The Cav Forever

Reconnaissance and Security for Emerging Formations

By CPT Christopher Jordan

July 1, 2026 | Armor, Summer 2026 Edition

Read Time: < 13 mins

Over the past two years, the U.S. Army Transformation Initiative (ATI) has spurred significant structural changes across the Joint Force’s land component. These changes have ranged from the consolidation of major headquarters and enablers, as well as a momentous divestment of formations deemed to be outdated.1 The BCTs have lost significant organic combat power, a change that is not without controversy.2 Moreover, MBCTs and Stryker BCTs (SBCTs) lost their organic cavalry squadrons. With the loss of the squadrons, the MBCT and SBCT lost their dedicated, trained and equipped all-weather, reconnaissance and security (R&S) assets.

The newly designed BCTs need to learn to do more with less by replicating their squadron’s capabilities. MBCTs and SBCTs must temper the expectations of their R&S formations significantly from plans based around the modular BCT structure. The new BCTs must do the same missions without the robustness of an organic cavalry squadron. Instead, R&S must be conducted by a mixture of dynamically organized task forces, MFRCs, and multi-purpose companies (MPCs). Future formations will blend emerging capabilities with existing systems to achieve a solution likely to succeed. As units Transform in Contact (TiC), the role the cavalry once filled remains essential to unit success. The purpose of this article is to create shared understanding of what gaps exist in the emerging formations and provide lines of effort to enable units to close those gaps.

Figure 1. A Soldier inspects a UAS carrying a grenade capable of being dropped. (U.S. Army photo by SGT Collin Mackall)

Recon and Security: The Mechanisms that Enable Informing and Protecting

To understand the gaps left with the in-activation of the cavalry squadrons, it is important to answer two fundamental questions: What did the squadrons provide, and how? What did the Cavalry provide? Foundationally, the cavalry squadron provided an all-weather combat formation which informs, protects, and fights for the main body. The cavalry is not simply a formation of observers, instead the squadron shapes the battlefield. This role is inherently active, and impossible to replace solely through sensors or battlefield transparency.

The cavalry provides battlefield intelligence about the threat and operational environment (OE) which enables the commander to maneuver their forces.3 Similarly, the cavalry protects not merely through systematic observation. Instead, they report threats and actively prevent the enemy from influencing the main body, enabling commanders to marshal their forces for commitment at the optimal time and place.4 Finally, the cavalry squadron fights for the main body. Troopers are part of a combined arms force which shapes the battlefield. They perform offensive and defensive tasks as necessary to accomplish assigned missions, often to a flank or as an economy of force to avoid early commitment of the main body.

The second question to clarify: What is the major mechanism that enables the cavalry to inform and protect the main body? R&S operations are the mechanisms. As doctrine states: “Reconnaissance and Security operations are essential to the execution of offensive, defensive, and stability operations” because they “provide a continuous flow of combat information and intelligence that assist commanders with uncertainty, make contact under favorable conditions, identify opportunities, prevent surprise, and make timely decisions. R&S operations provide BCT commanders with freedom of movement and action to create advantageous conditions for future operations to seize, retain, and exploit initiative.”5

The actions of MG John Buford’s division provide a concrete example of how R&S protects and informs the main body. In the initial stage of the battle, MG Buford’s Troopers conducted reconnaissance to find the Army of Northern Virginia. By finding the enemy location and scheme of maneuver, MG Buford’s reconnaissance informed the commander and enabled his decision to deploy on advantageous terrain overlooking Gettysburg. Once the reconnaissance enabled the decision, MG Buford transitioned into a security operation to protect the main body. His division deployed as a cover. In the cover they fought the Confederate vanguard. Over the course of several hours MG Buford’s cover force engaged in security, as well as offensive and defensive operations within the security operation to protect the main body.6 The security operation, the cover, was the mechanism through which the cavalry protected MG George Meade’s army, providing the main body with the time necessary to deploy in defensive positions.

Cavalry Leaders Course (CLC) instructors boil it down to a simple phrase: “The Cavalry primarily inform and protect the main body by conducting R&S. R&S enables timely decision-making to achieve positions of relative advantage.”7 Reconnaissance drives understanding to inform commanders about the OE. Security to protect the main body from observation and direct fire. During both, the cavalry answer priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) to drive decisions. Operating as a combined arms team gives the cavalry the combat power to fight for the main body. As BCTs seek to replace the cavalry, one cannot focus on some components at the expense of understanding the entire gap.8 Instead, units must understand the effects of the cavalry’s absence. Understanding the new limitations and constraints enables BCT staffs to create a better picture for what other formations must now be prepared to execute.

Figure 2. One Station Unit Training with Copperhead Troop, 2nd Squadron, 15th Cavalry Regiment, 194th Armored Bri-gade participates in the Thunder Run at Harmony Church, June 26, 2025. (U.S. Army photo by CPT Stephanie Snyder)

Technology: Silver Bullet or Silver-Tongued Devil?

The fundamental problem for emerging formations to solve is then:

Without the squadron, who will inform, protect, and fight for the main body, and how will one do so? Many units are seeking to answer this question as they TiC. One of the most common denominators in these answers is the ubiquitous quest for more drones.9 However, drones and technology are not a panacea, they are tools to integrate. Doctrine already tells us that “complex terrain, adverse weather, enemy air defense systems, and deception and countermeasures degrade the effectiveness of aerial reconnaissance”.10 Drones can be fooled, and you cannot always fly. As CSM Garret O’Keefe wrote on developing new assets, high end technology “require specialized training, logistical support, and substantial investment.”11 Over-reliance on only one tool will limit a BCT’s flexibility in a large-scale combat operation (LSCO) environment, as well as creating new potential vulnerabilities for detection by enemy forces. Drones are extremely capable sensors but create new signatures that need to be mitigated, especially in the electro-magnetic spectrum.

The proliferation of capabilities such as the low-altitude stalking and striking ordnance (LASSO), long-range reconnaissance (LRR), medium-range reconnaissance (MRR), and short-range reconnaissance (SRR) systems promise incredible advances in the ability of Soldiers to understand and shape the battlefield at heretofore unheard-of ranges.12 These capabilities need to be integrated into a doctrinally based, tactics, techniques, and procedure (TTP) tested, coherent vision of how a new BCT will conduct R&S to inform and protect.

The organization tasked to protect and inform BCTs will be novel, based on each BCT’s mix of personnel and assets. However, one need not fixate on novelty. Evolving technology enables the creation of new TTPs but does not necessitate the reinvention of R&S fundamentals. Instead, commanders and staffs have new tools with which to apply the existing fundamentals creatively.

Guidons Change, the Job Remains: Informing and Protecting on the Modern Battlefield

If technology is not the silver bullet, what lines of effort can BCTs pursue to effectively protect and inform the main body through timely decision-making in order to achieve positions of relative advantage? Line of effort one is for the BCTs to create a clear and cogent vision for how their specific BCT will fight. For example, a BCT that focuses on long, dismounted movement through complex terrain will have a different battlefield framework than one that prioritizes rapid advances and high tactical mobility. Included in this vision for how the BCT fights must be deliberate discussions of when and where the commander plans to focus targeting and shaping the deep fight, and when the priority of collection shifts to enable decision making for the upcoming close fight.

With a concrete vision of how the brigade fights, the next line of effort is to integrate the new R&S formations. The loss of a squadron means that the dedicated replacement by necessity must trade mass for efficiency. Today, organizations like the MBCT’s MFRC, with its tactical unmanned aircraft system (TUAS), scout, and electronic warfare (EW) platoon, leverage new technologies, but lack the manpower as compared to the squadron. As a basis to employ the MFRC, history provides us with a template to build from.

Historical force structures provide a template to help define the MFRC’s role. Prior to BCT modularization, R&S was done at the BCT level by a brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT). BRTs consisted of a headquarters, with two scout platoons, and were generally augmented with specialized equipment and observers.13 Like the MFRC, the BRT cannot be seen as a one-for-one replacement for the capabilities and expertise of the cavalry squadron. A staff cannot simply find and replace “squadron” with “MFRC” and move on to the next step.

The MFRC is capable and provides options, but it alone cannot answer all of a BCT’s questions, enable targeting, and protect the main body. Instead, the staff must use mission analysis to understand gaps and leverage the MFRC. The BCT must consider how it can dynamically man and resource a security zone capable of protecting the main body to avoid premature commitment or provide time for the main body to maneuver to positions of advantage, such as occupying an alternate battle position. The staff must also consider how the MFRC or a larger task force might inform all of the commander’s priorities across the entirety of the BCT frontage.

Line of effort three is to inculcate organic subject matter expertise. Besides the loss of personnel and equipment, BCTs without squadrons lost the existing repository of R&S expertise. The loss includes both operational expertise from the squadron, but also information collection expertise with the loss of the military intelligence company (MICO). For the MFRC to effectively replace a squadron as the organic subject matter experts, leaders must re-learn and maintain a doctrinal foundation. MFRCs, squadrons, and other organizations cannot balkanize, with each organization applying competing fundamentals.14

To ensure a common foundation, leaders should attend the appropriate courses for their level to gain the base knowledge and ensure a commonality of language and concepts. Courses such as Scout Leader Course (SLC), CLC, and Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course (RSLC) provide Soldiers and leaders doctrine-based knowledge and expertise. After graduation, Soldiers should train relentlessly so that all echelons can conduct operations in accordance with the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security. Soldiers trained by such courses will understand that PIRs should be their north star, decisions their raison d’etre. Leaders at echelon must be true professionals, able to turn information gained through all nine forms of contact into intelligence while understanding how the indicators observed enable higher commanders to act.

In addition to sending leaders to schools, units can leverage Field Manual (FM) 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-20.96, Cavalry Squadron, FM 3-96, Brigade Combat Team (Chapters 4 and 5), and FM 3-90, Tactics (Chapters 1, 12, and 13) to develop robust, effective products and processes. Tough, realistic training will foster a cadre of leaders that understand how to integrate assets to accomplish the desired. Moreover, these leaders can then disseminate the knowledge gained to sister units tasked to support the BCT’s information enabling and protection missions. Training focused on singular capabilities will ossify units as the battlefield continues to evolve. If an organization becomes wrapped around the asset, not the result, it will be ineffectual and less teach other supporting organizations that lack the same technology mix.

The final line of effort focuses on enabling staff success. The integration of new formations, technologies, constraints, and capabilities enable staff to create new solutions to complex problems. To achieve the most success the staff must be familiar with the former role of the Cavalry to build new solutions while mitigating gaps. As important as the formations’ skill in execution is the staff’s capacity to plan. If BCT headquarters staff trained to focus, resource and enable R&S efforts, then the organization conducting these tasks are set to fail. A well-trained brigade reconnaissance cell is essential to optimize how the BCT uses R&S to shape the battlefield.

So What?

The new BCT structures face an old problem: without a dedicated cavalry squadron, who is my MG Buford? Who will inform my understanding and protect my main body? The full answer is yet to be determined, with the U.S. Army continuing to transform. The common denominator for all of these organizations is that they need not develop in a vacuum. Whatever the details of these organizations, be it a MFRC, a multifunctional strike troop, a MPC, or a regimental observer/controller-trainer (ROC-T), BCTs require units to inform and protect the main body by conducting R&S. These operations enable decision making so the line companies and battalions can win. To succeed, units should build on the doctrine and legacy of the organizations that preceded them. From Paul Revere alerting the Minutemen, to the BRTs leading the way into Iraq in 2003, the information and protection the Cavalry provide are essential. In the SBCT and MBCTs, cavalry squadrons are currently inactive. However, their role is eternal. Long live the Cav.

Notes