Book Reviews
By COL Vincent J. Stoneking, RETIRED SFC Lloyd A. Conway, and RETIRED COL
Vincent J. Stoneking
| Armor, Winter 2025
Edition
Read Time:
< 11 mins
Osprey Publishing, 2022, 80 pages, $22.00
Hunnic Warrior versus Late Roman Cavalryman: Attila’s Wars, AD 440-53
By Murray Dahm, New York, reviewed by RETIRED COL Vincent J. Stoneking
This book continues Osprey’s tradition of packing a lot of information
into a few pages. In this installment, Dahm compares the late Roman
cavalryman to the Hunnic warriors during their invasions and border
clashes. This monograph is directly aimed at antiquarian and military
historians. As is the norm with Osprey books, it balances well-researched
scholarly writing with excellent use of photographs, illustrations, and
maps. It can serve both as an introduction, or a handy quick reference
volume.
It is organized into six main chapters. The first deals with each side’s
composition and size, organization and command, and equipment and tactics.
The next three chapters review the battles at Naissus, the Utus River, and
the Catalunian plains. The next chapter evaluates each side’s overall
effectiveness, and the book ends discussing the aftermath and the impact
on the fall of the Roman empire not long after.
Dahm’s core argument is that the Hunnic invaders under Attila had tactical
superiority over the Roman Cavalry forces for a number of reasons. First
is the Hun’s slower but more hardy horses. Second is the fact that the
Hunnish forces were essentially all mounted light cavalry or skirmishers.
He argues that their horse-based nomadic life-style gave them
superior horsemanship. For the Romans, Cavalry was only one part of a
Roman “combined force” with multiple different “flavors” of cavalry, some
of which were tied to social status. On the Hunnish side, they tended to
integrate conquered peoples into their core ranks, whereas the romans
brought in allied troops generally as separate units, leading to division
and organizational challenges. A final difference was that the Huns were
not interested in taking and holding territory, allowing them to raid at
will and mass their forces with impunity. The Romans, faced with the need
to defend all their possessions and limited manpower were generally unable
to mass forces in a timely manner. Even when they were able to hold their
own in battle, they generally couldn’t risk a full on pursuit of
retreating Hunnish forces.
Dahm has written several monographs for Osprey as well as many military
history magazine articles. He references 37 ancient and 30 modern works in
the present volume, adding to his credibility. One thing that stood out
was his clear delineation of the (surprisingly few) known facts and the
much larger body of assumptions and guesswork. While he weaves a
compelling narrative of the battles as well as the political realities
facing both sides, he always qualifies it as being a “best guess.”
The book’s detailed and comparative approach to equipment,
organization, and tactics did an excellent job of bringing both sides to
life. He weaves a seamless narrative moving from strategic and manpower
concerns, to logistics, politics, and tactics. This is especially true
when discussing the impact Atilla had in unifying the essentially
tribal/clan-based Hunnish forces. The battle maps, illustrations, and
pictures of artifacts bring both the troops and the battles into sharp
focus. The main weakness is that the book draws, perhaps unavoidably, from
contemporary Roman accounts of the battles and overall conflict. As the
Hunnish forces didn’t favor fixed cities, there is little written or
archaeological data from the contemporary Hunnish side. While the Roman
facts, viewpoints, and motivations are easy to trace, that leaves much of
the other side of the conflict open to conjecture. Again, Dahm makes sure
to highlight this at every opportunity. Given its focus, the book largely
overlooks Roman non-Cavalry formations, which made up the bulk of Roman
forces.
This monograph illustrates many themes of use to the modern military
reader. At first blush, it can appear to be a narrative about fixed
defenses facing a mobile attacker, or utilization of light versus heavy
forces. However, a closer reading shows it as a case study in applying the
nine principle of war. With the possible exception of the Catalaunian
battle, which by some interpretations was a draw, the Hunnish forces were
superior in their application of the principles. The Hunnish forces had
clear objectives (generally plunder and tribute), maintained the offense,
had economy of force, unity of command, security, tactical surprise, and
simple battle strategies. However, where they really won their battles was
maneuver, choosing the timing and places of battle, and then massing their
forces at the point of decision. This book deserves a place in a
professional development reading list, especially for future or junior
officers and NCOs of the mounted combat arms.
Pen & Sword Books, 2017, 217 pages, $25.67
Cataphracts: Knights of the Ancient Eastern Empires
By Erich B. Anderson, Bransley, South Yorkshire, UK, reviewed by RETIRED
SFC Lloyd A. Conway
Mobile warfare was born in Eurasia, obscured from history by distance from
the literate, littoral civilizations budding in an arc from China to Crete
sometime in the Third Millennium, B.C. From serving as a wild food source
to domestic cattle and then to becoming a beast of burden, the horse
entered human history on the windswept steppe, there to remain as our
chief companion in warfare until the eve of World War II. The evolution of
the horse as an instrument of war in and around the cradles of
civilization, culminating in the development of fully armored riders and
mounts – Cataphracts – is the story unfolding in the pages of Erich
Anderson’s book of the same title.
Horse-enhanced warfare evolved from chariots, as Homer described it in the
Trojan War, transporting infantry to battle, to light cavalry at the start
of the First Millennium, B. C. Charioteers began armoring their horses;
however, cavalry from Central Asia - Scythian and Persian, initially –
proved superior in battle, compelling littoral states to follow suit and
mount their soldiers. The Assyrians were the first to do this, and their
steeds soon had frontal armor, as their charioteer forebears had.
It was not long before Scythian and Persian riders began adding armor to
themselves and their mounts, as well as adding the lance to their
armament. These innovations continued to originate on the steppes, as
military R&D typically flowed from the Eurasian interior to littoral
civilizations for most of the pre-modern era. One critical exception was
the technology transfer from Assyria to their Scythian allies of scale
armor metalworking. While Assyrian soldiers used scale armor only to cover
their torsos, Scythian troops saw the new technology as an opportunity to
completely enclose their bodies, sometimes to a depth of four layers, and
wealthier soldiers armored their horses, as well. These troops were the
first true mobile armored striking force.
Tactics developed apace with technology, as Anderson relates, relying on
ancient sources, archaeology and modern scholarship to create a coherent
and comprehensive narrative. Fully armored lancers used ‘shock and awe’
tactics to overrun opponents, and when operating in combined arms
formations, with mounted archers using indirect fire to soften up the
target while infantry providing follow-on support, they were virtually
irresistible, as the Romans discovered at Carrhae in 55, B. C. However,
when operating independently, vulnerabilities existed which an opponent
could exploit. When Cataphracts were dispersed or unhorsed, they were
virtually immobile and subject to destruction by close assault from the
flanks or behind.
Horse-breeding developed alongside armor and weaponry, culminating with
mounts over 15 hands high, able to bear the weight of an armored rider and
their own protection while charging at the gallop. Before the development of the stirrup and spur in the early Medieval Era, Cataphracts
were limited in how they deployed their armament; afterward, they could
handle a shield and lance simultaneously, and they could also use bow,
often of the Mongolian composite variety, allowing them to take the
‘Parthian shot,’ by facing rearward at the gallop while still delivering
accurate fire. They also employed the ‘Mongolian pull,’ using the thumb
instead of their fingers, to help stabilize their fire while on the move.
The final evolution of the Cataphracts produced the “iron knights” of the
Byzantine Empire. This elite striking arm was the backbone of Byzantine
military superiority for centuries, enabling smaller armies to defeat more
numerous foes. Due to the cost involved several military landholders often
pooled resources to support one Cataphract; at a cost of 16 lb. gold, or
approximately $650,000 dollars. (In comparison, the first M4 Shermans cost
$33,500 to build, or about $770,000 in today’s dollars.) Units of eight
were recruited from the same district; this reflects sound practice; from
Nestor’s advice to Homer’s Greeks to Van Crevald’s analysis of Wehrmacht
performance in the World Wars, unit cohesion and performance improves when
soldiers fight alongside friends and family instead of in the company of
strangers.1-3
The system began to decay when later Byzantine society had fewer
citizen-soldiers, as some chose to pay not to serve while many others lost
their holdings to acquisitive, wealthy neighbors. After the Fourth Crusade
sacked Constantinople in 1204, a mortally weakened Byzantium could no
longer afford Cataphracts, and these Eastern armored units passed into
history.
This book is recommended for anyone interested in the development of
pre-modern armored units, and what lessons we can learn from their
successes and failures on the battlefield.
Osprey Publishing, 64 pages, $20.00
Roman Plate Armour
By M.C. Bishop, New York, reviewed by RETIRED COL Vincent J. Stoneking
This admirably brief monograph covers the design and evolution of plate
armor used by the Roman armies from the Republican to late Imperial
periods, drawing not only on traditional historical resources, but also
more recent archaeological finds.
While its short length limits the amount of detailed analysis it can
provide, it admirably combines scholarship, accessible writing, color
photographs, drawings, and custom artwork to make the topic come alive. It
is an excellent introductory text and a good specialized resource for
those interested in Roman plate armor.
Bishop argues that lorica segmentata, Roman plate armor, was a revolution
in armor that came about between the 1st century BC to the 4th century AD,
due to growing technological prowess of Roman industry and greater
tactical sophistication. He looks at the evolution from the Kalkriese to
Corbridge, and Newstead types (each named after a significant
archaeological find), emphasizing how they were each adaptations to
military needs. He points out historical misconceptions of Roman armor
based on the art of Trajan’s column.
He argues that the lorica segmentata was almost exclusively used by
citizen soldiers, Legionaries and Praetorians, with others using mail or
scale armor, despite some contradictory finds. He gives significant
attention to its significantly lighter weight and greater flexibility
compared to its more common alternatives as well as its much more involved
creation and fitting processes, as well as the fragility of many of its
parts, leading to frequent field repairs and cannibalization. The other
forms of armor and accessories are dealt with in some detail despite being
outside the core scope of this monograph.
M.C. Bishop is a writer and archaeologist who focuses on the Ancient Roman
Military and its arms and armor. He is the editor, author, or co-author of
dozens of books and articles on the topic, including several for Osprey.
He also conducts tours of Hadrian’s Wall among other Roman heritage sites.
His bibliography, which is cited consistently throughout the text, is
significant for such a brief work, including 14 ancient and 36 modern
works.
Bishop does a superb job of condensing detailed archaeological and
historical information into a readable narrative for the non-expert. Each
chapter is well researched and well organized, making it easy grasp
its significance. Practical insights are gained by including perspectives
from reenactors, allowing the reader to consider the armor as an actual
piece of kit, rather than a historical curiosity.
For such a brief book, extensive use is made of illustrations and
photographs. However, it is done so skillfully that a picture is actually
“worth a thousand words.” The density of technical detail is impressive,
without losing the reader in excessively technical jargon. The one area of
weakness is his treatment of horse armor. While he argues that equine
armor and eye protection were used only for sport and not in battle, these
claims don’t have the same evidence as the rest of the book.
This book offers many insights for modern military readers. It provides a
great foundation for study of personal gear, equipment testing,
standardization, and maintenance. It demonstrates the eternal nature of
logistics as a driver of operations, including efforts to standardize
equipment across their force. Its coverage of repairs, both “depot” level
and field expedient, highlight the maintenance side of the equation.
Likewise, it highlights the importance of the industrial base in
determining equipment design, in particular the discussion of Roman plate
armour requiring steel rolling equipment to manufacture. At the same time,
the armor had to be at least semi-custom fitted to the man. It was not
“one size fits all” and mail might be. Of note are examples showing that
the armor’s modular construction was likely driven by needs for easy
transport. He clearly shows how trade-offs were made over time as the
armor iterated based on experiences in the field and local technologies
throughout the Empire.
This book won’t satisfy someone looking for a deep treatment of Roman
armor, though it should be noted that Bishop has several longer form books
on this exact topic. However, it is an excellent and well detailed
introduction to field with clear lessons for the modern reader interested
in equipment design.
Notes