Like Moths to a False Flame
Lethality and Protection through Deception Operations
By CPT Paul Dolan
| Armor, Summer 2025
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The ongoing war in Ukraine has demonstrated the deadly efficiency of
modern battlefield targeting. Rapid sensor-to-shooter integration, enabled
by signals intelligence (SIGINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), and
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) reconnaissance, has shortened kill chains to
the point where detection often leads to immediate engagement. High-value
assets, identified through electronic emissions or ground-based
reconnaissance, face a severe risk of engagement and destruction. The
prevalence of SIGINT collection, integration of UAS, and massed indirect
fires in the doctrines of American adversaries represents a complex
problem that can be mitigated by the use of tactical deception.
1
Russia and China both employ multi-layered information collection and
rapid sensor-to-shooter systems. Command and Control (C2) nodes are an
example of High-Value-Targets (HVT) targeted by adversary doctrines and
are a convenient example for exploring the use of, and opportunities
created by, deception. Adversary doctrine describes the following kill
chain for engaging C2 nodes: mobile SIGINT collectors locate command
nodes, UAS confirm the target location, and artillery at echelon execute
massed fires strikes before blue force commanders can react. The threat to
U.S. forces this system represents is not theoretical, it unfolds daily on
the battlefields of Ukraine and represents the conditions under which
American forces are expected to fight and win. These doctrines are
replicated every rotation at the National Training Center (NTC), where the
Troopers of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (Blackhorse) serve as the
professional opposing force (OPFOR). Blackhorse provides units with a
critical opportunity to train against the techniques America’s adversaries
use daily. Unexercised solutions already exist within Army formations to
mitigate the effects of the modern battlefield’s shortened kill chains. By
understanding adversary collection techniques, reducing signature, and
presenting deception signatures, battalions can disrupt enemy targeting
cycles and create opportunities for lethal response.
Threat Collection Doctrine
Russia and China prioritize rapid target acquisition, integrated
information collection, and fire control automation as core tenets of
their military doctrine. The 7-100 series doctrinal manuals lay out their
shared approach to large-scale combat operations (LSCO), detailing the
reliance on multi-layered information collection systems that feed
directly into massed indirect fires, shortening the time between detection
and engagement. SIGINT plays a critical role in this process, by
geolocating friendly forces C2 nodes and tracking emissions from
communications and mission command information systems. GEOINT, collected
by UAS, supplements SIGINT data by confirming target locations and
conducting battle damage assessment (BDA) to refine follow-on strikes.
This integrated targeting process ensures that friendly forces are rapidly
engaged before they can reposition, react, or conceal themselves.
For U.S. forces, the threat posed by this level of collection and
targeting cannot be overstated because of our reliance on digital mission
command systems. The ability of adversaries to rapidly detect and engage
formations means that any electronic emissions or movement bears
significant risk of compromise and targeting. Without effective mitigation
measures, units risk being outpaced in the decision-making cycle, allowing
the enemy to dictate the tempo of battle. Blackhorse replicates these
conditions at NTC, ensuring that rotational training units (RTUs)
experience the same information-driven targeting process they will face in
combat. By understanding how adversaries collect and process information,
U.S. forces can better prepare to disrupt, degrade, deny enemy kill
chains.
Figure 1. NESTS in the vicinity of Strawberry Fields oriented towards
Dazashah collecting on rotational brigade MCP and enabler signatures in
the Pass Complex targeting Joint Battle Command-Platform. (Photo by 11th
ACR Regimental S2)
Threat Replication
Blackhorse executes information collection operations by integrating
SIGINT, UAS, and ground-based reconnaissance to target friendly command
and control C2 nodes, thereby disrupting decision-making processes. Their
layered sensor network operates in a sequence designed to detect,
validate, and engage targets in real time. The Networked Electronic
Support Threat Sensors (NESTS) system collects SIGINT, identifying
emissions from satellite-based communications, while the Versatile Radio
Observation and Direction (VROD) system intercepts frequency modulated
(FM) transmissions to locate and classify targets. Identification of
likely targets by SIGINT cues UAS to confirm targeting data and refine
collection. Due to limited time on station, UAS only remain on their
assigned named areas of interest (NAIs) long enough to confirm targeting
data before moving on to identify additional targets in support of the
maneuver fight. Small UAS (sUAS) may conduct BDA later if required.
Once validated, the Blackhorse Regimental Targeting Intelligence Cell
(RTIC) processes the refined target data and passes it to fires elements
for strike execution. This sensor-to-shooter process mirrors adversary
workflows, where electronic detection leads to physical compromise and
rapid engagement. The effectiveness of this process underscores the
necessity for signature management, deception, and counter-fire strategies
to disrupt enemy kill chains.
Defeat through Deception
Deception is a fundamental aspect of modern warfare but is typically
relegated to a survivability operation. Successful battlefield deception
forces adversaries to misallocate resources, delay decision-making, and
strike false targets. FM 3-90 defines deception as actions executed to
deliberately mislead adversary decision-makers about friendly military
capabilities, intentions, and operations.
2
Adversary intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) networks
rely on rapid detection, classification, and engagement. By integrating
deception, friendly forces can manipulate enemy perception, disrupt
targeting cycles, and increase survivability.
3,
4
Deception operates across all domains and targets two specific deminision:
physical and technical. Together these dimensions infulence the cognitive,
or human, dimension of decision making. Physical deception uses false
positions and decoys to mislead enemy analysts into assessing a decoy as a
legitimate target. Technical deception manipulates the electromagnetic
spectrum (EMS) by emitting signals that mimic actual targets, causing
adversary collectors to misinterpret the data. C2 nodes have both a
physical and technical signature, making them a useful example for
exploring the requirements of a deception story.
5
Figure 2. FM NEST Emission Assessment for 2/11 TOC (Photo by 11th ACR
Regimental S2)
Units generate deception stories by creating signatures inside the
collected spectrums, that force adversary analysts to make false
assessments. In the electronic spectrum, the deception node must emit
signatures that mimic a C2 node. This requires units to allocate FM and
Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBCP) capability to the deception node as
both systems are present in MCPs. JBCPs constantly update their location
data to the network, creating a continuous low-power emission. JBCP
emissions are commonly assumed to be too weak to be detected, this is a
false assumption. In addition to being detectable, the static nature of C2
nodes allows enemy analysts to accurately classify their emissions as a C2
node and initiate a queuing cycle and kill chain.
Reinforcing the deception story requires physically constructing the
deception node to present a believable target. After SIGINT assets
identify a likely MCP, adversary doctrine calls for UAS or ground
reconnaissance to validate the target. Blackhorse replicates this effect
with a dedicated MQ-1C Gray Eagle during NTC rotations. When UAS
collection begins, the deception node must match the physical signature of
an actual MCP. To achieve this, units must equip the deception node with
wheeled vehicles, tentage, antennas, and other identifiable MCP-associated
equipment.
Battalions can improve deception effectiveness by creating deception kits
from non-functional or excess equipment components. Broken antennas
simulate active communication architecture, while trailers transporting
generator mockups and fuel cans replicate life support systems. Worn-out
power cables present the image of power distribution to tents, reinforcing
the illusion of an operational command node. Because high quality thermal
sensors are widely available common commercial markets, the deception node
should also mimic the thermal signature of an operational command node.
Crews can simulate a generator’s thermal signature by piping exhaust from
the towing vehicle into the decoy, allowing it to escape through a
replicated exhaust port. Properly routing exhaust tubing and covering both
the vehicle and the fake generator with camouflage netting obscures the
deception and breaks up its physical signature, making identification of
the deception story as a deception less likely. Damaged shelters staged as
command post structures further reinforce the deception story without
risking mission-essential assets. Integrating these elements allows units
to construct deception nodes capable of withstanding both SIGINT and
GEOINT validation.
To reduce risk, all personnel should withdraw from the deception node once
it establishes. A technique to improve the deception teams survivability
is to locate them in offset security positions, several hundred meters
away, minimizing exposure while maintaining operational control of the
node. Using wired connections to FM radios enables deception teams to
transmit from secure positions, increasing the deception node’s
electromagnetic (EM) signature while keeping personnel protected. This
method strengthens deception by making the site appear active while
preserving force survivability. Another technique to strengthen technical
deception is to equip the deception node with a CX-13298 Retrans Cable,
commonly known as a “dog bone”. This cable allows the deception node to
act as a retrans site, mimicking the radio traffic of the actual C2 node
while simultaneously allowing the C2 node to broadcast lower power
transmissions, reducing the likelihood of electronic detection.
Figure 3. JBC-P NEST Emission Assessment for Troop CP and 2/11 TOC
(Photo by 11th ACR Regimental S2)
The final step in any deception operation is concealing the actual asset.
While the deception nodes attract enemy collection by design, the real MCP
must obscure or eliminate the signatures that would expose its location.
This requires reversing the techniques used to make the deception node
appear authentic and ensuring the protected asset remains undetected.
Minimizing electromagnetic emissions is the first priority. JBCP should
operate on communications windows, establish offset from the MCP, or
establish behind terrain that completely masks horizontal emissions. FM
radios should connect by hardline to an offset antenna farm, preventing
immediate correlation between transmissions and the MCP’s physical
location. ATP 6-02.53,
"Techniques for Tactical Radio Operations,”
details how antennas can offset more than two miles using ASIP remote
operations via hardline connection, reducing the MCP’s exposure to SIGINT
collection.
6 When
using a retrans setup on the deception node, the C2 node can locate in
terrain that masks FM communication forward but allows broadcasts to hit
the retrans system. These techniques not only improve concealment but also
reinforce the deception story by generating EM emissions at the decoy
location.
Beyond SIGINT mitigation, the physical composition of the MCP should be
structured to blend into the operational environment while still meeting
operational requirements. Use of vehicles and equipment incongruent with
an MCP, reducing the size of the node, and collapsing assets during
periods of UAS reconnaissance all contribute to the deception story by
representing the C2 node as a different asset.
Reports of contact with UAS should trigger protection battle drills,
including breaking down easily identifiable equipment, applying additional
camouflage, or even jumping the command post to prevent the presentation
of an easy target. Once the ISR threat is neutralized or off-station,
units can restore digital communications as needed.
Leveraging Lethality from Deception
A well-integrated deception plan must align with counter-reconnaissance,
fires, and intelligence planning, anticipating how and when enemy
collection assets will react, and how to actively counter their efforts.
This concept is rooted in reflexive control, a strategy developed by the
Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s. Reflexive control seeks to manipulate
an adversary’s decision-making process by shaping their perception,
leading them to take actions that are predictable and favorable to the
initiator. In this context, deception forces the enemy into a predictable
reaction, which friendly forces can prepare to exploit.
Given the passive nature of SIGINT collection, the first engagement window
occurs when enemy UAS attempts to validate the deception target. To
counter this, units should establish anti-air ambushes near MCPs and
deception nodes, positioning short-range air defense (SHORAD) or mobile
air defense teams in ISR flight corridors. This allows friendly forces to
engage enemy ISR platforms before they collect actionable intelligence,
denying the enemy the ability to confirm or refine targets.
If the enemy cannot validate the target with UAS, they may deploy ground
reconnaissance teams to confirm or deny its presence. By identifying and
securing ground infiltration routes, units deny the enemy access to the
deception node, reinforcing the perception that a high-value target is
present while creating opportunities to trap and destroy enemy
reconnaissance elements before they can collect.
If deception is successful, the enemy will likely commit fires assets
against the deception node without validation, encouraged in their belief
that these protective efforts are aligned against a real asset. The final
engagement opportunity, where counter-fire radar, ground moving target
indicator (GMTI) radar, and national level collection can detect and track
enemy fires assets that have unmasked for a valueless engagement. Friendly
forces can track and destroy these targets, preventing their use against
friendly forces and creating hesitation to unmask assets for future
strikes.
By integrating deception with air defense, counter-reconnaissance, and
counter-fire operations, units can force the enemy into predictable,
exploitable mistakes while preserving their own combat power. Deception is
not passive. It is a deliberate operation that includes all warfighting
functions and sets conditions for the enemy to fail.
7
Conclusion
By understanding adversary collection techniques, reducing the signature
of high-value targets, and leveraging deception to shape enemy behavior,
units can force adversaries to misallocate ISR and fires assets,
disrupting their kill chain and protecting friendly forces. Current
conflicts are occurring in highly contested ISR environments, where
failure to integrate deception will result in rapid targeting and
engagement.
Deception is not just a defensive tool, it shapes the battlefield by
forcing adversaries to react to false information, creating opportunities
to disrupt their targeting cycles and degrade their effectiveness. A
well-integrated deception plan must synchronize with reconnaissance,
fires, and intelligence planning to maximize survivability and create
conditions for decisive action. Success in deception is not based on what
friendly forces do, but by what the enemy demonstrates they believe,
measured by the actions they take. When applied effectively, deception
forces adversaries to waste resources, commit to false targets, and fight
based on a reality that no longer ever existed.
Notes
1. ATP 7-100.1,
“Russian Tactics”, 2024
2. FM 3-90, “Tactics”,
2019
3. ATP 7-100.1,
“Russian Tactics”, 2024
4. ATP 7-100.2, “North
Korean Tactics”, 2024
5. FM 3-90, “Tactics”,
2019
6. ATP 6-02.53,
“Techniques for Tactical Radio Operations”, 2019
7. FM 3-90, “Tactics”,
2019
Author
Paul T. Dolan, a Captain in the Army, is currently
assigned as a Battalion Intelligence Trainer with Panther Team at the
National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California. Prior to this, he
served as a Squadron Intelligence Trainer with Cobra Team, also at the
National Training Center. Previous assignments include Battalion
Intelligence Officer for 2-8 Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division; Current
Operations Intelligence Officer for Task Force South East in Paktia
Province, Afghanistan; and Platoon Leader for Bravo Troop, 1-40 Cavalry,
4th Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division. His military schooling
includes the Armor Basic Officer Leader Course at Fort Benning, Georgia;
Stryker Leader Course at Fort Benning, Georgia; Military Intelligence
Captains Career Course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona; and the Army Space
Basic Cadre Course at Peterson Space Force Base, Colorado. Dolan holds a
Bachelor of Arts in Studies in War and Peace from Norwich University and
is currently pursuing a Master of Science in Unmanned and Autonomous
Systems from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University.