Signal Officer Planning for CPs during LSCO

By LTC Joe Kaminski, 3rd Infantry Division

Article published on: in the Summer 2025 edition of Army Communicator

Read Time: < 7 mins

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has confirmed the vulnerability of traditional command post (CP) structures that were designed for low-threat, counter insurgency environments. Static, easily detectable CPs, both visually and in the electromagnetic spectrum, are highly susceptible to modern intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and long-range precision fires against near-peer competitors.

This article identifies signal officers’ responsibilities and roles within Mission Command, the planning considerations through both science and art, to support CP emplacement, and proposes a practical framework for enhancing CP survivability in large-scale combat operations (LSCO). These lessons were learned by the 3rd Infantry Division (ID) G6 from a recent deployment.

The 3rd ID has reimagined the role of the signal officer when planning for CPs during LSCO. For decades, U.S. military operations, primarily focused on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in the Global War on Terror, relied on stationary CPs operating within a force array of a wide area security construct. Signal officers focused on “making their systems work” and were less concerned about command and control (C2) CP nodes maneuvering on the battlefield in a combined arms maneuver environment. However, the emergence of near-peer adversaries with advanced ISR, loitering munitions, and long-range strike capabilities within a more defined forward line of troops necessitates a fundamental shift in how the Army structures, deploys, and secures its C2 nodes and the requirement to maneuver CPs on the battlefield to enable survivability.

The Problem

Armored formation CPs, often large and immobile, present lucrative targets for adversaries seeking to disrupt or destroy C2 capabilities. Within 3rd ID, our threat environment dictated if we were going to consolidate CPs to increase C2 effectiveness or if we were to distribute CPs that would lead to less C2 effectiveness but increase survivability. We found that consolidated capabilities of both our Joint Air-Ground Integration Center and ISR processing, exploitation, and dissemination strike cells helped in shaping the deep area while brigade CPs were forced to be more distributed and mobile in the close fight.

CP vulnerability stems from several factors:

  • Signature. Adversaries can exploit large physical CP footprints, electromagnetic emissions, and predictable patterns of life. This makes traditional CPs easily detectable by sophisticated ISR systems.
  • Lack of mobility. Stationary CPs are inherently vulnerable to targeting by adversaries once located, especially by long-range artillery and missile systems.
  • Dependence on vulnerable infrastructure. CP reliance on host nation fixed infrastructure, such as power grids and communication networks, creates critical dependencies that adversaries can exploit through both kinetic and non-kinetic means.

CP Emplacement

The 3rd ID identified a gap in understanding for signal officers’ role in support of Mission Command and planning within the division during a LSCO fight. The 3rd ID developed and utilized a well-defined framework for CP emplacement and survivability that involved synchronization between the G6/S6, the division higher headquarters battalion (HHBN), and the G3/S3 current operations (CHOPS).

3rd ID signal officers are responsible for planning CP emplacement within the division; we accomplished this by identifying where signal assets needed to be placed, within time and space, on the battlefield while tailoring the communications package, a la carte style, based on mission requirements. Our signal officers coordinated this effort through the unit’s operational synchronization matrix with both the G5 planners to align the CPs with the operational plan and with the G2 planners to identify the enemy’s kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities during the fight.

Finally, our signal planners planned with the Cyber Electromagnetic Activities section and G39 to plan electronic warfare (EW) masking and deception operations to increase survivability. This plan was nested with all warfighting functions through the commander’s visualization, Targeting Working Group, and then it was approved through the Targeting Decision Board.

After approval for the movement of the CP, the division HHBN was responsible for the movement of the CPs from “point-A to point-B” within the plan that the G6 provided. HHBN controlled and planned the movement chalks of each section, setup checkpoints, and provided C2 for overall movement. When the CP or communications node was ready to displace, the G3 CHOPS owned the Mission Command transition between nodes to control the fight. Each warfighting section had well defined Go/No Go criteria to help inform the commander on the capabilities of the Mission Command node’s transition between CPs.

The Science

To enhance CP survivability in LSCO, the 3rd ID G6 adopted a more agile, distributed, resilient approach to employment by developing a CP survivability posture framework. This framework is categorized into four separate threat levels and provides guidelines for tailoring CP configuration, manning, and communication capabilities:

  • Permissive threat. CPs can operate under canvas, both static and consolidated, with minimal risk. The CPs communication systems support traditional military systems that are non-mobile and have high-power draw; this enables consolidation of highly technical equipment and personnel to run these systems.
  • Low threat. CPs remain static and consolidated but employ camouflage, concealment, and counter-fire measures to mitigate enemy harassing fires. The CP is outside of enemy’s ISR close strike range and outside of the enemy’s ability to mass fires but is within enemy’s harassing fires capability; the CP possesses counter-mortar, rocket, or artillery systems to facilitate protection. Communication systems can support at-the-halt (ATH), Upper Tactical Internet (TI) and nodal communication systems.
  • Medium threat. CPs either disperse into smaller, mobile nodes while in the open or consolidate within hardened structures while utilizing Commercial-off-the Shelf communications for low-signature operations. The CP is within the enemy’s ISR strike and artillery range while the CP possesses counter-mortar, rocket, or artillery systems to facilitate protection. During this time, a commander has options to either disperse CP nodes or to consolidate the CP into a harden building or subterranean location. For dispersed CPs, network transport like proliferated low Earth orbit (pLEO), small basebands, and virtualized servers support on-the-move communications. For consolidated CPs, commercial communication systems that operate KU band, 4G LTE, or 5G network transport support integration into a software defined Wide Area Network construct provide signal dispersion through obfuscation.
  • High threat. CPs are within enemy ISR strike and artillery range and operate in a highly dispersed and mobile manner, relying on robust, low-probability-of-intercept (LPI) communications, such as mesh networks and LPI radios, to support C2. Maneuver is critical in keeping nodes and platforms alive.

The Art of CP Disguising

In 3rd ID, we are rethinking how signal officers plan CP emplacement during LSCO. They need to operationalize the electromagnetic spectrum by utilizing frequency as a weapons system. We identify enemy EW capabilities during reverse-intelligence preparation of the battlefield and through signal intelligence signal surveys to understand the signal noise floor to then determine if a CP needs to hide within the electromagnetic spectrum, blend into the electromagnetic spectrum, or saturate the electromagnetic spectrum. This is not a binary choice, rather a commander can switch between these approaches throughout the battle.

  • Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations: 3rd ID worked with techniques to "hide, blend, or saturate" within the electromagnetic spectrum to evade enemy detection and targeting of CPs.
    • Hide: CPs use the periscope method to go “dark” within the electromagnetic spectrum until they need to push/pull data. Units can then “periscope down” by turning off emitters and then conducting a CP survivability jump. This approach needs to be well-rehearsed through well-defined tactics, techniques, and procedures and identification of changing reporting times.
    • Blend: CPs utilize the environmental electromagnetic noise to blend into their surroundings. This works well in an urban environment where a unit can mimic the civilian radio frequency noise that is present in the electromagnetic spectrum. Units can utilize host nation local infrastructure to operate out of and utilize host nation network transport for C2. Divisions can utilize this approach through systems that support fiber, 4G LTE, 5G, and KU-band pLEO commercial satellite systems.
    • Saturate: CPs use EW decoys that mimic a CP’s electromagnetic signature to saturate a large area to confuse the enemy in their targeting. This approach works well outside of urban areas where the enemy would easily detect emitters. The 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd ID, utilized EW saturation with a deception CP during their rotation to the National Training Center in 2024. This unit utilized legacy Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) systems, in conjunction with additional EW decoys, to confuse the opposing force’s targeting cycle.

Adapting for Future Warfare

The days of static, heavily defended CPs are over. Rightfully so, the Army has recognized the changing environment and transitioned our combined training centers to a full-on Decisive Action Training Environment rotation with an emphasis on mobility. Contrarily, the days of signal officers sole focus being on “just making comms work” need to morph into understanding and planning the maneuver requirements for nodal and Mission Command CPs within LSCO. Modern warfare demands a paradigm shift towards agile, distributed, and resilient C2 and leadership.

By embracing the lessons learned from Ukraine, implementing an adaptable framework like the 3rd ID model, and investing in key enabling technologies, the Signal Corps can ensure that the Army’s CPs remain survivable and effective in the face of evolving threats.