Recommended Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures to Combat Groups 1 & 2 UAS Threats in SGT STOUT Battalions

By 1 LT Christopher Rosene

June 1, 2026 | Air Defense Artillery Journal, 2026 E-Edition

Read Time: < 10 mins

Introduction

Upon the receipt of multiple lessons learned and intelligence gathered during the Russia-Ukraine conflict, there has been a clear need to incorporate Counter-Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-sUAS) training into every formation. While there are helpful doctrinal references for combating this emerging threat—ATP 3-01.81 (Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System)—the use of UAS changes as rapidly as an operator can type a line of code. Through my personal experience, I have seen these unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in the European theater used by both U.S. and allied NATO partners alike, and though the offensive side of training is ever present for these teams, the training and resources for countering this threat are severely lacking. Leaders across the tactical level of warfare need to consider sensor capabilities and small dismounted teams with both kinetic and non-kinetic means of defeat for this growing threat.

Observations

The SGT STOUT platform was fielded nearly four years ago to operators in 5-4 ADAR as the premier maneuver short-range air defense (M-SHORAD) asset to join maneuver formations. The inclusion of a 30 mm chain gun (XM914) and a coaxial M240 machine gun enable the SGT STOUT crew to be able to increase their survivability against ground vehicles. What has become evident through the publication of TC 3-01.28 (M-SHORAD Gunnery Program) is the concept of primarily engaging ground targets, only including the engagement of two aerial targets into the table 6 qualification.

During multiple U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF) exercises and battery-level field training exercises (FTXs), the SGT STOUT platform is fulfilling primarily a static role. While the platform for short-range air defense options has been upgraded from the Avenger weapon system, the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) remain relatively unchanged from base defense operations used during counter insurgency (COIN) warfare. However, with the emergence of an increasingly intelligent UAS threat, TTPs utilized during COIN will become ineffective during large scale combat operations (LSCO).

Discussion

With the emergence of an ever-growing UAS threat, the need to implement new and innovative technology and TTPs is now.

SGT STOUT Kinetic and Non-Kinetic TTPs:

While in a COIN environment, the need for static base defense became the standard operating procedure (SOP) for short-range air-defense capabilities. As we transfer to LSCO and continue to field the SGT STOUT weapons system, static defense is no longer the primary focus for supporting maneuver forces, especially when combating group 1 and 2 UAS operated by both state and non-state actors.

The capabilities of the SGT STOUT not only increase air defense presence across the battlefield area of operations (AO), but it also grants commanders greater situational awareness of aerial threats. The XM914 30 mm chain gun and coaxial M240 machine gun provide a capable defense against hostile ground threats while the payload of Stinger missiles provides adequate coverage against enemy aerial assets. With the fielding of a proximity-fused 30 mm round, the SGT STOUT gains even further capabilities to engage group 1 and 2 UAS without the need to expend an expensive and limited stinger missile. Integration of the SGT STOUT in maneuver formations will continue to enable their freedom of maneuver across the battlefield by neutralizing or destroying enemy sUAS or rotary-wing assets by kinetic means of engagement.

For the non-kinetic capabilities that the SGT STOUT brings to the fight, this is reliant heavily on the personnel who are within the vehicle itself. Currently serving as a crew of three (driver, gunner, and vehicle commander), there is limited opportunity for personnel to exit the vehicle to conduct counter-UAS engagements. This can be rectified with the addition of a fourth crew member (assistant gunner). This addition of one extra Soldier in the vehicle will not only allow for a more efficient reload of mounted kinetic-weapons systems but also allows for teams to conduct dismounted non-kinetic engagements. The vehicle commander will be afforded more time for decision making and continue the C2 responsibilities of monitoring air space and directing engagements utilizing the organic forward area air defense (FAAD) tablet.

With the fielding of a drone buster and smart shooter to each vehicle, the gunner and assistant gunner can dismount from the SGT STOUT and maneuver to more suitable and concealed positions. Based on established SOPs and rules of engagement (ROEs) the crew will have the ability to engage with either kinetic means, utilizing the smart shooter, or non-kinetic effects using a drone buster. This ultimately allows for a greater standoff between the SGT STOUT and hostile group 1 and 2 UAS by adding a localized layered-defense concept to each SGT STOUT fighting position. We continue to see these small UAS being successfully utilized against heavily armored vehicles by Ukrainian troops by outfitting them with rockets, grenades, and impact-detonated explosives. The early-engagement capabilities of the dismounted team from a SGT STOUT would allow for a greater chance of survivability of the vehicle and its crew from these tactics.

Increased Sensor Situational Awareness:

While the SGT STOUT offers an increase to both kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities, there are still other instances in which this system can add value to the battlefield. The inclusion of four Multi-Mission Hemispheric Radars (MHRs) gives the SGT STOUT the capability to see the local airspace within a 10 km radius of its position. Adding a Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAADC2) tablet allows the vehicle commander to have situational awareness and slew the Reconfigurable Integrated-weapons Platform (RIwP) to any detected air tracks. Not only will this give the BDOC more opportunities for increased situational awareness, but it also facilitates the practice of mission command at the fire-unit level.

The implications for this increased sensor ability aren’t just for the crew of the SGT STOUT but also for battlefield commanders, whether in static positions or on the move with maneuver forces. Increasing updates to existing sensors like the Sentinel, Q-50, and KuRFS radars allows for greater awareness of small group 1 and group 2 UAS. Yet all planners must fight the one constant on every battlefield: terrain. While the capabilities of these radars are an invaluable resource to commanders and operators, it is physically impossible to see around massive terrain features or exceed the limit to each radar’s range. This is where the SGT STOUT should be augmented and utilized as an extra set of eyes on the battlefield’s airspace.

During Operation European Assure, Deter, and Reinforce (EADR), 5-4 ADAR deployed units across the eastern front where platoon leaders were faced with each different type of terrain. Urban areas challenged us with large structures and city landscapes, whereas open runways allowed for the maximum effective range of the sensors. Mountainous terrain caused gaps in the radar beam, creating shadows and dead zones in coverage where small UAS would be able to fly under the radar within the AO. During mountainous operations, the TTP was emplacing a SGT STOUT within one of these valleys and intermittently turning on the MHRs to nullify the dead space that was created by the terrain.

This tactic proved to be effective during static defensive operations and has larger implications when operating in LSCO environments. The MHRs on the SGT STOUT give battlefield commanders an extra 10 kms of added situational awareness in either extending the maximum effective range of sensors or covering dead space that is created by terrain. A risk consideration with this tactic is having a lone four-Soldier crew that is away from the forward line of troops (FLOT) without potential security forces for assistance. This is where the training and experience of short-range air-defense crew members (14Ps) in passive air-defense measures matter the most. Crews have found that the utilization of fixing camo nets and foliage from the surrounding environment to their vehicle increases their survivability by defeating enemy ISR capabilities and minimizes their thermal signature when emplaced in battle positions. Adding a deliberate radiation schedule and pre-determined jump sites enables the SGT STOUT to become a mobile sensor with slew-to-cue capabilities while adding additional survivability chances for the crew. By cross-walking existing TTPs utilized across the force—such as reconnaissance SOPs, shoot-and-scoot tactics used by HIMARs fire units, and emission-reduction measures—SGT STOUT crews can become more effective when integrating with maneuver forces.

Recommendations

The recommendation for SGT STOUT battalions moving forward is to provide an MTOE change that includes one additional crew member to the platform, the development of new tactics to improve sensor capabilities, and the fielding of additional equipment to augment the capabilities of individual SGT STOUT crews.

The modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE) for what comprises a SGT STOUT crew should increase from three to four personnel. This will not only reduce the workload placed on the vehicle commander but will also allow more space for decision making, a more manageable work-rest cycle, and enable dismounted operations. Along with this comes equipping each crew with both kinetic and non-kinetic options when dismounted through the fielding of additional drone busters and smart shooters. The recommendation for additional equipment is one drone buster and one smart shooter per crew divided between the gunner and assistant gunner to extend the range of fixed-site effectors on the battlefield.

When it comes to the employment of these new tactics to provide increased sensor capabilities and situational awareness, we must leverage the utilization of beyond line-of-sight communication systems. The utilization of Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) capabilities continues to be identified as a necessity during local FTXs and Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations. The retrofitting of dual PRC-162 radio mounts into the SGT STOUT will allow for both beyond line-of-sight communication as well as data passing through an intra-FAAD network to create a more comprehensive combined-operating picture.

The fielding of the Android Tactical Assault Kit (ATAK) system to each SGT STOUT crew along with future software updates to allow FAAD interoperability will enable dismounted personnel to be utilized as human sensors at look-out positions where radars might not be able to cover. Utilizing the end user device (EUD) on the operator’s chest, they will be able to cross-reference to what radars are seeing in the air space and what they are seeing on the ground. The goal is to be able to mark possible group 1 or 2 UAS flying below radar picture on the EUD to provide early warning to friendly forces both on the FLOT and in the tactical operations center (TOC).

Conclusion

While there are a multitude of lessons learned coming from theaters around the globe on the utilization and mitigation of group 1 and 2 UAS threats, that’s all they are until they are acted upon. This is an ever-changing domain of warfare where mission success is going to be determined by planners and operators alike who are equipped with the right tools to increase the survivability of friendly forces on the battlefield. This is a clear and persistent threat that is quickly becoming the future of warfare, and we have the resources and expertise to not only survive on the battlefield but fight and win as well.