A Strategic Inflection Point for Air Defense Deception Tactics

By CW2 Erick P. Forsythe

July 1, 2026 | Air Defense Artillery Journal, 2026 E-Edition

Read Time: < 11 mins

While current discussions and Army doctrine touch base on what deception entails, doctrine does not force air-defense leaders to rethink its application. The current trend prioritizes reaction followed by execution rather than challenging intellectual understanding and preparedness before execution. By assessing and reviewing antiquated doctrine from the 1980s and 1990s such as FM 44-15 and FM 44-48, we can couple the analysis with modern doctrine and lessons learned to enhance aptitude in both the academic setting and operational environment. Measuring how we currently fight and certify versus how we may fight in the near term, we should consider the importance and implications of deception aligned with air and missile defense (AMD) operational elements—active and passive defense. We can tailor doctrine to every level of leadership and institution to act appropriately during planning, gunnery certification, and execution for deployment operations to enhance collective understanding and application.

Analyzing legacy doctrine such as the field manuals listed above, Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target (Patriot) batteries employed a decoy section (see Figure 1).1 Previous doctrine additionally required that any deception or decoy operations be communicated through a warning order. While that still seems to be common practice, timing is critical, and commanders operating in austere and potentially autonomous environments must think creatively and critically to survive. Understanding lessons learned, we must incorporate deception to amplify the AMD principles, tenets, and imperatives and apply it to institutional courses to increase understanding and application.

Current publications distinguish the difference between military deception (MILDEC) and tactical deception (TAC-D). “TAC-D is an activity planned and executed by, and in support of, tactical-level commanders to cause enemy decision makers to take actions or inactions prejudicial to themselves and favorable to the achievement of tactical commanders’ objectives,” whereas “Military deception (MILDEC) is planned, trained, and conducted to support military campaigns and major operations.”2 They do not have an inverse relation but rather complement each other in all phases of an operation. In FM 3-01, U.S. Army AMD Operations, it describes AMD principles and employment tenets. If you delve deeper into them, MILDEC and TAC-D are not mentioned. Understanding the concept of deception during the planning and execution phase, you can apply MILDEC and TAC-D into all the AMD principles that correlate to having a positive linear relationship to the AMD employment tenets.

As a branch, we need to reframe MILDEC and TAC-D as more of an architectural framework that drives the art and science of decision making, essentially using it as a deliberate engineering machine against the enemy’s perception within their sensor-to-shooter chain. Doctrine describes the “see, think, do” for enemy activity and “do, see, think” for friendly forces.3 Publication updates can take it a step further and reframe it with confirmation bias or tunnel vision, motivated reasoning, shot-doctrine pattern expectation, high-value target-priority logic, and doctrinal rigor or strictness. During the deception-planning process, leaders can use these elements and couple the most likely enemy action when determining TAC-D application.

In air defense, emissions control (EMCON) can determine survivability and should be considered as “signature management.” TAC-D verbiage within the AMD tenets can be amplified into “controlled” signature exposure, intentional intermittent emissions (a.k.a. “blinking”), deliberate mis-prioritization cues to friendly forces, and layered decoy emissions depth. This can commonly be applied as another form of layered defense. In FM 3-01, the concept of deception with blinking operations is introduced.4 However, it does not provide guidance on the “how” we should think, plan, and apply along with ramifications if it is not used correctly. Understanding the “how to” for TAC-D will enhance active- and passive-defensive measures and in turn increase survivability while enhancing protection and enabling freedom of action. Again, this is all conceptual without any tactical details, and deception is not hiding; we should consider it selective visibility. We must ask questions such as “Does it reveal our capability or capacity?” and “Does it create a dependency, or does it hinder or risk future operations?” TAC-D can trade long-term uncertainty for a short-term advantage regardless of the risk.

TAC-D contains certain risks for resource distribution throughout a theater-wide operation. Commanders can calculate factors such as allocation of limited personnel and materials as there will likely be a resource scarcity. Senior leaders should additionally weigh the options based on the prioritized-asset list because if our deception efforts, such as mockups and emitters, do not deceive the adversary, those efforts are wasted and our objectives can quickly degrade while exposing our intentions. Becoming a static target can similarly disfavor outcomes, which can be countered by directing survivability movements of a TAC-D site. The fundamental point is that resources should be managed and deliberately planned and integrated prior to the execution phase.

The topic of large-scale combat operations (LSCO) and multi-domain operations is not as seamlessly integrated as it can be for MILDEC and TAC-D operations. Adding deception as a planning mechanism within integration should be restructured and centralized at the operational level and decentralized at the tactical level to the following: signature and narrative shaping, perception bias, and sensor saturation. This applies to all domains and must align with the EMCON cycle in relation to decisive action, geographical displacement and reconstitution timelines, defensive counter-air requirements, and early warning or electronic-warfare employment. Simply put, misaligned TAC-D will become blatant observable “noise” and most of the time reactionary, whereas having a planned-precision approach coupled with deliberate execution and sustained deception techniques with multiple courses of action will drive decision making and survivability.

Patriot units attached to maneuver formations will become a reality for LSCOs. Due to the conventional ways Patriot conducts gunnery certifications, an altered and unconventional approach to gunnery is necessary and unavoidable. Patriot will likely conduct semi-static-point defense while steadily synchronizing efforts for movement to support the maneuver force. This can cause friction due to Patriot’s inability to move with the tempo of the supported element, causing a potential delay in objectives. As most air defenders know, Patriot requires deliberate emplacement considerations. This may prioritize the time needed for system analysis and survivability, whereas the maneuver force may prioritize decisive action. Strategically streamlining efforts will become critical, and timing will not be in favor of TAC-D. Consistent movements may be required for Patriot, potentially sacrificing TAC-D for reliable protection of the maneuver force. In other words, conflicting requirements on the battlefield coupled with specified tasks and purpose between elements may degrade TAC-D’s measures of effectiveness or overall protection. Including these factors into the institution domain and applying them during gunnery certifications, Patriot emplacement considerations and TAC-D will transform from being a logistical challenge to a decisive enabler within the scheme of maneuver.

Measures of effectiveness and measures of performance (MOEs and MOPs) are not at the forefront of MILDEC planning or deliberate TAC-D execution. Although modern TAC-D applications appear to be reactive rather than proactive, there are areas of focus where MOEs and MOPs can be added as a benchmark in the AMD principles. During my tenure, while attending selected courses, we were introduced to the concept of military deception. We were asked to incorporate how we would execute deception tactics for Patriot operations. During course of action development, we considered the following elements of focus: enemy ISR, munition inefficiency and targetry (them against us, including decoy sites), delayed-engagement timelines, sensor-dwell and misallocation, timed arrival versus timed attack, and decision-hesitation indicators. All of these areas drove our intelligence requirements and decision-support matrix. While war gaming, we used these areas and compared them as MOE versus MOP for the effects of their fires. After deliberating the analysis, I found that TAC-D is essentially Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) manipulation that allows us to gain an advantage, which directly ties to tactical-level planning and execution. The question remains: What are the risks?

Synchronizing efforts and application of Patriot TAC-D for any phase of an operation, along with a combined list of required resources, can determine failure or success during the execution phase. Again, these are all proactive thought processes to drive change in doctrine and future operations. Furthermore, time needs to be a requirement in MILDEC and TAC-D planning considerations. TAC-D execution is determined by reactionary cues but does not elaborate on how or why a commander should think. It is not always about what our adversary believes; it is more about when or how long they believe it, how quickly they can act on it, and whether the window of our timing aligns with enemy objectives, or as Peter Gonsalves stated, “sense—makes sense—shoot construct.”5 TAC-D can be perceived more as “decision timing” rather than “just perception” and will become a time-sensitive, decisive process. Evaluating the credibility or reliability of TAC-D efforts requires recognition of patterned establishment and viable repetition with outputs from confirmation trends through detailed intelligence analysis. When comparing MOEs, MOPs will confirm if the activities impacted the outcome and influenced an adversary’s intentions.

Adversary command-and-control elements and tactics are either centralized, decentralized, or combined. Furthermore, does intelligence collection depict a coordinated enemy response? Regardless of the approach, it will impact the effectiveness of TAC-D. Commanders can consider having criteria for information requirements to drive the MOEs and MOPs of their TAC-D to determine decisions. Can our operations and effectors change the enemy's reaction? If the reaction is slow, we gain an advantage of establishing and creating sustainable conditions. If the reaction is fast, timing and precision become crucial. How does our reaction look for a TAC-D site neutralized or destroyed? TAC-D sites rendered ineffective should be expected, and follow-on courses of action can be incorporated into the decision support matrix. Although these questions may appear trivial, analytical, or anecdotal of an inexperienced viewpoint, examining deception techniques from both a holistic and selective lens with support to the AMD tenets and principles is critical to developing leaders capable of making informed and timely decisions in a complex environment.

Understanding that time is always critical in operations, FM 3-01 describes time in the AMD principle, agility. Days of TAC-D can influence enemy targeting priorities, hours can misdirect enemy ISR assets, and minutes can protect movement and save lives. The longer TAC-D continues, the greater the chance of exposure, cost, pattern recognition, and risk. The bottom line is that it will decay over time without additional, suitable, and feasible courses of action. Instead of saying TAC-D “misleads the enemy,” another way of looking at it is to buy time for operational movement in relation to offensive and defensive operations. As stated before, deception is not just about what the enemy sees; it is about what they believe and how or when they decide to attack. The MOE of TAC-D will drive follow-on requirements and adaptation throughout all phases of the plans. TAC-D can be considered as the deliberate manipulation of time within the enemy’s decision-making cycle, hence the reason why adding TAC-D with relation to timing of execution to the principles and tenets of AMD will transform the institutional and operational domains.

All adversaries understand our historical patterns of how air defense fights, so how do we weaponize it to fit into AMD principles? We must create a structured exposure model in any operation that layers small, medium, and larger emissions. Commanders can also reverse it to either drive strength with depth of capability or show weakness without revealing actual capacity. Doing both can deliberately mislead enemy-intelligence gathering and reshape enemy tactics and, most importantly, increase reaction time and survivability.

Military and tactical deception should be added to and augment the AMD principles. An alternative option is to craft MILDEC and TAC-D into their own category within the AMD principles. Areas of emphasis when describing deception can be composed to reflect patterns of life, sustainment and logistical operations, site development and employment timeline, employment location consideration, integration, mission, purpose, and risks. Regardless, these elements coupled with enemy capabilities such as ISR, signal intelligence, and geospatial intelligence will drive the required transformation air defense needs in doctrine and will force change in the operational and institutional domains. Incorporating these concepts and schools of thought into ATPs, FMs, academic institutions, and training across the air-defense branch will cultivate more capable and adaptive leaders. It will develop knowledgeable commanders who are better equipped and proactive to make informed and timely decisions in a complex battlefield environment to posture air-defense systems accordingly to support the joint force. Requiring an added principle in FM 3-01 or augmenting all AMD principles for planning and execution processes, leaders across the force must codify and integrate MILDEC and TAC-D as a permanent survivability tactic and planning tool, not a temporary means to misdirect adversarial intent. It must become a vital component of planning with adherence to proactive and actionable execution while having an acceptable level of risk.

Notes