Warfare and Logistics along the US-Canadian border during the war of 1812

By Christopher Dishman and Review by Al Dickenson

Article published on: June 20, 2025 in the Summer 2025 Edition of Army History

Read Time: < 4 mins

University Press of Kansas, 2021 Pp. xvii, 334. $39.95

In his book Warfare and Logistics along the US-Canadian Border during the War of 1812, Christopher Dishman provides readers with an engaging and informative account of a little-studied aspect of military history, especially among amateur historians: logistics. Dishman’s basic argument, which he more than adequately proves, is that wars are won not solely through tactics or numbers, but also through operations. In what is, perhaps, the most detailed history of the logistical operation of the War of 1812, Dishman considers all the belligerents, comparing and contrasting their logistical operations and taking into account other considerations.

The War of 1812 is often ignored or glossed over in history books, and, therefore, the importance of the naval superiority required to win the war has been lost to many. The Great Lakes region was the primary staging ground of the war and an area both sides needed to control, especially the British. Using many previously unused sources from the Canadians of the era, Dishman tells the story of the British struggle to hold the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River regions of Canada.

From the primary British bases of Montreal and Halifax, the commanding officers of the British army, including Governor General of Canada George Prevost, had an incredibly difficult time supplying the farther-flung outposts of British military power. Some forts, such as Detroit, Malden, and Michilimackinac, were more than 1,500 miles away. Traveling there required costly, dangerous, and long overland expeditions through the untamed and little-explored Canadian wilderness or a journey focused on the waterways, particularly rivers, that would have hampered the supply quantity. Neither method greatly benefited the British military, and both would take a heavy toll on their already stretched-thin military.

In contrast, Dishman considers the Americans’ comparatively easy time regarding logistics. Major American military bases—such as Cleveland, Ohio; Buffalo and Albany, New York; and Baltimore, Maryland—obtained resources from relatively close suppliers. The Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, area provided a great amount of iron and timber. At the same time, the southern states offered commercial crops, and the Midwest and upstate New York areas provided the bulk of agricultural resources. None of these products had to travel more than a few hundred miles to reach their destination. Whereas the Canadian frontier was widely considered to be untamed, the waterways and overland routes in the United States were much better mapped and cleared for transportation. This gave the Americans a considerable edge over the British in the area of logistical support.

What the Americans made up for in logistics, they squandered in execution. Dishman makes a compelling argument that the Americans remained relatively undisciplined in their war efforts and focused too heavily on interpersonal squabbles, rather than on efforts to win the war and potentially expand America’s territory. During the winter of 1813–1814, the Americans made several pushes north into Canada with varying levels of success. Although some level of defeat is to be expected, Dishman argues that, had communication and interpersonal relationships been strengthened between American commanders (Maj. Gen. James Wilkinson, Michigan Governor William Hull, Maj. Gen. William Henry Harrison, and others), a greater victory over the British, Canadian, and Indian forces could have been possible.

Dishman provides a fair account of the war efforts on both sides. For instance, Prevost is frequently regarded as an incompetent commander, incapable of delivering a successful blow to the American forces. Though it is true that his attempted strikes at Plattsburgh, Lake Champlain, and along the Hudson River going into New York all ended in abject failure for the British, Dishman also illustrates the admirable way in which Prevost still (largely) kept Canada safe from American attack. Given the limited materials and extensive territory to consider, few commanders would have done much better than Prevost.

Likewise, Dishman discusses the sword dangling over Prevost’s head: the potential but completely uncertain arrival of the Duke of Wellington. By 1814, with the Napoleonic Wars in France all but ended, the well-regarded British military commander toyed with the idea of sailing to the New World to aid his British-Canadian brothers-in-arms. However, he considered the voyage contingent on Prevost fully securing the Great Lakes region, which was not an easy feat. Dishman does not specifically make this argument, but he implies that Prevost felt this pressure and, as such, perhaps overextended himself in a region already hard-pressed with limited supplies and soldiers.

Christopher Dishman’s Warfare and Logistics along the US-Canadian Border during the War of 1812 is a fantastic look into the often-forgotten conflict. The narrative is engaging, the illustrations helpful, and the sourcing impeccable. The few typographical errors and inconsistencies are minor mistakes that hardly detract from the book. Though Dishman is not an academic, his professional experience with the Department of Homeland Security obviously lends itself to the book’s multiple considerations and perspectives. This work would fit aptly on the shelf of any avid or casual American history reader.