Resilience Through Redundancy

Closing the Company-Level Communications Gap

By MAJ Jonathan Steel

July 24, 2026 | Army Communicator, Summer 2026 Edition

Read Time: < 8 mins

The enduring Signaleer builds resilient networks not by preventing failure, but by ensuring the formation can fight through it. During Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation 26-06, the 3rd Mobile Brigade (MB), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), faced simulated adversary cyber and electronic warfare attacks – dubbed "Operation Space Jam – that disabled commercial satellite communications (COMSATCOM).

Although the brigade maintained command and control (C2)through transport diversity and active network management, demonstrating that resilience is achievable when redundant systems exist, the exercise exposed critical gaps: limited military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) below brigade, and complete absence of robust beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) high-bandwidth connectivity at the company level.

This article examines how 3rd MB responded to contested conditions, identifies organizational vulnerabilities, and proposes solutions centered on proliferated low Earth orbit (pLEO) satellite terminals for companies and stratospheric aerial retransmission.

Testing Resilience Under Fire

The 3rd MB employed organic On-the-Move Network Nodes (ONN) and four Division Network Node (DNN) At-the-Quick-Halt (ATQH) systems from the division signal battalion, all equipped with the Seeker (SKR) software suite. SKR's multi-transport input and automated load balancing supported up to four simultaneous internet transports, enabling the brigade to sustain C2 during repeated cyber and electromagnetic interference events.

During three separate "Operation Space Jam" attacks, Starshield – the primary COMSATCOM transport – was forced offline, shifting traffic to Long-Term Evolution (LTE)-based Mobile Broadband Kits (MBK). In the first two events, the Brigade Forward Command Post used the DNN Tampa MILSATCOM dish. The node aligned to the Main Command Post (MCP) was decentralized to support the new Alternate Logistics Operations Center (ALOC) co-located with the Brigade Support Area, leaving the MCP without MILSATCOM support.

In the third event, the MCP operated with the rotation's most robust communication architecture, trunking the ONN Colorless (XLESS) Core to the DNN via the ATQH organic MILSAT transport without significant reconfigurations on the nodes while maintaining services at reduced bandwidth.

SKR's telemetry system enabled rapid detection and ensured service continuity across C2 nodes. The brigade completed its fastest Joint Spectrum Interference Report (JSIR) battle drill in 33 minutes; 22 minutes faster than the previous JRTC record. Bandwidth virtualization and active load balancing increased resilience against jamming and transport denial, distributing traffic and sustaining essential C2 under degraded conditions.

The Limits of Borrowed Resilience

Despite operational success, two structural risks constrain endurance under contested conditions.

First, the brigade lacks organic MILSATCOM capacity, relying instead on the division signal battalion's Tampa dishes, typically limited to two brigade nodes habitually aligned. This creates single points of failure and leaves battalions and companies without redundant MILSATCOM paths. Second, ONN and ATQH C2 nodes depend on SKR licenses that are lost during server failures, rendering nodes inoperable and imposing reconstitution lead times exceeding 48 hours.

These risks are magnified by contemporary adversaries who blend presence-based intrusions with event-triggered effects targeting C2 and logistics networks. The brigade's outcomes demonstrate progress toward an integrated defensive posture, but structural gaps remain. While the formation can fight through transport denial with graceful degradation – preserving priority C2 functions and sustaining decision-making tempo – limited MILSATCOM allocation below brigade and dependence on SKR licenses pose real concerns. Localized jamming or server faults could lead to operational pauses if multiple nodes are contested for prolonged periods.

Where Resilience Ends

While brigade and battalion echelons demonstrated resilience through redundant transport layers, companies remained tethered to detectable, jammable systems. Modern maneuver companies operate under unprecedented information requirements, maintaining near-real-time common operational pictures (COP) through Android Tactical Assault Kit (ATAK), Battle Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3), and Logistics Tactical Assault Kit (LOGTAK) – all requiring continuous high-bandwidth connectivity.

Current company-level BLOS communications rely on four primary systems: LTE-based MBKs, Mounted Mission Command (MMC), Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), and High Frequency (HF) radio. Of these, only MBK provides sufficient bandwidth to support COP applications. Tactical Scalable Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (TSMANETs) excel for internal position location information and voice communications but cannot meet data-intensive application throughput requirements. This creates a critical vulnerability: LTE is inherently susceptible to threat interference and potentially exposes its’ users.

During Operation Space Jam attacks, brigade and battalion CPs maintained operations through redundant MILSATCOM and COMSATCOM paths, but companies lacked equivalent resilience. When commercial and LTE transports are contested, companies lose all high-bandwidth connectivity. This asymmetry creates operational risk: companies cannot maintain the COP, pass targeting data at tempo, or synchronize logistics when dispersed in contested electromagnetic environments.

Path Forward

Small pLEO terminals at the company level provide resilient, mobile, independent communication solutions critical to maintaining C2 in distributed operations. They resist jamming through frequency hopping and beam steering, deploy rapidly, and integrate with existing networks. Critically, they provide the bandwidth needed to sustain COP applications while maintaining low electromagnetic signatures and offering low probability of intercept/low probability of detection (LPI/LPD) characteristics.

Aerial Retransmission Reimagined

Beyond transport diversity at the company level, the 3rd MB tested high-altitude balloons for aerial retransmission during JRTC 26-06. In previous 101st Airborne Division JRTC rotations, long-endurance unmanned aerial platforms provided up to four hours of coverage but were grounded more often than air-borne due to weather or contested airspace. To address these limitations, 3rd MB tested high-altitude balloons briefed to provide 24 to 72 hours of coverage above 60,000 feet, well above weather and Class A airspace.

Over eight flights totaling 26 hours – five TSM relay flights and three SILVUS flights – provided approximately 12 hours of aerial extension over the training area. The highest altitude reached during this rotation was over 75,000 feet during the second night of flight. Through this, the brigade established a link from the Brigade Forward Command Post in Fullerton box to reach back to the Logistics Support Battalion in Alexandria, Louisiana. The tests yielded mixed results. SILVUS data backhaul tests failed mainly due to improper antennas and possibly insufficient power. Expected long-duration coverage lasted only 90-minute windows, likely due to stratospheric winds and differences between flown and advertised heights.

Analysis of JRTC 26-06 operations indicates aerial retransmission offers significant potential for network extension in contested environments. A maneuverable, long-range drone operating in the stratosphere could mitigate challenges posed by weather and contested airspace. For the enduring Signaleer, operationalizing the stratospheric layer represents an opportunity to extend resilient communications beyond terrestrial and orbital system constraints. A maneuverable, long-endurance stratospheric platform equipped with TSM retransmission and high-bandwidth data backhaul could provide persistent aerial extension for dispersed companies in contested environments – bridging the gap between line-of-sight tactical networks and BLOS satellite transport.

Priority Actions for the Enduring Signaleer

To build resilience from the company up, the Army must address three priority actions:

1. Field organic MILSATCOM redundancy at echelons below brigade. Provide at least one additional MILSATCOM-capable path to Main and Forward Command Posts and evaluate redundancy for battalion nodes. This reduces single points of failure and ensures graceful degradation during transport denial events.

2. Distribute LPI/LPD high-bandwidth BLOS transport to the company level. Acquire small pLEO terminals – one per maneuver company and two for forward resuscitation and critical care – through the United States Space Force Commercial Satellite Communications Office (USSF CSCO) contracting pathways. Integration must enforce physical and logical separation from NIPRNet and SIPRNet while enabling multi-transport load balancing at battalion and brigade levels.

3. Operationalize the stratospheric layer for aerial retransmission. Invest in maneuverable, long-endurance stratospheric platforms capable of hosting TSM retransmission and high-bandwidth data back-haul. These platforms mitigate weather and airspace limitations while providing persistent aerial extension for dispersed formations.

Additionally, establish a SKR license continuity-of-operations plan: pre-approved spare licenses, offline license escrow, hot-standby license servers, and scripted re-licensing drills to avoid long reconstitution times after server or node losses.

Conclusion

Resilience is not an abstraction. It is the practical ability to keep essential C2 moving when the spectrum turns hostile. JRTC 26-06 demonstrated that with transport diversity, active management, and MILSAT-COM at key nodes, formations can fight through denial while maintaining tempo. The brigade's 33-minute Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution cycle time and sustained operations during three separate jamming events prove resilience is achievable but only where redundancy exists. To make that resilience enduring where it matters most – at the company – the Army must close the BLOS bandwidth gap with LPI/ LPD, high-bandwidth solutions tailored for maneuver. Companies face the same contested electromagnetic environment, the same adversary electronic warfare capabilities, and the same mission-essential bandwidth requirements as the brigade and battalion – but lack the transport diversity to fight through denial. Distributing small pLEO terminals to companies and operationalizing the stratospheric layer for aerial retransmission ensures that resilience built at brigade and battalion echelons extends to the formations that close with and destroy the enemy.

The enduring Signaleer ensures that no formation – regardless of echelon – fights blind, isolated, or unable to share information that enables lethality and survivability. Building resilient networks from the company up is not simply an upgrade; it is a critical investment to maintain C2 in the face of evolving battlefield realities.