Pearl Harbor and the Growth of a Branch

By MSG Carl J. Johnson

Article published on: July 1, 2024 in the 2024 Issue 1 of the Air Defense Artillery Journal

Read Time: < 15 mins

Patriot Launching Station Picture – Patriot Launching Stations of 5-52 ADA emplaced and ready to defend their asset in Southwest Asia (photo taken by author during the establishment of a new Patriot Site).

Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on December 7, 1941. The President of the United States of America, Franklin Roosevelt, said this was a day “which will live in infamy,” (Chan, 2023). This attack brought the United States into World War II and would culminate in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At the time of the attack, located at Pearl Harbor was the Army, Army Air Force, and Navy (Roblin, 2019). These three branches of the military at the time, did not work together to prevent the attack by the Japanese, but they certainly failed as a team. Overall, Army early warning air defenses were successful in detection, but failed in communication with the other branches and with the War Department in Washington, D.C. (Roblin, 2019). Today, Air Defense Artillery is one of the most critical and deployed assets in the United States Army (Wiggins, 2019). While devastating and tragic, the events of Pearl Harbor and lessons learned revealed to ADA its need to develop command and control, deployment capabilities, interoperability, and communication.

Command and Control

While the Navy was the overwhelming presence at Pearl Harbor, the Army was also there and took a protective posture to defend the harbor and more specifically the Navy. However, at this time, each command had their own plans of deploying defenses and it was not until October of 1941 that they came together to develop a unified plan (Conn et al, 2000). In a multi-domain combat environment, command and control is critical to the success of the United States military’s defense and ensures a well-protected defensive posture.

At the time, Pearl Harbor was a disjointed and individualized deployment of American forces. The morning of the attack, the Aircraft Warning Service (AWS) was at minimum staffing with newly trained personnel, on new equipment, and a command structure that was dismissive of warnings and efforts given by the two privates on duty (Jewel, 1996). All factors combined, the AWS failed in executing command and control (C2) while succeeding to contribute to the overall events of the day. Exercising leadership in the absence thereof, is a staple of military C2. Without command and control there is no unity of action on the battlefield and the events of Pearl Harbor become prevalent across all military actions. An example of this concept is the Supreme Allied Commander created during World War I. At the time, French, British, and American commanders struggled to direct operations, command and control, without a unified commander that would ensure unity of effort across all forces on the battlefield (Chandler, 2023).

Today, Air Defense Artillery is striving to become one of the most integrated branches through the development of the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS) (Suits, 2020). The new system will integrate multiple weapons systems and sensors into one network capable of communicating across the battlefield with other branches in a unified defensive effort. Having applied lessons learned over the decades, the ADA garnered learning opportunities from the failures of command and control at Pearl Harbor and applied those concepts to help achieve their current modernization status in the Army. Some of the issues were C2 and a lack of pre-deployment of Air Defense assets (Jewel, 1996). Today, well-established is the C2 of ADA assets as prescribed by combatant commands and assets deployed according to the Secretary of Defense’s Operations Book (SDOB).

Deployment Capabilities

Radar was a new capability at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor and could be mobile in temporary locations or installed in permanent locations (Jewel, 1996). Known as the Pearl Harbor Radar, the Signal Corps Radio (SCR)-270 was one of the first functioning wartime radars in use for the military. “The device could consistently track individual aircraft out to 125km, and formations out to 240km. As was common with most air-search radars of the time, the 270 could not provide altitude information for any contacts, but an experienced crew operating a well-calibrated set could provide a reasonable estimate based on the ‘fade zones’ caused by ground reflections of the radar pulses,” (Matt, 2019). Prior to the Japanese attack, there was a period of cross-training between the Army and Navy personnel on radar instructions since this was the first combat application of the radar, but the Navy failed at providing a liaison to the Army in the Information Center (McHale, 2017).

While this was the first use of radar on the battlefield, and the personnel trained were brand new Soldiers, the AWS radar and its crews were effective in the deployment and usage of the new non-combat tested equipment. At the time of the attack, the Army did not permanently emplace any of the five radar stations. Demonstrating successful application of training and use of equipment, the one station that was active, detected the Japanese force 132 miles from the Opana Radar Station located in northern Oahu (Jewel, 1996). However, while the Soldiers and equipment performed their duties in the manner trained the officer in charge disregarded that training and dismissed the Soldiers as well as the equipment and its readings. “At 0715, his information center received a call from the Opana Radar Station in the northern part of Oahu. The two privates working the radar that morning told Tyler they just saw the biggest radar blip they’ve ever seen…Tyler told the privates not to worry about the blip. Around 40 minutes later, the attack on Pearl Harbor began,” (unknown, 2021).

To be successful in the modern deployment of an Air Defense Artillery unit, crew members and batteries, train, evaluate, and certify in the successful march order and emplacement of battery-collective equipment (Department of the Army, 2020). An example of this concept is 3rd battalion, 2nd Air Defense Artillery and their preparation for an upcoming deployment from Fort Sill, OK to Southwest Asia in 2018. “Patriot mobility is a complex choreographed task to tactically mobilize more than 15 pieces of rolling stock [non-Patriot equipment vehicles] and the Patriot missile system. There are many things happening at the same time, so this requires agility in all aspects and requires every Soldier skill and tactical equipment capability that builds on the multi-echelon training concept,” said 1st. Lt. Cristian Salazar, a 3-2nd ADA tactical director (Samuel, 2018). Two guiding principles of Army training are to train as you fight and train to sustain. 3-2 ADA is a part of 11th ADA BDE, the largest and most deployed ADA unit in the world (Imperial Brigade, n.d.). When Soldiers work together to achieve a collective mission, the possibility of success increases with every training opportunity.

Pearl Harbor Picture - At 7:20, the reported blip of what would eventually be known as Japanese planes, was dismissed by a lieutenant as a returning squadron of B-17 Flying Fortresses (photo of the first wave of Japanese planes taken from www.pearl-harbor.com).

The lesson to learn from Pearl Harbor is not just training on the equipment, but also trusting in that training and ensuring those in charge do not faulter in their responsibility to support their subordinates. Temporarily emplaced radar units at Pearl Harbor had to face no-notice application of their training, as compared to today’s ADA, where units may face no-notice deployments but prepare to immediately positions themselves for operations upon arrival. A formerly long-standing Army Air and Missile Division Command (AAMDC) training event, Roving Sands, reignited in 2018. Conducted on McGregor Range, this exercise tests logistics, Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO), and ADA tasks. During Roving Sands, units simulate how to defend against asymmetric threats, search and evaluate for patterns and trends in enemy attacks, and improve their ability defend their tactical site (Lacdan, 2018). With the modernization of ADA and employment of the IBCS, the branch finds itself in the same situation as Pearl Harbor. There is a need to develop units that can quickly train on the new equipment, leverage the experience of others, and work with other branches on the battlefield (Henke, 2023).

Interoperability

Interoperability is the activity of the Army to operate effectively as an element of a joint force across a broad range of military operations (Fogg et al., 2020). Pearl Harbor saw a complete breakdown of interoperability leading up to and on the day of the attack. The systems in place had no continuity between Naval intelligence confirmation and notification, Army Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) weapons manning and ammunition storage and distribution, and no pre-deployment of air assets by the Army Air Force (Jewel, 1996). When systems designed to work together, all work independently of the other, the failure is comprehensive, whole, and devastating. Separate from the failed radar warning, the AAA weapons had no ammunition, would have to go over a mile to retrieve the rounds from the Navy ammunition depot, and then because of storage, would have to link each round individually (Jewel, 1996). The displacement of ammunition only led to the prolonging of AAA weapons employment against the enemy.

Air Defense Artillery today, utilizes on site Missile Storage Areas (MSAs) and close vicinity Missile Storage Facilities (MSFs) to increase response and meet time requirements in support of air defense missions (Andrews, 2021). Critical to learning from Pearl Harbor, when separating necessary defense measures by time, distance, and bureaucracy, success of the mission is incredibly reduced, if not eliminated. Military operations across the globe today, regardless of the branch of service, include the storage of ammunition on site or traveling with the element. When necessary, as units support one another and even joint forces, communication is paramount to the success of interoperability and mission accomplishment.

Communications

At Pearl Harbor, there was no lack of warnings for the attack. Communication was active, but it was the response to the warnings that led to the failing defense of Pearl Harbor. Rear Admiral Husband Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter Short received and acknowledged the intelligence from Washington, and their communication to lower echelons and Washington, was that of preparation for local and internal danger (Frank, 2021). To be successful, any organization must be able to communicate in a fluid manner that goes both up and down the rank structure. The attack on Pearl Harbor comes from the dismissal of information, as well as omittance of the same; both acts of miscommunication contributed to the overall success of the Japanese attack.

Across the battlefield in the modern Army, communication is the first thing that leads to the ability of a Soldier to visualize, describe, and understand the mission and battlefield to ensure success. In ADA, without communication during a mission there can be no defense of an asset. Communication is vital to identify, engage, and destroy enemy air and missile threats. The Army General and Navy Admiral at Pearl Harbor did not communicate within their own organizations and did not communicate effectively with one another. The lessons of Pearl Harbor carry over to the modernization of Air Defense in both internal and external organizations. The ability of IBCS to communicate internally with multiple ADA assets and to joint forces across the battlefield eliminates ambiguity and increases situational awareness across the combat zone. This joint and multidomain communication is the application of lessons learned from the Japanese attack and leans to prevent this same type of disaster from happening in the future. Communication finds itself as the bridge across all areas of failure at Pearl Harbor and connects all the concepts of lessons learned in the current and future application of Air Defense Artillery.

Conclusion

The Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was shocking and catastrophic for the United States Army and Navy. The procedures put in place to prevent the attack, only helped the enemy achieve the desired decimation. The development of Air Defense Artillery today, comes from the lessons learned across military history. The development of the IBCS is a testimony to the understanding of past events, and enemy actions. It is the application of the necessary combat power that wholly integrates the concepts of command and control, deployment capabilities, interoperability, and communication so that the future does not imitate the past.

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