Cav Scout Divisional Air and Defense (DIVAD)

Checkmate Battery 4-60th Integration into Calvary Scout Formation for Project Convergence Capstone 2024 (PC-C4) Testing and Evaluation

By 1LT Russell Rozensky

Article published on: June 3, 2025 in Air Defense Artillery Bulletin 2025 E-Edition

Read Time: < 16 mins

Photo Taken by 1LT Rozensky at ATK POS Apache. A 1-4 CAV Abrams is visible in the background.

Introduction

The SGT Stout Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense Stryker (M-SHORAD), named after SGT Stout (a Vietnam War Medal of Honor Recipient), is the newest vehicle for the ADA branch. The SGT Stout is meant to support maneuver elements, primarily Heavy Brigades and Calvary Squadrons with short range air defense meant to counter rotary wing, fixed wing, and unmanned aircraft. The system is fitted with the XM-914 30mm cannon, a pod of Stinger Surface to Air missiles, and four Multi-Hemispheric RADARs (Radio Detection and Ranging) (MHRs) for situational awareness. Fielding started at 5th Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment under 10th Air and Missile Defense Command (10th AAMDC) in Ansbach, Germany first in April of 2021 with 4th Battalion, 60th Air Defense Artillery Regiment the next to receive the SGT Stout in May of 2023.

Fielding was sequential by Battery starting with Able, then Baker, and then Checkmate wrapping up in October of 2023. Immediately following the fielding of each Battery, which was composed of two months each of NET/NEF (New Equipment Training/ New Equipment Fielding), was training as best could be done to prepare for multiple rotations at the National Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin, California. 4-60th HHB had the first rotation at NTC in January 2024 following a Battalion level Deployment Readiness Exercise (DRE) with Able’s rotation integrated into HHB’s rotation as well as the following rotation. Checkmates rotation following Ables, and Bakers later in the year in May.

Project Convergence Premise

Project Convergence is a set of large-scale experimentation exercises with the largest, Project Convergence Capstone, a joint and multinational experiment hosted by the US Army and Joint Modernization Command (JMC). Project Convergence Capstone 2024 (PC-C4) was hosted from January to March of 2024 and took place at both Camp Pendleton and Fort Irwin in California. The premise of PC-C4 was systems and techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) to enable Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) for an amphibious landing and then deep attack into enemy territory. Testing for PC-C4 was a slew of synchronous experiments conducted in phases and through the premise of many vignettes with the scenarios of each being conducted at multiple echelons and through multiple partner nations. Each scenario contains many experiments which are referred to as threads with testing performed by agencies including the US Marines, JMC, Army Testing and Evaluation Command (ATEC), Air and Missile Defense Cross Functional Team (AMD CFT), the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF), the Australian Army, the New Zealand Army, the Canadian Army, the British Army, the French Army, and representatives of the Defense industry to support system testing. Checkmate Battery, while being assigned to 1st Armored Division, was tasked to support Apache Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Calvary Regiment (1-4 CAV), 1st Infantry Division. The vignette 1-4 CAV conducted was: to utilize unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and new types of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) to bypass an obstacle between Moose Gardens and CHOD Hill to move onto Objective Charleston, an objective in front of Hill 780 at NTC, with Checkmate Battery providing direct support in the form of Air and Missile Defense. The leaders of Project Convergence preach developing the TTPs utilizing the technologies given and stress testing those systems and their capabilities. This large-scale stress test is used to evaluate what technologies are needed and what improvements need to be made to ready the Army for future LSCO conflicts.

Photo taken by 1LT Rozensky of map board with scenario objectives

Officer and NCO Training

Checkmate Battery, as well as every SGT Stout Battery in the Army, is primarily composed of three MOS: 14A, 14P, and 14G. 14As are Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Officers and attend Stryker Leader Course and ADA Basic Officers Leaders Course (BOLC). 14Ps are Air and Missile Defense crewmembers and only attend 14P AIT. 14G are Air Defense Battle Management System Operators and only attend 14G AIT. The curriculum for these courses, though under constant revision and development, did not adequately prepare the Officers and NCOs of the formation for maneuvering with a Calvary Troop. Between the end of NET/NEF and the beginning of Checkmate’s rotation at NTC there were only four months that primarily included holiday block leave, the BN EDRE, and multiple ranges. There was only one dedicated field to prepare for NTC and was only conducted to test radios and communication systems.

NTC was in fact the first time any soldier in Checkmate Battery, apart from those soldiers who were either prior maneuver or were former members of a different branch of the armed forces, maneuvered with any system. Additionally, the Combined Arms Rehearsal (CAR) performed with 1-4 CAV was the first time the platoon leader had even been involved in any sort of Combined Arms Operation.

While multiple firsts for the formation, being unfamiliar with how everything works did not present an insurmountable challenge for the Soldiers of Checkmate. Given that PC-C4 is not primarily a test of tactics but one of systems, the scenario was tested five times and multiple rehearsals were performed prior to the first test instance. 1-4 CAV had not been to NTC recently so even their Soldiers were learning; therefore, the CAR was performed at more of a “walking pace”.

When it comes to training there were a few lessons learned. The first is NTC is not the place to be maneuvering for the first time. Nothing that 4-60th can arrange equates to the experience of maneuvering with an armored formation. 4-60th is geographically separated from its supported Division. Until 4-60th can be collocated with 1AD where Soldiers of the formation can maneuver regularly, multiple TDYs with vehicles should be performed to enable Vehicle Commanders with the experience and proficiency they’ll need to be successful and safe at NTC. The other lesson learned was that ADA BOLC does not teach the requisite skills for a CAR with a maneuver force. Every exercise I did in BOLC was based on using the SGT Stout just like an Avenger and moving them from static position to static position in conjunction with the Land Based Phalanx Weapons System (LPWS) primarily for base defense. ADA BOLC should add maneuver tactics to its POI and possible add a practice CAR.

Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI)

RSOI for Checkmate Battery was hasty at best. Besides Unit Movement Officer (UMO) functions and what was expected with equipment and the command relationship not much else was known. Soldiers in Checkmate had to move tents four times during the whole of PC-C4 since no one seemed to know where we were supposed to be. Unit involvement with ATEC and AMD CFT was also not known until we arrived at NTC. Members of ATEC arrived on a random day hoping to find us and get integrated since no one communicated a timeline to them and AMD CFT had plans for our vehicles that we weren’t aware of until we arrived on ground.

The lesson learned when working with outside agencies is to coordinate as best you can prior to departure for NTC. Coordination is being performed to a higher degree this year as Baker Battery is in the chute for PC-C5 and has already met with JMC and the unit to be supported this year at Fort Bliss, TX.

The two biggest issues Checkmate had for PC-C4 was Communication Security (COMSEC) Cryptological Key (crypto) access and airspace deconfliction. One of the coordination factors that should have been performed prior to Checkmate’s arrival at NTC was ensuring someone who knew how to operate the RAPTOR (a SIPR laptop for creating radio mission plans) and the AN/PRC-162 radio. Luckily, we had an NCO that managed to fill in the gaps and get everything working but he was a 14P and besides a one-day Communication Exercise and a couple “Tactical Tuesdays” there was no guarantee he would know what to do. Our 25U had no experience with the radio or the RAPTOR prior to PC-C4. Additionally, a consequence of having one of the newest radios in the Army was no one in our supported unit, even the S6, knew enough to help us. The lesson learned here is to have a dedicated Soldier for COMSEC systems and ensure that Soldier is experienced enough to reprogram the system. Additionally, cross train Soldiers as much as possible.

With COMSEC sorted the next issue was drawing crypto. Our 14P NCO that was knowledgeable with radios had the ability to draw crypto from 31st ADA Brigade at Fort Sill but given each post has its own stringent rules, we were unable to draw COMSEC for March at NTC, which became a top issue. What happened was a lot of coordination with the 1AD DIVARTY Spectrum Manager and the 1-4 CAV S6 with a rushed packet for our NCO to draw crypto from 1AD and borrowing a 25U from 1ID to fill our radios. While this was difficult at first, being in direct support to 1-4 CAV meant that we were able to leverage that relationship. The lessons learned were to have a plan for crypto before leaving and touch base and synchronize as soon as possible with the supported unit upon arrival. The 1-4 CAV S6 had a lot of work to do helping JMC with activating the planned architecture for testing, therefore the ability for three Stryker’s and a few HMMWV Shelters to be on the same net as his unit was not entirely his priority. Being present at the Cav Commander’s Update Brief each evening meant the Squadron Commander was able to put emphasis on the S6 to assist.

The last major issue Checkmate had, and the issue that was never really fixed, was airspace deconfliction. Typically, the airspace plan can be complex with manned, friendly unmanned, enemy, and enemy unmanned aircraft flying at the same time. With Project Convergence it gets far more complicated as system sponsors don’t always inform the relevant personnel what is flying and where. To make matters worse the Division AMD cell that normally provides the AMD annex, provided a dated one from a warfighter exercise earlier in the year that had next to no specificity and no real-world context. I would guess this was because the experimentation specifics are so unknown that even during testing no one is entirely sure of everything going on. The lesson learned is to force everyone to speak the same language prior to experimentation. For PC-C5 there is progress on this with the airspace working group convening for the first time in September, five months prior to experimentation. But the real issue is going to be the individuals that need to be present at the working group not being aware they need to be there. Without guidance from 1AD for PC-C4 Checkmate created an airspace plan with the 1-4 CAV ADAM/BAE (Air Defense Airspace Management/ Brigade Aviation Element) cell. Immediately we couldn’t follow it because a Soldier assigned to Alpha 1-29 Infantry arrived days before experimentation and stated he was attached to 1-4 CAV and would be flying a UAS that violated the deconfliction plan. He said he could not abide by the plan and test the system at the same time. The lesson that I think should be learned from all of this is to have someone knowledgeable on AMD be the front runner and ensure every stake holder abides by the deconfliction plan. PC-C5 is already planning on having far more technologies this year than it did last year and fratricide of unmanned systems within the experimentation does not appear to be a real concern for JMC.

C2 Integration

As discussed previously the only radio in the SGT Stout is the AN/PRC-162 which is an extremely versatile MANPACK and Vehicle configurable radio that can handle multiple channels and radio waveforms at the same time, it is often said to be two radios in one. This radio handles voice and data simultaneously and does well but does not fit well on its own into a PACE plan. Having one radio in the SGT Stout is a single point of failure and can, as discovered during testing, be a real issue. Monitoring two frequencies at the same time was standard during experimentation with the Battery channel handling voice and radar data over Warrior Robust Enhanced Network- Tactical Scalable Mobile Ad Hoc Network. A Software Defined Radio system that is Line of Sight and functions as a mesh network. This network supports clear voice communication and high data throughput. The Cav channel was on SINCGARS (a dated line of sight radio that uses FM-frequency modulation) but monitoring anything past that is not possible to perform continuously. There should be a second radio in the SGT Stout to ensure a second radio on a different waveform like MUOS, a US Navy satellite-based UHF communication system. to communicate with friendly elements. During experimentation it was discovered one of the Strykers had some level of faulty wiring where it would lose radio contact further than 50m away. The only solution was to use a second Stryker in proximity and due to the nature of the WREN-TSM network this proximity was able to restore the Stryker back on the network. Another issue with the Stryker, in general, is the talk boxes for switching between channels are mounted on the same wall as the seat. This means if a Soldier is buckled in, especially in full kit, they are unable to swap channels without unbuckling, which if the vehicle is moving is a safety concern. The solution is to authorize a smaller plate carrier or no plates at all in the Stryker or have the talk box mounted in front of the Soldier. Alternatively, provide Soldiers with CVC (Combat Vehicle Crewman helmet) alternatives like Peltors or Bose headsets with a switch to change channels.

The 162 enables several other systems including the JBC-P (Joint Battle Command Post, a friendly element tracker and type-based communication system in one) and the Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAAD C2). Until this year 4-60th vehicles did not have JBC-Ps. There needs to be far more training on the JBC-P as this was not included in NET/NEF. Additionally, there needs to still be analog based training to ensure crews can shoot, move, and communicate with just voice in the case a JBC-P malfunctions. Checkmate was able to do this by using a hastily made map board and listening to prowords with a copy of the EXCHECK out. Use of an EXCHECK in these operations is a sustain.

The FAAD C2, while a versatile system, is not well trained by the 14Ps and 14Gs of 4-60th. There are many tasks on the system that need to be practiced, and most of the training has been during NTC rotations. A solution is involving the FAAD C2 and associated skills into the gunnery program. 14As need FAAD C2 training too, as using the FAAD C2 on FDO (Fire Direction Officer) mode makes coordination of fires far easier than yelling numbers, letters, distance, and elevation over a radio. At PC-C4 Checkmate had issues with ghost tracks, tracks that appear to be duplicates, as well as friendly track classification changing back and forth without user intervention. While this is likely a result of the network architecture and actions of other users on the net, the fact I don’t know what caused it for sure tells me that I need more training on the FAAD C2 and I am sure all other 14As would come to the same result.

Initializing the FAAD C2 network was also an issue for Checkmate. Part of that issue was caused by not having a Battery 140A at the time. This was also an issue caused by 14Gs not having up to date Battle Books with FAAD C2 Joint Tactical Information Distribution System Unit Numbers or the OPTASKLINK for the mission or theatre. 14Gs also need to understand the Intra-FAAD Network and Multi-Cast and how they are used, initialized, and their pros and cons. Only one 14G in Checkmate knew how these worked. The lesson learned was to have this training as part of certification whether it’s called tables or gunnery. The likely architecture for PC-C5 and future NTC rotations would best be Intra-FAAD within the Battery and up to the BCT and Multi-Cast to all other units. The FAAD C2 at the BCT would ideally be fed airspace control data from the Tactical Airspace Integration System in the ADAM/BAE cell and be input and connected to the Battery through Intra-FAAD so layers would appear on the VCs screen.

Battlefield Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures

From my point of view a lot of the lessons learned from PC-C4 by myself as well as the VCs will be difficult to adopt and likely rejected as it is very distinct from the common SHORAD doctrine.

To start off, PTLs (primary target lines) don’t make any sense to a maneuver force and certainly don’t make sense for the Stryker so long as sensors are working. The sensors, either the Sentinel or the MHRs, work 360 degrees so giving Soldiers one distinct direction to look doesn’t entirely make sense. A Stryker defending a maneuver force will have a position relative to the formation and that position will be unrelated to an azimuth it’ll only be related to the position and direction of the formation. If the Stryker is positioned behind a platoon of tanks in a Troop and that Troop is maneuvering around a mountain the PTL will likely need to be tangential to the mountain, therefore constantly changing. It could also be from any other direction if there’s a threat of enemy UAS. Playing devil’s advocate, the PTL could be the direction of the gun on the AAA (air avenue of approach) but even then, there’s no benefit. The Stryker has slew-to-cue, and it can be cued automatically with the FAAD C2, and it’ll be quicker than trying to find a target in the sky using the EO and IR camera with a heading and elevation. Additionally, if there’s multiple drones coming from one direction it would likely need more than one fire unit to defend that AAA. All this also means having a defined sector of fire doesn’t make much sense except for integrating the airspace deconfliction plan.

Next, VACR (visual aircraft recognition) is a dated practice and would be better to not be as involved as it is. No VACR deck covers all potential enemy air assets as anyone can make a UAS or buy one and use it for their aims. Without the aid of computer systems for image recognition, which I think should be experimented with, no gunner is going to be able to recognize all air threats. Theres far too many and the lines are too blurred these days with who’s aircraft is on what side especially since older Soviet aircraft are utilized by friendly forces. Additionally, the EO/IR systems on the Stryker do not have the resolution to see clearly at the range of the Stinger. I suggest the effort could be better spent on understanding different aircraft speeds, weapons release points/distances, and FAAD C2 symbology.

The current SGT Stout block should be fitted with a cyber or electronic warfare based CUAS system. One DIVAD Battalion per Division means Strykers would be spread thin along a FLOT (forward line of troops) and could easily be overwhelmed by swarms with the standard armament.

A factor that changed during PC-C4 testing was the echelon that had Engagement Authority (EA). While common SHORAD practice calls for EA at the VC level, the lowest we had it for experimentation purposes was at the Platoon Leader (PL) level. This worked only because there was a dedicated FAAD C2 in FDO mode that the PL was able to have EA sent at a rapid pace. During experimentation, authority went up to a simulated ADAFCO (air defense artillery fire control officer), to the ADAM/BAE cell, and to the Battery. The issue with having EA at the ADAFCO level was the response time was as long as 30 minutes. Anything that took longer than 10-15 seconds resulted in not engaging targets. Having EA at the ADAM/BAE cell was an issue the same as before, but also because the ADAM/BAE cell is not entirely aware of the capabilities and limitations of the SGT Stout. Having EA at the Battery level just caused inefficiency as the PL had the same air picture and the SHORAD element maneuvering was a platoon-minus size. Some in the SHORAD community might think there’s no point in belaboring the level of EA for SHORAD engagements but JP 3-01, II-12 states an ADAFCO is required anytime an Army AMD capability is employed and those in the HIMAD (High-altitude air and missile defense) community working with SHORAD are quick to mention this and even require it. This is a current point of contention for PC-C5 planning.

ADA units need to practice survivability drills due to the enemy being able to track the radar emissions and practice Radiation/Maintenance scheduling. These practices will increase survivability and system effectiveness therefore increasing lethality. Radiation scheduling will also inform all elements in a formation of when they need to radiate and when certain radars will be off. The threat of Anti-Radiation Missiles being utilized in suppression of enemy air defenses operations by the enemy will be higher than ever in LSCO. Recording good practices in Standard Operating Procedures now will make things in the future easier.

While this is currently utilized at 4-60th something that needs to be adopted by all M-SHORAD Battalions is having a Battle Lab where Soldiers can practice FAAD C2 engagements, tracking enemy air assets, radiation scheduling, and battle handover in a simulated environment.

Last VCs and drivers need to practice utilizing micro terrain to maneuver. Micro terrain being terrain great enough to hide a vehicle but not visible when conducting map reconnaissance is how friendly and enemy elements make fighting in a desert more survivable.

Conclusion

SHORAD doctrine needs to evolve to fight the LSCO battles of the future. Like stated in the beginning Project Convergence is not about using today’s doctrine it’s about using the doctrine that will exist in 2030 and 2040. Current doctrine is primarily focused on static defense and needs to be more akin to tank doctrine. There also needs to be less division in the Air Defense community on the place of SHORAD and the methods through which SHORAD operates. It’s difficult enough explaining to a maneuver element how SHORAD needs to be arrayed and fight it is pointless also fighting an argument on who can give EA. There is a slew of updates that need to happen to the M-SHORAD to enable it to best fight tomorrow’s wars and it’s important the system is enabled to be as lethal to enemy air assets as possible.

While this paper was originally written in the Spring of 2024 after PC-C4 many of the same issues persist. While the unit experience with PC-C5 was generally better there were still a frustrating number of seemingly avoidable issues that had been identified in the year prior. Hopefully many of these issues can be avoided by PC-C6.