We Are All Air Defenders Now

By CPT Peter Clifton, U.S. Army

Article published on: September 1, 2025 in Air Defense Artillery Bulletin 2025 E-Edition

Read Time:< 14 mins

In the Age of the Almighty computer, drones are the perfect warriors. They kill without remorse, obey without kidding around, and they never reveal the names of their masters.

Rapidly improving unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) have proven to be incredibly effective both kinetically and financially in the Russia Ukraine War. UAS and counter unmanned aerial systems (CUAS) capabilities are growing exponentially as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) evolve from both sides. As lessons learned are implemented and payload quantity and delivery system sophistication increase, seemingly rudimentary recreational toys are now the chief threat to maneuver and fire support formations on today’s battlefield. Therefore, the U.S. Army must restructure its formations by creating dedicated UAS and CUAS military occupational specialties (MOS) and implement organic lethal and non-lethal UAS capabilities down to the squad level across all maneuver formations. This will vastly improve maneuver formation survivability, increase direct and indirect fires element’s lethality, and ultimately ensure success on the future battlefield against near peer adversaries.

Current U.S. Army Air Defense and UAS Employment

For the purposes of this paper, we will focus on group-1, group-2, and group-3 UAS. While group-4 and group-5 are important to large-scale combat operations (LSCO), they generally reside at the division level and higher, require a two-star general for use approval, and require advanced training and maintainers for piloting and maintenance support. ¹ Therefore, they are not relevant to this discussion regarding immediate threats to lower echelon tactical maneuver units. Additionally, we will discuss air defense against these same threats. Thus, we will not focus on counter missile systems like the Avenger, Patriot or Iron Dome.

Group-1 UAS are generally defined as weighing less than 20 pounds, with airspeeds less than 100 knots, and a normal operating altitude below 1,200 feet above ground level (AGL). ² Examples include most commercial off-the-shelf recreational drones available to consumers, and the U.S. Army RQ-11B Raven found at the company echelon. Group-2 UAS are generally defined as weighing between 21 and 55 pounds, with airspeeds ranging from 100-250 knots, and flying up to 3,500 AGL.³ Examples include the ScanEagle, Flexrotor, and multiple variants from foreign nations.

Group-3 UAS are generally defined as weighing between 56 and 1,320 pounds, with airspeeds similar to group-2 UAS.⁴ The key difference between group-2 and group-3 UAS are payload capabilities, to include higher lethal munition payloads and improved electronic, cyber, and electronic defeat capabilities.⁵ Examples include the recently divested RQ-7B Shadow, Iranian Shahed-136, and the JUMP-20.

Lessons Learned from the Russia Ukraine War

The primary UAS lesson learned from the Russia Ukraine War is that full-spectrum UAS integration is essential to victory. Ukraine has made exceptional use of group-1 UAS employed in tactical environments by low echelon formations for targeting and information operations, and Russia is continuously refining TTPs in integrating UAS across the warfighting domains, especially by utilizing UAS based signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities to feed targeting for conventional indirect fire weapon systems.

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, most of the international community expected a swift Russian victory due to their superior military capabilities. On paper, Russia held all the advantages: better technology to include communications and electronic warfare capabilities, better trained soldiers, better armored vehicles, superior aircraft, a more robust intelligence apparatus, and better supply lines and supply stockpiles. Russia was generally considered to have a near-peer military in comparison to the United States and its Western allies.⁶

However, Ukraine shocked the world and continues to resist, especially with financial and military equipment aid packages provided by much of the Western world. Emerging “...flaws in Russian intelligence, motivation, morale, and logistics,” brought to light by Russian failures.⁷ So, how is Ukraine able to stall and repel the Russian onslaught and exploit their weaknesses? The answer is UAS.⁸

Kerry Chávez, political science instructor at Texas Tech University and nonresident research fellow with the Modern War Institute at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, explains that “Ukraine’s ability to blend commercial drones into its broader aerial arsenal and team it with traditional weapons and ground troops is a bedrock of its success at resisting the more powerful Russian military.”⁹ Ukraine has taken advantage of commercial, off the shelf UAS capabilities initially designed for recreational use. Group-1 UAS brings a wealth of capabilities down to the smallest unit echelons as operators can “…observe troop positions and movements, improve targeting for conventional weapons, harass and pressure enemy forces, and [record] video successes that can later be publicized to rally support and demoralize the Russian side.”¹⁰ This has given them the ability to inflict costly casualties on both Russian personnel and equipment, while spending fractions of the price to target, engage, and destroy the same. Harnessing full-spectrum UAS into their force structures against an unprepared Russian enemy continues to keep Ukraine in the fight.¹¹

The expendability of commercial UAS greatly improves their integration throughout the Ukrainian military force structure. Their low cost makes these losses acceptable, which improves soldiers’ ability to employ them as they do not feel compelled to retain them for future use.¹² Commercial UAS, and even military grade group-1 UAS, are intended to be expendable; their loss is built into the UAS’s mission.¹³ Coined “A Mosquito Air Force,” these easily portable, accessible, and cheap UAS models enable Ukrainian ground forces to shorten their sensor-to-shooter targeting cycle and can detect Russian activity, disposition, and composition much faster than larger UAS systems, which are much less available and easier to target.¹⁴

“Army” of DJI Drones from the Ukraine

Their employment cost is much less than that of regular anti-tank and anti-armor weapons, such as the FGM-148 Javelin. The Javelin’s average cost is between $80,000 and $107,500 per unit.¹⁵ As of FY2022, the new Lightweight Javelin Command Launch Unit was a staggering $514,000 per unit although the Army expects to lower costs in the future.¹⁶ In comparison, group-1 UAS, commercially purchased, can cost as low as $300.¹⁷ Higher end equipment with longer flight times and greater payload weight capacity can also be purchased from online retailers like Amazon for approximately $500-$5000.¹⁸ When equipped with military grade explosives, the total cost can be from $500-$7,000. Therefore, group-1 UAS low-cost employment and intended expendability make them far more cost effective at disabling and destroying enemy armor than conventional anti-armor weapon systems.

Conventional fixed wing and rotary close air support is hard to come by in the Russia Ukraine War. This will be exacerbated during the early stages of LSCO as most anti-aircraft systems will still be operational. Dense concentrations of anti-aircraft weapon systems close to the front lines with far ranges will restrict air movement and thus the ability of aircraft to conduct reconnaissance and move personnel and equipment throughout the area of operations (AO).¹⁹ UAS, especially group-1 UAS, play a vital role in allowing units to conduct organic reconnaissance, giving commander’s a real-time picture of the battlefield. Without relying on higher assets to report what is an immediate danger, maneuver echelons up to the battalion level can easily seize the initiative as they execute their commander’s intent with the immediate threats to their formation organically identified.

Moreover, group-1 UAS are also beneficial for information operations and producing supportive media.²⁰ In the age of social media and the speed of information travel compared to historical information operations conducted with leaflets, radio, and television, messaging via social media is more important than ever. LSCO has made this even more apparent as combat operations are sustained over long periods of time with slow favorable results being realized with high attrition rates. Russia has done an excellent job of conducting information operations, like when they targeted family members of Ukrainians on the front line with text messages, discussed later. Conversely, the ability for group-1 UAS to film Ukrainians decimating Russian formations and proliferate on social media platforms quickly enables the Ukrainians to correct false information campaigns and expose war crimes by the Russians while also increasing morale within their soldiers and supporters from visual confirmation of their successes.²¹

Ukrainians using Group 1 Drones with Explosives

Russia has pioneered new TTPs in SIGINT collection, illustrating their integration of intelligence collection with psychological operations to driving targeting. Their success has been duplicated by Ukrainian forces who have also successfully targeted Russian positions via similar means as both sides learned the vulnerabilities of soldiers’ cell phones. Russia uses the Orlan-10, which is a group-2 UAS with a multitude of capabilities.²² Its modular design enables it to carry payloads for a variety of missions ranging from reconnaissance and full motion video surveillance electronic warfare capabilities like jamming.²³ However, its SIGINT capabilities are what make it so lethal. The Orlan-10 can differentiate between friendly and enemy means of communication, locking onto those transmissions and pulling locational data from the source.²⁴ Operators can use the camera payload to extract grid coordinates for what they are observing. Once locations are extracted from the data, the coordinates are transmitted to artillery units who process fire missions resulting in devastating losses.

Russia has also used UAS to facilitate information operations and push propaganda. Ukrainian forces in battle positions have received text messages, which are designed to undermine unit cohesion and decimate troop morale such as telling Ukrainian soldiers that they are “surrounded and abandoned.”²⁵ Nancy Snow, a professor of public diplomacy at the Kyoto University of Foreign Studies in Japan, describes this as “pinpoint propaganda.” Pinpoint propaganda targets specific individuals, limited to a certain area or of a certain group, allowing the attackers to isolate them informationally and exploit the temporary effects of their information campaign.²⁶ Russia also utilizes pinpoint propaganda to target family and friends of the soldiers, saying that their son was killed in action; this often prompts a call or a text to the soldier from their family, which further helps Russian SIGINT collection teams triangulate Ukrainian locations.²⁷ Thus, Russia coordinates action, electronic warfare, and information operations to dramatically reduce the sensor-to-shooter time between the collection platform and delivering kinetic effects on a target.²⁸

Group-2 and group-3 UAS are used to target larger, more important objectives and infrastructure that requires a higher payload to affect it than a group-1 UAS can carry. They have better survivability capabilities, such as improved resiliency to enemy jamming and other electronic warfare countermeasures. Their larger payloads and more sophisticated avionics improve flight path planning operating altitude, making them much harder to detect, holding entire areas hostage.²⁹ They provide a deeper strike capability, especially with waypoint GPS, enabling them to conceal their intended target until right before the strike. Ukraine has used higher group UAS to target deep inside of Russia with success. The Ilyushin 76, a Russian military long range cargo transport aircraft, being stored at a regional airport in Pskov, a city that lies approximately 372 miles from Ukraine, was targeted and destroyed.³⁰ This ability to effect vital supply lines by damaging important transportation equipment is one of the many examples of higher importance targets that UAS can affect.

Too little too slow

While the Army is taking steps in the right direction, they are being implemented too slowly to keep up with ever evolving UAS threats, especially as commercial and military UAS technologies develop and integrate simultaneously. The Joint CUAS course is generally an afterthought for training and pulls soldiers from their primary MOS responsibilities. As of 2024, deploying units receive UAS electronic defeat equipment, usually “drone defender[s]” or “drone buster[s]” at their deployment location. Squad members already must be proficient with individual, and crew served machine guns such as the M249 and M240B, as well as anti-armor weapons like the AT4 and Javelin. Adding additional duties to a squad member in an already over tasked squad will severely degrade mission command from the company commander to the team leader as squads and platoons will have less riflemen for closing with and destroying the enemy. This will degrade cannon crew members in artillery units as well. Less cannon crew will participate in firing the rounds, significantly degrading the speed at which they can execute a fire mission and conduct survivability maneuvers. This greatly increases the risk of accidents occurring, such as an incorrect charge being used, and could mean the difference between life and death for both the maneuver elements they are supporting and their own survivability.

Recommendations

Overall, the U.S. Army must restructure based on the lessons learned from the Russia Ukraine War to ensure victory. By creating dedicated CUAS and OUAS MOSs, especially with group-1 UAS, and implementing organic lethal and non-lethal UAS capabilities down to the squad level across all echelons of maneuver formations, the Army will greatly improve its survivability and remain the most lethal fighting force in the world. Creating new MOSs is paramount to winning the war of the future. Taking soldiers and assigning them additional duties pulls them away from their primary responsibilities and severely degrades the overall lethality of organizations from the lowest to highest echelons.

I recommend that offensive and defensive UAS MOSs be created to allow operators to focus on their roles, reducing task oversaturation with capabilities they do not have the bandwidth to implement effectively. UAS operators should be broken down further into two different jobs, with one conducting ISR operations to help decision makers understand what threats are present on the battlefield and the other focusing on conducting kinetic and offensive electronic warfare operations.

By bringing kinetic capabilities down to the company echelon, company commanders will be able empowered to engage valuable targets of opportunity without having to wait for their higher echelons to approve an already slow targeting process. Group-1 kinetic UAS will be able to target enemies in prepared positions, as well as target immediate threats such as tanks or other armored vehicles with significantly less financial costs. Group-2 UAS will allow for better imagery and ISR collection, and will support offensive electronic warfare operations, especially by jamming enemy communications. Their greater payload capacity, range, and flight duration will also make them less vulnerable to enemy electronic warfare and anti-UAS countermeasures. This will give battalions the capability to conduct kinetic engagement and improve the sensor-to-shooter time, while giving commanders better visibility in their battlespace.

Dedicated CUAS MOSs will focus on defensive operations by defending maneuver formations from enemy kinetic UAS and ISR assets. This will allow friendly formations to retain freedom of maneuver on the battlefield and prevent enemy UAS assets from detecting and reporting friendly positions. They will also integrate with kinetic air defense like the Coyote system and C-Ram, providing early warning and targeting data when applicable. The CUAS MOSs will enable integrated air defense from group-1 to group-3 UAS, protecting both static and dynamic friendly formations. The creation of new MOSs combined with technology that appeals to new generations of recruits will also attract talent with an affinity for technology and video games. Recruits already predisposed to systems like the Xbox controller will lower the learning curve and make their training faster and more cost effective.³¹

Artificial intelligence (AI) has also seen a major recent ascent to the forefront of technological debate regarding the future of UAS on the battlefield. AI enables machine-learning from experience and human like adaptability to new inputs. As this technology evolves and is integrated into ISR collection platforms and the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of said collection to intelligence consumers, UAS will become even more deadly. AI will further allow UAS to integrate with each other, allowing for the possibility of observing and targeting by multiple UAS with different payloads and minimal human direction. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Offensive Swarm-Enabled Tactics Program (OFFSET) program seeks to arm “small-unit infantry forces using swarms comprising upwards of 250 small-unmanned aircraft systems… to accomplish diverse missions in complex urban environments.”³² AI projects like this illustrate the future where the size of the UAS shrinks considerably and can employ swarm tactics to overwhelm an enemy position or equipment. As the U.S. continues to improve its UAS and CUAS capabilities, it must ensure that it uses AI to its full potential.

Group-1 to group-3 UAS in the Russia Ukraine war have drastically changed the way that LSCO will be fought. Our near-peer adversaries are implementing these lessons learned. The Army must act quickly to integrate UAS into maneuver formations and create dedicated MOS to execute offensive and defensive UAS and CUAS operations. The creation of these new MOSs and the improved capabilities of lower echelon units to conduct both kinetic and non-lethal UAS will ensure that our maneuver formations have the best probability of survivability and that our Army remains the most lethal army the world has ever seen.

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