Restoring Maneuver in MSHORAD

By CPT Christopher Roberts, CPT Brett Yelverton, & 1LT Mark Haroutunian, 6th Battalion, 56th Air Defense Artillery Regiment

Article published on: April 1, 2026 in the 2026 E-Edition of the Air Defense Artillery Journal

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U.S. Army air defenders with Alpha Battery, 5th Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, reload ammo during a M-SHORAD live fire Feb. 9 at Grafenwoehr. 5-4 ADA Battalion, the Army’s first M-SHORAD Battalion based out of Ansbach, is currently in the process of switching to the new M-SHORAD system and is certifying their gunnery skills on the new platform (U.S. Army photo by Pfc. Yesenia Cadavid)

The absence of standardized tactical SGT Stout MSHORAD doctrine has led to the lack of a cohesive plan for SGT Stouts in support of Brigade Combat Teams (BCT). This doctrinal development is hindered by the conflicting perceptions of MSHORADs role in Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). The US Army divested Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) capabilities and skills which atrophied during the twenty years of focusing on Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN). The divestiture of SHORAD in favor of COIN meant that the Air Defense community focused primarily on static point defense via High-to-Medium Air Defense (HIMAD) or niche capabilities such as Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) systems.

Contemporary SHORAD doctrine and methodology has yet to fully return to the maneuver-centric air defense that is required for LSCO. The lack of integrated air defense within the maneuver force has led to some current Division Air Defense (DIVAD) planners utilizing their SGT Stouts as static protection assets in the BCT rear area. According to FM 3-01, this role is filled by Avenger and IFPC, but planners have triaged the lack of these assets by using SGT Stouts. However, this is antithetical to the design of the SGT Stout and its role on the LSCO battlefield. If SGT Stouts are not utilized aggressively and adaptively in tandem with the Combined Arms Battalions (CAB), enemy aviation assets will be able to freely target these formations.

Lack of specified doctrine for MSHORAD has led to different standards of employment and utilization across the Army. One camp prioritizes direct support and integration with CABs while the other aligns itself to static defense of assets on the Priority Protection List (PPL). Implementing forward and maneuver formation-aligned Direct Support (DS) employment enables early engagement and defense in depth rather than PPL-driven zone coverage concentrated on static assets in the rear.

Figure 1. Zone Protection Concept

Problem Statement

The lack of published doctrine has led to opposing concepts of SGT Stout employment in support of a BCT between Maneuver-integrated and PPL-driven Air Defense. As SHORAD doctrine continues to be developed, which competing methodology best enables maneuver formations in LSCO?

1. Differences in Warfighting Functions (WfF) associated with SHORAD planning:
   1. Maneuver-integrated Air Defense primarily embraces the Fires WfF for planning and execution for SGT Stouts.
   2. PPL-driven Air Defense embraces the Protection WfF for planning and execution.
2. Differences in positioning of SGT Stouts in the BCT Area of Operations:
   1. Maneuver-integrated Air Defense aligns the preponderance of SGT Stouts in the BCT Close near the Forward Line of Troops in support of CABs.
   2. PPL driven Air Defense emplaces the preponderance of SGT Stouts in the BCT Rear and towards the rear of the BCT Close in support of static assets such as Field Artillery units.
3. Protection Zones vs Support Relationships:
   1. Maneuver-integrated Air Defense relies on both General and Direct Support relationships down to individual battalions to organize Air Defense coverage throughout the BCT AO.
   2. PPL-driven Air Defense relies primarily on static Protection Zones more in line with a General Support capacity to each BCT to organize Air Defense coverage throughout the AO.

If these differences are left unaddressed, MSHORAD doctrine will lack a cohesive vision that will severely degrade operational readiness, reducing lethality, survivability, and interoperability.

Case Studies

PPL Driven Air Defense

Throughout various CTC rotations, the Observer, Coach, and Trainers (OC/T) recorded SHORAD assets utilized in a Zone Protection Concept (ZPC). The ZPC is divided into four static zones throughout a BCT AO. The PPL is then overlayed over the protection zones; individual SGT Stouts are assigned to a protection zone and are responsible for defending PPL assets within that zone. The corresponding zones are the Rear Zone comprising the BCT Rear (12-16km from Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT)), the Protection/Shaping Zone comprising the BCT Rear/Rear of the Close (7-12km from FLOT), the Battle Zone (1-6km from FLOT), and the Recon Zone which straddles the FLOT on either side by one kilometer. The majority of SGT Stouts are assigned to the Rear and Protection/Shaping Zones (11/12 SGT Stouts) with only one SGT Stout assigned to the Battle Zone near the CABs. Maintaining this level of individual control also implies exclusively General Support relationships with the supported units. SGT Stouts fighting as singular units rather than as sections increases their vulnerability and degrades their ability to coordinate air defense coverage. Dedicated Air Defense coverage for CABs is sacrificed to provide coverage for static assets in the rear. Currently, the lack of SGT Stouts in the Battle Zone is supplemented by dedicated Stinger Teams; however, this organic capability is being removed from DIVAD battalions to be replaced by Counter-small UAS (C-sUAS) Batteries.

Under the ZPC, sustainment operations must be facilitated by Battery PSGs and the 1SG rather than by the supported units through Logistic Resupply Points. Furthermore, without SGT Stouts along the FLOT, enemy air threats are incapable of being engaged until after passing over the FLOT. As a result, the BCT will lose almost all Defense in Depth and Early Engagement capabilities. However, the Rear and Protection/Shaping Zones will have Weighted Coverage, Balanced Fires, and Overlapping Fires. Focusing coverage on prioritized assets in the BCT’s rear also provides security in the event that friendly forces are attritted along the FLOT. Ensuring these shaping capabilities are protected enables the BCT to effectively transition to a defense or an adjusted force posture.

Maneuver-Integrated Air Defense

Over the course of multiple CTC rotations, 6-56 ADAR refined Direct Support relationships with the supported BCT and CABs. This allowed the unit to dynamically adjust Air Defense coverage based on the threat and attrition of friendly forces. Full integration during BCT and CAB MDMP fostered shared understanding with supported units that ensured their responsibility for SGT Stout sustainment operations. Forward positioning of SGT Stouts enabled 6-56 ADAR to greatly expand their engagement area beyond the FLOT. Although this reduces coverage of static assets to the rear of the CABs, this risk is mitigated as air threats would first need to bypass SGT Stouts deployed near the FLOT. Non-Dedicated Stinger Teams provided by the supported BCT would supplement Rear Asset coverage and would be capable of handling any air threats that manage to bypass the FLOT.

Additionally, essential Division and Brigade assets on the PPL are covered by units from the dedicated C-sUAS Battery. As the first DIVAD Battalion to be fielded this capability, 6-56 ADAR demonstrated the feasibility of securing these rear assets with Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft System Integrated Defeat System (FS-LIDS) and Maneuver -LIDS (M-LIDS). In conjunction with the early warning and early engagement provided by the SGT Stouts along the FLOT, 6-56 ADAR was able to provide consistent coverage while maintaining the ability to maneuver alongside the CABs.

Analysis

ZPC:

• The ZPC fails to attrit or engage enemy air threats before they can influence friendly forces along the FLOT, allowing them to severely degrade Maneuver formations at near-maximum combat power. The CABs have minimal dedicated coverage under the ZPC.
• The ZPC creates a significant logistical strain on SGT Stout Batteries by making them responsible for multiple LRP sites, requiring additional manpower and coordination.
• The ZPC is static and difficult to adjust in the offense. SGT Stouts being tied to static positions and assets rather than friendly formations or air threats decreases synchronization with maneuver forces and disrupts operational tempo.

Maneuver-Integrated:

• Maneuver-integrated Air Defense places SGT Stouts in Direct Support to CABs, thus enabling the interdiction of air threats 4-7km beyond the FLOT. This is in accordance with the operational framework provided by FM 3-01.
• Linking SGT Stout allocation to supported CABs or air threats, rather than terrain, enables MSHORAD formations to remain far more dynamic on the battlefield.
• Conducting MDMP as a member of the Fires WFF enables Air Defense to shape the maneuver plan and increase visibility and relevance of the scheme of air defense. In contrast, the ZPC forces DIVAD planners into the Protection WFF, reducing agility and potential for DIVAD input on the wider operation and scheme of maneuver.

Figure 2. Maneuver-integrated Air Defense

Direct Support

• Positions/AO assigned from supported unit
• Priorities established from support unit
• Receives sustainment from PARENT unit

Recommendations

1. Air Defense doctrine establishes a set standard for SGT Stout Operations:
   • To address the current shortage of SHORAD doctrine for Combined Arms integration, Army planners should leverage previously published guidance on DIVAD operations such as ARTEP 44-413-34: SHORAD Battery In The Armored Cavalry Regiment and the Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade, published in 1997 or FM 44-100 US Army Air Defense Operations, published in 1995.
   • The forthcoming publication of ATP 3-01.28 should emphasize maneuver-integrated SHORAD forces in support of offensive operations.
   • With only four templated DIVAD Battalions in the Active US Army, they will be expected to support formations that do not have organic MSHORAD capability. Lack of a specific standard for integration inhibits interoperability of DIVAD organizations operating outside of their primary command.
2. DIVAD integrates into BCT/CAB MDMP and targeting cycle:
   • Ensures that SHORAD units are shaping the BCT/CABs plan rather than planning around it.
   • Leverage Fires WFF to maintain investment with supported units by increasing visibility and relevance of the scheme of maneuver air defense.
3. SGT Stouts should be employed near the FLOT in support of maneuver formations:
   • Prioritizes and enables Early Engagement and Defense in Depth for SGT Stouts.
   • Achieved through support relationships to maneuver units rather than through static zones.
   • Allows enemy air threats to be significantly reduced before reaching the FLOT.

Synthesizing Competing Concepts

In a primarily defensive context, the ZPC has the potential for successful employment. In LSCO, the BCT’s ability to continue fighting is frequently constrained less by speed of initial threat interdiction and more by supplying, synchronizing, and commanding the formation beyond the first 24–72 hours. A ZPC deliberately concentrates limited air-defense coverage over the assets whose loss creates non-linear effects: DIV CP nodes, BSA/DSA sustainment hubs, ammo and fuel points, bridging assets, key aviation FARPs, and critical communications. ZPC maximizes control and survivability of SGT Stouts under such constraints, while sacrificing the ability to maintain offensive momentum.

ZPC reduces the planning and execution burden by anchoring air defense to stable geography and predictable defended assets, which improves engagement authority clarity and airspace deconfliction. ZPC trades forward reach for the higher probability of preserving the BCTs support and sustainment nodes while maintaining a defensible, executable scheme under degraded conditions.

In support of offensive operations, Maneuver-integrated Air Defense prioritizes the preservation of the CABs’ combat power, enabling the BCT to seize and retain their objectives. By shaping the Close fight against forward-axis air threats that will be engaged by forward positioned SGT Stouts, we ensure Early Engagement and Defense in Depth. Being threat focused, maneuver-integrated air defense is able to dynamically adjust air-defense coverage based on the air threat and attrition of friendly forces. Sustainment operations through this type of air defense would also allow SGT Stouts to be sustained closer to the FLOT by leveraging defined support relationships. This allows SGT Stouts to maintain tempo with the supported CABs on the offense.

Maintaining SGT Stout alignment along the FLOT also enables surface-to-air fires in support of advancing maneuver forces. According to FM 3-96: Brigade Combat Team, the role of the BCT in LSCO is to close with and destroy the enemy via rapid movement through close or complex terrain. Without SHORAD moving in tandem with the BCT at the FLOT, friendly forces will be unavoidably attritted and unable to achieve their objectives. Regardless of how well the BDE shaping and support elements are defended, BCTs and Divisions will be unable to achieve their offensive operational goals.

Conclusion

As SHORAD reestablishes its key role in the LSCO battlespace, DIVAD formations must synchronize their efforts towards a singular, clear end state. The current various disjointed visions will severely hinder the development of coherent doctrine. Maintaining a consistent standard across the Army ensures interoperability between all formations. This developing doctrine must incorporate Maneuver-integrated method of Air Defense planning to enable the preservation of the CABs combat power, increasing BCT lethality and survivability.