings near the town of Oran. His mission was to capture the city's port and local airfields while maintaining a line of communications with Patton's Western Task Force. Simultaneously, the Eastern Task Force, commanded by Maj. Gen. Charles W. Ryder, executed the three-pronged main effort on the shores east and west of the city of Algiers. The Eastern Task Force would place Allied troops close to German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps while seeking to capture the city and its robust logistical infrastructure.9 Positioning soldiers to fight against Vichy French forces, the nine landings took place in a mixed bag of environments that cost the United States 1,800 casualties. Some forces received incoming fire; others experienced little to no resistance. Despite the Vichy defenders' appetite for battle, all the landings were successful. The Americans had had their first taste of combat in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. However, significant problems soon arose, including poor StS movement, unorganized beachheads, and difficulties with communications and logistics support. The general consensus of the U.S. effort was summarized by one Eastern Task Force soldier who quipped, "We received no opposition whatsoever from the beach and if we had, in that condition of landing, it would have been a complete failure."10Even Patton agreed, commenting, "Had the landings been opposed by Germans, we would have never gotten ashore."11

Although each task force had its own issues and challenges, several common deficiencies emerged. Many landing times were missed by hours when equipment-laden troops had trouble traversing cargo nets and making their way into bobbing landing craft.12Many commanders referenced the excess amount of equipment carried by individual soldiers, reporting them to be "woefully overloaded" and "virtually immobilized."13The Western Task Force landings at Mehdia were two hours late, and similar delays occurred at Fedala and Saf.14Some Central Task Force landings experienced the same problem, missing landing times and hitting the beaches some thirty minutes late.15

Troops go over the rails into the awaiting landing craft during Operation Torch. Such movement was slow and cumbersome. Naval History and Heritage Command

Adding to the problem of StS movement, landing craft were too fragile for the North African surf. The Landing Craft, Personnel Large; Landing Craft, Vehicle Personnel; and Landing Craft, Mechanized were not up to the environmental challenges created by surf that often reached 7 fleet. Mechanical issues added to the peril; ramp-operating mechanisms failed, putting both crew and ships in jeopardy.16One Army report described the landing craft as "inadequate in every respect. They are too small to carry tactical units; they broach easily; they break up in moderately heavy seas; [and] their compasses are worthless."17After the operation, a naval officer surveyed the assault beaches and counted 169 wrecked boats. They were so damaged that, in some cases, he had to count engines instead of intact hulls.18

An LST unloads troops, equipment, and cargo directly to the shore. Naval History and Heritage Command

Problems with StS movement also came from inexperienced coxswains crashing their landing craft on beaches, rocks, and shoals. At the Fedala landings, twenty-one overloaded landing craft capsized in rougher-than-expected surf. Precious supplies and equipment were lost, and troops, weighed down by their heavy equipment, were thrown from the vessels and drowned.19Other landing craft were abandoned or stranded and left to be battered by the crashing surf.20Additionally, landing-wave integrity broke down, which resulted in chaotic traffic jams that hindered offload and recovery operations.

Navigation was a problem even for more experienced coxswains. Many landing craft wandered aimlessly, unable to locate their objective beaches. Others failed to find their assigned assault transports and did not embark their landing force troops. Still others landed at the wrong beaches, sometimes as far as 12 miles away from the proper place, forcing troops to reorient or assume new missions.21The Eastern Task Force after action report bluntly stated, "All units were widely scattered and intermingled due to failure to land troops at the place and time scheduled."22From all three efforts, it was clear that StS movement needed significant improvement. The tally of lost landing craft during Operation Torch reached 37 percent, with the Eastern Task Force alone losing 98 percent.23Serving as Patton's CATF, V. Adm. Henry Kent Hewitt recognized the problem, stating, "The dire need of better training of boat crews was everywhere apparent."24

Another common problem lay with the establishment of the beachhead and the generation of combat power ashore. Training of beach-party personnel tasked with receiving, organizing, and distributing supplies and equipment fell short. Shore and beach parties arrived too late, were too few, lacked material handling equipment, and often were poorly led.25Training for such operations was only an afterthought; the assault waves were the priority. Army beach parties could not manage the flow of incoming supplies and equipment. Supplies delivered for the initial waves were not segregated by classes, and crews dumped stocks and equipment wherever they saw fit.26As more landing waves arrived, a rising tide swamped vehicles and supplies, and the beaches were littered with unaccounted-for gear and equipment.27Troops looking for food, ammunition, or other specific supplies had to hunt them down at various locations ashore. Compounding the problem was the absence of beach markers, identification panels, lights, and an organized layout. Vehicles got stuck in the soft sand and had no recovery capabilities, adding to the chaos.28

Wreckage from General Patton's Western Task Force landing craft litters the beaches of Morocco. Naval History and Heritage Command

Fault also lay offshore aboard the assault transports, where the organization of embarked supplies and equipment fell woefully short. Crews threw items into the landing craft without regard for their proper storage while in transit or their offloading once ashore.29Additionally, even though the Navy had requested the Army's input regarding the stateside loading of transports, the landing force failed to identify high-priority items. Therefore, transport ships did not configure their holds for "combat loading," which would have assured that the most-needed supplies were loaded last for easy access on D-day. Instead, the assault ships' personnel had to rearrange embarked items to gain access to the higher priority supplies and equipment located in the lower holds. The failure to combat load was a serious impediment to developing combat power ashore, especially when time mattered.30

Navy V. Adm. Henry K. Hewitt was a major figure in developing joint amphibious operations in the European Theater, helping to unify air, land, and sea efforts. Naval History and Heritage Command

The use of naval guns for NSFS was lauded by both services. However, the Army remained unfamiliar with naval fires and feared fratricide with troops ashore.31An Army report suggested that once troops were ashore, NSFS should be used only on an oncall basis.32Naval personnel argued the value of preassault bombardment, but the Army stuck to the belief that tactical surprise was more important than prelanding fires for battlefield shaping.33However, ground commanders did emphasize the importance of dress rehearsals with actual naval fires, suggesting that Army units needed to familiarize themselves with their use, particularly because some troops froze when hearing them for the first time.34Furthermore, the fleet found that destroyers were extremely effective at delivering fires and engaging targets of opportunity, especially when coordinated and controlled by spotter planes. Able to sail close to the shoreline, destroyers proved their worth as fire platforms and soon became a staple of amphibious assaults in the Mediterranean/European Theaters of Operation.

The Navy found that close air support was not effective in destroying targets, especially when using bombs smaller than 1,000 pounds. Furthermore, the dust and smoke raised by the explosions obscured other possible targets. However, aircraft strafing with .50-caliber rounds were devastating to soft-skin targets, such as hasty defensive positions and lightly armored vehicles. The Navy recommended using incendiary rounds while recognizing the effectiveness of using strafing runs against light tanks and armored vehicles.35Regarding air-ground coordination, the Navy's after action review praised the use of jeep-mounted SCR193 radios to help control close air support missions. Both services also recommended extensive use of air support party teams to coordinate such support. The after action report specifically stated that all commanders should be "properly indoctrinated as to the desirability of, and limitations of air-ground liaisons."36

Fifth Army Invasion Training Center

After Torch, the Western Task Force, I Armored Corps, II Corps formations, and XII Air Support Command were consolidated under the Fifth Army on 1 December 1942. Commanded by Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark, the new command's primary mission was "to prepare a well-organized, well-equipped, and mobile striking force with at least one infantry division and one armored division fully trained in amphibious operations."37Sifting through and synthesizing the recent Torch experience, Fifth Army established training programs in preparation for future amphibious assaults. The Fifth Army Invasion Training Center was stood up on 14 January 1943 at Port-aux-Poules, Algeria.38In growing appreciation for the joint nature of amphibious assault, the new command included Navy personnel as part of the training center's staff. The Navy established its own new training organizations in the region under the command of R. Adm. John L. Hall Jr. This command included the naval staff assigned to the Army's training center. While landing-craft training still occurred stateside, a forward school was established in the newly liberated North African ports. In February 1943, R. Adm. Richard L. Conolly assumed command of Landing Craft and Bases Northwest African Waters, located near Arzew, Algeria. The command worked directly with the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center while maintaining newly arrived landing craft at various locations.39

Cent task force vessels land broach in the rough surf near Scoglitti, despite reinforced coxswain training at the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center. Naval History and Heritage Command

On 19 March, the USS Samuel Chase arrived at Oran with 2,500 tons of supplies and equipment for the construction of training center facilities along with more than 500 personnel to staff the organization. The Samuel Chase was followed by more vessels with additional supplies for various training locations.40The curriculum for joint littoral operations was developed from existing doctrine and modified based on the services' after action reports. Lesson plans addressed a range of topics including detailed guidance on landing-wave composition, organization of landing craft, and scheduling of landing-team movement.41The training center revised the number of landing craft required for a division assault and adjusted subsequent wave configuration, planned loss rates, and transit times.42Instruction included night attacks, infiltration, demolitions, destruction of obstacles and armored vehicles, air-ground coordination, fire support, and sustainment in subsequent operations ashore.43

This Fifth Army Invasion Training Center schematic shows notional beachhead organization with supply dumps, roads, and designated areas. U.S. Army Combined Arms Research Center Digital Archive

In addition to classroom instruction, doctrinal development, and unit training, the center sponsored amphibious landing exercises. These drills were as realistic as possible, using live ammunition so troops could practice landing under fire. Combined arms such as armor, air, and engineers were integrated into rehearsals, along with instruction in the clearing of urban areas, which often were adjacent to landing beaches. Pillboxes and defensive positions were constructed in the training areas to mimic those ashore. 44The 1st, 3d, 34th, and 36th Infantry Divisions all went through the training; they soon would see action.45

Meanwhile, naval forces were receiving much more capable and robust littoral craft. The fragile vessels used in Operation Torch were replaced with a host of new StS designs. During the interwar years, the Navy had created a whole new fleet of amphibious vessels-despite their low priority-with a veritable "alphabet soup" of names. No longer an afterthought but still held in lower esteem than their blue-water counterparts, the Navy's amphibious fleet grew at a remarkable rate. Four basic designs stood out and became readily available for combat use. The Landing Ship, Tank (LST); Landing Craft, Tank (LCT); and Landing Craft, Infantry (LCI) were innovative designs that were inherently flexible and used in all theaters of the war. At the same time, the Army developed an amphibious truck, designated the DUKW, that was incredibly valuable in the movement of both materiel and supplies. Development of these vessels is often overshadowed by the war's larger historiography, but it significantly advanced forcible-entry operations.

A DUKW moves supplies ashore at Anzio. Naval History and Heritage Command

With their new amphibious designs, the Allies no longer were stuck with the complex StS processes used during Torch. The beaching abilities of these larger vessels meant that personnel, supplies, and equipment could be disgorged directly onto land without need for ports, infrastructure, or cumbersome transfers at sea. Although fixed-port facilities certainly were more efficient, these new capabilities provided a more robust and efficient way to develop combat power across an unprepared beach.

Operation HUSKY

After the liberation of North Africa, Operation Husky-the invasion of Sicily-was the next step for the Allies. A continuation of the British periphery strategy, taking the island would help secure the Mediterranean Sea lines of communications while potentially helping to topple Benito Mussolini's government. More than 3,200 ships, craft, and boats made up the Allied naval forces, of which more than 1,700 were assigned to what was now called the Western Naval Task Force, now commanded by Hewitt.46American forces, all part of Patton's newly designated Seventh Army, landed on three separate beach locations. The respective infantry divisions then were divided up into separately named task forces. The 3d Infantry Division made up the Joss task force and covered the town of Licata; the 1st Infantry Division, as the Dime task force, landed at Gela; and the 45th Infantry Division, as the Cent task force, covered the area around Scoglitti. In addition to the surface landings, the 82d Airborne Division jumped behind the invasion beaches, disrupted enemy communications, and helped prevent Axis movement against the beachheads. Unlike the Torch landings, in which the Vichy defensive posture was ambiguous, in the Husky landings, the Allied forces could count on a hostile reception. With four Italian and two German divisions on the island, the Axis formations on Sicily numbered approximately 325,000.

Whereas the Navy and Army were learning to work and plan together, the air components-including the Army Air Forces and the Royal Air Force, which made up the Northwest African Air Forces (NAAF)-remained disconnected from the larger joint planning effort and failed to communicate their intentions.47The 3d Infantry Division commander, Lt. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott Jr., commenting on the air component's lack of cooperative planning, stated that the air forces showed "a complete lack of participation at any level below that of the high command."48Hewitt, too, pulled no punches regarding poor NWAAF support in preinvasion planning, claiming, "The weakest link in the joint planning of the U.S. Force was the almost complete lack of participation by the Air Force."49Heading the air component was the Royal Air Force's air chief marshal, Sir Arthur W. Tedder, who, like many of his fellow aviators, believed the best use of airpower was not close air support but battlefield air interdiction, striking the enemy in the rear areas. For Tedder, sealing off the island precluded possible enemy movement, resupply, or reinforcement and was the larger, more productive use of airpower-not reduction of enemy forces or protection of the amphibious assault forces.50

For NWAAF, providing aircover over the amphibious beaches was a decidedly low priority. Despite the fact that naval aviation assets were used during the North Africa landings and were a key part of the Western Task Force's success, for this next assault, Hewitt's fleet was devoid of any aircraft carriers, leaving him with only land-based support. Once the landings commenced, the amphibious objective area (AOA) did not have sufficient aircover. With no protection overhead, the destroyer USS Maddox was attacked by a JU-88 bomber at 0500 on D-day. The Maddox sank, taking most of the crew to the bottom.51Enemy air attacks continued throughout the day.52Axis aircraft continued to be a nuisance throughout the operation; eighty-nine raids disrupted offload operations, harassing the fleet and sinking two vessels along with dozens of landing craft.53Because of the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica attacks, naval gunners assumed that any aircraft above was hostile. Fresh from his naval aviation experience during Torch, a frustrated Patton exclaimed, "You can get naval air to do anything you want, but we can't get the Air Force to do a goddam thing!"54

To reinforce the beachhead, on 11 July, Patton committed his reserve, the 504th Parachute Infantry, which was to arrive in C-47s from North Africa. Flying a route near the Allied armada, both the aircrews and paratroops expected a smooth ingress. The 82d Airborne commander, Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, attempted to contact the Navy and establish a safe air corridor over the Allied fleet.55The first wave jumped during a lull in the aerial fight overhead, but the second and third waves were not so lucky. Despite attempts to warn antiaircraft artillery gunners, both naval and ground-based batteries opened up.56As formations of C-47s tried to evade the antiaircraft artillery, commanders helplessly watched the slaughter of American soldiers at the hands of their own forces. Of the 144 aircraft that took of that night, 23 were lost and 37 were badly damaged, resulting in a 16 percent loss rate. The 504th suffered 229 casualties: 81 dead, 132 wounded, and 16 missing.57A NWAAF pilot memorably observed, "Evidently the safest place for us tonight while over Sicily would have been over enemy territory."58

Despite the problems regarding the airborne insertion, naval fires were a key element in the successful landings at Gela. Earlier on 11 July, the Germans sent offensive thrusts down Routes 117 and 115, each with a Kampfgruppen (combat group) with infantry and an estimated strength of thirty to forty Mark IV and VI tanks. In a separate and uncoordinated effort, the Italians launched their own armor assault near Route 117 toward Gela. With flew antitank assets available, U.S. infantry needed help from the 33d Field Artillery Battalion as well as NSFS. Defending the beachhead, USS Savannah and USS Boise engaged enemy formations along with shore-based artillery.59

Troops debark their transport during Operation Husky. Naval History and Heritage Command

German formations driving along Route 117 made progress and began to move across the Gela plain to join the other Kampfgruppen traveling along Route 115. Wehrmacht troops along Route 115 bypassed American positions near Priolo and made their way to the fringes of the American beachhead.60Panzers threatened to penetrate the established beachhead and came within 1,000 yards of the shore. For a time, enemy troops were too close to friendly forces for NSFS. All the forces on the beach, sailor and soldier alike, now were involved in the defense, including the newly arrived 32d Field Artillery Battalion and the Cannon Company, 16th Infantry. These units lowered their muzzles and engaged in direct fire. Additionally, a platoon of M4 Sherman tanks from Company I, 67th Armor, also made it ashore and engaged the enemy. These combined fires stopped the German attack.61Retreating German armor was then engaged by NSFS, which left the smoking hulks of sixteen enemy tanks on the Gela plain and destroyed an estimated third of the Herman Goering Division's armor.62

Soldiers carry equipment ashore at Scoglitti. Naval History and Heritage Command

At Gela, the joint coordinated defense of Army artillery and NSFS made a difference. Part of this successful effort was that a fire direction center aboard USS Samuel Chase stayed in contact with the 1st Infantry Division batteries managing joint fires.63Even after the initial landings, naval gunfire continued making significant contributions to the Dime sector. In his Husky after action report, Admiral Hewitt remarked, "The destruction of this armored force by naval gunfire delivered by U.S. cruisers and destroyers, and the recovery of the situation through naval support, was one of the most noteworthy events of the operations."64Supporting this assertion, General Patton complimented his naval counterpart claiming, "The gunfire support that you provided has been of inestimable value."65

While movement ashore went reasonably well in the Joss and Dime sectors, the Cent landings were problematic. Marginal surf conditions in the Cent area created problems with StS movement. Arriving late in the AOA, Combined Task Force 85 commander R. Adm. Alan G. Kirk decided that H-hour, originally designated for 0245, had to slip some sixty minutes. Once in the transport area, the sea state made landing-craft deployment difficult. H-hour was reset for 0345, but the late change caused confusion: scout boats already had launched, some landing craft were waiting in assembly areas, and others were in the process of embarkation.66Adding to the problem, just before the landings were underway, Axis aircraft arrived overhead and attacked Kirk's combined task force for forty-five minutes.67

In the Cent sector, several landing craft also were stuck offshore on small runnels, causing troops to wade ashore. At another assault beach, scout boats failed to locate the correct landing sites as their inexperienced coxswains landed battalions of target.68Some landing craft also fought a rough surf that pushed them into the rocks of Punta Bracetto to the right of the beach known as Yellow 2. Trying to avoid the hazards, two craft collided and sank, and thirty-eight soldiers drowned. In the darkness, other boats faced similar navigational hazards, losing another five boats by daybreak. Only one wave landed on the correct beach.69

By 0625, the Navy had tried to assist by moving transports closer to the beach to ease the StS movement. However, much like in Torch, the beaches now were awash in stranded landing craf, equipment, and supplies. One Navy officer noted that the scattering of landing craft looked like "the shoes in a dead man's closet."70Cartoonist Bill Maudlin of "Willie and Joe" fame observed the beaches and realized, "My first lesson about war is that nobody really knows what he is doing."71Given how crowded the shore was, the naval commander abandoned the use of beaches Yellow and Green 2 and moved the offloading of supplies to the southernmost beach of Blue 2.72A survey of boats in one landing area found only 66 of the 175 landing craft remained functional (a 63 percent loss rate).73To the north, at Yellow beach, the situation was equally bad. Dozens of swamped or grounded landing craft foundered on runnels, and salvage crews were overwhelmed. The landing beaches had flew exits along the soft sand and dunes, which were difficult for wheeled vehicles to traffic, adding to the congestion.

A German Mark VI tank is hit by naval fires during Operation Avalanche. Naval History and Heritage Command

Once again, beach-party personnel had a hard time organizing and managing equipment once ashore. 45th Infantry Division commander Lt. Gen. Troy H. Middleton already had a poor opinion of shore-party personnel, calling them a "rabble," and seeing them as self-interested rejects from combat units.74The Seventh Army's after action report specifically mentioned the lack of resident knowledge regarding beachhead organization. Supporting Middleton's observation, Hewitt, too, criticized the shore-party personnel and their lack of initiative, claiming that they stood idle, cowered in foxholes, or hid within the piles of unorganized supplies, unwilling to help unload and consolidate equipment.75He also was chagrined to see that the beach parties again had failed to erect markers, identify safe routes through enemy mine fields for motorized transport, establish delivery locations for various classes of supplies, and enforce traffic control measures, and had established only weak defensive positions on the perimeter.76

Without sufficient beach-party personnel, beachhead establishment and the organization of supplies and equipment were still chaotic during the Salerno operation. Naval History and Heritage Command

Similar to Torch, Husky had issues with StS movement. The landings in two of the three objective areas were well executed, but coxswain performance still required improvement. The deficiencies in beach parties and organization ashore still were problematic, but Husky used new amphibious vessels, which allowed an entire Army to come ashore and support itself in an expeditionary environment. The movement of bulk logistics was significantly easier and not tied to a port. Furthermore, although naval aviation was absent, coordinated naval fires were an integral part of the fight and saved the Dime sector from Axis counterattacks. The main lesson learned was the importance of air integration. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the commander in chief of the Allied Force, came to the same conclusion:

One of the major lessons [that] should never be lost sight of in future planning . . . [is] that during the critical stages of landing operations, every item of available force including land, sea, and air must be wholly concentrated in support of the landing force until troops are positioned to take care of themselves.77

The same applied to airborne forces. Better air-ground coordination and control of aircraft was an imperative requiring more robust cooperation from the Army Air Forces during the planning and execution of operations.

Operation AVALANCHE

The next assault came on the heels of the Sicily landings, with very little time for a wholesale assessment or the implementation of changes. Only a flew weeks after the Allies marched into Messina, the Americans landed on the beaches of Salerno in much the same fashion as they had in Operation Husky. The initial waves of Operation Avalanche were to be supported by armor and artillery while logistics support came over the shore. Even though Avalanche occurred shortly after Husky, the Allies had been able to garner some obvious lessons from the earlier landings.

Landing in the southern part of the Gulf of Salerno was the American VI Corps under Maj. Gen. Ernest J. Dawley. The initial waves consisted of Maj. Gen. Fred L. Walker's U.S. 36th Infantry Division, with a reserve that included General Middleton's 45th Infantry Division and General Ridgway's 82d Airborne. Naval support came from Admiral Hall's Task Force 81. Serving as the overall CATF was Admiral Hewitt with his CLF counterpart General Clark in his first combat command as head of Fifth Army.78

With D-day scheduled for 9 September and H-hour set for 0330, the invasion force consisted of some 600 ships departing from various locations in both North Africa and Sicily. Like the American commanders from previous assaults, General Walker refused pre-D-day fires to soften up enemy defenses. Admirals Hewitt and Hall argued against Walker's decision as naval planners had developed a list of 275 identified targets worthy of servicing ashore.79In studying reconnaissance photos, the 36th Infantry Division commander saw no hardened enemy positions and believed that any defenses quickly would be overrun with the planned armor wave. It was an unfortunate decision.

In a significant departure from Husky, tactical air covered the amphibious assault flying from British carriers or from land-based NWAAF aircraf.80Salerno fit under the range fan of NWAAF fighter cover, but P-38s and A-36s remained at their limit of endurance. As a result, loiter times in the AOA were restricted to about one hour.81Despite this, the combined aircover planned to span daylight hours from 0900 to 1950. Patrolling altitudes between 6,000 and 20,000 fleet, the NWAAF flew more than 9,000 sorties during the first nine days of the operation.82Despite the Allied aircover, the Luftwaffe still made a presence striking beach targets. In a thirty-six-hour period, Hewitt's flagship USS Ancon was attacked thirty times, with near misses occurring almost two dozen times.83

Adding to the joint nature of air-surface cooperation, the Ancon embarked the commander of XII Air Support Command, Maj. Gen. Edwin J. House, and his staff from the air support control center (ASCC), a precursor to the modern joint air operations center. Tried initially during the Husky landings, the ASCC included radar, radio, and command and control equipment and was intended to serve as the defensive fighter control unit during initial landings. This time, the shipboard organization's berthing spaces were much improved and equipped. With a more robust suite and better communications capability, the ASCC coordinated defensive air over the fleet while also supporting troops ashore. For close air support missions, ground formations notified their divisional headquarters, which passed requests to the shipboard ASCC. The ASCC then tasked inbound or patrolling aircraft within the AOA.84Oncall air support normally was serviced within five minutes, with such responsiveness playing a key role in thwarting German counterattacks.85In addition, the Army Air Forces also helped spot for naval guns. Before the landings, Navy personnel successfully trained XII Air Support Command aviators on spotting procedures and fire adjustments.86

In addition to these advances, air and ground commanders began having daily meetings to determine targets and missions for the next day. Operations saw an increase in the use of onshore air support parties equipped with jeep-mounted radios.87Forward air controllers also were employed to assist in close air support missions. Called "Rover Joe" by U.S. troops, the forward air controller team consisted of an experienced pilot and an Army ground officer, who flew above the front lines in light aircraft. Troops needing assistance radioed the Rover Joe, which then passed the request to the shipboard ASCC. Once a request was approved, the Rover Joe would guide the inbound aircraft in locating the target.88This was an important and successful advancement in combined arms coordination.

Unlike in previous assaults, a robust minefield disrupted Avalanche's StS movement. Many inbound landing vessels either turned away or failed to make it ashore, disrupting landing wave integrity. Without preparatory fires, the troops landing on the northern Red and Green beaches faced a tough fight once their landing craft ramps dropped. Slowly advancing ashore, they succeeded in establishing a beachhead 1 mile inland. However, beach-party support broke down again, and the beaches quickly became littered with equipment and supplies.89 Red beach especially was awash in boxes, materiel, and equipment. By late morning, Admiral Hall had contacted General Clark for additional personnel to help clear the beaches.90Chaos reigned. Navy beach masters could not attempt to reconcile the ships' manifests of high-priority equipment before 21 September.91

Although the organization of the beach remained a problem, the loss of landing craft was significantly less. The StS distances were longer, but surf conditions were conducive to surface movement. Despite the incoming enemy fire and the minefield, only eleven landing craft were abandoned. This was a far cry from what had occurred during the initial landings at Torch and at selected sites during Husky.92In-theater training in North Africa clearly had improved the proficiency of coxswains and naval personnel. Hewitt reported, "These crews are deserving of the greatest praise and credit."93The Navy was learning, too.

Progress was slow on the northern Red and Green beaches, and defenses on the two southern beaches, Yellow and Blue, precluded inland movement. Little progress was made in the southern approaches, but by the end of D-day, the 36th Infantry Division had established a toehold on the continent. In all, the division incurred only 500 casualties, 20 percent of which were fatalities, while pushing some 5 miles inland and attaining all of its objectives except for Blue beach.94Hold of Yellow beach remained tenuous as more troops and supplies came ashore on the northern approaches. Although beach-master and engineer support again were poor and slow to develop, by dusk, beach exits were being prepared, supply dumps had been organized, and communications networks had been established.95

Even though VI Corps made a successful landing and continued to expand the beachhead, the established Allied lodgment did not necessarily mean that the amphibious operation was over. By 11 September, the German defenders realized the Allied scheme of maneuver and began committing reserves to the objective area. Eventually, six German divisions entered the Salerno defense, and these formations counterattacked at several locations.96A German counterattack found a seam between the Allied forces north of the Sele River. One American division commander remarked years later, "The Germans could have broken through us and gone right down to the beach. Why they didn't I'll never know."97By 13 September, the American advance had been pushed back approximately 4 miles.98To plug the Sele gap, C-47s and C-53s carrying a regimental combat team of the 504th Parachute Infantry dropped troops into the AOA and avoided flying over the Allied fleet. Making their way along the Italian coast line, they averted a repeat of the Husky D plus 1 friendly fire incident.99Clark also gave specific direction prohibiting all antiaircraft artillery from firing after 2100, ordering barrage balloons to be taken down, and sending officers to the firing batteries to ensure the word was passed.100The insertion into the Sele River drop zone occurred with no aircraft losses.

The American response to the German counterattack also included A-36s and P-38s, which hit troop concentrations, vehicles, roads, and bridges. From 12 to 15 September, both strategic and tactical aircraft dropped more than 3,000 tons of bombs with an average bomb density of 760 tons per square mile.101Additionally, NSFS from 15-inch battleship guns and smaller-caliber fire provided by cruisers and large destroyers joined in.102NSFS was key in thwarting the Wehrmacht counterattack. The German 10th Army commander, General Heinrich von Vietinghof, stated, "With astonishing precision and freedom of maneuver, these ships shot at every recognized target with very overwhelming efect."103Quite obviously, the services had learned important lessons about joint fires and had applied them quickly without waiting for higher authority.

Operation SHINGLE

As summer 1943 turned to autumn, the Wehrmacht effectively used Italy's defensible terrain to its advantage. South of Rome, the Germans established a series of defensive lines that laterally spanned the Italian peninsula from the Adriatic to the Tyrrhenian Sea and anchored in the Central Apennines mountains. The "Gustav Line," established in the valleys and draws of this mountainous region, allowed very little room for Allied movement or maneuver. Any Allied advance was a bloody and expensive endeavor. However, Allied leadership reasoned that an amphibious assault on the Italian coast and a push to sever Wehrmacht supply lines near the Alban Hills might cause the Germans to reorient their Gustav Line defenses. This, in turn, might stimulate the Allied offensive.

Code-named Operation Shingle, this amphibious "left hook" held promise for Allied forces looking to end the existing stalemate. Analysis of German defenses and the surrounding hydrography showed the beaches by the coastal towns of Anzio and Nettuno might provide the best sites for an amphibious envelopment.104Anzio also fell within range of Allied protective aircover now based on Italian soil.105VI Corps' new commander, Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas, ordered the 3d Infantry Division to land on a stretch of beach south of Anzio near Nettuno. Additionally, three Ranger battalions were to seize Anzio's port with the United Kingdom's 1st Infantry Division landing further north. The assault was scheduled in concert with a large offensive push along the Gustav Line in hopes that the two Allied movements would link up near the Liri Valley.106

However, at this time, the cross-channel invasion of Normandy became the primary effort in the European Theater of Operations. As a result, personnel, materiel, and ships were allocated for the Normandy assault. Included in this allocation were the all-important LST vessels so key in providing bulk logistics ashore. In light of the larger strategic imperatives, Clark was informed that he would have only six LSTs available by D plus 2, but the number eventually grew to twenty-four. In this regard, the proverbial cart was ahead of the horse; the force structure for the Anzio landings was reflective of the amphibious lift available and not necessarily the force requirement to land, approach, and then seize the Alban Hills.107

An LST ofoads an M4 Sherman tank at Anzio during Operation Shingle. U.S. Army

Plans were finalized and approved by 8 January 1944, with D-day set for 22 January. Understanding the importance of air-ground cooperation, XII Air Support Command provided aircover for the operation and, as in previous operations, shaped the environment with pre-D-day attacks that hit rail and marshalling yards, road networks, bridges, and industrial targets. The newly established Mediterranean Allied Air Forces provided aircover over the landing beaches and the amphibious fleet and close air support for troops ashore. However, in a new development, engineers repaired an existing airstrip near Nettuno that was soon occupied by the Army Air Forces' 307th Fighter Squadron. This was a deliberate effort to get ground-based aircraft placed directly within the AOA.

The invasion fleet sortied from Naples on 21 January with the American component initially consisting of dozens of LSTs, 40 LCTs, and 250 DUKWs.108H-hour was set for 0200, and, at 0153, LCT(R)s (i.e., LCTs bearing rockets) fired in support of the 3d Infantry Division, which was clearing mines along the beachfront. The initial waves landed on time, and the only enemy troops the Allies encountered were slumbering or drunk Germans at the flew resident positions.109Enemy action was minimal as follow-on waves continued ashore until all LCTs had landed by 0643. Given the benign nature of the landings, Truscott moved his flag ashore as the morning sun rose.110

However, not all was quiet. At 0748, a request by a shore fire-control party had the destroyer USS Mayo hit several buildings.111 Shortly afterward, Luftwaffe aircraft broke through the Allied fighter cover. German attacks set fire to several vehicles; FW-190s hit pontoon causeways and landing craft and sunk an LCI. Enemy artillery fire eventually joined in from inland positions, but Truscott described the incoming fire as "slight and harassing."112Air attacks continued during the next flew days, and several surface vessels were knocked out of action. These losses were the highest price paid by the Allied fleet in the entire Mediterranean campaign.113

Casualties ashore were remarkably light. Thirteen VI Corps soldiers were killed, forty-four went missing, and only ninety-seven were wounded. Eventually, the 3d Infantry Division, the Rangers, and British forces all contacted each other, tied in their defensive fire plans, and established the Allied beachhead. By consolidating their gains and improving the beachhead through deliberate engineering efforts, they improved the small Anzio harbor to accommodate LSTs, LCTs, and LCIs simultaneously.114Engineers built beach exists and constructed roads, making Anzio's beaches capable of handling large, heavy vehicles.115In a change from earlier landings, the benign environment allowed the smooth accomplishment of shore-party functions and beachhead organization.

Having learned the importance of combat loading, Fifth Army also realized that such configurations reduced the amount of "cube" (volume of material) a given ship could carry. With smaller combat-loaded payloads and limited LST availability, Army planners came up with the idea of "mobile loading." In this method, trucks were loaded up to their full capacity at supply depots in Naples, driven aboard designated LSTs, and then debarked ashore to the VI Corps supply points. This made the most of the transportation assets available, facilitated quick offload, and expedited turnaround. Using 1,500 trucks, this procedure was not a one-time lift but a continuous process.116Daily, 300 empty trucks from Anzio would drive aboard the ships, transit down to Naples, reload with supplies, and reembark aboard the amphibious ships for a quick return. By 28 January, six LSTs moved daily from Naples to Anzio carrying preloaded vehicles with various classes of supplies. This efficient use of vehicles reduced debark time from one day to one hour.117The newfound use of mobile-loaded trucks was a determining factor in the expeditious offload of equipment.118The constant movement of trucks along what was called the "Anzio Highway" between the AOA and the port of Naples kept VI Corps well supplied.119In addition to the mobile-loaded LSTs, fifteen LCTs made weekly turns between Anzio and Naples along with the instream offload of anchored Liberty ships. According to one historian, "What made life possible at Anzio in the midst of death was the logistical lifeline that pumped a steady stream of supplies to the beach head."120

Facilitating better joint communication, the landing force employed a new radio, the backpack-sized SCR300. This radio provided reliable communications for divisional units.121It was a key link between forward observers and fire support assets. To support the air coordination, Army Air Forces personnel also introduced a host of radios, transmitters, and procedures to handle the communication requirements. The SCR299 radio was by far the most used high-frequency radio. This dependable, vehicle-mounted radio covered a wide range of frequencies. Combined with the SCR193 and other communications equipment, the SCR299 gave signal personnel ample coverage and frequencies to support coordination activities.

Slapton Sands was a key training location, serving as the "far shore" for various prelanding exercises for Operation Overlord. Naval History and Heritage Command

In addition to the preassault aerial bombardment, air-ground coordination became more robust and effective. Once ashore, U.S. Army Air Corps representatives met nightly with VI Corps planners to identify and determine future targets and sequencing.122They developed new methods of support, classifying targets as either prearranged or oncall. Requests for prearranged calls were initiated twenty-four hours in advance with liaison officers, who coordinated strikes between the air and ground domains. Eventually, a joint Army-Air Force targeting board sequenced, coordinated, and prioritized targets.123The nightly conference brought together various unit representatives to review the day's activities, request targets, and confer with the various air commands that were accepting requests based upon availability and capacity.

As VI Corps established a beachhead and had limited success advancing, the Germans organized a counterattack. On 16 February, the Wehrmacht initiated a 4-mile front assault that included motorized infantry, Panzer grenadiers, and other armored formations totaling some 120,000 troops. After an initial assault breached the beachhead defenses, an exploitation wave would follow and drive down toward Anzio and Nettuno.124By the end of the first day of the assault, the German offensive was blunted, but, on the seventeenth, the Germans renewed their offensive, and, for the next three days, intense combat ensued. Fortunately, VI Corps held the beachhead using combined arms integration, leveraging air, ground, and naval fires in a coordinated fashion.125

Although the Anzio landings failed to meet their initial mission objectives of seizing the Alban Hills, cutting German supply lines, and helping facilitate the 15th Army Group's assault, Operation Shingle illustrated how U.S. forces quickly were developing tactics, techniques, and procedures for a joint fight in a littoral environment. All three services were beginning to work together in a coordinated fashion toward a single objective. With liaison officers, joint boards, dedicated communication networks, and established processes and procedures, cooperation between the services enabled more effective and responsive expeditionary operations. Furthermore, the establishment of a beachhead and a robust and orderly logistics footprint ashore became a reality along with efficient StS movement. Such lessons would be applied to efforts both in Normandy and the French Riveira.

Troops practice assaulting the beach from landing craft at Slapton Sands. Naval History and Heritage Command

Lessons Applied to Operation OVERLORD

The events that occurred early in the morning of 6 June 1944 on the beaches of Normandy have been covered in numerous books, essays, and documentaries. No other amphibious assault in history was as large or complex or pitted against such lethal and well-prepared defensive positions. Taking lessons from the European and Mediterranean Theaters of Operations, the Supreme Allied Command undertook countless initiatives to ensure the six elements of an amphibious assault would be addressed sufficiently given enemy defenses. More than a year before, in January 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff initiated the detailed work of the cross-channel invasion. As discussion and coordination continued in late spring 1943, Allied representatives met at North Devon, United Kingdom, to attend the Conference on Landing Assaults. During this month-long meeting, Allied representatives addressed various issues and outlined preparation requirements. In the introductory address at the conference, the European Theater of Operations commander, Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, declared that there was one goal for the Overlord invasion: "crossing the English Channel with properly organized and properly trained assault teams, ready to seize, to hold, and maintain beachheads through which might land a major invasion force to advance against the enemy."126

This schematic shows the radio networks required to command and control U.S. forces during the Normandy invasion. U.S. Army Combined Arms Research Center Digital Archive

To ensure a common vernacular and staff functioning between the two militaries, in January 1943, the Army established the Quartermaster Course (referred to as the "Q School") at Norfolk House in London. This school trained a pool of U.S. and British officers in each country's doctrine, organization structures, planning processes, and staff procedures.127Although the two countries were allies, U.S. and British planning methods had fundamental differences. Such training was key in combined and joint endeavors because planning and execution needed to be based on common vernacular and staffing actions and standardized orders-generation processes.

As before, American forces required amphibious training areas and rehearsals. U.S. Army representatives coordinated with U.K. national and local governments to acquire civilian areas for military use.128Eventually, the Americans settled on a stretch of beach in North Devon near the towns of Woolacombe and Appledore. This site provided 8,000 yards of beach on the Bristol Channel and another 4,000 on the Taw Estuary. The location had tidal variations and shorelines similar to those in northern France and even included hedgerows that were comparable to the Normandy bocage. The Americans used the site not only as an exercise space but also as a doctrine and training center for U.S. forces. Another important training area lay within Lyme Bay on the English Channel. Named Slapton Sands, this new amphibious exercise area served as the "far shore" for pre-D-day exercises. Units would embark at various ports in the United Kingdom and then set sail for an "assault" at the location. With a 7-mile stretch of rough sand and a rock- and gravel-strewn shingle that was overlooked by cliffs, Slapton Sands' shoreline and topography were eerily similar to those in Normandy.129The site was key to several important preassault exercises.

StS movement and coxswain performance had improved appreciably from the first assaults in North Africa, and continued improvement remained a deliberate process. Additionally, assault vessels and landing craft skippers were better prepared by receiving a "monograph" packet that included weather, sea, and tidal information; enemy orders of battle; schematics of defensive positions, ports, and other facilities ashore; and hydrographic sketches for coxswains and navigators with charts depicting adjacent landing areas, bombardment, and gunfire plans.130Furthermore, the newly established Naval Scout Boat School trained landing craft crews on how to recognize coastline silhouettes and significant landmarks.131

Regarding beachhead establishment and logistics, engineer support brigades also trained at U.K. locations and practiced beach-party functions like setting up dumps, constructing beach exits, conducting salvage operations, and moving supply support inland.132 Navy beach battalions trained with the engineer support brigades, creating better joint interoperability. Army and Navy units at the regimental and division levels that had been assigned to the same beach assault trained to work together in preassault exercises.133

Using their experiences from the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, the Allies determined that the initial amphibious landings should occur in daylight. This change came because pre-H-hour NSFS and close air support, both of which were considered vital, required visual targeting. In previous assaults, amphibious planners had felt that because they did not have overwhelming strength in both air and sea, they should use the cover of darkness to create an element of surprise.134However, by the time of Operation Overlord, the material tide had shifted in favor of the Allies. With U.S. production in full swing, planners did not believe the element of surprise was of chief importance. Additionally, embarkation and other functions were easier in the daylight hours, which facilitated better StS movement.

Without the use of the mulberry port, several classes of ships unload supplies and equipment offshore, days after the initial landings at the Normandy beachhead. U.S. Army

Unlike previous operations, the assault used prelanding fires by battleships and cruisers placed between 6,000 and 12,000 yards from the beach, well out of range of enemy artillery fire.135As H-hour passed, the incoming tide allowed naval vessels to move closer to the beach. With this tidal variation, NSFS directly engaged enemy positions and provided additional firepower ashore. Such support was broken up into three phases. The first phase targeted counterbattery fire on German artillery and fixed positions. The second phase focused on defensive obstacles and positions. The third phase was largely oncall and tasked dynamically. As in previous operations, naval fire-control parties accompanied landing forces, thus providing an important link to the fleet while delivering valuable information on targets and their locations and assisting in adjustments.136

For NSFS, twenty-seven shore fire-control parties went ashore with nine assigned to each infantry division. Each team consisted of army and naval officers with twelve enlisted personnel. The team was equipped with SCR609 radios and landed in the early waves. Similarly, naval vessels providing fires had accompanying SCR608s providing reliable and flexible radio networks. In addition, a naval gunfire liaison officer was assigned to each artillery battalion's fire direction center to coordinate and direct the activities of the three shore-control parties in his sector. There was similar representation at the division artillery headquarters.137

At the 1943 landing conference, Air Force Brig. Gen. Robert C. Candee had stated, regarding air support and coordination, that a cross-channel invasion required "well trained and efficient air staff organization and air-army-navy teamwork [to] permit the whole operation [to be] controlled by the supreme tactical commander."138By 1944, this vision was coming to fruition. Eisenhower, as the supreme commander, had a joint and combined staff that planned the entire invasion. Unlike in Husky, for Overlord, airmen were an integral part of the planning process, helped shape the AOA, and created conditions for the surface assault.

Prelanding air support focused on what was called the "Transportation Plan." Its intent was to make the 100-mile radius around the assault beaches of northern France a "railroad desert."139Both the 8th and 9th Air Forces along with the Royal Air Force conducted pre-D-day bombing, dropping a total of 76,200 tons on railway centers, bridges, and open lines.140In the two weeks before the invasion, the 8th Air Force dropped 13,000 tons of bombs and damaged twenty-three rail centers so badly that fifteen needed no additional attack.141One German general recalled, "The main difficulties that arose for us at the time of the invasion were the systematic preparations by [the Allied] air force: smashing of the main lines of communication, particularly the railway junctions."142

With the wreckage of Mulberry A, U.S. forces rely upon a ferry-their previously established method of ship-to-shore movement-to get equipment ashore. Naval History and Heritage Command

This final plan for Operation Dragoon shows how the respective landing forces were geographically separated. U.S. Army Combined Arms Research Center Digital Archive

For D-day itself, the Army Air Forces already had established air superiority through a deliberate aerial attrition campaign that started earlier that year. Close air support and battlefield air interdiction missions sortied and were relatively unhindered by the Luftwaffe. Allied airpower support provided another example of better air-ground coordination during an amphibious assault that included robust aircover at sea and ashore. Once ashore, air support parties were resident at each regimental combat team, division, and corps headquarters. The parties would have vehicle-mounted very-high-frequency/high-frequency radios that could range the seaborne air cells and the Allied Expeditionary Air Force Advanced Headquarters Combined Control Center at Uxbridge.143Much like before, air operations centers were located on flagships to coordinate joint air operations during the assault.144

Supporting such an operation required a much more robust communications network. The invasion plans called for the use of more than 90,000 transmitters, all within the same AOA. Complicating the communication architecture was the increased use of radars and other sensors that could interfere with voice communications. To help address this problem, communications personnel reduced the number of kilocycles for ground-based units from five to four, which required the grinding down of radio crystals. In addition, Supreme Headquarters published twenty-one detailed sets of instructions, annexes, charts, and other documents to establish policies and share technical details necessary for managing the electromagnetic spectrum.145

Logistics support for the initial assault included preloaded packages of supplies and equipment for D-day through D plus 2. A joint Army and Navy shore and beach-party effort handled the organization of the initial supply movements ashore. This was a massive undertaking. Almost 130,000 troops and 17,000 vehicles came ashore during the first two days alone. The total plan included the movement of more than 1 million personnel and a quarter million vehicles.146Because of the Allies' experiences in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Overlord planners knew that having a large number of personnel and equipment and the use of ports and fixed facilities would be important to subsequent land operations. Initial plans for Overlord called for a minimum of 6,000 tons of supplies per day starting at D plus 4 and grew to 9,000 by D plus 10 and 12,000 by D plus 16.147

To address the growing requirement of supplies and equipment, and while waiting for the use of the Cherbourg port, the Allies developed artificial harbors in Normandy nicknamed "mulberries." In the American sector at Omaha Beach, Mulberry A began operations on 16 June. An accompanying structure was constructed at Gold Beach in the British sector at Arromanches-les-Bains.148These feats of engineering allowed a more expedient offload of equipment and supplies and were a marked improvement over the existing over-the-shore method. The pierheads accommodated the simultaneous berthing of cargo ships, and LST discharge times were reduced to just over an hour.149This new capability was impressive, but it was short-lived.

The mulberries were heavily damaged in a storm from 19 to 21 June. The American mulberry was a complete loss.150Desperately needing equipment and supplies, the Allies resumed offload operations on 23 June. Despite the loss of Mulberry A, offload tonnage at both Omaha and Utah Beaches surpassed its previous throughput performances. During the last week of June, troops at Omaha processed 115 percent of the beach's planned tonnage capacity using conventional over-the-shore methodologies. Utah processed 124 percent.151The planned movement of 17,500 long tons over both beaches on D plus 24 was surpassed by the actual movement of more than 20,500 long tons. However, from D plus 1 to D plus 24, cumulative tonnage moved ashore was only at 80 percent of the planned figure, while vehicle movement was at 64.5 percent, and troop buildup was at 78 percent.152Although short of the envisioned plan, such numbers were still indicative of how efficient and capable American expeditionary logistics had become and proved sufficient to meet the combat need.

Operation DRAGOON

Before Overlord, Eisenhower executed a second amphibious assault of France coinciding with the Normandy invasion.153Originally code-named Anvil and then changed to Dragoon, the operation had Allied forces landing near Marseille or Toulon and driving north to meet with the U.S. First Army and the British Second Army.154The plan provided Allied troops access to the port city of Marseille, a logistical hub connected to transportation networks, that was 100 miles closer to Germany than Cherbourg.155Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch, as the Seventh Army commander, oversaw the rudimentary planning for three U.S. divisions and several French formations.156The southern France invasion was approved on 2 July 1944 with the Combined Chiefs of Staff ordering its execution on 15 August.157

Patch's task was to establish a beachhead, capture the ports of Toulon and Marseille, and then head north and eventually join with the army groups from Normandy.158The beaches east of the Hyeres Islands from Cap Negre to Cannes provided the best option for an assault. The coastlines were relatively flat and conducive for amphibious operations, with sufficient exit points for movement inland to Toulon, Marseille, and the Rhone River Valley. However, the shoreline prevented assault divisions from landing abreast. As a result, U.S. task forces would end up isolated from the others, violating the principle of mass.159

Army and Navy beach- and shore-party personnel work together to direct ships coming ashore. U.S. Army Combined Arms Research Center Digital Archive

Admiral Hewitt again served as naval commander, this time for the Western Task Force, supporting the planned operation that included a three-pronged surface attack by VI Corps. With General Truscott now commanding, VI Corps had three assault divisions designated the Kodak Force.160 On Kodak's left flank was the Alpha Task Force with the 3d Infantry Division, now under the command of Maj. Gen. John W. O'Daniel, supported by R. Adm. Bertram J. Rogers's Task Force 84.161 A second set of landings with the 45th Infantry Division, code-named Delta, were in the Kodak Force's center. Landing east of the 3d Infantry Division, near the Saint-Tropez-Bougnon area, were Maj. Gen. William W. Eagles, now commanding the 45th Infantry Division, and his naval counterpart R. Adm. Frank J. Lowry and Task Force 85. Finally, on the American right was Camel, comprising the 36th Infantry Division, now under the command of Maj. Gen. John E. Dahlquist. Supporting the 36th was a flotilla under R. Adm. Spencer S. Lewis with Task Force 87.162

The daylight of the 0800 H-hour made embarkation and StS navigation easier. Pre-D-day fires purposely were limited, but daylight landings allowed for the more efficient use of NSFS. Because first light occurred at 0610, pre-H-hour fires had sufficient time to sight and hit designated targets.163After H-hour, designated targets shifted to calls for fire, targets of opportunity, and active enemy batteries. Air support came from the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, which, under the command of Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, conducted operations for weeks before the landings. However, Hewitt was concerned about tipping the VI Corps' hand regarding the locations of the assault beaches. Given this concern, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces agreed to expand the aerial attacks in both time and location to mask the Seventh Army's intentions. They hit targets all the way from the Po Valley to Genoa and the Marseille-Toulon area.164

During the landings, much like in previous operations, the ASCC exercised sea-based coordination of the invasion's aerial effort. Offensive fighter-bomber support was controlled again from Hewitt's flagship, the USS Catoctin. With both naval and ground-based aviation representation, the ASCC controlled both carrier- and land-based aircraft. In the ASCC, both Navy and Army Air Forces personnel made direct contact with all inbound and outbound fighters. The naval air component was robust; nine U.S. and British escort carriers provided more than 200 fighters, who worked under the XII Tactical Air Command and flew up to 300 sorties per day.165

As a testament to the development of joint interoperability, Dragoon's naval and land forces were commanded by equal yet independent flag officers who worked toward a unified objective. Because there was no Corps-level entity established with Hewitt's command, each division commander (acting as the CLF) was responsible to the corresponding naval task force commander (serving as the CATF). Furthermore, Hewitt divided the NSFS vessels among the assault divisions in direct support of the respective CLFs.166Although this created a fractured arrangement-each landing force was its own entity-both services understood that Army troops would revert to Truscott's command once he moved his flag ashore. Command authority and transfer can indeed be a tricky and delicate matter, but the Dragoon arrangement was possible because the services had developed close, familiar relationships.167

As they had for Overlord, Army shore and Navy beach parties trained together before the Dragoon assault. In early March, Seventh Army established a beach control board with joint representation establishing standard operating procedures for debarkation and unloading. To execute these responsibilities, engineer support brigades and Navy beach battalions worked side-by-side on each assault division's beach. Because these organizations had conducted preassault training jointly and in the same manner assigned for the operation, the joint Army-Navy teams had established familiarity between the commands and understood how each component operated. Weather for D-day was clear and calm with only a slight breeze. Most landings arrived only minutes apart.168The first waves encountered very little resistance, although mines caused damage to some amphibious tanks and landing craft.169Once ashore, troops found that the beach defenses had been abandoned or destroyed, and enemy action was limited. By the end of D-day, all combat elements of VI Corps had landed and were moving inland. The following day, on 16 August, General Patch transferred his VI Corps flag ashore. Dragoon achieved much more than expected, and U.S. losses were amazingly low, with only 95 killed and 385 wounded.170

According to the Seventh Army's after action report, "the assault phase [of] the operation had gone according to plan, but in many ways, it had exceeded even the most optimistic expectations."171The quickness of the assault led naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison to compare it to the assault on the island of Tinian in the Pacific by writing, "If Tinian in the Pacific was the 'perfect amphibious assault' on a small scale, Dragoon was the nearly faultless one on a large scale."172This last major seaborne amphibious operation in the European Theater of Operations was a marked improvement from what preceded it just a flew years earlier.

Conclusion

The U.S. military learned much since Torch and indeed mastered the art and science of amphibious assault. Working as a joint force, the Army, Navy, and Army Air Forces came together and developed procedures, practices, and materiel solutions while showing themselves to be learning organizations. Addressing the six functions of amphibious assault, the Allies innovated in ways never imagined and constantly reassessed their individual and collective performances. Even more astonishing, these functions were largely ignored as late as 1941. Many units in the Mediterranean and European Theaters of Operations had to start from scratch.

Command, control, and coordination between air, surface, and naval components grew appreciably during the African and European campaigns. This, in turn, led the services to develop mutual trust and an accompanying focus on joint objectives. These efforts yielded effective command interactions and a clear understanding of the CATF and CLF relationship. The creation of littoral craft such as the LST, LCT, and DUKW was key in improving StS movement. However, the application of these materiel solutions was only as effective as the methodologies used to employ them. Development of landing plans, appreciation of embarkation and debarkation methods, establishment of coxswain and crew training programs, and scheduling of realistic training exercises were essential to moving personnel and materiel to the objective beaches more efficiently. NSFS proved its utility in all operations in the European Theater. Although the Army had been wary of naval fires, the landing forces owed much to the destroyers, cruisers, and battleships at places like Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio. The big guns failed to reduce most of the German defenses at Normandy, but the smaller destroyers provided critical direct support to troops scaling the high ground of Omaha Beach. Similarly, the integrated use of aviation in the AOA provided effective support to the fleet offshore and the troops on the ground and also augmented NSFS in both defensive and offensive roles. Joint fires from both air and surface assets often overwhelmed Axis formations, keeping Allied troops from being pushed back into the sea.

The services gradually learned how to generate combat power ashore through the development of beachheads. Although they were slow to develop beach-party functions fully and to organize supplies and equipment that arrived in the initial waves, the services began working together to create familiar relationships with specific units and functions. Such relationships also fostered better logistics support for subsequent operations ashore. Providing the necessary supplies and equipment while expanding the beachhead was a key enabler in power projection. Finally, command, control, and coordination of all functions and actions within the AOA were tied together by a robust communications network. Management of the electromagnetic spectrum, assignment of frequencies, and the provision of radio networks for all three domains were imperative for all littoral operations.

In only three years, the Americans went from the poorly coordinated landings of Operation Torch and dismal performances against Vichy forces to the successful execution of fully coordinated landings of larger forces against a more robust enemy with prepared defenses. Doctrinal, organizational, and training adjustments combined with new equipment saw the liberation of two continents from Nazi occupation. Given the scale and scope of these operations, only the United States could have developed such a lethal and effective capability-one that no nation in the world could match.

Notes