Immediate-Response Force

Responding to a Chemical Attack in a LSCO Fight

By CPT Alex T. Roan

Article published on: March 1, 2023 in the 2023 edition of the Army Chemical Review

Read Time: < 11 mins

Although nuclear weapons remain the most destructive weapons in the world, chemical weapons top the list of the most taboo and fear-inducing weapons of modern warfare. The use of chemical weapons violates multiple international treaties.1 2 3 As such, the slightest possibility of a chemical attack draws worldwide distress. In response to this threat, President Joseph R. Biden attempted to make the U.S. stance against chemical weapons known by “drawing a red line” and explicitly stating that the United States would directly respond to any Russian use of chemical weapons against Ukraine.4 If Russia decides to leverage chemical weapons, it will fall to the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) Soldiers and commanders of Task Force 82 (TF82), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to accurately assess and plan a ground response.

As a TF82 company commander, responding to this possible chemical threat is the primary mission. The CBRN Reconnaissance Platoon, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 307th Engineer Battalion, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, which is under my command, allows our brigade to detect, assess, and confirm the presence of chemical weapons. This article highlights potential shortfalls in our tactical organizational design and in the equipment that our unit carries when responding to a chemical attack on a modern urban target within a large-scale combat operations (LSCO) setting. To understand this article, it is essential to understand what constitutes a current urban target, why a LSCO setting matters, and what capabilities are available. This article establishes tactics for emerging chemical attacks, describes our ability to respond with special equipment and techniques, and explains the deficits between theory and capability. This analysis assesses our capability to effectively respond to emerging scenarios and drive organizational change.

Assessing a Threat

Henry Kissinger aptly stated, “The more powerful the weapons . . . the greater the reluctance to use them.”5While this sentiment generally holds true for nuclear weapons, it does not necessarily prove true for chemical weapons. Although the most prolific use of chemical weapons occurred during World War I, such weapons continue to plague the battlefield. However, the implementation of chemical weapons has become more sporadic; the tactics for employing these weapons have also evolved.

A Polish CBRNE unit demonstrates the capabilities of an armored reconnaissance vehicle.

For the purposes of this article, overt chemical munition attacks by state level militaries are excluded from discussion. Such attacks would escalate far beyond company missions, and responses would likely be kinetic. Instead, this article examines a more likely, and potentially more damaging, scenario involving a subversive enemy employing chemical weapons to delegitimize the U.S. military.

I define a modern urban battlefield as city infrastructure capable of sustaining large populations and providing first-world commodities. This setting contributes to the complexity of chemical weapon employment due to the inevitability of the daily lives of a large number of civilians being suddenly interrupted by warfare. The establishment of this setting under the banner of a LSCO fight results in a posture that includes many government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, humanitarian aid, and modern Army equipment on both sides of the conflict.

The type of attack that I am most concerned about is one that would target civilians and military forces alike. An attack of this type would almost certainly aim to degrade the perception that the military was able to provide refuge to those fleeing the conflict. In the most sinister of scenarios, this might even appear to be the military’s fault. These types of scenarios have occurred and have created a precedent for future implementation.

For example, during the Moscow Theatre hostage crisis in 2002, Chechen rebels stormed a theatre, taking more than 100 hostages; the Russians responded by pumping a gas mixture containing a lethal substance into the theater to incapacitate the hostage-takers, resulting in the deaths of more than 120 people.6Russia’s deployment of a lethal substance against the Chechen rebels proves that certain substances can immediately incapacitate crowds. Encountering a weapon like this at a refugee center or a border crossing location under the guise of riot control could create a massive problem for our forces. Additionally, Russia could use a similar tactic to control riots within its own country, further legitimizing this application without risking an international response.

Another example recently occurred in the Russia-Ukraine conflict but, fortunately, did not result in death. Heavy Russian shelling resulted in the rupture of ammonia storage tanks in the northern Ukrainian city of Rubejny, Lugansk Oblast, spilling toxic ammonia and causing nearby residents to seek shelter.7This scenario demonstrates that, under the right conditions, the enemy could improvise, creating a chemical weapon using civilian industrial chemical plants and effectively destabilizing an urban objective. This improvised tactic would actively combine toxic industrial materials (TIMs)- and artillery-based targets to form a TIM-artillery approach to urban-centric objectives. Although attacks like this can cause severe hardship to civilians and military personnel, they do not constitute the direct employment of a chemical munition and, therefore, do not cross that ever-diminishing red line.

U.S. Army Soldiers decontaminate Polish soldiers during training.

Responding to a Threat

To understand how the 82d Airborne Division would respond to the scenarios described above, it is important to understand how TF82 mobilizes and postures. It is no secret that the 82d Airborne Division can deploy anywhere in the world within 18 hours, but that feat translates to a large force of very light paratroopers arriving armed to the teeth with little else to sustain or protect it. The TF82 CBRN Reconnaissance Platoon carries everything it needs to assess a target for the presence of chemical or toxic materials and decontaminate its members. The design creates two distinct mission-critical gaps in capability: the lack of superior-level capacity to investigate and determine the type of chemical compounds present and the inability to decontaminate a large population, including vehicles. To better convey the importance of capabilities, I would like to address each of the two scenarios described above and explain how the U.S. Army might respond.

In the first scenario, the toxic substance is employed in gas form in an urban center, killing more than 120 people. Most U.S. Army CBRN units carry organic equipment that will protect Soldiers from a gas threat, thus allowing continued operations in and around the target area. However, the TF82 CBRN Reconnaissance Platoon does not carry drugs that counter the effects of toxic substances. For that, it would be necessary to coordinate for outside support.

The CBRN Reconnaissance Platoon has the tools necessary to take samples of any chemicals detected on-site and rely on coordination to determine definitive chemical presence based on sample chemistry. A tremendous higher-level asset that could bolster TF82 is the U.S. Navy preventative medical team. The team’s Level 2 assessment capability applies to theater level rather than tactical-level decision making. The naval team can only support forward tactical operations if the assessment is time-consuming and would stall tactical operations. The naval team is not equipped to accompany a forward tactical element, meaning that all samples must be returned to a designated site that employs leak prevention measures. Once the analysis is complete, a diagnosis produces two outcomes—a treatment and a defense. Given limited time to respond, the tactical commander will be able to respond to a suspected chemical attack only by cordoning the area and tending to casualties. Once the catalyst is known, the ability to save lives depends on a higher level of medical care and the proper drugs for countering the chemical deployed.

Polish soldiers conduct decontamination after a mission.

In the ammonia spill scenario, the ability of the CBRN Reconnaissance Platoon to respond would be quickly degraded and dictated by the chemical concentration. TF82 cannot contain the spill or clean or decontaminate affected areas. TF82 has a containerized kit that includes a full-body encapsulation suit with a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) for extended presence on an objective.

Recommendations

The underlying logic in determining the posture of the company commander, brigade commander, and TF82 commander to respond to a chemical attack depends on a precarious balance between threat assessment and budget constraints. The mission is highly fluid, and it would not be feasible to account for all possible attack vectors. Assessing the threat involves considering the likelihood of an attack and the potential damage it could cause. So far, the approach demonstrates a willingness to accept a high level of risk based on the unlikeliness of a chemical attack. However, the potential for significant casualties in such an attack remains.

Three levels of change could be implemented to better posture TF82 forces to respond to a chemical attack on military and civilian populations. I am not suggesting that we overhaul our force posture for the most dangerous course of action; rather, I propose an intermediate approach that aligns assets to set the stage for a response.

The first level of change would be the simplest to implement. Any potential for future operations must be aligned in Europe, so the U.S. Army should coordinate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) regarding any changes in the response to the threat of chemical warfare. NATO would benefit from this proposal due to the proximity of NATO allies to the frontlines. TF82 would also greatly benefit from receiving a second CBRN reconnaissance platoon as an attachment to HHC. This added workforce would allow maintenance of the same posture across multiple locations. As the HHC commander responsible for the CBRN Reconnaissance Platoon, I am uniquely positioned to recognize that preparedness requires a shared understanding of higher-level assessment and treatment assets. This level and type of readiness are critical to TF82. Preparedness begins with posturing the necessary personal protection, detection, and medical treatment equipment in theater and ends with a rehearsal in which these assets are coalesced within an acceptable timeline.

The second level of change would be to coordinate directly with emergency services in the host country. This change would allow a faster return on investment. Since the assessed scenarios take place in a modern urban setting, emergency services would be readily available. This option would enable the 82d Airborne Division to circumvent the bureaucratic red tape that is linked to dealing with host nation armed forces and allow on-the-ground coordination. TF82 should attach a chemical decontamination company to its ranks to facilitate this option. This company would not be a part of the 82d Airborne Division and would need to come from an enabling unit. The challenge of coordinating the restructuring of TF82 to accommodate such a company would be outdone by the benefit of having a dedicated company to assess, plan, and respond to a chemical attack.

The third level of change would require a redesign of organic equipment and force composition. The addition of a dedicated chemical decontamination company is a concept that has been previously introduced, and the company even existed at one point. However, due to threat level, downsizing, and force restructuring, this asset was removed from the division. The strongest argument against this change is simple: We have not needed that company asset. However, I contend that the weaponry and the intensity of a LSCO battlefield warrant the return of this internal asset.

Conclusion

From my perspective, one of the keystones in responding to a chemical threat is the authorization for U.S. forces to engage. This type of authorization is weightier than an order for paratroopers to rush forward into an unknowable situation. Secondary effects must be considered. The 82d’s current mission requirements do not exactly warrant the mobilization of massive supplies in preparation for a chemical attack; however, improving our posture is possible and is the responsible thing to do.

A LSCO war will test every level of readiness and stress the ability to adapt. The U.S. Army must continue to build shared understanding at all levels. Army leaders must accurately assess organizational design and how it relates to the enemy, constantly considering chemical weapons and how U.S. forces can respond to them. Tailoring the force posture to respond to chemical weapons (whether intentional or unintentional) within a city will be crucial. This posture must provide detection, assessment, diagnosis, and treatment capabilities. In any future conflict, the possibility that civilian populations would become a target for chemical weapons must be considered—and these crucial aspects will save military and civilian lives.

Urban battlefields hold a special place in the U.S. Army history; 100 years ago, the U.S. Army established military dominance across European cities. Although the way we fight urban battles has been molded by the contemporary age, the daunting threat of chemical weapons remains eerily familiar and frighteningly effective.

Endnotes